THIRD DIVISION
EUGENIO FELICIANO, substituted by his wife CEFERINA DE
PALMA- FELICIANO, ANGELINA DE LEON, representing the heirs of ESTEBAN FELICIANO, TRINIDAD VALIENTE, AND
BASILIA TRINIDAD, represented by her son DOMINADOR T. FELICIANO, Petitioners, - versus - |
G.R.
No. 161746 Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO,
JJ. |
PEDRO CANOZA, DELIA FELICIANO, ROSAURO FELICIANO, ELSA
FELICIANO AND PONCIANO FELICIANO, Respondents. |
Promulgated: September
1, 2010 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA,
JR., J.:
Before the Court is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated June 26, 2003 and Resolution[2]
dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61888. The CA had
reversed the Decision[3]
dated
The facts are as follows:
When Antonio Feliciano passed away on
During his lifetime, Jacinto
Feliciano applied for a free patent over the portion of land he bought,
declaring that the same was a public land, first occupied and cultivated by
Pedro Feliciano.[8] Jacinto was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4)
012293 on
On October 18, 1993, Eugenio
Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de Leon, surviving heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad
Feliciano-Valiente and Basilia Feliciano-Trinidad, surviving children of the
late Doroteo Feliciano, filed a complaint[12]
against Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the
late Jacinto Feliciano, namely Delia, Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all
surnamed Feliciano, for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title,
Recovery of Real Property and Damages.
They alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale were done
without their participation and consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the ancestral home
of the Felicianos is erected on the subject property and that they have
occupied the same since birth. Canoza and Jacinto falsely declared that the
property was not occupied, so their titles to the property should be declared
null and void on the ground that they have made false statements in their
respective applications for free patent.
On
In their Answer,[14]
respondent Pedro Canoza and his spouse, respondent Delia Feliciano, alleged
that they were buyers in good faith and for value. They likewise contended that assuming that
there was preterition of legal heirs, they never took part in it. As affirmative
defenses, they alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action; the lower court had no jurisdiction as the
subject of the case were free patents and therefore prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies was required; the case was prematurely filed; no effort
was exerted towards a settlement; plaintiffs’ right has prescribed; Eugenio
Feliciano was a mere squatter who should be ordered to vacate; the deed of sale
was validly, genuinely and duly executed; Eugenio and Angelina were guilty of
misleading the court because there were other heirs who were indispensable
parties but who were not included; and Presidential Decree No. 1508 or the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
was not resorted to by plaintiffs.
Respondents Rosauro Feliciano, Elsa
Feliciano and Ponciano Feliciano likewise filed an Answer[15]
containing the same allegations and defenses as respondents Pedro Canoza and
Delia Feliciano. The other defendants, Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano and
Nardo Feliciano were declared in default.
On
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, as follows:
1. Declaring the extra-judicial settlement of estate of Antonio Feliciano null and void;
2. Declaring the sale of the property in question to Pedro Canoza, Felisa Feliciano and Jacinto Feliciano null and void;
3.
Declaring the original certificate of Title No. 364 in
the name of Pedro Canoza and the certificates of titles in the name of
defendants over
4. Ordering defendants to reconvey ownership and possession of said property to plaintiffs subject to a just and equitable partition thereof by and between all interested parties.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The trial court explained that by
operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) have as much right as
Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina Feliciano to inherit the property in question,
and they cannot be deprived of their right unless by disinheritance for causes
set forth in the law. When Leona Feliciano,
Pedro Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and Salina Feliciano appropriated the disputed
lot solely to themselves through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they
committed a fraudulent act. To the extent that Doroteo and Esteban were
deprived of their rightful share, the said out-of-court settlement was annullable,
said the trial court. The trial court
also declared that Pedro Canoza was not a buyer in good faith of Leona and
Maria’s shares. Records show that Pedro
Canoza’s live-in partner, Delia Feliciano, was a relative of the petitioners and
the other defendants; thus, he could be reasonably charged with the knowledge
of petitioners’ status vis-à-vis the
subject property. The acquisition by
Canoza and Jacinto Feliciano of free patent titles over portions of the
contested lot also did not legitimize their ownership thereof, as they acquired
no greater rights over the property than their predecessors-in-interest, having
merely stepped into their shoes.[17]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to
the CA with the following assignment of errors:
I. THE
LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT “B”)[;]
II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF ANTONIO FELICIANO (EXHIBIT “B”)[;]
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT “C”) IN FAVOR OF JACINTO FELICIANO, FELISA FELICIANO AND PEDRO CANOZA[;]
IV. THE
V.
THE
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 3, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 (XI), Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 819-M-93 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint is ordered DISMISSED for being time-barred.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The
CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v. Court
of Appeals,[20]
which held that the applicable prescriptive period to annul a deed of
extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. It reasoned that when petitioners filed the
instant complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of Antonio
Feliciano’s estate, more than four (4) years had elapsed from the issuance of
the free patents. As regards the portion claimed by the late Jacinto Feliciano,
sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free patent was issued to him
before petitioners filed the complaint, while in the case of Canoza, fourteen (14)
years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patent in Canoza’s favor. Hence,
according to the CA, the action for the annulment of the documents had
prescribed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied by the CA in the Resolution dated
Hence, this petition.
The grounds relied upon by the
petitioners are the following:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING THE APPEAL BY ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION HAS NOT BEEN RAISED ON APPEAL AS AN ISSUE, NOR ASSIGNED AS AN ERROR, NOR DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS AMONG THE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED;
B. ASSUMING THAT PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION MAY BE TAKEN AS A GROUND FOR DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT EVEN IF NOT RAISED ON APPEAL, NOR ASSIGNED AS AMONG THE ERRORS COMMITTED, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS, OR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTION IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.[21]
Essentially,
the issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in reversing the trial
court’s decision.
Petitioners
allege that the CA gravely erred in granting the appeal and in dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription of action because that issue was never
raised on appeal, nor defined as one (1) of the issues outlined and limited in
the pre-trial order.
We
do not agree.
While
respondents have not assigned the defense of prescription in their appeal
before the CA, they raised such defense in their
Moreover, Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that when it appears from
the pleadings or the evidence on record that the action is already barred by the
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Thus, in Gicano
v. Gegato,[23]
we held:
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred x x x; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record: either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. (Underscoring supplied.)
But did the CA nonetheless commit
error when it held that the applicable prescriptive period is four (4) years?
Petitioners argue that the CA
erroneously treated the action they filed at the trial court as one (1) for
annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and applied the four (4)-year
prescriptive period in dismissing the same.
They contend that the action they
filed was one (1) for Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Titles, Recovery
of Real Property and Damages, and as such, their action was imprescriptible
pursuant to Article 1410[24]
of the Civil Code.
Respondents,
for their part, maintain that the CA did not err in holding that the deed of
extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge of the partition and did not consent thereto, is merely fraudulent
and not void. They stress that the
action to rescind the partition based on fraud prescribes in four (4) years
counted from the date of registration, which is constructive notice to the
whole world.
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and
Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by
In Gerona v. De Guzman,[26] respondents therein executed a deed
of extrajudicial settlement declaring themselves to be the sole heirs of the
late Marcelo de Guzman. They secured new
transfer certificates of title in their own names, thereby excluding the
petitioners therein from the estate of the deceased. The petitioners brought an action for the
annulment of the said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. The Court held,
Inasmuch as petitioners seek
to annul the aforementioned deed of “extra-judicial settlement” upon the ground
of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four
(4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva,
L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in
the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.[27] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
Evidently,
the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of
extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud
as held in the case of
WHEREFORE,
the petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED.
The Decision dated
With costs
against petitioners.
SO
ORDERED.
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
MARIA Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 879 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 32-44. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4] Also spelled as “Bonga” in some parts of
the records.
[5] Records, pp. 9-10.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 43.
[10] Records, pp. 15-16.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[17]
[18] CA rollo, pp. 55-56.
[19] Rollo, p. 43.
[20] G.R. No. 118680,
[21] Rollo, p. 19.
[22] Records, p. 42.
[23] No.
L-63575,
[24] ART. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
[25] Pedrosa
v. Court of Appeals, supra at 628, citing Villaluz v. Neme, No.
L-14676,
[26]
No.
L-19060,
[27]
[28] Supra note 26.