Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
|
AUGUSTUS GONZALES and spouses NESTOR
victor and MA. lourdes
rodriguez,
Petitioners, -versus- quirico pe,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 167398 Present: CARPIO,*
J., VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, BRION,** PERALTA, and SERENO,***
JJ. Promulgated: August
9, 2011 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a
petition for review on certiorari seeking
to set aside the Decision[1] dated
June 23, 2004 and Resolution[2]
dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Twentieth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171,
entitled Quirico Pe v. Honorable Judge Rene Hortillo, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 31, Augustus Gonzales and Spouses
Engr. Nestor Victor and Dr. Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez, which granted the
petition of respondent Quirico Pe. The
CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order[3]
dated September 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
Branch 31, which dismissed respondent's appeal for non-payment of docket and
other lawful fees, and directing the issuance of the writ of execution for the
implementation of its Decision[4]
dated June 28, 2002 in favor of the petitioners and against the respondent. The CA Decision also directed the RTC to
assess the appellate docket fees to be paid by the respondent, if it has not
done so, and allow him to pay such fees and give due course to his appeal.
The antecedents are as
follows:
Respondent Quirico Pe was
engaged in the business of construction materials, and had been transacting
business with petitioner Spouses Nestor Victor Rodriguez and Ma. Lourdes
Rodriguez. The Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) awarded two contracts in favor of petitioner Nestor
Rodriguez for the following projects, namely, construction of Lanot-Banga Road
(Kalibo Highway) km. 39 + 200 to km. 40 + 275 Section IV (Aklan side) and
concreting of Laua-an Pandan Road (Tibial-Culasi Section), Province of
Antique. In 1998, respondent agreed to
supply cement for the construction projects of petitioner Spouses
Rodriguez. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez
availed of the DPWHs pre-payment program for cement requirement regarding the
Lanot-Banga Road, Kalibo Highway project (Kalibo project), wherein the DPWH
would give an advance payment even before project completion upon his
presentment, among others, of an official receipt for the amount advanced. Petitioner Nestor Rodriguez gave Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 6563066 to respondent, which was signed by
co-petitioners (his wife Ma. Lourdes Rodriguez and his business partner
Augustus Gonzales), but leaving the amount and date in blank. The blank LBP check was delivered to
respondent to guarantee the payment of 15,698 bags of Portland cement valued at
P1,507,008.00, covered by
Official Receipt No. 1175,[5]
issued by respondent (as owner of Antique Commercial), in favor of petitioner
Nestor Rodriguez (as owner of Greenland Builders). However, a year later, respondent filled up blank
LBP Check No. 6563066, by placing P2,062,000.00 and June 30, 1999,
corresponding to the amount and date.
On December 9, 1999, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint[6]
for Declaration of Payment, Cancellation of Documents and Damages
against respondent with the RTC, Branch 31, Iloilo City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 25945. The amended complaint alleged
that they entrusted blank LBP Check No. 6563066 to respondent so as to
facilitate the approval of the pre-payment application of petitioner Nestor
Rodriguez with the DPWH. They stated
that the blank LBP check would serve as collateral to guarantee the payment
for 15,698 bags to be used for the Kalibo project, amounting to P1,507,008.00,
and that after payment of the said amount, respondent would return the LBP check.
According to them, after having paid
respondent the amount of P2,306,500.00, which is P139,160.00 more
than the amount of P2,167,340.00 (representing the value for 23,360 bags
of cement taken for the Kalibo project), they were cleared of any
liability.
On January 6, 2000, respondent
filed an Answer to Amended Complaint,[7] averring that he had so far delivered 40,360 bags of cement to petitioners who remitted P2,306,500.00, thereby leaving an outstanding amount of P2,062,000.00. He countered that when petitioners stopped
the bank-to-bank online payments to him, he filled up the amount of P2,062,000.00
and made the LBP check payable on June 30, 1999. The LBP check was dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds (DAIF). By
way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of P2,062,000.00,
with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as actual damages.
In the Pre-trial Order[8]
dated January 28, 2000, the trial court determined the following to be the
delimited issues, to wit:
(1) whether plaintiffs [herein petitioners]
liability to defendant [herein respondent] for 15,698 bags priced at P1,507,008.00 subject of the earlier-mentioned pre-payment program and
covered by the blank LBP Check No. 6563066 has already been paid, hence,
plaintiffs are no longer liable to the defendant for this amount;
(2)
whether this LBP Check No. 6563066 should not be returned by defendant
to plaintiffs, or failing in which, should now be declared as cancelled, null
and void;
(3)
whether plaintiffs have completely paid to the defendant the price of
the cement used for the Kalibo project which specifically is the amount of
23,360 bags of cement valued in the total amount of P2,167,340.00;
(4)
whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages and attorneys fees; and
(5)
whether this case be dismissed and with the dismissal of the complaint
to proceed with the counterclaim.[9]
In a Decision dated June 28,
2002, the trial court, applying Section 14[10]
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, found that respondents subsequent filling
up of LBP Check No. 6563066 in the amount of P2,062,000.00 was
not made strictly in accordance with the authority given to him by petitioner
Nestor Rodriguez, and that since one year had already lapsed, the same was not
done within a reasonable time. As to the 23,360 bags of cement for the Kalibo
project, valued at P2,167,340.00 which was subject of previous
transactions, the trial court ruled that the same had been fully paid and
considered a settled issue. Consequently,
the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and against
the respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, as follows:
1. Declaring plaintiffs' obligation to the
defendant for the cement supplied for the Kalibo (Lanot-Banga) Road
Construction Project in the amount of P2,167,340.00
as already and fully paid, hence, plaintiffs are no longer liable to the
defendant;
2. Declaring Land Bank Check No. 6563066 dated
June 30, 1999 for P2,062,000.00 as null and void
and without any legal effect;
3. Ordering defendant to
pay each plaintiff the sums of P100,000.00
as actual damages; P500,000.00 as moral damages; P200,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee; P50,000.00 as miscellaneous actual and necessary litigation
expenses; and
4. To pay the costs.
Defendant's counterclaim
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[11]
After receipt
of a copy of the said RTC Decision on July 26, 2002, respondent filed a Notice
of Appeal on July 30, 2002.
In an Order[12]
dated August 5, 2002, the trial court gave due course to respondent's appeal,
and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire records of the
case to the CA.
On August 26, 2002, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ
of Execution,[13]
stating that respondents appeal should be dismissed as the same was not
perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees as required under
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Claiming that since the respondents appeal was not perfected and, as a
consequence, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 became final and executory,
petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of execution for the implementation
of the said RTC Decision. To buttress
their motion, petitioners also appended a Certification[14]
dated August 19, 2002, issued by the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk
of Court (OCC) of the RTC, Iloilo City, certifying that no appeal fees in the
case had been paid and received by the OCC.
In the Order dated September 23,
2002, the trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed the issuance
of a writ of execution to implement the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On October 2, 2002, the Clerk of
Court and Ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff of Iloilo issued the Writ of Execution[15]
directing the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On October 7, 2002, respondent filed
a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order,[16]
seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002 (which dismissed
his appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the
RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), and to enjoin the implementation of the Writ
of Execution dated October 2, 2002.
In a Resolution[17]
dated October 9, 2002, the CA granted the respondents prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and, in the Resolution[18]
dated August 20, 2003, approved the respondents injunction bond and directed
the Division Clerk of Court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 20, 2003, the Division
Clerk of Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[19]
thereby enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated October 2,
2002.
On June 23,
2004, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the petition is granted. The assailed
order and writ of execution of the Regional Trial Court must be, as it is
hereby, SET ASIDE. The trial court is
hereby ordered to assess the appellate docket fees, if it has not done so, and
allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to the petitioner's
appeal. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.[20]
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21]
on August 24, 2004, which, however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution[22]
dated February 23, 2005.
Hence,
petitioner filed this present petition raising the sole issue that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO BELATEDLY PAY THE REQUIRED APPELLATE
DOCKET AND OTHER LEGAL FEES.
Petitioners
allege that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal fees at
the time he filed the Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected in
contemplation of the law. Thus,
petitioners pray that the CA decision be set aside and a new one be rendered
dismissing the respondents appeal and ordering the execution of the RTC
Decision dated June 28, 2002.
On the other hand, respondent, citing
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, maintains that his appeal has been
perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal. Respondent theorizes that with the perfection
of his appeal, the trial court is now divested of jurisdiction to dismiss his
appeal and, therefore, only the CA has jurisdiction to determine and rule on
the propriety of his appeal. He raises
the defense that his failure to pay the required docket and other legal fees
was because the RTC Branch Clerk of Court did not make an assessment of the
appeal fees to be paid when he filed the notice of appeal.
The petition
is meritorious.
In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that the appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from)
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Concomitant
with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal
fees within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said
Rule. Thus,
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant
shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
or the record on appeal.
In reversing the ruling of the trial
court, the CA cited Yambao v. Court of
Appeals[23]
as justification for giving due course to respondents petition and ordering
the belated payment of docket and other legal fees. In Yambao,
the CA dismissed therein petitioners appeal from the RTC decision for
failure to pay the full amount of the required docket fee. Upon elevation of the case, the Court,
however, ordered the CA to give due course to their appeal, and ruled that
their subsequent payment of the P20.00 deficiency, even before the CA
had passed upon their motion for reconsideration, was indicative of their good
faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.
The ruling in Yambao
is not applicable to the present case as herein respondent never made any
payment of the docket and other lawful fees, not even an attempt to do so,
simultaneous with his filing of the Notice of Appeal. Although respondent was able to file a timely
Notice of Appeal, however, he failed to pay the docket and other legal fees,
claiming that the Branch Clerk of Court did not issue any assessment. This procedural lapse on the part of the
respondent rendered his appeal with the CA to be dismissible and, therefore,
the RTC Decision, dated June 28, 2002, to be final and executory.
In
Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo,[24] as with other subsequent
cases[25] of the same ruling, the
Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is
not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an appeal is not a
right, but a mere statutory privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA
must be made within 15 days from notice.
And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from.
The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees
within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. The payment of docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an
appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket
fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.
Respondents
claim that his non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should be treated as
mistake and excusable negligence, attributable to the RTC Branch Clerk of
Court, is too superficial to warrant consideration. This is clearly negligence of respondent's
counsel, which is not excusable.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against.[26] Respondent's
counsel filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period for filing the
same without, however, paying the appellate docket fees. He simply ignored the basic procedure of
taking an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, coupled with the payment of the
full amount of docket and other lawful fees.
Respondents
counsel should keep abreast of procedural laws and his ignorance of the
procedural requirements shall bind the respondent. In National Power Corporation v. Laohoo,[27] we ruled that therein
counsels failure to file the appeal in due time does not amount to excusable
negligence. The non-perfection of the
appeal on time is not a mere technicality.
Besides, to grant therein petitioners plea for the relaxation of the
rules on technicality would disturb a well-entrenched ruling that could make
uncertain when a judgment attains finality, leaving the same to depend upon the
resourcefulness of a party in concocting implausible excuses to justify an
unwarranted departure from the time-honored policy of the law that the period
for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.
The CA
took cognizance over the case, based on the wrong premise that when the RTC
issued the Order dated August 5, 2002 giving due course to respondents Notice
of Appeal and directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire
records of the case to the CA, it ipso
facto lost jurisdiction over the case.
Section 9,[28] Rule 41 of the Rules
explains that the court of origin loses jurisdiction over the case only upon
the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the
original records of the case to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the prevailing party, as in this
case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the respondents appeal was
not perfected.
Moreover, Section 13, Rule 41 of the
Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken from the RTC on the ground
of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the 15-day
reglementary period:
SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time, or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. (As amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, May 1, 2000.)
Since
respondents appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary period, it
was as if no appeal was actually taken.
Therefore, the RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents
lodged before it, such as the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, to
Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of Execution, filed on August 26,
2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated August 5, 2002 that gave due
course to respondents Notice of Appeal, and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution. Having
no jurisdiction over the case, the prudent thing that the CA should have done
was to dismiss the respondents appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and
declare that the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 has now become final and
executory.
As an incidental matter on the
propriety of petitioners petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, respondent raises the
argument that since the subject of the present petition is the writ of
preliminary injunction granted by the CA (in favor of the respondent enjoining
the execution of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002), in CA-G.R. SP No.
73171, which is interlocutory in nature, petitioners petition should be denied
for being the wrong remedy. In other
words, respondent advances the theory that since the assailed CA Decision dated
June 23, 2004 partakes of an interlocutory order, i.e., enjoining the
finality of the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002, petitioners should have
availed of the remedy of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Respondents argument is
unfounded. The proper remedy of a party
aggrieved by a decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is not
identical to a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Rule 45 provides that
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to Us by filing a petition for
review on certiorari, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[29] Therefore, petitioners filing of the present
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 is the proper and adequate remedy to challenge the Decision dated
June 24, 2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the CA.
To recapitulate, one who seeks to
avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the
rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[30] The rules require that from the date of
receipt of the assailed RTC order denying ones motion for reconsideration, an
appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch
Clerk of Court, within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an
appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's
appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment
of docket and other lawful fees. As a
consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and executory and,
therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Since the CA erroneously took
cognizance over the case, its Decision dated June 23, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 23, 2005 should be overturned, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued on August 20, 2003 should likewise be lifted. Thus, the RTC Decision dated June 28, 2002 is
reinstated and, as the said decision having become final and executory, the
case is remanded for its prompt execution.
While every litigant must be given
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it
deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory,
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.[31]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 23, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73171, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction, issued by
the Court of Appeals on August 20, 2003, is LIFTED.
The
Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Iloilo
City is REINSTATED and, in view of
its finality, the case is REMANDED for
its prompt execution.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
Chairperson
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1059 dated August 1, 2011.
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special Order No. 1056 dated July 27, 2011.
*** Designated as an additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 30-38.
[2] Id. at 39-40.
[3] Per Presiding Judge Rene S. Hortillo, records, vol. 1, p. 347.
[4] Id. at 312-340.
[5] Id. at 28.
[6] Id. at 58-63.
[7] Id. at 74-88.
[8] Id. at 129-131.
[9] Id. at 130-131.
[10] Sec. 14. Blanks; when may be filled. Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any amount. In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against any person who became a party thereon prior to its completion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a reasonable time.
[11] Records, Vol. I, p. 340.
[12] Id. at 342.
[13] Id. at 343-345.
[14] Id. at 346.
[15] Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[16] Id. at 41-65.
[17] CA rollo, p. 95-97.
[18] Id. at 256-257.
[19] Id. at 258-259.
[20] Rollo, pp. 30-38.
[21] CA rollo, pp. 336-350.
[22] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[23] G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 141.
[24] G.R. No. 148739, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 218, 226-227, 229. (Citations omitted.)
[25] Rural Bank of the Seven Lakes (S.P.C.), Inc. v. Dan, G.R. No. 174109, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 476, 488-489; KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits, Inc., G.R. No. 174219, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 713, 727-728; Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 252, 259-260; Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006, 470 SCRA 594, 603-604; Bacarra v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162445, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 581, 586.
[26] Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, January 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 44. (Citations omitted.)
[27] G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 591.
[28] SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal, effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice
of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal
in due time.
x x x x
In appeals by notice of appeal,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties.
x x x x
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule
39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
[29] Emcor Incorporated v. Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009, 598 SCRA 617, 626-627, citing Mercado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150241, November 4, 2004, 441 SCRA 463, 469; Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165910, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 78, 99.
[30] M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 525, 528.
[31] National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, supra note 27.