Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
|
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,
Petitioners,
-
versus - LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. |
G. R. No. 164195
Present:
CORONA,
C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, velasco, JR., *NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, peralta, BERSAMIN, DEL
CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and sereno, JJ. Promulgated: April 5, 2011 |
|
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
||
|
|
||
R E S O L U T I O N
|
||
|
|
||
BRION,
J.:
|
||
We resolve Land
Bank of the Philippines’ (LBP’s) 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration of December 14, 2010 that addresses our Resolutions of
October 12, 2010 and November 23, 2010.
This motion prays as well for the holding of oral arguments. We likewise resolve the Office of the
Solicitor General’s (OSG) Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention
dated February 15, 2011 in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic).
The Motion
for Reconsideration
The LBP submits the following
arguments in support of its 2nd motion for reconsideration:
a) the
test of “transcendental importance” does not apply to the present case;
b) the
standard of “transcendental importance” cannot justify the negation of the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and the abrogation of a vested
right in favor of the Government that respondent LBP represents;
c) the
Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural property must be
viewed in the context of social justice; and
d) granting
arguendo that the interest payment has factual and legal bases, only six
(6%) percent interest per annum may be validly imposed.
We have more than amply
addressed argument (d) above in our October 12, 2010 Resolution, and we see no
point in further discussing it. Without in any way detracting from the
overriding effect of our main and primary ruling that the present 2nd
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited motion that the Court can no longer
entertain, and if only to emphatically signal an unequivocal finis to
this case, we examine for the last and final time the LBP’s other
arguments.
In the course of the Court’s
deliberations, Mr. Justice Roberto A. Abad questioned the application of
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court to the present
2nd motion for reconsideration. He
posited that instead of voting immediately on the present 2nd motion
for reconsideration, the Court should instead first consider the validity of
our October 12, 2010 Resolution; he claimed that this Resolution is null and
void because the Court violated the above-cited provision of the Internal Rules
when it did not first vote on whether the Resolution’s underlying motion
(itself a 3rd motion for reconsideration) should be entertained
before voting on the motion’s merits. We shall lay to rest Mr. Justice Abad’s
observation before dwelling on the merits of the present 2nd motion for
reconsideration.
Our Ruling
We
find no merit in the LBP’s second motion for reconsideration, and reject as
well the Mr. Justice Abad’s observation on how to approach the consideration of
the present motion.
Mr. Justice
Abad’s Observations/Objections;
The Rules
on 2nd Motions for Reconsideration.
Mr. Justice Abad’s observation apparently
stemmed from the peculiar history of the present case.
a. A recap of the history of the case.
This case was originally handled by the Third Division
of this Court. In its original Decision
of February 6, 2007, the Division affirmed the RTC’s decision setting the just
compensation to be paid and fixing the interest due on the balance of the
compensation due at 12% per annum. In
its Resolution of December 19, 2007, the Third Division resolved the parties’
motions for reconsideration by deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of
the awarded just compensation. The parties’ subsequent motions to reconsider
this Resolution were denied on April 30, 2008; on May 16, 2008, entry of
judgment followed. Despite the entry of
judgment, the present petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration
that prayed as well that the case be referred to the Court en banc. Finding merit in these motions, the Third
Division referred the case to the En Banc for its disposition. On December 4, 2009, the Court en banc
denied the petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration. Maintaining their belief in their demand to
be granted 12% interest, the petitioners persisted in filing another motion for
reconsideration. In the interim, the
Court promulgated its Internal Rules that regulated, among others, 2nd
motions for reconsideration. On October
12, 2010, the Court en banc granted – by a vote of 8 for and 4 against –
the petitioner’s motion and awarded the 12% interests the petitioners’ prayed
for, thus affirming the interests the RTC originally awarded. The Court subsequently denied the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, giving rise to the present 2nd
motion for reconsideration. It was at
this point that the OSG moved for leave to intervene.
b. The
governing rules on
2nd motions for reconsideration
The basic rule governing 2nd motions for
reconsideration is Section
2, Rule 52 (which applies to original actions in the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 56) of the Rules of Court.
This Rule expressly provides:
Sec. 2. Second Motion for Reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
The absolute terms of this
Rule is tempered by Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court that provides:
Sec. 3. Second Motion for Reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration “in the higher interest of justice” when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration. [Emphases supplied.]
Separately from these rules is
Article VIII, Section 4 (2) of the 1987 Constitution which governs the
decision-making by the Court en banc
of any matter before it, including a motion for the reconsideration of a
previous decision. This provision
states:
Section 4.
x x x x
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Thus, while the Constitution grants
the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the practice and
procedure in all courts[1]
(and allows the Court to regulate the consideration of 2nd motions
for reconsideration, including the vote that the Court shall require), these
procedural rules must be consistent with the standards set by the Constitution
itself. Among these constitutional
standards is the above quoted Section 4 which applies to “all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc,” and does not make any
distinction as to the type of cases or rulings it applies to, i.e, whether
these cases are originally filed with the Supreme Court, or cases on appeal, or
rulings on the merits of motions
before the Court. Thus, rulings on the
merits by the Court en banc on 2nd
motions for reconsideration, if allowed by the Court to be entertained under
its Internal Rules, must be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations.
When the Court ruled on October 12,
2010 on the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by a vote of 12 Members (8
for the grant of the motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of
the petitioners’ motion. This ruling
complied in all respects with the Constitution requirement for the votes that
should support a ruling of the Court.
Admittedly, the Court did not make
any express prior ruling accepting or
disallowing the petitioners’ motion as required by Section 3, Rule 15 of the
Internal Rules. The Court, however, did
not thereby contravene its own rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; since 12 Members of the
Court opted to entertain the motion by voting for and against it, the Court simply did not register an express
vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through the
participation by no less than 12 of its 15 Members. Viewed in this light, the Court cannot even
be claimed to have suspended the effectiveness of its rule on 2nd
motions for reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a form
other than by express and separate voting.
Based on these considerations,
arrived at after a lengthy deliberation, the Court thus rejected Mr. Justice
Abad’s observations, and proceeded to vote on the question of whether to
entertain the respondents’ present 2nd motion for reconsideration. The vote was 9 to 2, with 9 Members voting
not to entertain the LBP’s 2nd motion for reconsideration. By this vote, the ruling sought to be
reconsidered for the second time was unequivocally upheld; its finality –
already declared by the Court in its Resolution of November 23, 2010 – was
reiterated. To quote the dispositive
portion of the reiterated November 23, 2010 Resolution:
On these considerations, we hereby DENY the Motion for Reconsideration with FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
Thus, this
Court mandated a clear, unequivocal, final and emphatic finis to the present case.
Landowner’s
right to just compensation:
a matter of public interest
In assailing
our October 12, 2010 resolution, the LBP emphasizes the need to respect the
doctrine of immutability of final judgments. The LBP maintains that we should
not have granted the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in our October 12,
2010 Resolution because the ruling deleting the 12% interest had already
attained finality when an Entry of Judgment was issued. The LBP argues, too, that the present case
does not involve a matter of transcendental importance, as it does not involve
life or liberty. The LBP further contends that the Court mistakenly used the
concept of transcendental importance to recall a final ruling; this standard
should only apply to questions on the legal standing of parties.
In
his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Roberto Abad agrees with the LBP’s
assertion, positing that this case does not fall under any of the exceptions to
the immutability doctrine since it only involves money and does not involve a
matter of overriding public interest.
We reject the basic premise of
the LBP's and Mr. Justice Abad’s arguments for being flawed. The present case goes beyond the private
interests involved; it involves a matter of public interest – the proper application
of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner
to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent
domain in its agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the
1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent domain – “Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” While confirming the State’s inherent power
and right to take private property for public use, this provision at the same
time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property pursuant to its
inherent right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the
owner just compensation for the property taken.
For compensation to be considered “just,” it must not only be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken;[2]
it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.[3]
To fully and properly
appreciate the significance of this case, we have to consider it in its proper
context. Contrary to the LBP’s and Mr. Justice Abad’s assertions, the outcome
of this case is not confined to the fate of the two petitioners alone. This
case involves the government’s agrarian reform program whose success largely
depends on the willingness of the participants, both the farmers-beneficiaries
and the landowners, to cooperate with the government. Inevitably, if the government falters or is
seen to be faltering through lack of good faith in implementing the needed
reforms, including any hesitation in paying the landowners just compensation,
this reform program and its objectives would suffer major setbacks. That the government’s agrarian reform program
and its success are matters of public interest, to our mind, cannot be disputed
as the program seeks to remedy long existing and widespread social justice and
economic problems.
In a last ditch attempt to
muddle the issues, the LBP focuses on our use of the phrase “transcendental
importance,” and asserts that we erred in applying this doctrine, applicable
only to legal standing questions, to negate the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. This is a very myopic reading of our ruling as the context clearly
shows that the phrase “transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize
the overriding public interest involved in this case. Thus, we said:
That
the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to
discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no
less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can
compensation in an eminent domain case be “just” when the payment for the
compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does,
that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an
expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets, too,
that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to
government who carries the burden of showing that these standards have been
met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private interest matter is an
extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not leave uncorrected.
x x x x
More than the stability of our
jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the
nation because of the subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a societal
objective of that the government has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past
half century.[4]
From this perspective,
our Resolution of October 12, 2010 only had to demonstrate, as it did, that the
higher interests of justice are duly served. All these, amply discussed in the
Resolution of October 12, 2010, are briefly summarized and reiterated below.
LBP at fault
for twelve-
year delay
in payment
In his dissenting opinion, Mr.
Justice Abad insists that the LBP’s initial valuation of the petitioners’
properties was fully in accord with Section 17 of the CARL. He posits that when
the RTC gave a significantly higher value to these lands, the LBP acted well
within its rights when it appealed the valuation. Thus, to him, it was wrong
for this Court to characterize the LBP’s appeal as malicious or in bad faith.
A simple look at the attendant facts
disproves the accuracy of this claim.
First,
Mr. Justice Abad’s allegation that the LBP correctly valued the petitioners’
properties is not at all accurate.
Significantly, Mr. Justice Abad
does not cite any evidence on record to support his claim that “the Land
Bank valued the lands using the compensation formula that Section 17 of
Republic Act 6657 and the DAR’s implementing rules provide.”[5]
More to the point, this Court has
already determined, in a final and executed judgment, that the RTC’s valuation
of the petitioners’ properties is the correct one. To recall, the LBP initially
fixed the value of Apo Fruits Corporation’s (AFC) properties at P165,484.47 per hectare or P16.00
per square meter (sqm), while it valued Hijo Plantation Inc.’s (HPI) properties at P201,929.97
per hectare, or approximately P20.00/sqm. In contrast, the
Regional Trial Court fixed the valuation of the petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sqm.,
or more than five times the initial valuation fixed by the LBP.
After reviewing the records, this
Court affirmed the RTC’s valuation in its February 6, 2007 decision, noting
that it was based on the following evidence: (a) the Commissioners’ reports,
(b) the Cuervo appraisers’ report, (c) the schedule of market values of the
City of Tagum per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property
Classification, (d) the value of the permanent improvements found on the
expropriated properties, and (e) the comparative sales of adjacent lands from
early 1995 to early 1997. The Court observed that the RTC valuation also took
into consideration the land’s nature as irrigated land, its location along the
highway, market value, assessor’s value, and the volume and value of its
produce. This valuation is fully in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657,
which states:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by government to the
property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
On
its face, the staggering difference between the LBP’s initial valuation
of the petitioners’ properties (totaling P251,379,104.02) and the RTC’s
valuation (totaling P1,383,179,000.00)
– a difference of P1,131,799,895.98 amounting to 81% of the total
price – betrays the lack of good faith on the part of the government in dealing
with the landowners. The sheer enormity of the difference between the two
amounts cannot but lead us to conclude that the LBP’s error was grievous and
amounted to nothing less than gross negligence in the exercise of its
duty – in this case, to properly ascertain the just compensation due to
the petitioners.
Mr. Justice Abad further argues
that interest on just compensation is due only where there is delay in
payment. In the present case, the
petitioners allegedly did not suffer any delay in payment since the LBP made
partial payments prior to the taking of their lands.
This argument completely overlooks
the definition of just compensation already established in jurisprudence. Apart
from the requirement that compensation for expropriated land must be fair and
reasonable, compensation, to be “just,” must also be made without delay.[6] In simpler terms, for the government’s
payment to be considered just compensation, the landowner must receive it in full without delay.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took
the petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only
received full payment of the just compensation due on May 9, 2008.
This circumstance, by itself, already confirms the unconscionable delay in the
payment of just compensation.
Admittedly,
a grain of truth exists in Justice Abad’s observation that the petitioners
received partial payments from the LBP before the titles to their landholdings
were transferred to the government. The full and exact truth, however,
is that the partial payments at the time of the taking only amounted to a
trifling five percent (5%) of the actual value of the expropriated
properties, as determined with finality by this Court. Even taking into
consideration the subsequent partial payments made totaling P411,769,168.32
(inclusive of the amounts deposited prior to the taking), these payments only
constituted a mere one-third (1/3) of the actual value of the petitioners’
properties.
It
should be considered – as highlighted in our October 12, 2010 Resolution – that
the properties the government took were fully operating and earning plantations
at the time of the taking. Thus, the landowners lost not only their properties,
but the fruits of these properties. These were all lost in 1996, leaving the
landowners without any replacement income from their properties, except for the
possible interest for the trifling payment made at the time of the taking that,
together with the subsequent payment, only amounted to a third of the total
amount due. Thus, for twelve long years,
the amount of P971,409,831.68 was withheld from the landowners.
An added dimension to this delayed
payment is the impact of the delay. One impact – as pointed out above – is the loss of income the landowners suffered. Another impact that the LBP now glosses over
is the income that the LBP earned from
the sizeable sum it withheld for twelve long years. From this perspective,
the unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust enrichment in its favor and an
inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what the Court
essentially addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12% interest.
Mr. Justice Abad goes on to argue
that the delay should not be attributed to the LBP as it could not have foreseen
that it would take twelve years for the case to be resolved. Justice Abad’s
stance could have been correct were it not for the fact that the delay in this
case is ultimately attributable to the government. Two significant factors justify the attribution
of the delay to the government.
The first is the DAR’s gross
undervaluation of the petitioners’ properties – the government move that
started the cycle of court actions.
The
second factor to consider is government inaction. Records show that after
the petitioners received the LBP’s initial valuation of their lands, they filed
petitions with the DARAB, the responsible agency of the DAR, for the proper
determination of just compensation. Instead of dismissing these petitions
outright for lack of jurisdiction, the DARAB sat on these cases for three
years. It was only after the petitioners resorted to judicial intervention,
filing their petitions for the determination of just compensation with the RTC,
that the petitioners’ case advanced.
The
RTC interpreted the DARAB’s inaction as reluctance of the government to pay the
petitioners just compensation, a view this Court affirmed in its October 12,
2010 Resolution.
Expropriation
for agrarian reform
requires
the payment of just compensation
The LBP claims that the just compensation in this case should be
determined within the context of the article on social justice found in the
1987 Constitution. In the LBP’s opinion, when we awarded the petitioners 12%
interest by way of potential income, we removed from the taking of agricultural properties for agrarian reform
its main public purpose of righting the wrong inflicted on landless
farmers.
By this argument, the LBP effectively attempts to make a distinction
between the just compensation given to landowners whose properties are taken
for the government’s agrarian reform program and properties taken for other
public purposes. This perceived distinction, however, is misplaced and is more
apparent than real.
The constitutional basis for our agrarian reform program is Section 4,
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which mandates:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm
workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation.
This provision
expressly provides that the taking of land for use in the government’s agrarian
reform program is conditioned on the payment of just compensation.
Nothing in the wording of this provision even remotely suggests that the just
compensation required from the taking of land for the agrarian reform program
should be treated any differently from the just compensation required in any
other case of expropriation. As explained by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
[T]he term “just compensation” is used in several
parts of the Constitution, and, therefore, it must have a uniform meaning. It
cannot have in one part a meaning different from that which appears in the
other portion. If, after all, the party whose property is taken will receive
the real value of the property on just compensation, that is good enough.[7]
In fact, while a proposal was
made during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give a
lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission
never intended to give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in
the expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.[8]
To our mind, nothing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of
land reform and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for the
expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are
corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken against
them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz
eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice - or any justice for that matter - is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.[9]
Interest payments borne by government,
not by farmers-beneficiaries
Nor do we find any merit
in the LBP’s assertion that the large amount of just compensation that we
awarded the petitioners, together with the amount of interest due, would
necessarily result in making the farmers- beneficiaries endure another form of
bondage – the payment of an exorbitant amount for the rest of their lives.
As the petitioners correctly pointed out, the government’s liability for
the payment of interest to the landowner for any delay attributable to it in
paying just compensation for the expropriated property is entirely separate and
distinct from the farmers-beneficiaries’ obligations to pay regular
amortizations for the properties transferred to them.
Republic Act No. 6657 (The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL)
provides for the specific source of funding to be used by the government in
implementing the agrarian reform program; this funding does not come directly
from the payments made by the farmers-beneficiaries.[10]
More to the point, under the CARL, the amount the farmers-beneficiaries
must pay the LBP for their land is, for the most part, subsidized by the State
and is not equivalent to the actual cost of the land that the Department of
Agrarian Reform paid to the original landowners. Section 26, Chapter VII of the CARL
provides:
SEC. 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. - Lands awarded
pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in
thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The
payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at reduced
amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first five (5)
annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the
annual gross productions paid as established by the DAR. Should the
scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10) of the
annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to
the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the
principal obligation to make the payment affordable.
Interpreting this
provision of the law, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1993 provides:
A.
As
a general rule, land awarded pursuant to E.O. 229 and R.A. 6657 shall be repaid
by the Agrarian Reform Beneficiary (ARB) to LANDBANK in thirty (30) annual
amortizations at six (6%) percent interest per annum. The annual amortization shall
start one year from date of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA)
registration.
B.
The
payments by the ARBs for the first three (3) years shall be two and a half
percent (2.5%) of AGP [Annual Gross Production] and five percent (5.0%) of AGP
for the fourth and fifth years. To further make the payments affordable, the
ARBs shall pay ten percent (10%) of AGP or the regular amortization, whichever
is lower, from the sixth (6th) to the thirtieth (30th)
year.
Clearly, the payments made by the farmers-beneficiaries
to the LBP are primarily based on a fixed percentage of their annual
gross production, or the value of the annual yield/produce of the land
awarded to them.[11]
The cost of the land will only be considered as the basis for the payments made
by the farmers-beneficiaries when this amount is lower than the amount based on
the annual gross production. Thus, there is no basis for the LBP to claim that
our ruling has violated the letter and spirit of the social justice provision
of the 1987 Constitution. On the contrary, our ruling is made in accordance
with the intent of the 1987 Constitution.
Motion for Oral
Arguments
We deny as well the LBP’s motion to set the case for oral
arguments. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the case,
have already provided this Court with enough arguments and particulars to rule
on the issues involved. Oral arguments at this point would be superfluous and
would serve no useful purpose.
The OSG’s
Intervention
The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has
been amply protected through the direct action of petitioner LBP – the
government instrumentality created by law to provide timely and adequate
financial support in all phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian
reform. The OSG had every opportunity to
intervene through the long years that this case had been pending but it chose
to show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence can only serve
to delay the final disposition of this case.
The arguments the OSG presents, furthermore, are issues that this Court
has considered in the course of resolving this case. Thus, every reason exists
to deny the intervention prayed for.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the respondent’s second motion for reconsideration and the motion
to set the case for oral arguments are hereby DENIED WITH ABSOLUTE
FINALITY. The motion for
intervention filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is, likewise,
denied. We reiterate, under pain
of contempt if our directive is disregarded or disobeyed, that no further
pleadings shall be entertained. Let judgment be entered in due course.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I
join the dissent of Justice Abad
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
|
|
No Part, prior inhibition ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice (I join the dissent of J. Abad) PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice I maintain my vote for reduced interest
rate TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice Please see my dissenting
opinion ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice (On leave) ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice |
Associate Justice
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Section 5.
(5) Promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
[2] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla,
G.R. No. 157206, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 102, 116-117.
[3] Land Bank v. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
148892, May 6, 2010.
[4] In our resolution dated
October 12, 2010.
[5] Justice Abad’s Dissent, p.
2.
[6] Land Bank v. Rodriguez,
G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010.
[7] III Record at 17, cited in Bernas, SJ. The
Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 948.
[8] Id. at 947; III Record at 17, where
the Commissioners, in discussing just compensation within the context of
properties expropriated for redistribution to farmers in pursuance of agrarian
reform, stated thus:
Fr. Bernas: We discussed earlier
the idea of a progressive system of compensation and I must admit, that it was
before I discussed it with Commissioner Monsod. I think what is confusing the
matter is the fact that when we speak of progressive taxation, we mean the
bigger the tax base, the higher the rate of tax. Here, what we are saying is
that the bigger the land is, the lower the value per square meter. So, it is
really regressive, not progressive.
Mr. Monsod: Yes, Madam
President, it is true. It is progressive with respect to the beneficiary and
regressive with respect to the landowner.
Fr. Bernas: But is it the
intention of the Committee that the owner should receive less than the market
value?
Mr. Monsod: It is not the
intention of the Committee that the owner should receive less than the just
compensation.
[9] Gelos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616.
[10] Section 63 of
Republic Act No. 6657 provides:
Section 63. Funding Source.- The
initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period of ten (10) years
upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund created
under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 229.Additional amounts are
hereby authorized to be appropriated as and when needed to augment the Agrarian
Reform Fund in order to fully implement the provisions of this Act.
Sources of
funding or appropriations shall include the following:
(a) Proceeds of the sales of the
Assets Privatization Trust;
(b) All receipts from assets
recovered and from sale of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government;
(c) Proceeds of the disposition of
the properties of the Government in foreign countries;
(d) Portion of amounts accruing to
the Philippines from all sources or official foreign aid grants and
concessional financing from all countries, to be used for the specific purposes
of financing production credits, infrastructures, and other support services
required by this Act;
(e) Other government funds not
otherwise appropriated.
All funds
appropriated to implement the provisions of this Act shall be considered
continuing appropriations during the period of its implementation.
[11] DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
1993 defines Annual Gross Production (AGP) as the “peso (P) value of the annual
yield/produce per hectare of the land awarded to farmer-beneficiaries (as
established jointly by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land
Bank of the Philippines [LBP] during the valuation process) which is reflected
in the valuation portion of the Claims Valuation and Processing Form.