Republic
of the
Supreme Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA,
JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Respondent. |
|
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ] Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: April 13, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated
Complainant Monticalbo is one of the
defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money filed by Fatima
Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro,
The case was dismissed by the said court in its
Aggrieved, complainant elevated the
case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian,
In his
Under
the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the proceedings of
this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a prohibited pleading, it will not
suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990,
3rd Division). Since the appealed Order
was received by counsel for the defendants-appellants on
Complainant Monticalbo imputes the
following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent erred in
ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated
by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order; and (3) respondent
accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case
No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff of the trial court
presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the Board and President of
the said cooperative.[8] Complainant further avers that he personally
witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo and his
other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial
court during office hours in the afternoons of
In his Comment and Manifestations dated
The administrative complaint was
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Executive
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among the justices
thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.[13]
On
In
sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of
grave misconduct and corruption.
However, the citation of a non-existent case by the respondent Judge in
his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and
therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a
court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND
STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.[14]
The Court agrees with the findings of
the Investigating Justice.
Grave Misconduct and Bribery
In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that
respondent’s actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were
attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[15] In the absence of such proof, the decision or
order in question is presumed to have been issued in
good faith by respondent judge.[16] This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,[17] where the Court explained:
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance
of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith
or with deliberate intent to do an injustice.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance
of the law can find refuge.[18]
In cases where a judge is charged with
bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can
bad faith or malice be inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by
respondent is adverse to complainant.[19] What constitutes bad faith has been expounded
on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge Indar:[20]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for
ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith
connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
cause damage.[21]
Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust
judgment or order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is
unjust and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the
aggrieved party.[22] Well-established is the rule in
administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the complainant,
who must be able to
support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations against respondent.[23] Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof
required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[24] Failure of the complainant to substantiate
his claims will lead to the dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack
of merit because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption
that a judge has regularly performed his duties will prevail.[25]
In this case, complainant has nothing
but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress his allegations of grave
misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if complainant is to be
believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in drinking sprees with court
employees during office hours. Contrary
to complainant’s statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was
attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions.
Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.[26] Complainant miserably failed to substantiate
his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged hollow suppositions
to shore up his Complaint. Consequently,
this Court has no other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint
for lack of merit.
Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or
omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
people’s faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent
court employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which
has no basis in fact or law.[27] As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in
the case of Francisco v. Leyva,[28]
This Court will not shirk from its responsibility
of imposing discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we
hesitate to shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[29]
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Respondent judge can be held liable
for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.[30] In addition to this, the acts complained of
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.[31]
Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent
judge erred in ruling that his counterclaim for attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure which provides that a
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and will not toll the
running of the period to appeal. To
support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00
limit set in the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Complainant is mistaken.
A cursory reading of Section 1 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly shows that complainant’s claim is
covered by the said rule which reads:
Section 1. Scope. – This rule
shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
x x x
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount
of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
or Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila,
exclusive of interest and costs.
Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as amended by A.M. No.
02-11-09-SC, effective P100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in
charging that respondent’s “knowledge of law fell so short” and that he was
remiss in his obligation to be familiar with the law which “even law students
these days know such x x x.”[32]
For this reason, counsel for complainant
is reminded to choose his words carefully and refrain from hurling insults at
respondent judge especially if, as in this instance, he is obviously mistaken
in his reading of the law. His use of
insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer
to accord due respect to the courts.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that “a
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.”
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge
erred in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.[33] A judge is not required to be faultless
because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of
justice can be infallible.[34] As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be
subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be
shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or
improper considerations.[35]
The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher
courts. The filing of an administrative
case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies
provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions.[36] With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis[37] is
instructive:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in
appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for
new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia
the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion
for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or
proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted
and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an
inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.[38]
Citation of non-existent case
The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a
non-existent case – Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case
number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 – in his questioned Order.
A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has
been promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, “CA
G.R.” And, it cannot be considered a CA
case because the respondent is the “Court of Appeals.” This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard
of competence and integrity expected of those occupying respondent’s judicial
position. A judge must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.”[39] The Code of Judicial Conduct also demands
that he “be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.”[40]
While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without
proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he
is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance
of his official duties.[41] As such, he should always strive to live up
to the strict standards of competence, integrity and diligence in public
service necessary for one in his position.[42] The case of Lacanilao v. Judge
Rosete appropriately states that: “A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no
doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity,
in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.”[43]
It is important to note that
respondent did not offer any explanation for the incorrect citation of the said
case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He should be admonished for his failure to
address this issue, especially as it pertains to the proper execution of his
office.
Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has
been reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him
leniency.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct
and Corruption is hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent
judge is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his
functions and duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-5.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Ang v. Judge Asis, 424 Phil. 105, 115 (2002).
[16] Planas v. Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 300 (2005), citing Osorio v. Judge Dizon, et al,
469 Phil. 819 (2004).
[17] 458 Phil. 11 (2003).
[18]
[19] Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2236,
[20] A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,
[21]
[22] Supra note 15 at 116, citing Naval v. Panday, 341 Phil. 656 (1997).
[23] Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 301 (2005), citing Ong v. Judge Rosete, 484
Phil. 102 (2004).
[24] Office of the Court Administrator v.
Lopez, A.M. No.
P-10-2788,
[25] Ever Emporium, Inc. v. Judge Maceda, 483 Phil. 323, 339 (2004), citing Atty.
Rex J.M.A. Fernandez v. Court of Appeals Associate Justices Eubolo G. Verzola,
Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Mario L. Guariña III,
480 Phil. 1 (2004); Leonides T. Cortes v. Sandiganbayan
Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada and Rodolfo G.
Palattao, 467 Phil. 155 (2004).
[26] De Jesus v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 171491, September 4, 2009, 598
SCRA 341, 350, citing Manalabe v. Cabie,
A.M. No. P-05-1984,
[27] Sarmiento v. Salamat, 416 Phil. 684, 694 (2001), citing Re: Report on the Judicial Audit, RTC Br.
117, Pasay City, 353 Phil. 190 (1998).
[28] Francisco v. Leyva, 364 Phil. 1, 4 (1999).
[29]
[30] Ora
v. Judge Almajar, 509 Phil. 595, 601 (2005), citing Joaquin v. Madrid,
482 Phil. 795 (2004).
[31]
Ocampo v. Bibat-Palamos, A.M. No.
MTJ-06-1655,
[32] Rollo, pp. 3 and 28.
[33] Supra note 18, citing Castaños v. Escaño, Jr., 251 SCRA 174 (1995).
[34] Tan v. Judge Adre, 490 Phil. 555, 562 (2005), citing Villanueva-Fabella v. Lee, 464 Phil. 548 (2004).
[35] Sps.
Daracan v. Judge Natividad, 395
Phil. 352, 365 (2000), citing Guerrero
v. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88 (1998).
[36] Salcedo v. Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236,
[37]
341 Phil. 299 (1997).
[38]
[39] Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.01.
[40] Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[41] Dipatuan v. Judge Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190,
[42] Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1702,
[43]