Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 173792 Present: CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August 31, 2011 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
For Our consideration is an appeal
from the Decision[1] dated March
2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00888, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]
dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City, Branch 104,
in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303.
The RTC found accused-appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa (Ochoa)
guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined and penalized under Article II, Section 6 in relation to
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," in Criminal Case No. 98-77300;
and of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303.
The Information filed
before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-77300, charged Ochoa with illegal
recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the period covering the months of
February 1997 up to April 1998 or immediately before or subsequent thereto in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above name accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior
Agustin, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang,
Helen B. Palogo, Joebert Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo,
Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and
Rosemarie A. Bermejo for a consideration ranging from P2,000.00 to P32,000.00
or a total amount of P124,000.00
as placement fee which the complainants paid to herein accused without the
accused having secured the necessary license from the Department of Labor and
Employment.[3]
(Emphases supplied.)
Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303, this time
charging Ochoa with three counts of estafa, committed separately upon three
private complainants Robert Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior
Agustin (Agustin), respectively. The
Information in Criminal Case No. 98-77301 accuses Ochoa of the following acts
constituting estafa:
That
on or about March 3, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above name accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan
to one ROBERT GUBAT for a
consideration of P18,800.00
as placement fee, knowing that she has no power, capacity or lawful authority
whatsoever and with no intention to fulfill her said promise, but merely as
pretext, scheme or excuse to get and exact money from said complainant, as she
did in fact collect and received the amount of P18,800.00 from said
Robert Gubat, to his damage and prejudice.[4]
(Emphases supplied.)
The two other Informations for estafa
were similarly worded as the aforequoted Information, except as to the name of
the private complainants and the amount purportedly collected by Ochoa from
them, particularly:
|
Docket No. |
Private Complainant |
Amount Collected |
|
Criminal Case No. 98-77302[5] |
Cesar Aquino |
|
|
Criminal Case No. 98-77303[6] |
Junior Agustin |
|
As prayed for by the State
Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against Ochoa before the RTC were
consolidated. When arraigned, Ochoa pleaded
not guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the
four criminal cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as
witnesses Cory Aquino (Cory) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) and private complainants Gubat, Agustin, Francisco Pascual (Pascual),
Rosemarie Bermejo (Rosemarie), Cesar, Christopher Bermejo (Christopher),
Joebert Decolongon (Decolongon), and Fernando Rivera (Rivera).
According to private
complainants, they were recruited by Ochoa from January to March 1998 for
various jobs in either
1.
In the second week of February 1998,
Ochoa was introduced to Robert Gubat, a licensed electrical engineer and a resident
of Pulang Lupa, Las Pias, through a certain Nila, Gubats neighbor, who had a
pending application for work abroad with Ochoa. Ochoa talked to Gubat on the telephone, and during
their conversation, Ochoa told Gubat that one of her applicants was already leaving
for Taiwan. Per Ochoas instruction,
Gubat met with Francisco Pascual, who accompanied him to Ochoas house in San
Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, and personally introduced Gubat to
Ochoa. Gubat submitted his rsum to
Ochoa, which Ochoa would bring to Axil International Agency where Ochoa was
working as a recruiter. Right after browsing
through Gubats rsum, Ochoa informed Gubat that as an engineer, Gubat was qualified
to work as a factory supervisor and could leave for Taiwan in two weeks or in March
1998. Ochoa also told Gubat that the
total application expenses would amount to ₱100,000.00, and the
downpayment was ₱50,000.00. Gubat was
able to actually pay Ochoa ₱18,800.00 as reservation fee at the agency; processing
fee for Gubats papers at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Malacaang,
and Embassy of Taiwan; and medical examination fee. Ochoa, however, only issued to Gubat three
receipts, dated March 3, March 31, and April 6, all in the year 1998, in the
amount of P5,000.00 each or a total of P15,000.00. Gubat started to worry when he was not able
to leave for abroad as Ochoa promised and when she failed to show up at their
arranged meetings. When Gubat was finally
able to talk to Ochoa, Ochoa again promised him that he would be leaving for
abroad soon. Despite Ochoas renewed
promise, Gubat was still not able to leave the country. Gubat then demanded that Ochoa return his
documents and money. When Ochoa failed
to comply with his demand, Gubat filed a report against Ochoa at Barangay
(Brgy.) San Bartolome, Novaliches,
2. The paths of Junior Agustin and Ochoa crossed on February 2,
1998. Agustin, a farmer, was staying at
the home of Pascual, his cousin, at No. 4 Gulod, Novaliches, P18,000.00. Ochoa then
informed Agustin that the total placement fee for P80,000.00. Agustin initially paid Ochoa the sum of P28,000.00
as processing fee. Ochoa then promised
that Agustin could leave for
3. Francisco Pascual, presently jobless and a resident of Gulod,
Novaliches, Quezon City, learned from a neighbor of one Mrs. Bermejo that her son
was being helped by Ochoa, a recruiter, to find a job abroad. Pascual went to Mrs. Bermejos house in
January 1998, and met Ochoa for the first time. Ochoa invited Pascual to apply for a job
abroad, saying that the latter could leave within two weeks. During Pascuals visit at Ochoas house at
Blk. 1, P18,000.00. Ochoa told Pascual
that the placement fee would be P7,000.00 and that Pascual should
already have his medical examination so that the position in Saudi Arabia could
be reserved for him. Since his visa had
not yet arrived, Pascual did not pay any placement fee to Ochoa. Pascual did undergo medical examination at
St. Peter Medical Clinic in Ermita, P2,600.00 to Ochoa. Pascual though did not receive the results of
his medical examination because according to Ochoa, the same was withheld by
the clinic. Despite Ochoas promises,
Pascual was not able to leave for
4.
Rosemarie Bermejo came to know of Ochoa through Rivera, a friend of Rosemaries
mother. Rosemarie first met Ochoa at the
latters home in P2,600.00 for
their medical examinations, and it was Ochoa who gave the payment to the
clinic. Rosemarie and her brothers then
spent P55.00 each to secure NBI clearances for travel abroad. In addition, Rosemarie gave Ochoa P5,500.00
on April 17, 1998; and although not secured by a receipt, said payment was
witnessed by Rosemaries mother and Imelda Panuga, the landlord of Rosemaries
mother, who lent Rosemarie the P5,500.00. During their initial meeting in January 1998,
Ochoa said that Rosemarie could already leave for abroad in two weeks. Since Rosemarie was not able to complete the
requirements, her departure for
5. It was Pascual who introduced Cesar Aquino, a resident of
Cubao, to Ochoa at the latters residence in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon
City, sometime in February 1998. When
Cesar directly asked Ochoa if she was a recruiter, the latter answered in the
affirmative. Cesar applied to work as a
factory worker in P15,000.00 a month.
On March 13, 1998, Cesar handed over P17,000.00 to Ochoa to cover
his processing fee and medical examination.
On the same day, Cesar had his medical examination at St. Peter Medical
Clinic. Ochoa then promised that Cesar
could leave two weeks thereafter. When
two weeks had passed and he was not able to leave for
6. Christopher Bermejo met Ochoa at the house of his mother in
Novaliches, Quezon City in January 1998.
Also present at the house were Fernando Bermejo, Christophers brother,
and Richard Luciano. Ochoa promised that
after a week, Christopher would already be deployed to P5,000.00 as processing fee for Christophers
application. A week passed and Ochoa
failed to send Christopher to Saudi Arabia for work. When Rosemarie and Raymundo Bermejo (Raymundo),
Christophers sister and brother, respectively, also failed to leave for work
abroad as promised by Ochoa, Christopher, Rosemarie, and their mother went to
see Ochoa at an office at the Jalandoni Building, Ermita, Manila. Ochoa explained that Christopher and his
siblings could not leave yet because there are other documents that still need
to be accomplished. Ochoa said that she
would just notify Christopher and his siblings of their scheduled departure. When they still did not receive any
notification from Ochoa, Rosemarie, Raymundo, and their mother returned to the
office at the
7. Joebert
Decolongon is a resident of Sta. Maxima, Gulod, Novaliches, P2,000.00 as placement fee. The rest of Decolongons placement fees would
be paid by one-month salary deduction.
Trusting Ochoa, neither Decolongon nor his wife demanded a receipt. When Ochoa failed to deploy Decolongon for
employment abroad, Decolongon too filed a complaint against Ochoa before Brgy.
San Bartolome, Novaliches,
8. Sometime in January 1998, Ochoa was accompanied by a certain
Amy to Fernando Riveras residence at 27 Villareal Street, Novaliches, Quezon
City. Ochoa first talked to Riveras
mother who had previously worked abroad.
Ochoa then also offered work to Rivera, either as tea boy or janitor in
the army in P2,000.00
as she would be the one to secure Riveras passport. In March 1998, Rivera handed over his ring
and necklace, worth of P10,000.00, to Ochoa to cover his processing and
medical examination fees. Rivera did not
require a receipt from Ochoa because he trusted Ochoa, who was his mothers
friend. When Rivera failed to leave in
February 1998, Ochoa explained that Riveras departure was postponed until
March 1998 due to Ramadan. After the period of Ramadan, Rivera was still not able to leave for P2,000.00, but Ochoa did
not appear at the barangay hearing
set on
Cory C. Aquino of the POEA
authenticated the Certification dated June 3, 1998, issued by Hermogenes C.
Mateo (Mateo), Director, Licensing Branch of the POEA, that Ochoa, in her
personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit
workers for overseas employment. Cory
identified Director Mateos signature on the Certification, being familiar with
the same. The Certification was issued
after a check of the POEA records pursuant to a request for certification from
the NBI. Cory, however, admitted that
she did not participate in the preparation of the Certification, as the NBIs
request for certification was through a counter transaction, and another person
was in charge of verification of counter transactions.[16]
Ochoa testified on her own
behalf.
Ochoa stated under oath
that she was employed by AXIL International Services and Consultant (AXIL) as
recruiter on
|
Private Complainant |
Amounts Collected |
|
Robert Gubat |
|
|
Junior Agustin |
|
|
Francisco Pascual |
|
|
Rosemarie Bermejo |
|
|
Cesar Aquino |
|
|
Christopher Bermejo |
|
|
Joebert Decolongon |
|
|
Fernando Rivera |
|
Ochoa claimed though that she remitted private complainants money to a
person named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but AXIL failed to issue receipts
because the private complainants did not pay in full.[25]
On April 17, 2000, the RTC
rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 98-77300) and three counts
of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, 98-77303). The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case
No. 98-77300, the Court finds the accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, defined
and penalized in Section 6 in relation to Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No.
8042, and sentences her to life imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos.
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-77301, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Robert Gubat in the amount of Eighteen
Thousand Eight Hundred (P18,800.00) Pesos.
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-77302, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of prision mayor
as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Cesar Aquino in the amount of
Seventeen Thousand (P17,000.00) Pesos.
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-77303, the Court finds the
accused, ROSARIO ROSE OCHOA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of ESTAFA, defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the Revised Penal Code, and sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years, eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor
as maximum, and to indemnify complainant Junior Agustin in the amount of Twenty-Eight
Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos.[26]
Ochoa filed a Notice of
Appeal[27]
in which she stated her intention to appeal the RTC judgment of conviction and
prayed that the records of her case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Ochoas appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No.
24147 before the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution[28]
dated
Ochoa filed her Appellants
Brief on
The Special Fourteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision[31]
dated
In its Resolution[34]
dated
We affirmed this judgment on
It was error to consider accused-appellants appeal
from a trial court judgment imposing life imprisonment in Criminal Case No.
Q-98-77300 for illegal recruitment in a large scale. Consequently, the judgment
we rendered dated
SECTION 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x x
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of the lower court in:
x x x x
(d) All
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher
17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reiterates
SECTION 17.
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in
(1)
All criminal
cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is life imprisonment;
and those involving offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the
same occurrences or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether
the accused are charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether
they have been tried jointly or separately; x x x.
3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure likewise declares
SEC. 3. How
appeal taken.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty
is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is impose[d], shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
Even if only in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 was the
penalty of life imprisonment meted out, we still cannot consider the appeal of
the verdict in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 to 98-77303 for as the Supreme Court
clearly clarified
An appeal of a single decision cannot be
split between two courts. The splitting
of appeals is not conclusive to the orderly administration of justice and
invites possible conflict of dispositions between the reviewing courts. Specifically, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction
to review an appeal of a judgment imposing an indeterminate sentence, if the
same ruling also imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment and death for crimes arising out of the same
facts. In other words, the Supreme Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed below is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment or death, even if the same decision orders, in addition, a
lesser penalty or penalties for crimes arising out of the same occurrence or
facts.
It will be seen that Robert Gubat, private complainant
in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77301, Cesar Aquino, private complainant in Criminal
Case No. Q-98-77302 and Junior Agustin, private complainant in Criminal Case
No. Q-98-77303 were also the private complainant in the illegal recruitment in
a large scale suit, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300. As gleaned from the charges, the estafa cases
were intimately related to or arose from the facts and occurrences of the
alleged illegal recruitment. Clearly, we
have no recourse but to refuse cognizance over the estafa cases as well.[35]
Despite its lack of
jurisdiction over Ochoas appeal, the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the same
and merely ordered its transfer to us:
While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the
dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong court, the Supreme Court has in
practice allowed the transfer of records from this Court to the highest
court. In which case, we shall subscribe
to this practice in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our decision is declared NULL and VOID. We order the TRANSFER of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 98-77300 to 98-77303
to the Supreme Court for proper action.[36]
In the Resolution[37]
dated September 17, 2003, we accepted Ochoas appeal and informed both Ochoa
and the OSG to file their respective additional briefs. Ochoas appeal was then docketed as G.R. No.
159252.
On August 17, 2004, Ochoas
counsel filed an explanation stating that he had nothing more to add since he
had already written and filed all necessary pleadings, complete with all the
necessary research and arguments.[38]
In the meantime, People
v. Mateo[39] was promulgated on
When Ochoas
appeal was before the Court of Appeals a second time, it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888. The Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
l. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 98-77300
finding appellant Rosario Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic sabotage under Sec. 6 (l) and
(m) in relation to Sec. 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 and sentencing her to life
imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is AFFIRMED.
ll. The
judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa is MODIFIED.
Appellant is, hereby, ordered to indemnify Robert Gubat in the amount of
P15,000.00 only as and by way of actual damages.
lll. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77302, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa is AFFIRMED.
IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa is MODIFIED. Appellant is, hereby, sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS OF prision mayor as maximum.[41]
Ochoas appeal is anchored on the
following assignment of errors:
The lower court erred:
a. In admitting Exhibit A the POEA Certification when it was already excluded during the bail hearing
b. In shifting the burden of the accused to prove that there was no illegal recruitment
c. In finding that there was estafa
d. By not limiting liability of the accused to civil liability only[42]
We find no reversible error in the assailed
Court of Appeals decision.
Illegal recruitment in large scale
Ochoa
was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision broadens the concept of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code[43]
and provides stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic
sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment
in large scale and illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.
Section
6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:
SEC.
6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes
referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad,
whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided,
That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
x
x x x
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
It is well-settled that to prove
illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants
abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in
order to be employed.[44] All eight private complainants herein
consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas.
Ochoa required private complainants to
submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which private
complainants did. Private complainants
also gave various amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as
evidenced by the receipts Ochoa issued to Gubat,[45] Cesar,[46]
and Agustin.[47] Despite private complainants compliance with
all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work
abroad. Private complainants pleaded
that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Ochoa contends that Exhibit A, the POEA
certification which states that Ochoa, in her personal capacity, is neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was already
rejected by the RTC during the hearings on bail for being hearsay, and should
not have been admitted by the RTC after the trial on the merits of the criminal
cases. Inadmissible evidence during bail
hearings do not become admissible evidence after formal offer. Without the POEA certification, the
prosecution had no proof that Ochoa is unlicensed to recruit and, thus, she
should be acquitted.
Ochoas contention is without
merit.
We refer to the following ruling in Fullero v. People,[48]
wherein we rejected a similar argument raised by petitioner therein against a
certification issued by an officer of the Professional Regulation Commission:
Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution's documentary evidence, consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R and their sub-markings, are inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:
(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that petitioner's name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not properly identified during the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have been the signatory therein which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present when the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of the certification are mere hearsay; x x x.
x x x x
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty by a public officer.
Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.[49]
In the case at bar, the POEA certification was signed by Dir. Mateo of the POEA Licensing Branch. Although Dir. Mateo himself did not testify before the RTC, the prosecution still presented Cory, Dir. Mateos subordinate at the POEA Licensing Branch, to verify Dir. Mateos signature.
Also worth re-stating is the
justification provided by the Court of Appeals for the admissibility of the
POEA certification, viz:
The certificate is admissible. It is true that the trial court, during the bail hearings, rejected the certification for being hearsay because at that stage of the proceedings, nobody testified yet on the document. However, as the trial progressed, an officer of the POEA, specifically in its licensing branch, had testified on the document. It does not follow, then, as appellant would want this court to assume, that evidence rejected during bail hearings could not be admissible during the formal offer of evidence.
This court admits that Ms. Cory Aquino was not the signatory of the document. Nevertheless, she could testify on the veracity of the document because she is one of the officers of the licensing branch of the POEA. Being so, she could testify whether a certain person holds a license or not. It bears stressing that Ms. Aquino is familiar with the signature of Mr. Mateo because the latter is her superior. Moreover, as testified to by Ms. Aquino, that as a policy in her office, before a certification is made, the office checks first whether the name of the person requested to be verified is a reported personnel of any licensed agency by checking their index and computer files.
As found in the offices records, appellant, in her personal capacity, is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. It bears stressing, too, that this is not a case where a certification is rendered inadmissible because the one who prepared it was not presented during the trial. To reiterate, an officer of the licensing branch of the POEA, in the person of Ms. Aquino, testified on the document. Hence, its execution could be properly determined and the veracity of the statements stated therein could be ascertained.[50]
More importantly, Ochoa could still
be convicted of illegal recruitment even if we disregard the POEA
certification, for regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder
of authority, she could still have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly
provides that any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal
recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic
Act No. 8042, is the [f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in
cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers
fault. Ochoa committed illegal
recruitment as described in the said provision by receiving placement and
medical fees from private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her,
and failing to reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid
when they were not able to leave for
Ochoa further argues in her defense
that she should not be found personally and criminally liable for illegal
recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned
over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL.
We are not
convinced. Ochoas claim was not
supported by any corroborating evidence. The POEA verification dated September 23,
1998, also signed by Dir. Mateo, and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains
only to the status of AXIL as a placement agency with a limited temporary
authority which had already expired. Said
verification did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of AXIL,
Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as
appointment papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private
complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication
that Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof
that private complainants money were actually turned over to or received by
AXIL.
There is no
reason for us to disturb the weight and credence accorded by the RTC to the
evidence of the prosecution, over that of the defense. As is well-settled in this jurisdiction, greater
weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than the accuseds denial and explanation concerning the
commission of the crime.[51] Likewise, factual findings of the trial
courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled
to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the Court
of Appeals affirmed such findings. After
all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight
of the testimonies of witnesses. The
absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case,
or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial
courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.[52] Moreover, in the absence of any evidence
that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered
with by this Court.[53]
Under the last
paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large
scale, that is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants who
convincingly testified on Ochoas acts of illegal recruitment.
In view of
the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict
of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of
illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00
nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus:
Sec. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal
recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not
less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Since the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P1,000,000.00 imposed on Ochoa by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are in accord with the law, we similarly sustain the
same.
Estafa
We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa
for estafa committed against three private complainants in Criminal Case Nos.
98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The
very same evidence proving Ochoas criminal liability for illegal recruitment
also established her criminal liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No.
8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We
explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut[54]
that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who
commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The offense of
illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where
the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while
estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code
does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par.
2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code.
It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not
necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale, and vice versa.[55]
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
x x x x
2. By means of any of the
following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name,
or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
The elements
of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[56] Both elements are present in Criminal Case
Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. Ochoas
deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat,
Cesar, and Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said
private complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to
two weeks from completion of the requirements, among which were the payment of
placement fees and submission of a medical examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already
existing job vacancies overseas for private complainants, even quoting the
corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on
the deceit by receiving application documents from the private complainants,
accompanying them to the clinic for medical examination, and/or making them go
to the offices of certain recruitment/placement agencies to which Ochoa had
actually no connection at all. Clearly
deceived by Ochoas words and actions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and
Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their
placement and medical fees. Sadly,
private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were never able to leave for work
abroad, nor recover their money.
The penalty
for estafa depends on the amount of defraudation. According to Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
It was
established by evidence that in Criminal Case No. 98-77301, Gubat was defrauded
by Ochoa in the amount of P15,000.00; in Criminal Case No. 77-98302,
Cesar paid Ochoa the sum of P17,000.00; and in Criminal Case No.
77-98303, Agustin handed over to Ochoa a total of P28,000.00.
The prescribed penalty for estafa
under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, when the amount of the fraud is
over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (i.e., from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
to 8 years). If the amount of fraud exceeds
P22,000.00, the aforementioned penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, provided that
the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years.
Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, or anywhere
within prision correccional minimum
and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months).[57] Consequently, the minimum terms in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302 were correctly fixed by the RTC and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals at 2 years, 11 months, and 11 days of prision correccional. While
the minimum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 was increased by the Court of
Appeals to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, it is still within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by Section 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
The maximum
term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be that which, in view of
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
Revised Penal Code. To compute the
minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the prescribed penalty for estafa when
the amount of fraud exceeds P12,000.00, the time included in prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum shall be divided
into three equal portions, with each portion forming a period. Following this computation, the minimum period
for prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is from 4 years, 2
months, and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; the medium period is from
5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days; and the
maximum period is from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years. Any incremental penalty (i.e., 1 year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.)
shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years,
at the discretion of the court, provided that the total penalty does not exceed
20 years.[58]
In Criminal
Case Nos. 98-77301 and 98-77302, the amounts of fraud were more than P12,00.00
but not exceeding P22,000.00, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the maximum
term shall be taken from the medium period of the penalty prescribed (i.e., 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days to
6 years, 8 months, and 20 days). Thus,
the maximum terms of 6 years, 8 months, and 20 days actually imposed by the RTC
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301 and
98-77302 are proper.
As for
determining the maximum term in Criminal Case No. 98-77303, we take into
consideration that the amount of fraud was P28,000.00. Since the amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00,
the maximum term shall be taken from the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty, which is 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years; but since the
amount of fraud exceeded P22,000.00 by only P6,000.00 (less than P10,000.00),
no incremental penalty shall be imposed.
Considering that the maximum term of 8 years fixed by the Court of
Appeals in Criminal Case No. 98-77303 is within the maximum period of the
proscribed penalty, we see no reason for disturbing the same.
WHEREFORE, we DENY
the present appeal for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision dated March 2, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00888,
affirming with modification the Decision dated April 17, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77300
to 98-77303, to read as follows:
1. In
Criminal Case No. 98-77300, accused-appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale, constituting
economic sabotage, as defined and penalized in Section 6(l) and (m), in
relation to Section 7(b), of Republic Act No. 8042, and is sentenced to life
imprisonment and a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00);
2. In
Criminal Case No. 98-77301, accused-appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify private complainant Robert Gubat in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) as actual damages;
3. In
Criminal Case No. 98-77302, accused-appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify private complainant Cesar Aquino in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Pesos
(P17,000.00); and
4. In
Criminal Case No. 98-77303, accused-appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify private complainant Junior Agustin in the amount of
Twenty-Eight Thousand Pesos (P28,000.00).
SO
ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice |
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
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MARTIN S.
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[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 26-60; penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
[3] Id. at 5.
[4] Id. at 7.
[5] Id. at 9.
[6] Id. at 11.
[7] Robert Gubat, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano Mislang, Helen Palogo, Joebert Decolongon, Corazon Austria, Christopher Bermejo, Leticia Londonio, Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual, Reynaldo Bermejo and Rosemarie Bermejo. (TSN, September 21, 1998, pp. 11-12.)
[8] TSN, July 14, 1998, pp. 10-50; TSN, September 21, 1998, pp. 2-24.
[9] TSN, September 21, 1998, pp. 25-43.
[10] TSN, September 28, 1998, pp. 2-14.
[11] TSN, October 5, 1998, pp. 2-11.
[12] TSN, October 26, 1998, pp. 6-14.
[13] TSN, February 16, 1999, pp. 4-16.
[14] TSN, April 12, 1999, pp. 2-10.
[15] TSN, May 5, 1999, pp. 2-15.
[16] TSN, October 26, 1998, pp. 2-5.
[17] TSN, January 17, 2000, p. 5.
[18] Id.
[19] Id at 6.
[20] Id.
[21] Id. at 5.
[22] Id. at 6.
[23] Id. at 6-7.
[24] Id. at 7.
[25] Id. at 7-9.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 59-60.
[27] Id. at 63.
[28] Id. at 70.
[29] Id. at 71-78.
[30] Id. at 125-137.
[31] Id. at 142-158.
[32] Id. at 165-168.
[33] Id. at 170-173.
[34] Id. at 176-183.
[35] Id. at 180-182.
[36] Id. at 182.
[37] Id. at 193.
[38] Id. at 201.
[39] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[40] CA rollo, pp. 207-213.
[41] Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[42] CA rollo, p. 71.
[43] Article
13 x x x
(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising for advertising for
employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
[44] People v. Gasacao, 511 Phil.
435, 444-445 (2005).
[45] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibits C, D, and E.
[46] Id., Exhibit G.
[47] Id., Exhibit L.
[48] G.R. No. 170583, September 12, 2007,
533 SCRA 97.
[49] Id. at 118-120.
[50] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[51] People v. Gharbia, 369 Phil. 942, 953 (1999).
[52] People v. Nogra, G.R. No. 170834, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 723, 735.
[53] People v. Saulo, 398 Phil. 544, 554 (2000).
[54] 374 Phil. 575 (1999).
[55] Id. at 586.
[56] People v. Ballesteros, 435 Phil. 205, 228 (2002).
[57] People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 299.
[58] Id.