Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
AGRIPINO V. MOLINA, Petitioner, - versus - PACIFIC PLANS, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165476 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, PEREZ,*
MENDOZA, and SERENO,**
JJ. Promulgated: August 15, 2011 |
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RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution is petitioner's Urgent
Manifestation and Supplemental Motion to Implement the
On March 10, 2006, this Court
promulgated its Decision[2] in the
instant case finding the dismissal of herein petitioner to be illegal and
ordering herein respondent to immediately reinstate petitioner to his former
position as Assistant Vice-President without demotion in rank and salary, and
to pay him his backwages from August 1, 2001 up to his actual reinstatement, as
well as other accrued monetary benefits.
On
Thereafter, upon motion of petitioner,
Executive Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC)-National Capital Region Arbitration Branch issued an Order[4] dated
On P5,494,358.75
representing petitioner's monetary award, consisting, among others, of
backwages, separation pay and overriding commissions, as computed by the CEU.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a Partial
Appeal assailing the
On
In compliance with the Decision of the
NLRC, the CEU submitted its Re-Computation indicating a total award of P4,366,954.80 to petitioner.[6] Both
parties were furnished copies of the said Re-Computation.
Subsequently, pre-execution conferences were held. During the
proceedings, petitioner manifested that he had no objection to the monetary
award as re-computed. However, he claimed that he is entitled to a legal
interest of 12% on the amount due him reckoned from the finality of the P2,259,410.40.
On
P4,366,954.80.
On
December 8, 2008, respondent filed a partial appeal reiterating its stand that
petitioner is not entitled to overriding commissions as well as 12% legal
interest on the amount due him.
Meanwhile,
on
On
On
the other hand, in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the partial appeal filed by respondents is GRANTED IN PART. The
computation of [the] Computation and Examination Unit dated July 8, 2008 is
MODIFIED, in that, the award of overriding commission is DELETED, and
respondents are additionally ordered to pay 12% interest per annum beginning
March 5, 2007 on the monetary award of P2,107,544.40
(excluding vacation and sick leaves), which as of September 5, 2009 amounts to P632,263.32 (P2,107,544.40 x 12% x 2 years and 6
months). Thus, complainant's total monetary award is provisionally computed in
the amount of P2,739,807.72.
Let the records of this case be remanded immediately to the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin for execution proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Both
petitioner and respondent moved for the reconsideration of the abovequoted
Decision.
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by both parties are partly
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Commission dated
A new one is entered
REINSTATING the Computation of Monetary Awards submitted by the Computation and
Examination Unit on
In compliance with the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 14, 2009, the entire records of
this case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter a
quo for the immediate issuance of a writ of execution of complainant's
monetary award totaling P4,366,954.80
SO ORDERED.[11]
On
In
the meantime, petitioner filed the present Motion praying that the June 18,
2010 Resolution of the NLRC be modified to conform to the January 14, 2009
Resolution of this Court by including in the award, aside from the principal
amount of P4,366,954.80,
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from March 5, 2007 until full payment of
the principal amount. Petitioner further prays that, after modification, the
subject NLRC Resolution be immediately executed.
On
The
issues left for resolution now are: (1) whether petitioner is entitled to a
legal interest of 12% on the principal amount due him to be computed from the finality
of the March 5, 2007 Decision until full payment thereof; and (2) whether the
judgment in favor of petitioner may be executed in view of respondent's claim
that it is still undergoing corporate rehabilitation.
The
Court finds the Motion partly meritorious.
With
respect to the matter of legal interest, it should be noted that this Court's
Resolution of P4,366,954.80 granted to him as
monetary award, he should also be awarded legal interest at the rate of 12% per
annum. Hence, the matter of the award of 12% legal interest is already settled.
Nonetheless,
it may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule as enunciated in the
landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[12] thus:
I. When
an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e.,
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title
XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the
measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Article 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[13]
Hence,
the payment of legal interest becomes a necessary consequence of the finality
of the Court's Decision, because reckoned from that time the said Decision
becomes a judgment for money which, under established jurisprudence, earns
interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
With
respect to the issue of execution, the Court notes respondent's contention that
since it is still undergoing corporate rehabilitation the execution of the
judgment in the instant case should be suspended, especially in view of the
fact that a Stay Order was issued by the RTC of Makati City and that the same
has not yet been lifted.
Petitioner
does not dispute respondent's claim of its ongoing corporate rehabilitation.
Neither does he question the existence and validity of the Stay Order issued by
the RTC. The only point he raises, insofar as this issue is concerned, is that
the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, upon which the Stay Order was based,
applies only to claims or cases which are pending before any court tribunal or
board but not to cases which have already been adjudicated, much less to those
where there is already an entry of judgment, as in the present case.
Petitioner's
argument is without merit.
The
Court finds that all pending actions in the instant case, including the
execution of the judgment in favor of petitioner, should be suspended pending
termination of the rehabilitation proceedings.
The
Court's ruling in the more recent case of Castillo v. Uniwide Warehouse Club, Inc.[14] is instructive, thus:
An essential
function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism of suspension of all
actions and claims against the distressed corporation, which operates upon the
due appointment of a management committee or rehabilitation receiver. The
governing law concerning rehabilitation and suspension of actions for claims
against corporations is P.D. No. 902-A, as amended. Section 6(c) of the law
mandates that, upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body, all actions for claims against corporations,
partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before
any court, tribunal, board, or body shall be suspended. It materially provides:
Section 6 (c). x x x
x
x x Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions
for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management
or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body, shall be
suspended accordingly.
In
Finasia Investments and Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 107002, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA
446, 450], the term claim has been
construed to refer to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature, or the assertion
to have money paid. It was referred to, in Arranza
v. B.F. Homes, Inc., [389 Phil. 318],
as an action involving monetary considerations and in Philippine Airlines v. Kurangking [438 Phil. 375], the term was identified as the right
to payment, whether or not it is reduced to judgment, liquidated or
unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or
undisputed, legal or equitable, and secured or unsecured. Furthermore, the
actions that were suspended cover all claims against a distressed corporation
whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases,
collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. More importantly,
the new rules on corporate rehabilitation, as well as the interim rules,
provide an all-encompassing definition of the term and, thus, include all
claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its
property, whether for money or otherwise. There is no doubt that
petitioners claim in this case, arising as it does from his alleged illegal
dismissal, is a claim covered by the suspension order issued by the SEC, as it
is one for pecuniary consideration.
Jurisprudence
is settled that the suspension of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly
applies to all actions for claims filed against a corporation, partnership or
association under management or receivership, without distinction, except only
those expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business. In the oft-cited
case of Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. NLRC
[G.R. No. 126773, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 721], the Court noted that aside from the given exception, the law is
clear and makes no distinction as to the claims that are suspended once a
management committee is created or a rehabilitation receiver is appointed.
Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.
Zamora [G.R. No. 166996, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 584, 605] declares that
the automatic suspension of an action for claims against a corporation under
a rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phases of the
suit, that is, the entire proceedings of an action or suit and not just the
payment of claims.
The
reason behind the imperative nature of a suspension or stay order in relation
to the creditors claims cannot be downplayed, for indeed the indiscriminate
suspension of actions for claims intends to expedite the rehabilitation of the
distressed corporation by enabling the management committee or the
rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any
judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the
rescue of the debtor company. To allow such other actions to continue would
only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver,
whose time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against
the corporation, instead of being directed toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation.[15]
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion is PARTLY GRANTED. The June 18, 2010
Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by including in the award, aside from the principal amount
of P4,366,954.80, interest at
the legal rate of 12% per annum from March 5, 2007, the date the Decision in
the present case became final and executory, until the principal amount is
fully paid.
However,
all proceedings in the instant case, including the execution of the
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE
PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE
CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 1059-b dated August 1, 2011.
** Designated additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.
[1] Rollo, pp. 601-621.
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[12] G.R. No. 97412,
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[14] G.R. No. 169725,
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