Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City
Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices, Petitioner, - versus - PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 168973 Present: CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: August
24, 2011 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated March 4, 2005 and Resolution[2]
dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64379, which granted
the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition of respondent Philippine Ports Authority and set aside the Orders
dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 44 of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No. N-201.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe
Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original
Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at
Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property
Registration Decree. The application was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-201.
Petitioner alleged in support of its
application:
1. That the applicant, City of Dumaguete through its Honorable Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings comprising the Engineers Compound where it is now situated and has been in continuous occupation and possession of the same for more than 30 years or from the year 1960 (Affidavit of Ownership executed by Felipe Antonio G. Remollo, the City Mayor, dated August 21, 1998 herein attached as ANNEX A). The said land consist of 5,410 square meters and is situated and bounded and described as shown on the plan (true and photostatic copies of the original plan marked Psu-07-006805 approved by the Regional Technical Director of the [Department of Environment and Natural Resources] DENR, Regional Office, Cebu City herein attached as ANNEX B) and technical descriptions attached hereto (technical description attached as ANNEX C) and made a part hereof;
2.
That said land at the last assessment for taxation was
assessed at P676,250, Philippine currency, with market value of P1,352,500.00,
Philippine currency. (Declaration of Real Property with the assessed and market
values attached as ANNEX D);
3. That to the best of my knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor another person having any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the land was acquired by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse occupation and possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years since 1960 (please refer to ANNEX A);
5. That the land is adjoined by the following:
NorthWest
NorthEast
SouthEast
All along line 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 by Flores Avenue, City Road and the Dumaguete Port Road
SouthWest along line 10-1 by Plan Msi-V-20453
x x x x
8. That
the land included is bounded on the West by
In an Order[4]
dated October 23, 1998, the RTC noted that:
A perusal of the records of the case shows that the annexes lack the following copies:
a) two blue print copies of the approved plan;
b) two copies of the technical description of the lot sought to be registered;
c) two copies of the Surveyors certificate;
d) a certificate in quadruplicate of the City Assessor of the assessed value of the land;
e) all original muniments of title in the possession of the applicant which prove ownership of the land;
f) two copies of the petition/application.
Further, the application did not state the number of the lot sought to be registered, the number of parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and indicate whether it claims a portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.
All these must be alleged in the petition so that the Court will know the nature of the property.
The RTC explained that the extra
copies submitted by petitioner shall be forwarded by the RTC Clerk of Court to
the Land Registration Commission (LRC) in
Petitioner filed its Compliance[5] with
the above-mentioned Order, submitting additional copies of the required
documents and clarifying thus:
1. The approved plan does not state the number of lot sought to be registered because it is a public land, thus, only PSU-07-006805 appears on the plan which is being applied for registration;
2. Only one (1) parcel of land is applied for by petitioners which consist of five thousand four hundred ten (5,410) square meters, more or less;
3. The City Engineers Building within the City Engineers compound are the only improvement found thereon; and
4. Petitioners do not claim any portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.
The RTC accordingly set the initial
hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 on
The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions [6] to
the application for registration of petitioner.
Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner may not
register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for
at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the
subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to
the Republic.
After several postponements of the
scheduled hearings, petitioner presented the testimony of its first witness, Engineer
Rilthe P. Dorado (Engr. Dorado), on
However, before the next hearing,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,[8] seeking
the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Respondent argued that Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of
ownership. The subject property in LRC
Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as
explicitly testified to by petitioners own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. This was precisely the reason why, respondent
points out, that the subject property was included in Presidential Proclamation
No. 1232 (delineating the territorial boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so
that the same would be administered and managed by the State, through
respondent, for the benefit of the people.
In its Terse Opposition to Oppositors
Motion to Dismiss, petitioner claimed that the subject property was a swamp
reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly, continuously,
exclusively, and notoriously under a bona
fide claim of ownership. The
technical description and approved plan of the subject property showed that the
said property was not bounded by any part of the sea. Petitioner invoked Republic Act No. 1899,[9]
which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out,
at their own expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and
grants said chartered cities and municipalities ownership over the reclaimed
lands. Presidential Proclamation No.
1232 is immaterial to the present application for registration because it
merely authorizes respondent to administer and manage the Dumaguete Port Zone and
does not confer upon respondent ownership of the subject property.[10]
Respondent filed a Reply/Rejoinder
(To Applicants Opposition to Oppositors Motion to Dismiss), [11]
asserting that there are no factual or legal basis for the claim of petitioner
that the subject property is reclaimed land.
Petitioner sought the original registration of its title over the
subject property acquired through alleged continuous possession for 30 years
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, and not through the
reclamation of the said property at its own expense under Republic Act No.
1899. The present claim of petitioner that
the subject property is reclaimed land should not be allowed for it would
improperly change the earlier theory in support of the application for
registration. Respondent reiterated that
the subject property is foreshore land which cannot be registered; and that
Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201 because
it confirms that areas within the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject
property, are not alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
On
The Court agrees with [herein respondent] Philippine Ports Authority that the basis of the [herein petitioners] application for original registration of the subject lot is Section 14 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. A circumspect scrutiny of said Section readily shows that it refers to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as proper subjects of registration, provided the applicant has met the other requirements such as open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for at least thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership.
It having been shown by [petitioners] own evidence that the lot subject of the application for original registration is a foreshore land, and therefore not registerable (Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., 98 SCRA 942, 944), the application must be denied.
Again as correctly argued by [respondent], [petitioners] reliance on Republic Act 1899 which authorizes all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out the reclamation by dredging, filling or other means of any foreshore lands bordering them and which confers ownership on them of the lands so reclaimed, is misplaced, as such has never been alleged in the application. It is fundamental that a party cannot prove what it has not alleged in his complaint or application, as in this case.
The admission by Engr. Dorado that there is no formal declaration from the executive branch of government or law passed by Congress that the land in question is no longer needed for public use or special industries x x x further militates against the application.
Moreover, the authority granted to municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them is for the purpose of establishing, providing, constructing, maintaining, and repairing proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
By its own evidence, [petitioner] has utilized the subject property allegedly reclaimed by it as Office of the City Engineer and not as docking and harboring facilities. [Petitioner] has failed to show that such reclamation was undertaken by it in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.[13]
The RTC decreed in the end that
the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of
merit.[14]
In its Motion for Reconsideration[15] and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,[16] petitioner
contended that the dismissal of its application was premature and tantamount to
a denial of its right to due process. It
has yet to present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application,
such as the subject property already being alienable and disposable at the time
it was occupied and possessed by petitioner.
Petitioner also pointed out that its
witness, Engr. Dorado, testified only as to the physical status of the land in
question at the time when the cadastral survey of Dumaguete was made sometime
in 1916.[17] In fact, Engr. Dorado expressly testified that
the subject property was part of the shore or foreshore a long time ago[;][18] and
he did not testify at all that the subject property was a foreshore lot at the
time petitioner occupied and possessed the same. The physical state of the subject property
had already changed since 1916. It is
now within the alienable and disposable area as per the Land Classification
Map No. 674, Project No. 1-D, BL C-6, certified on July 3, 1927, of the Bureau
of Lands, now Land Management Sector of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources[,][19] as
verified and certified by the Chief of the Map Projection Section, Land
Management Sector, DENR Regional Office in Cebu City, who has yet to take the
witness stand before the RTC.
Petitioner insisted that the RTC
should continue with the hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and allow petitioner to
present evidence that the subject property is reclaimed land. Petitioner sufficiently alleged in its
application for registration that it has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of the [subject property] for more than thirty (30)
years under a bona fide claim of
ownership.[20] In support of such allegation, petitioner must
necessarily prove that the subject property was previously a swampy area, which
had to be filled or reclaimed before the construction of the City Engineers
Office building thereon.
Respondent based its Opposition (To
Applicants Motion for Reconsideration dated September 28, 2000)[21] and
Opposition (To Applicants Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration)[22] on
technical and substantive grounds.
According to respondent, the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5
(Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioner did not set its Motion
for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be
considered as non-litigable. The RTC
could not hear the motion for reconsideration ex parte as they are prejudicial to the rights of respondent. Petitioner also failed to comply with Section
11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration
a written explanation why it did not resort to personal service of the said Motion. Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap of paper with
no legal effect. It did not interrupt
the reglementary period to appeal and the RTC Order dated
Respondent again posited that the
subject property was foreshore land belonging to the State and not subject to
private appropriation, unless the same had already been declared by the executive
or legislative department of the national government as no longer needed for
coast guard service, public use, or special industries, and classified as
alienable and disposable. Full- blown
trial in LRC Case No. N-201 was no longer necessary as the evidence so far
presented by petitioner had already established that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
In its Order[23]
dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with respondent that the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
Resultantly, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered
as not filed and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal,
rendering final and executory the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201.
However, after taking into
consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, the
RTC issued another Order[24]
dated
It was then the turn of respondent
to file with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration[25]
of the Order dated
A
thorough review and perusal of the disputed order dated
Respondent sought recourse from the
Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
64379. Respondent challenged the RTC
Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 for having been issued by
the RTC in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Respondent reiterated that
the RTC Order dated
The Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated March 4, 2005, found merit in the Petition of respondent and set
aside the RTC Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001. The appellate court, in its Resolution dated
June 6, 2005, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via the instant Petition for Review with
the following assignment of error:
GROUND FOR THE APPEAL
Error
of law: The March 4, 2005 decision of the Court of
Appeals and its June 6, 2005 Resolution, erred on question of law in setting
aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, dated December 7, 2000
and February 20, 2001. The said Orders
of the trial court were made in order to determine factual issues and to
correct its error in its findings on the
Respondent insists on the strict
application of Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court. Violations of the said
rules were fatal to the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the petitioner, and as a result, the RTC Order dated
We grant the Petition.
The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
exists where an act is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.[28]
The Court of Appeals erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in
favor of respondent. The RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7, 2000 and
February 20, 2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201
and resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in
said case.
Procedural rules were conceived to
aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands
of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.[29] In Basco
v. Court of Appeals,[30] we
allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to
the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, as illustrated in
well-settled cases, to wit:
The
liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing is exemplified in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. CA:
Admittedly,
the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for reconsideration did not stop the
running of the period of appeal because of the absence of a notice of hearing
required in Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court. As we have
repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere
scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the
court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to
disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration
was filed and, therefore, the reglementary period within which
respondent-spouses should have filed an appeal expired on
But,
where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed, especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained
therein. Technicalities may thus be
disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a
vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
Hence,
this Court should not easily allow a party to lose title and ownership over a
party worth P4,000,000.00 for a measly P650,000.00 without affording him
ample opportunity to prove his claim that the transaction entered into was not
in fact an absolute sale but one of mortgage. Such grave injustice must not be
permitted to prevail on the anvil of technicalities.
Likewise,
in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:
But
time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are
used only to help secure not override substantial justice (National Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Municipality of Libmanan,
97 SCRA 138 [1980]; Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1976]). The
right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of
rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and
the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal
(Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137
SCRA 570 [1985]; Pacific Asia Overseas
Shipping Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R.
No. 76595, May 6, 1998). . . .
In the
instant case, it is petitioner's life and liberty that is at stake. The trial
court has sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and his conviction attained finality on the
basis of mere technicality. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner be given
the opportunity to defend himself and pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would
be tantamount to grave injustice. A relaxation of the procedural rules,
considering the particular circumstances herein, is justified.[31]
(Emphasis ours.)
In the case at bar, the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner, which
sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 dismissing LRC Case
No. N-201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application of
procedural rules.
The dismissal by the RTC of LRC
Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently erroneous.
Basic as a hornbook principle is
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. The averments in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.[32]
As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.[33]
Under Act No. 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act, as amended by Act No. 2347, jurisdiction over all
applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon the Courts of
First Instance (CFI) of the respective provinces in which the land sought to be
registered was situated. Jurisdiction
over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired upon the
filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the
end of the litigation.[34]
The land registration laws were
updated and codified by the Property Registration Decree, and under Section 17 thereof,
jurisdiction over an application for land registration was still vested on the CFI
of the province or city where the land was situated, viz:
SEC.
17. What
and where to file. The application for land registration shall be filed
with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the land is
situated. The applicant shall file
together with the application all original muniments of titles or copies
thereof and a survey plan of the land approved by the Bureau of Lands.
The
Clerk of Court shall not accept any application unless it is shown that the
applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the application
and all annexes.
Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, created the RTC[35]
in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction
over an application for land registration remains with the RTC where the land
is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts under certain circumstances.[36]
It is not disputed that the
Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner before the
RTC of the City of
Respondent sought the dismissal of
LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the
insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence
presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the
subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable and
disposable. The RTC granted the Motion
to Dismiss of respondent in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer
for relief in the Application for Original Registration of petitioner, and already
scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner
was able to present.
As to whether or not the subject
property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which the RTC should
resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the
opportunity to present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial. As we have explained in the Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic[37]:
The
plain import of
Firmly
entrenched is the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law. Consequently, the
proper CFI (now the RTC) under Section 14 of PD 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) has jurisdiction over applications for registration of title to land.
x
x x x
Conformably,
the Pasig-Rizal CFI, Branch XXII has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the land registration case filed by Fermina Castro, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, since jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading the application. Settled is the rule that the authority to
decide a case and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up
jurisdiction. When there is
jurisdiction, the decision of all questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of jurisdiction.
In
our view, it was imprecise to state in Municipality
of Antipolo that the
It is true that petitioner, as the
applicant, has the burden of proving that the subject property is alienable and
disposable and its title to the same is capable of registration. However, we stress that the RTC, when it
issued its Order dated
The RTC Order dated
Also, the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner did not comply with Section 11, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court, for these did not include a written explanation why
service or filing thereof was not done personally. Nonetheless, in Maceda v. Encarnacion de Guzman Vda. de Magpantay,[39] citing
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v.
Ricafort,[40] and Musa v. Amor,[41] we
explained the rationale behind said rule and the mandatory nature of the same, vis--vis the exercise of discretion by
the court in case of non-compliance therewith:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,
this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that
a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said
rule is not complied with.
Personal
service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and
conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service
or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of
some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than
ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare,
for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving
notice from the post office that the registered containing the pleading of or
other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only
to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective
rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not
filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no
written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the
first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service,
for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.
We thus
take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and
resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may
resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written
explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall
likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11.
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the
impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied
Section 11 of Rule 13:
As
[Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case,
personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was
posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have
been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of
may, signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court
discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While
it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be
relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
In the
case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while
petitioner Sonias counsels is
Our ruling in the above-cited cases
is relevant to the instant case. Counsel
for petitioner holds office in
Jurisprudence confirms that the
requirements laid down in Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are
mandatory. If not religiously complied
with, they render the motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of
paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period.[44]
Yet, again, there were previous
cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us to liberally apply the
rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the
same. Once such case is Philippine National Bank v. Paneda,[45] where
we adjudged:
Thus, even if the Motion may be
defective for failure to address the notice of hearing of said motion to the
parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's taking cognizance
thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the
existence of said pleading. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing
rules if a copy of the said motion for reconsideration was furnished to the
counsel of herein private respondents.
In the
present case, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to
the respective counsels of the private respondents and they were duly furnished
with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff or
agents.
Consequently, the Court finds
that the petitioner substantially complied with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the requirements of motions and
pleadings.[46]
(Emphasis
supplied.)
It was not refuted that petitioner
furnished respondent and respondent actually received copies of the Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 filed by petitioner. As a result, respondent was able to file its Oppositions
to the said Motions. The RTC, in issuing
its Order dated December 7, 2000, was able to consider the arguments presented
by both sides. Hence, there was
substantial compliance by petitioner with the rules on notice of hearing for
its Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000.
Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity to be
heard on its opposition to said Motions.
In view of the foregoing
circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively or arbitrarily,
exercised its discretion when it subsequently issued the Order dated December
7, 2000, setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 and proceeding with the
trial in LRC Case No. N-201.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review of
petitioner City of Dumaguete is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated March 4,
2005 and Resolution dated June 6, 2005 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
64379 are SET ASIDE, and the Orders
dated December 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001 of Branch 44 of the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Dumaguete in LRC Case No. N-201 are REINSTATED. The said trial
court is DIRECTED to proceed with
the hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 25-32; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Vicente L. Yap, concurring.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 2-3.
[4] Id. at 33-34.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] An
Act to Authorize the Reclamation of Foreshore Lands by Chartered Cities and
Municipalities.
[10] Records, pp. 129-131.
[11]
[12]
[13] Id. at 136-137.
[14] Id. at 137.
[15]
[16]
[17] Id. at 138.
[18] Id. at 138-139.
[19] Id. at 139.
[20] Id.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Id. at 167.
[25]
[26]
[27] Rollo, p. 16.
[28] Casent Realty and Development Corporation v.
Premiere Development Bank, G.R. No. 163902, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 426,
434.
[29] Basco
v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 251, 266 (2000).
[30] Id.
[31] Id. at 266-267.
[32] Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, March 14, 2008, 548
SCRA 693, 705-706.
[33] Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 180765, February 27, 2009, 580 SCRA 397, 404.
[34] Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 Phil. 317, 329 (1987).
[35] Section
13.
[36] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 34
reads:
SEC. 34.
Delegated Jurisdiction in
Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00),
such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement
of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As
amended by Republic Act No. 7691.)
[37] G.R.
No. 168661,
[38]
[39] 516 Phil. 755 (2006).
[40] 355 Phil. 404 (1998).
[41] 430 Phil. 128 (2002).
[42] Maceda v. Encarnacion de Guzman Vda. de Magpantay, supra note 39 at 763-765.
[43] Records, pp. 141 and 152.
[44] De La Pea v. De La Pea, 327 Phil. 936, 942 (1996).
[45] G.R. No. 149236, February 14, 2007,
515 SCRA 639.
[46] Id. at 653.