Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
MA. ANA M. TAMONTE and EDILBERTO A. TAMONTE, Petitioners, - versus - HONGKONG and SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION LTD., HONGKONG and SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION
STAFF RETIREMENT PLAN, represented by
ATTY. MANUEL G. MONTECILLO, STUART P. MILNE and ALEJANDRO CUSTODIO; ALEJANDRO
CUSTODIO; RTC CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF and SHERIFF IN
CHARGE CLEMENTE BOLOY and BENEDICTO G. HEBRON, respectively, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 166970 Present:
CARPIO,* J., VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA,
MENDOZA, and SERENO,** JJ.
Promulgated:
August 17, 2011 |
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DECISION
PERALTA,
J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1]
dated
Petitioner
Ma. Ana M. Tamonte (Ana) was a regular employee of the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Ltd. (the bank) and a member of the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Staff Retirement Plan (HSBC SRP). The HSBC SRP was established through its
Board of Trustees for the purpose of providing retirement, disability and loan
benefits to all its regular employees. Petitioner
Ana applied for a housing loan with the HSBC SRP. To secure the said loan, petitioners and
respondent HSBC SRP entered into a real estate mortgage contract[3]
where petitioners mortgaged their property covered by TCT No. 17169 of the
Register of Deeds of Paraaque. The
monthly amortizations of the loan were paid by petitioner Ana through automatic
payroll deductions.
In
January 1993, a labor dispute arose between the bank and the employees' union,
where petitioner Ana was a member thereof, which culminated in a strike staged on
In
a letter[4]
dated
On
October 29, 1997, petitioners filed with the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, a Complaint[6]
for Annulment of the Entire Proceedings in Foreclosure No. 96-037 with Prayer
for Damages, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Final Injunction,
etc. against the bank, HSBC SRP, represented by Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo,
Stuart P. Milne and Alejandro L. Custodio and the RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff Benedicto G. Hebron.
Respondents
HSBC SRP and Custodio filed a Motion to Dismiss[7]
with Opposition to petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of
action. Respondents contended that the extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners'
mortgaged property was proper and regular as the full amount of the loan had
accelerated after petitioner Ana had ceased to be an employee of the bank as
she was terminated for cause and petitioners were unable to settle the same
upon demand; and that petitioner Ana's continued employment with the bank was
the sort of the security/guaranty for her loan.
Respondents also stated that petitioners had not made any single payment
since December 1993 which made them in default under their mortgage contract.
Respondents argued that they can proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgaged
property pending the labor dispute, since the foreclosure proceeding was civil
in nature which arose from a purely civil obligation and pursuant to its rights
under the mortgage contract. Respondents
continued that even assuming petitioners had been making payments, these cannot
operate as payment for all intents and purposes under the law, because they
were not for the full and accelerated obligation.
Respondent
bank filed a Motion to Dismiss,[8]
alleging, among others, that no cause of action existed against it, since it
was not a party to the mortgage contract nor did it participate in the
foreclosure proceedings sought to be annulled.
Respondent
HSBC SRP filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss[9]
stating that their case was anchored on the same facts obtaining in the case of
Cadena v. HSBC filed in the RTC which had already been dismissed by the
RTC after finding that the employee concerned had defaulted in the payment
of her monthly amortizations which gave
rise to the foreclosure of the mortgaged property; that just like the Cadena
case, herein petitioners did not
make any single payment of their housing loan since petitioner Ana's
termination in December 1993, thus, their housing loan became delinquent and
the eventual foreclosure of their mortgaged property.
Petitioners
filed their Consolidated Opposition[10]
to the Motion to Dismiss which stated, among others, that petitioner Ana's
continued employment with the bank was never meant to secure the housing loan
extended to petitioners. Petitioners did not deny that no amortization payments
were made after December 1993, but claimed that it was not the cause of the
foreclosure action but petitioner Ana's termination.
In
an Order[11]
dated
Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[12]
dated
Petitioners
filed their appeal with the CA. After the filing of the parties' respective Briefs,
the case was submitted for resolution.
In
a Decision dated
Petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution
dated
Hence, the instant
petition for review filed by petitioners on the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING THAT PETITIONERS HAD
NO CAUSE OF ACTION.[13]
Petitioners
reiterate their arguments raised in the CA. They insist that respondent HSBC
SRP foreclosed their property because of petitioner Ana's termination from
employment and not because of their default in the payment of their loan
obligation. Petitioners contend that based on the allegations in respondents
HSBC SRP and Custodio's Motion to Dismiss filed in the RTC, the default
respondents spoke of was petitioners' failure to pay the entire balance of
their loan in a single payment upon the cessation of petitioner Ana's employment
with the bank. Such being the case, petitioners claim that the question that
arose was whether or not respondent HSBC SRP had the right to withdraw the loan
benefit from petitioner Ana, considering that the issue of her employment
status has not yet been resolved with finality as the labor case is still
pending with Us. Petitioners admitted
that while it had not made any amortization payments since the termination of
petitioner Ana from her employment on
We
are not persuaded.
It
appears that respondent HSBC SRP's Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action cited the failure of petitioners to
make a single payment of the entire balance of their housing loan obligation
which respondent claimed to have accelerated after she was dismissed from her
employment. Notably, however, it was
also stated in the same motion that petitioners had not paid a single monthly
amortization after petitioner Ana's termination from her employment in December
1993, which petitioners did not deny but even admitted. Moreover, we note that
in their Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, respondent HSBC SRP reiterated that
petitioners did not make any single payment on their housing loan after
December 1993, thus, they resorted to foreclosure proceedings. Thus, there is no basis to petitioners' claim
that the default which led the respondent to foreclose the mortgaged property
was mainly due to petitioner Ana's discontinued employment.
Petitioners
were in default in the payment of their loan obligation when they never made
any payment after December 1993. In fact, the demand letter sent to petitioners,
dated
III
THE MORTGAGOR(S) hereby undertake(s) and agree(s) to pay to the MORTGAGEE, upon demand, any and all sums which may be or become due from and owing by the MORTGAGOR(S) to said MORTGAGEE, under and in virtue of the credit or credit facilities hereby granted or hereinafter to be granted by the latter to the former, together with the interest thereon at the rate computed in the manner set out in Article II hereof.[14]
Considering that petitioners failed
to pay their obligation with respondent HSBC
SRP, the latter, as mortgagee, resorted to extrajudicial foreclosure
of petitioners' mortgaged property which
respondents did pursuant to the
provisions of their real estate mortgage
contract, to wit:
VI
H. In the event that the MORTGAGOR(S) should fail to pay the sums of money secured by this mortgage, or any part thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions herein set forth, or should the MORTGAGOR(S) fail to perform any of the conditions stipulated herein, then and in that case, the MORTGAGEE shall have the right, at his election, to foreclose this mortgage and sell the mortgage property extrajudicially, in the manner hereinafter in this paragraph set forth; and for such purpose the MORTGAGEE is hereby appointed the attorney-in-fact of the MORTGAGOR(S), with full power of substitution and revocation.[15]
Undeniably,
respondent HSBC SRP has a clear right to foreclose the mortgaged property. In real estate
mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the creditor-mortgagee has the right to foreclose the
mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the
satisfaction of the unpaid loan.[16]
Clearly, foreclosure
is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness.[17]
Petitioners
argue that the resolution of the validity of
petitioner Ana's termination is akin to a prejudicial question, i.e.,
without a final determination of the legality or illegality of the termination
of her employment, respondent HSBC
SRP cannot validly decide to recall the loan benefits and demand
immediate full payment; and that the auction sale of their property was
premature.
We
do not agree.
As
we said, petitioners were already in default in the payment of their loan
obligations; thus, foreclosure of the mortgage property was resorted to by
respondents. Respondents were only enforcing the civil obligation of
petitioners under their mortgage contract. There is no labor aspect involved in
the enforcement of petitioners' obligation.
In
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),[18] the employees therein who were sales/medical
representatives were allowed to avail of the company's car loan policy. Under the policy, the company advanced the
purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly
deductions from his salary, but the company retained ownership of the motor
vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. Respondents-employees who availed of the car
loan were later dismissed from the service for participating in an illegal
strike. They filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter which dismissed their complaint and
upheld the legality of the employees' dismissal. While the appeal was then pending with the
NLRC, the employees sought a temporary restraining order with the NLRC to stop
Nestle company from canceling their loans and collecting their monthly amortizations
pending the final resolution of their illegal dismissal case. The employees claimed that there was a labor
dispute between them and petitioner Nestle, and that their default in paying
their amortizations was brought about by their illegal dismissal from work by
Nestle as punishment for their participation in the strike; that if they had
not participated in the strike, they would not have been dismissed from work
and they would not have defaulted in the payment of their amortizations. The
employees admitted their civil obligations to the petitioner. We then held that:
Nestl's demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations.
Petitioner Nestl Philippines, Inc. correctly pointed out that:
The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the private respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance on the value of their assigned cars under the company car plan or return the cars to the company for proper disposition; or (2) to pay all outstanding accountabilities to the company - are matters related to the enforcement of a civil obligation founded on contract. It is not dependent on or related to any labor aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them.
As noted, the options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations.
The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC.[19]
In
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. Staff Retirement Plan (HSBC SRP) v. Spouses Broqueza,[20]
which involved the dismissed co-employees of herein petitioner Ana who were
also unable to pay the monthly amortizations of their respective loans, and
despite HSBC SRP's demand for them to pay their loan, they still failed to pay
their loan obligations, We said, among others, that the enforcement of a loan agreement involves debtor-creditor
relations founded on contracts and does not in any way concern employee
relations.
To
reiterate, respondent HSBC SRP and petitioners agreed in their mortgage
contract that HSBC SRP as mortgagee was authorized to foreclose the mortgaged
property in the event that the petitioners-mortgagors failed to pay the sum of
money secured by the mortgage. After petitioners failed to pay upon demand, the
civil obligation of the petitioners under the mortgage contract must be enforced
to protect HSBC SRP's interest in the housing loan. The dismissal of
petitioners' complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure proceedings is,
therefore, valid and proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
Chairperson
MARIA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated
as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per
Special Order No. 1059 dated
** Designated as an additional member,
per Special Order No. 1028 dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas,
concurring; rollo, pp. 24-37.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Records,
pp. 35-36.
[6] Rollo, pp. 41-50; Docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-0518.
[7]
[8] Id at 72-77.
[9]
[10] Records, pp. 335-344.
[11] Rollo, pp. 91-94; Per Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
[12] Records, p. 412.
[13] Rollo, p. 15.
[14] Rollo, p. 51.
[15]
[16] Lotto Restaurant Corporation,
represented by Suat Kim Go v. BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc, G.R. No. 177260, March 30,
2011, citing Ramos v. Sarao, 491
Phil. 288, 300 (2005).
[17]
[18] G.R. No. 85197, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 340.
[19]
[20] G.R.
No.178610,