Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
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ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., |
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G.R. No. 171406 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus- |
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VELASCO, JR., |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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MALAYAN
INSURANCE, CO., INC., Respondent. |
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Promulgated: April 4, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands
reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assails the
Factual
Antecedents
On
On November 21,
1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,[6]
the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic
corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services,[7]
unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to
the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping,
pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.[8] When the unloading of the bags was completed
on
On
On P643,600.25.[12]
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
On
After the filing
of the Answers,[15] trial ensued.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is
rendered ordering defendant Asian Terminal, Inc. to pay plaintiff Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. the sum of P643,600.25 plus interest thereon at
legal rate computed from
The complaint of the
plaintiff against defendants Inchcape Shipping Services and MEC Customs
Brokerage, and the counterclaims of said defendants against the plaintiff are
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Ruling of the Court
of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[23]
to the CA but the appeal was denied. In
its July 14, 2005 Decision, the CA
agreed with the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores in handling and storing the subject shipment.[24] The CA likewise rejected petitioner’s
assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition as this
was belied by Marine Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio and Edgar Liceralde, who
both testified that the actual counting
of bad order bags was done only after all the bags were unloaded from the
vessel and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes (TOSBOC) upon which
petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995 or after
the unloading of the bags was completed.[25] Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.[26]
Petitioner moved
for reconsideration[27]
but the CA denied the same in a Resolution[28]
dated
Issues
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner
contending that:
1. RESPONDENT-INSURER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED AS IT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER SINCE, AS THE
ALLEGED SUBROGEE, IT NEVER PRESENTED ANY
VALID, EXISTING, ENFORCEABLE INSURANCE POLICY OR ANY COPY THEREOF
IN COURT.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TOSBOC & RESBOC WERE ADOPTED AS COMMON EXHIBITS BY BOTH PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT.
3. CONTRARY TO TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD, VARIOUS
DOCUMENTATIONS WOULD POINT TO THE VESSEL’S LIABILITY AS THERE IS, IN THIS
INSTANT CASE, AN OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE DAMAGE IN
QUESTION WERE SUSTAINED WHEN THE SHIPMENT WAS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE VESSEL.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED HEREIN
DEFENDANT LIABLE DUE TO [THE] FACT THAT THE TURN OVER SURVEY OF BAD ORDER
CARGOES (TOSBOC) WAS PREPARED ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE DISCHARGING
OPERATIONS OR ON
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF THE CONTRACT FOR CARGO HANDLING SERVICES BETWEEN PPA AND ATI AND
APPLYING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS THEREOF AS REGARDS ATI’S LIABILITY.[29]
In sum, the issues are: (1) whether the
non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s
cause of action; (2) whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the
shipment was the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores; and (3) whether the court can take judicial notice of
the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.
Petitioner’s
Arguments
Petitioner contends
that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the
insurance contract or policy covering the subject shipment.[30]
Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is not
sufficient to prove that the subject shipment was insured and that respondent
was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee.[31]
Thus, petitioner submits that without
proof of a valid subrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.[32]
Petitioner
likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that
the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores.[33]
Petitioner avers that such finding is
contrary to the documentary evidence, i.e.,
the TOSBOC, the Request for Bad Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey.[34]
According to petitioner, these documents
prove that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition and that no
additional damage was sustained by the subject shipment under its custody.[35]
Petitioner asserts that although the
TOSBOC was prepared only after all the bags were unloaded by petitioner’s
stevedores, this does not mean that the damage/loss was caused by its
stevedores.[36]
Petitioner also claims
that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant
to its Management Contract for cargo handling services with the PPA.[37]
Petitioner contends that the CA should
have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an official act of
an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.[38]
Respondent’s
Arguments
Respondent, on
the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or
policy was not raised in the trial court. Thus, it cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.[39]
Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, presentation
of the insurance policy is not indispensable.[40]
Moreover, with or without the insurance contract or policy, respondent claims
that it should be allowed to recover under Article 1236[41]
of the Civil Code.[42]
Respondent further avers that “the right
of subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote and to
accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good conscience ought to
pay.”[43]
Respondent likewise
maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained
by the subject shipment was caused by the negligent acts of petitioner’s
stevedores.[44] Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by
the CA, are conclusive and should no longer be disturbed.[45]
In fact, under Section 1[46]
of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari.[47]
As to the Management
Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside
the operation of judicial notice.[48]
And even if it is not, petitioner’s liability cannot be limited by it since it
is a contract of adhesion.[49]
Our Ruling
The petition is
bereft of merit.
Non-presentation of the insurance
contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case
Petitioner
claims that respondent’s non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy
between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this
was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed
upon by the parties to be resolved during the pre-trial.[50]
As we have said, “the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference
bars the consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal.”[51]
Thus, “[t]he parties must disclose
during pre-trial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, except those
involving privileged or impeaching matters. x x x The basis of the rule is simple. Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of
the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same.”[52]
Neither was this
issue raised on appeal.[53]
Basic is the rule that “issues or
grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for
to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea
of fair play, justice and due process.”[54]
Besides, non-presentation of the insurance
contract or policy is not
necessarily
fatal.[55] In Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[56]
we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold
that the presentation in evidence of the
marine insurance policy is not indispensable in this case before the insurer may recover from the
common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise of its
subrogatory right. The subrogation
receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of
herein private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the
lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amount paid to settle the
insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the
insurance company of the insurance claim.
The presentation of the insurance policy was
necessary in the case of Home Insurance
Corporation v. CA (a case cited by petitioner) because the shipment therein
(hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties
involved in each stage. First, from the shipper to the port of departure;
second, from the port of departure to the M/S Oriental Statesman; third, from
the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S
Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival; fifth, from the port of arrival to the
arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to the hauler, Mabuhay
Brokerage Co., Inc. (private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler
to the consignee. We emphasized in that case that in the absence of proof of
stipulations to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that
occurred from the time it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to
the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of
the cargo before it actually received it. The insurance contract, which was not
presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of the
insurer’s liability, if any, since no evidence was adduced indicating at what
stage in the handling process the damage to the cargo was sustained.[57]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In International Container Terminal Services,
Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation,[58]
we used the same line of reasoning in upholding the Decision of the CA finding
the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the
insurance company to offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine
insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or
even belatedly before the appellate court. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the presentation of the
marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from
the very existence of an insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its
consignee, ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v.
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the
insurance contract must be presented in evidence in order to determine the
extent of the coverage. This was also the ruling of the Court in Home Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are
admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of
the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly
occurred while on board the petitioner’s vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages
with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the
cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan,
there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while
in petitioner’s custody. Moreover, there is no issue as regards the provisions
of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract
itself is necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already
admitted by petitioner in open court.
And even though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case.[59]
Similarly, in
this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not
necessary. Although petitioner objected to the admission of the Subrogation
Receipt in its Comment to respondent’s formal offer of evidence on the ground
that respondent failed to present the insurance contract or policy,[60]
a perusal of petitioner’s Answer[61]
and Pre-Trial Brief[62]
shows that petitioner never questioned respondent’s right to subrogation, nor
did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity
of the insurance contract or policy, or any provision thereof, respondent had
no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the
trial.
Factual findings of the CA,
affirming the RTC, are conclusive and binding
Petitioner’s
attempt to absolve itself from liability must likewise fail.
Only
questions of law are allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it
is not our duty “to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh all over again the
probative value of the evidence presented,”[63]
especially where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
coincide on the matter.[64] As we have often said, factual findings of
the CA affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding, except in the
following cases: “(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment
of the [CA] is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the [CA], in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(7) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.”[65] None of these are availing in the present
case.
Both
the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores to be the
proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner
that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this to
say:
ATI, however, contends
that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of
record, particularly, the Turn Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-over of
the cargo by the carrier to the arrastre operator ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained
2,702 damaged bags.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to ATI’s
assertion, witness Redentor Antonio, marine cargo surveyor of Inchcape
for the vessel Jinlian I which arrived on November 21, 1995 and up to
completion of discharging on November 28, 1995, testified that it was
only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel that the actual counting
of bad order bags was made, thus:
x x x x
The above testimony of Redentor Antonio was
corroborated by Edgar Liceralde, marine cargo surveyor connected with SMS Average
Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., the company requested by consignee Chemphil
Albright and Wilson Corporation to provide superintendence, report the
condition and determine the final outturn of quantity/weight of the subject
shipment. x x x
x x x x
Defendant-appellant ATI,
for its part, presented its claim officer as witness who testified that a
survey was conducted by the shipping company and ATI before the shipment was
turned over to the possession of ATI and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargoes was prepared by ATI’s Bad Order (BO) Inspector.
Considering that the shipment arrived on November
21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and was completed
on November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes,
reflecting a figure of 2,702 damaged bags, was prepared and signed on November
28, 1998
by ATI’s BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping
company, the trial court’s finding
that the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof by
ATI’s stevedores cannot be said to be without substantial support from the
records.
We thus see no cogent
reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made
liable for the 2,702 bags of damaged shipment.
Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court,
which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the
witnesses. The findings of the trial
court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be reversed on
appeal, unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
We also find ATI liable
for the additional 179 damaged bags discovered upon delivery of the shipment at
the consignee’s warehouse in
The Report states that
the withdrawal and delivery of the shipment took about ninety-five (95) trips
from
We agree with the trial
court that the damage to the shipment was caused by the negligence of ATI’s
stevedores and for which ATI is liable under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. The proximate cause of the
damage (i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and caked/hardened portions of
the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATI’s stevedores, x x
x
x x x x
ATI has not
satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellee’s evidence on the negligence of
ATI’s stevedores in the handling and safekeeping of the cargoes. x x x
x x x x
We find no reason to
disagree with the trial court’s conclusion.
Indeed, from the nature of the [damage]
caused to the shipment, i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or
caked portions of the contents, it is
not difficult to see that the damage caused was due to the negligence of ATI’s
stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions
of the piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage
area of ATI with insufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing]
the contents to cake or harden.[66]
Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of
petitioner’s stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary
evidence. Hence, we see no reason to
disturb the same.
Judicial
notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner
implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01,[67]
Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered
with the PPA, which limits petitioner’s liability to P5,000.00 per
package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it
cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial
notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into
by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can
take judicial notice of. It cannot be
considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended,[68]
is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the
ports in the country.[69]
Obviously, the PPA was only performing a
proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner.
As such, judicial notice cannot be
applied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
SO
ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-149, with Annexes “A” to “M” inclusive.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, p. 134.
[7] Rollo, p. 9.
[8] Records, pp. 134-135.
[9] Rollo, p. 28.
[10] Records, pp. 135-136.
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 28.
[13]
[14]
[15] Records, pp. 19-23, 24-30, and 31-35.
[16] Rollo, pp. 38-44; penned by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar.
[17]
[18]
[19] Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
[20] Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
[21] Rollo, p. 43.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
[42] Rollo, p. 251-252.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46] Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
[47] Rollo, pp. 245-246.
[48]
[49]
[50] III. ISSUES
1. Whether
x x x the defendants are liable to pay the plaintiff the amount of US$456,000.00
representing the amount which plaintiff paid to the consignee;
2. What
is the extent of the damages sustained by the subject shipment?
3. Which
of the defendants is liable to plaintiff for the alleged damages and the extent
of liability?
4. Is
the package limitation contract applicable in the instant case?
5. Under
the Carriage of Goods by Sea [Act] (COGSA), is defendant Inchcape exempted from
damages by virtue of the defense like insufficient packing, the very nature of
the shipment.
6. Is
the defendant Inchcape liable for any damage which may have arisen after the
cargo was discharged from the vessel’s hold or ship’s docket in the case of
Ludo v. Binamira, 101 Phil. 120;
7. Whether
x x x defendant MEC broker had something to do with the unloading of the cargo
from the carrier up to the terminal;
8. Whether
x x x defendant MEC had any participation in the unloading of the cargo to the
warehouse or the place of the consignee;
9. Whether
x x x the alleged loss or damages to the cargo occurred while the shipper was
in transit or after it was unloaded from the carrier;
10. Whether x x x
defendants ATI, Inchcape and MEC are entitled to any form of damages,
specifically the attorney’s fees. (
[51] Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 394, 406 (2004).
[52]
[53] Rollo, p. 121.
[54] Cuenco
v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, Incorporated, G.R. No. 174154,
[55] Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 174116, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 565, 581.
[56] 420 Phil. 824. (2001).
[57]
[58] G.R. No. 161539,
[59]
[60] Rollo, p. 208.
[61] SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. Defendant
ATI, by way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, reiterates and repleads all
the foregoing.
2. Plaintiff
has no cause of action against defendant ATI because the latter was not
negligent in the performance of its duty as an arrastre operator.
3. As
evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, the subject shipment
arrived and was discharged unto the custody of defendant ATI in bad order
condition.
4. The
subject shipment was released/withdrawn from the custody of defendant ATI in
exactly the same quantity and condition as when discharged from the carrying
vessel. Hence, any alleged loss or
damage is no longer the liability of defendant ATI.
5. Under
Section 7.01 of Article VII of the Management Contract between the Philippine
Port[s] Authority and defendant ATI (formerly Manila Ports Services,
Inc.), the liability of the latter in
case of loss, damage or non-delivery of cargoes in its custody and control
shall be limited to PESOS FIVE THOUSAND ONLY (P5,000.00). (
[62] IV. ISSUES
ATI submits that the issues to be
resolved by this Honorable Court are the following:
1.
What is the extent of the damages sustained by the subject shipment?
2.
Which of the defendants is liable for the damages?
3.
Assuming that ATI
is liable for the damages up to how much may it be held liable? (Records, p.
42)
[63] Puno
v. Puno Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 177066,
[64] Dueñas v. Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679,
[65]
[66] Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[67] Section 7.01
Responsibility and Liability for
Losses and Damages; Exceptions – The Contractor shall, at its own
expense, handle all merchandise in all work undertaken by it hereunder,
diligently and in a skillful, workman-like and efficient manner. The Contractor
shall be solely responsible as an independent contractor, and hereby agrees to
accept liability and to pay to the shipping company, consignees, consignors or
other interested party or parties for the loss, damage or non-delivery of
cargoes in its custody and control to the extent of the actual invoice value of
each package which in no case shall be more than FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
each, unless the value of the cargo
shipment is otherwise specified or manifested or communicated in writing
together with the declared Bill of Lading value and supported by a certified
packing list to the Contractor by the interested party or parties before the
discharge or loading unto vessel of the goods.
x x x
[68] Revised
Charter of the Philippine Ports Authority. Promulgated on
[69] SECTION 6. Corporate Powers and Duties. —
a) The corporate duties of the Authority shall be:
x x x x
(ii) To supervise, control, regulate, construct, maintain, operate, and provide such facilities or services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the Authority.
x x x x
b) The corporate powers of the Authority shall be as follows:
x x x x
(vi) To make or enter [into] contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its functions under this Decree.
x x x x.