SECOND DIVISION
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ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON,
Petitioners, -versus- SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE POMASIN,
DIANNE POMASIN PAGUNSAN, CYNTHIA POMASIN, SONIA PEROL, ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA
SESISTA, and REYNALDO SESISTA,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 173180 Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,*
BRION, PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,** JJ. Promulgated: August 24, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney,[1]
figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the
jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven
by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga
City.[2]
The opposing parties gave two different versions of
the incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarnis father, was on
board the jitney and seated on the passengers side. He testified that while the jitney was
passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from
the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and
it was dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers.[3]
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he was
driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling
off the shoulder of the road.
Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the
direction of the truck. To avoid
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it
hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left
fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.[4]
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney
resulted.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay
Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His
daughter, Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham
Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His
other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin
Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His
wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky
Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and
Sonia Perol sustained injuries.[5]
On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.[6]
Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck, extended
financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each
immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin
(Cynthia), one of Gregorios daughters.
Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Antipolo. They alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness
of petitioners. Respondents prayed for indemnification
for the heirs of those who perished in the accident at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00
for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses; P350,000.00 for
continuous hospitalization and medical expenses of Spouses Pomasin; P1,000,000.00
as moral damages; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00 for
loss of income of Cynthia; P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P1,000.00
per court appearance; P50,000.00 for litigation expenses; and cost of
suit.[7]
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was
Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was
authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by executing
an Affidavit of Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners
complained that respondents filed the instant complaint to harass them and
profit from the recklessness of Laarni.
Petitioners counterclaimed for damages.
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint in view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia. The motion was denied for lack of merit.[8]
On 7 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against plaintiffs
hereby DISMISSING the instant complaint considering that plaintiffs have
authorized Cynthia Pomasin to settle the case amicably for P200,000.00;
and that the proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or
negligence of defendants driver/employee but from plaintiffs driver.[9]
The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon
regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorios, a
mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused
as that of the driver. The trial court
concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court likewise upheld the Affidavit
of Desistance as having been executed with the tacit consent of
respondents.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular
collision. In support of such finding, the
Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gregorios testimony that Jabon was driving
the tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney.
Based on the gravity of the impact and
the damage caused to the jitney resulting in the death of some passengers, the
Court of Appeals inferred that Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court noted that the
restriction in Jabons drivers license was violated, thus, giving rise to the
presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages
for his failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired
as driver of the truck. Finally, the
appellate court disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia
because the latter had no written power of attorney from respondents and that
she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she did not
read its content.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the
present appeal is granted, and the trial courts Decision dated February 7,
2003 is set aside. Defendants-appellees
are ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants or their heirs the following:
a) Actual damages
of P136,000.00 as above computed, to be offset with the P200,000.00
received by plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin;
b) Civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of each victim, to be offset with
the balance of P64,000.00 from the aforementioned P200,000.00 of
civil indemnity received by plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, the net amount is computed at P37,200.00
each, as follows:
Narcisa
Pomasin P37,200.00
Laarni Pomasin P37,200.00
Andrea P. Pagunsan P37,200.00
Dionisio Perol P37,200.00
Annie Jane P. Pagunsan P37,200.00
c) Moral damages
of P50,000.00 to each of the victims; and
d) Attorneys
fees of 10% of the total award.[10]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[11]
dated 19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact
and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial court: Who is the negligent party or the party at
fault?
The
issue of negligence is factual in nature.[12]
And the rule, and the exceptions, is
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive but may
be reviewed when: (1) the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the
inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on
the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[13]
The exceptions to the rule underscore
the substance and weight of the findings of the trial court. They render inconclusive contrary findings by
the appellate court. The reason is now a
fundamental principle:
[A]ppellate courts do not disturb
the findings of the trial courts with regard to the assessment of the credibility
of witnesses. The reason for this is
that trial courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witneses first hand
and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
The exceptions to this
rule are when the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions are not
supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and value,
likely to change the outcome of the case, have been overlooked by the trial
court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.[14]
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more
pronounced in this case of quasi-delict
in which, according to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites
must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred
by the plaintiff.[15] These requisites must be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.[16] The claimants, respondents in this case, must,
therefore, establish their claim or cause of action by preponderance of
evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.[17]
The
trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than
the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer
caused the vehicular collision.
One
reason why the trial court found credible the version of Jabon was because his
concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger. The trial court expounded, thus:
In the
appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration is
their opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or
observing the matter they testify to.
This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident
cases which oftentimes happen merely momentarily or in the split of a
second. In the case of a running or
travelling vehicle, especially in highway travel which doubtless involves
faster speed than in ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving
continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While in the case of a mere passenger, he
does not have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling
vehicle, as in fact he may converse with other passengers and pay no attention
to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze
off to sleep if he wants to, rendering his opportunity for observation on the
precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately preceding thereto not
as much as that of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his
driving. So that as between the
respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of the
defendants thru their driver as to the cause or antecedent causes that led to
the vehicular collision in this case, the version of the driver of defendant
should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of
Plaintiffs vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as
much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver, consequently the
capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to
which is the precise point of inquiry --- the proximate cause of the accident
--- is more reasonably reliable.
Moreover, the passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver
from the vantage point of the drivers seat especially in nighttime, thus
rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent causes of
the collision lesser than that of the driver.
This being so, this Court is more inclined to believe the story of
defendants driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell
off the shoulder of the curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag
manner and in the process the two vehicles approaching each other from opposite
directions at highway speed came in contact with each other, the zigzagging
jeep hitting the left fender of the truck all the way to the fuel tank, the
violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being thrown away
due to the disparate size of the truck.[18]
The appellate court labelled the trial courts rationalization
as a sweeping conjecture[19]
and countered that Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney
and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that he was not
driving.
While it is logical that a
drivers attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere
passenger, it should also be considered that the logic will hold only if the
two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does
not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a
passenger, the former is more credible.
The factual setting of the event testified on must certainly be
considered.
The trial court did just
that in the instant case. Contrary to
the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and
a passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis of analysis of the trial
court. Notably, aside from Jabons
alleged vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also
took into consideration Gregorios admission that prior to the accident, the
jitney was running on the curving and downward portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into
account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney
that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a curve, he saw the
incoming truck running very fast and encroaching the jitneys lane.
We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found
that the truck was actually ascending the highway when it collided with the
descending jitney.
During the direct examination, Jabon narrated that the
tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour when
he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag manner, thus:
Q: Now, when you passed by the municipality
of Polangui, Albay at about 5:00 of August 12, 1994, could you tell the Court
if there was any untoward incident that happened?
A: There
was sir.
Q: Could
you please tell the Court?
A: While on my way to Liboro coming from
Sorsogon, I met on my way a vehicle going on a zigzag direction and it even
fell on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way on a zigzag direction.
Q: Could you describe to the Court what was
the kind of vehicle you saw running in zigzag direction?
A: A
Toyota-jitney loaded with passengers with top-load.
Q: You
said that the top[-]load of the jeep is loaded?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Could you please tell the Court what was
your speed at the time when you saw that jeepney with top[-]load running on a
zigzag manner?
A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per
hour because I was ascending plain.
(Emphasis supplied).[20]
In that same direct
examination, Jabon confirmed that he was ascending, viz:
Q: Could you please describe the condition
in the area at the time of the incident, was it dark or day time?
A: It
was still bright.
COURT: But it was not approaching sunset?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Was
there any rain at that time?
A: None
sir.
Q: So
the road was dry?
A: Yes
sir.
Q: You
said you were ascending towards the direction of Liboro, Camarines Sur, is that
correct at the time the incident happened?
A: Yes sir.[21]
(Emphasis supplied).
Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct
examination described the road condition where the collision took place as
curving and downward, thus:
Q: Could
you please describe the place where the incident happened in so far as the road
condition is concerned?
A: The
road was curving and downward.
Q: And the road was of course clear from
traffic, is that correct?
A: Yes
sir.
Q: And practically, your jitney was the only
car running at that time?
A: Yes sir.[22] (Emphasis supplied).
Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony
of Jabon.
However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and
stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw the tractor-trailer running
down very fact and encroaching on their lane, to wit:
Q: Mr.
Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided with your owner
jeepney that you were riding testified in open Court on July 24, 1997 which I
quote, while on my way to Liboro coming to Sorsogon I met a vehicle going on a zig-zag direction and it even fell on the
shoulder and proceeded going on its way on zig-zag direction, what can you say
about this statement of this witness?
A: We
were no[t] zigzagging but because we
were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we saw the on-coming
vehicle going down very fast and encroaching on our lane so our driver swerved
our vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the on-coming vehicle.[23] (Emphasis supplied).
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road
condition was straightforward and consistent. The recollection of Gregorio
veered from curving and downward to uphill.[24] On this point, Jabon and his testimony is
more credible.
The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road
shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial courts conclusion that the
jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the original
testimony of Gregorio that the road was curving and downward.[25]
It is this conclusion, prodded by the
inconsistency of Gregorios testimony, that gives credence to the further
testimony of Jabon that the herein respondents jitney, loaded with passengers
with top-load was running in a zigzag manner.[26]
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to
accelerate. The fall into the shoulder
of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why
it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was
speeding. There is a preponderance of
evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the
tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney
which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was
negligent. In hindsight, it can be
argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging
before it collided with the tractor-trailer.
Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this
case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a
vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the
jitney oncoming downhill.
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni
was the proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of
the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the
restriction imposed on his drivers license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land
Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction
code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that
Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of
traffic regulation. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of
the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[27]
we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the
violation of the traffic regulation. It
must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate
or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting
in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.[28] Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals[29] where we
reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic
statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving a
car, did not
attempt to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed
to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a
putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on
Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the
link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed
to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclists own liability.[30] We took the occasion to state that:
The rule on
negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical
consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and
Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the
failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal
fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation
and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not
intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law
is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered
by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other.[31]
In the instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to
the vehicular collision. Furthermore,
Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office
merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.
Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Cynthia to exonerate them from any liability. An affidavit of desistance is usually frowned
upon by courts. Little or no persuasive
value is often attached to a desistance.[32]
The subject affidavit does not deserve a
second look more so that it appears that Cynthia was not armed with a special
power of attorney to enter into a settlement with petitioners. At any rate, it is an exercise of futility to
delve into the effects of the affidavit of desistance executed by one of the
respondents since it has already been established that petitioners are not negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 94-3418
lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Per Special Order No. 1067-C.
** Per Special Order No. 1066.
[1] The word jitney
has been used interchangeably with the word jeepney
during the lower courts proceedings. Merriam-Webster online defines jitney as a small bus that carries
passengers over a regular route on a flexible schedule. In the Philippines, it is commonly known as jeepney.
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jitney).
[2] Records, p. 142.
[3] TSN, 24 July 1996, pp. 6-7.
[4] Id. at 5-7.
[5] TSN, 13 November 1995, pp. 9-10.
[6] TSN, 24 July 1997, p. 9.
[7] Records, pp.
5-6.
[8] Id. at 69.
[9] Rollo, p. 74.
[10] Id. at 57-58.
[11] Id. at 59-60.
[12] Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco,
G.R. No. 165732, 14 December 2006, 511 SCRA 67, 82.
[13] Vallacar
Transit v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, 30 May 2011; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Monets Export and Manufacturing
Corporation, G.R. No. 161865, 10 March 2005, 453 SCRA 173, 184-185.
[14] People v. Cias, G.R. No. 194379, 1 June
2011 citing People v. Malana,
G.R. No. 185716, 29 September 2010, 631 SCRA 676, 686; People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 817, 825-826;
People v. Burgos, G.R. No. 117451, 29
September 1997, 279 SCRA 697, 705-707.
[15] Guillang v. Bedania, G.R. No. 162987, 21 May 2009, 588 SCRA 73, 84 citing Dy Teban Trading, Inc. v. Ching, G.R. No. 161803, 4 February 2008, 543 SCRA 560, 571.
[16] Briones v. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 150666, 3 August 2010, 626 SCRA 300, 309; Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, 11 September 2009, 599 SCRA 594, 606.
[17] Gepiga Vda. De Soco v. Soco Vda. De Barbon, G.R. No. 188484, 6 December 2010, 636 SCRA 553, 559.
[18] Rollo, p. 70.
[19] Id. at 45.
[20] TSN, 24 July 1997, pp. 4-5.
[21] Id. at 14.
[22] TSN, 24 July 1996, p. 6.
[23] TSN, 4 November 1998, pp. 4-5.
[24] TSN, 24 July 1996, p. 7.
[25] Id. at 6.
[26] TSN, 24 July 1997, pp. 4-6.
[27] G.R. No. 119092, 10 December 1998, 300 SCRA
20, 28 citing SANGCO, PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS AND DAMAGES 20 (1993).
[28] Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, id. at 28.
[29] G.R. No.
130003, 20 October 2004, 441 SCRA 24.
[30] Id. at 44.
[31] Id. at 41.
[32] Alonte
v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. No.
131652, 9 March 1998, 287 SCRA 245, 295.