SECOND DIVISION
|
Philippine
Long Distance
Telephone Company [PLDT], Petitioner, - versus - Roberto R. Pingol, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 182622 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: September 8, 2010 |
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D
E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
which seeks to reverse and set aside: (1) the December 21, 2007 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98670, affirming
the November 15, 2006[2]
and January 31, 2007[3]
Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC); and (2) its April 18, 2008 Resolution[4]
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
THE FACTS
In 1979, respondent Roberto R. Pingol (Pingol) was hired by petitioner PLDT as
a maintenance technician.
On
From
On
Pingol, however, countered that in
computing the prescriptive period, the years 2001 to 2003 must not be taken
into account. He explained that from 2001 to 2003, he was inquiring from PLDT about
the financial benefits due him as an employee who was no longer allowed to do
his work, but he merely got empty promises. It could not, therefore, result in abandonment
of his claim.
On
As correctly cited by (PLDT),
as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Callanta vs. Carnation Phils., 145
SCRA 268, the complaint for illegal dismissal must be filed within four (4)
years from and after the date of dismissal.
Needless to state, the money
claims have likewise prescribed.
Article 291 of the Labor Code
provides:
‘All
money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing from the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time
the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.’
WHEREFORE,
let this case be, as it is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
Pingol appealed to the NLRC arguing
that the 4-year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed because PLDT failed to
categorically deny his claims. The NLRC
in its
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED and the Order appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly,
let the entire records of the case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter a quo for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[8]
PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
NLRC in its Resolution dated
Unsatisfied, PLDT elevated the case to
the CA by way of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in
issuing the assailed resolutions.
The CA denied the petition in its
WHEREFORE, the Petition for
Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.[9]
PLDT moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated
THE ISSUES
Not in conformity with the ruling of the CA, PLDT seeks
relief with this Court raising the following issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF
THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[10]
The issues
boil down to whether or not respondent Pingol filed his complaint for
constructive dismissal and money claims within the prescriptive period of four
(4) years as provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code[11]
and three (3) years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code,[12]
respectively.
Petitioner PLDT
argues that the declaration under oath made by respondent Pingol in his complaint
before the LA stating January 1, 2000 as the date of his dismissal, should have
been treated by the NLRC and the CA as a judicial admission pursuant to Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.[13]
According to petitioner, respondent has
never contradicted his admission under oath.
On the basis of said declaration, petitioner posits that the LA was correct in finding that Pingol’s
complaint for illegal dismissal was filed beyond the prescriptive period of
four (4) years from the date of dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the New
Civil Code.
In his Comment,[14]
respondent Pingol counters that petitioner PLDT could not have sent those notices
with warning as that claim “has never been supported by sufficient proof not
only before the Labor Arbiter but likewise before the Court of Appeals.”[15] He further alleges that his dismissal is likewise
unsupported by any evidence. He insists
that both the NLRC and the CA correctly stated that his cause of action has not
yet prescribed as he was not formally dismissed on
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Parties apparently do not dispute the applicable
prescriptive period.
Article 1146 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1146. The following
actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff;
xxx xxx xxx
As this Court
stated in Callanta v. Carnation,[16]
when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of
livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal
from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of
the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four (4) years.
With regard to
the prescriptive period for money claims, Article 291 of the Labor Code states:
Article 291. Money Claims. – All money
claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity
of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be barred forever.
The pivotal
question in resolving the issues is the date when the cause of action of
respondent Pingol accrued.
It is a settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has
three (3) elements, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.[17]
Respondent asserts
that his complaint was filed within the prescriptive period of four (4)
years. He claims that his cause of
action did not accrue on
Petitioner PLDT, on the other hand, contends that
respondent Pingol was dismissed from the service on
The Court agrees with petitioner PLDT. Judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive
and so does not require further evidence to prove them. These admissions cannot be contradicted
unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.[18] In Pepsi Cola Bottling Company v. Guanzon,[19] it was written:
xxx that the dismissal of the private
respondent's complaint was still proper since it is apparent
from its face that the action has prescribed. Private respondent himself alleged in the complaint
that he was unlawfully dismissed in 1979 while the complaint was filed only on
In the case at bench, Pingol himself alleged the
date
The Labor Code
has no specific provision on when a claim for illegal dismissal or a monetary
claim accrues. Thus, the general law on
prescription applies. Article 1150 of
the Civil Code states:
Article
1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when
there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (Emphasis supplied)
The day the
action may be brought is the day a claim starts as a legal possibility.[21] In the present case,
Respondent claims
that between 2001 and 2003, he made follow-ups with PLDT management regarding
his benefits. This, to his mind, tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
The rule in this regard is covered by Article
1155 of the Civil Code. Its
applicability in labor cases was upheld in the case of International Broadcasting
Corporation v. Panganiban[22] where it was
written:
Like
other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to
interruption, and in the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision for
determining whether the said period may be
interrupted, Article 1155 of the Civil Code may be
applied, to wit:
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they
are filed before the Court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
Thus,
the prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action,
(b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written
acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
In this case, respondent Pingol never made any written
extrajudicial demand. Neither did petitioner make any written
acknowledgment of its alleged obligation. Thus, the claimed “follow-ups” could not have
validly tolled the running of the prescriptive period. It is worthy to note that respondent never
presented any proof to substantiate his allegation of follow-ups.
Unfortunately, respondent Pingol has no one but himself
to blame for his own predicament. By his
own allegations in his complaint, he has barred his remedy and extinguished his
right of action. Although the Constitution is committed to the policy of social
justice and the protection of the working class, it does not necessary follow that
every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights. Out of Its concern for the less privileged in
life, this Court, has more often than not inclined, to uphold the cause of the
worker in his conflict with the employer. Such leaning,
however, does not blind the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for
the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
applicable law and doctrine.[23]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A
T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo pp. 134-140. Penned by Associate Justice Japar D. Dimaampao with Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III and Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Art. 1146. The following
actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) upon
an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. xxx
[12] Article 291. Money claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
[13] Sec. 4. Judicial admissions.—An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
[14] Rollo pp. 62-76.
[15]
[16] 229 Phil. 279, 289 (1986).
[17]“J” Marketing Corporation v. Taran, G.R.
No. 163924, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 428, 440, citing Auto Bus Transport
Systems, Inc. v. Baustista, 497 Phil. 863 (2005).
[18] Damasco v. NLRC, 400 Phil. 568, 586 (2000), citing Philippine
American General Insurance Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434,
August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194.
[19] 254 Phil. 578, 586 (1989).
[20] Rollo, p. 124.
[21] Anabe v. Asian Construction, G.R. No. 183233,
[22] G.R. No. 151407,
[23] Maribago Bluewater Beach Resort, Inc. v. Dual, G.R. No.
180660,