Republic of the
Supreme Court
ABRAHAM KAHLIL
B. MITRA,
Petitioner, -
versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES and ORLANDO R. BALBON,
JR., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 191938
Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, *CARPIO MORALES, velasco, JR., NACHURA, leonardo-de castro, brion, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, *ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., perez, mendoza, and sereno, JJ. Promulgated: October 19, 2010 |
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E S O L U T I O N
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BRION, J.:
We
resolve the Motion for Reconsideration[1]
filed by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments[2]
filed by private respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July 19,
2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010[3]
(July 2, 2010 Decision or Decision). We annulled in this Decision the February 10,
2010 and May 4, 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private
respondents’ petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B.
Mitra (Mitra).
The Assailed Ruling
To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited
certiorari jurisdiction in election
cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally
bound to intervene when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion – in this case, a
situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the
COMELEC, mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction. Based on our evaluation of the evidence
presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate
material misrepresentation in his COC.
We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its appreciation
of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of
Aborlan, Palawan. We also found that the
COMELEC failed to critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible
for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his
Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan,
we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of
transfer of residence which the private respondents’ evidence failed to
sufficiently controvert. Specifically,
the private respondents’ evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto
Princesa City resident.
In this regard, we took note of the “incremental moves” Mitra undertook to
establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following: (1) his expressed
intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make
him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in
early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his
initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the
purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house
on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the
completion of his house. Thus, we found that under the situation prevailing
when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any
misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence
in Aborlan. We also emphasized that the
COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used
subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitra’s
statement in his COC concerning his residence was indeed a
misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded
that the evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra
indeed transfered his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the
period required by law.
The Motions for Reconsideration
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010,
the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider
our July 2, 2010 Decision on the sole ground that:
THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
REVIEWED THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN
FACTUAL FINDINGS OVER THAT OF [THE] PUBLIC RESPONDENT.[4]
The COMELEC argues that we overstepped our review power over
its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and
conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of
finality. The COMELEC also contends that
the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since the issues
raised therein are essentially factual in nature. It
claims that it is elementary that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to correcting
questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are
not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari.
On the merits, the COMELEC submits that there is substantial,
if not overwhelming, evidence that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan,
Palawan. It argues that it merely took
cognizance of Mitra’s purported dwelling’s “habitableness,” or lack thereof, to
determine the fact of residency; while Mitra may have exhibited his intention
to transfer his domicile, the fact of actual residency was lacking.
For their part, the
private respondents raise the following errors in support of their Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments dated July 20, 2010, viz:
I.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
EXERCISING THIS HONORABLE COURT’S LIMITED CERTIORARI JURISDICTION EVEN WHEN THE
PETITION, ON ITS FACE, FAILED TO SHOW HOW THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
II.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY USING
SUBJECTIVE AND NON-LEGAL STANDARDS IN ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY
MITRA.
III.
GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING
THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ONE ASPECT OF ITS
RESOLUTION, THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NONETHELESS CONSIDER WHETHER THE OTHER
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED ARE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE RULING OF THE COMELEC.
A.
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
NECESSARY TO OVERTURN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COMELEC SHOULD BE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE. WHEN THE EVIDENCE
OF [THE] PETITIONER ARE UNSUBSTANTIATED AND CONTROVERTED, THE SAME FAILS TO
REACH THE QUANTUM OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUBSTITUTE THE FINDINGS OF THE COMELEC.
IV.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
FOCUSING ON THE COMELEC’S OPINION REGARDING THE PHOTOGRAPHS SUBMITTED BY MITRA
OF HIS SUPPOSED RESIDENCE, WHILE TOTALLY DISREGARDING OTHER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED
BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND CONSIDERED BY THE COMELEC.
A.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE WHICH SHOWS THAT THE SAME
IS ONLY UP TO 28 FEBRUARY 2010.
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING EVIDENCE WHICH SHOW THAT MITRA FAILED TO ABANDON HIS DOMICILE OF
ORIGIN.
V.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT MITRA HAD TRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM HIS DOMICILE OF ORIGIN IN
VI.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT MITRA DID NOT COMMIT ANY DELIBERATE MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN
HIS COC.
A.
THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN
PETITIONER’S COC RESPECTING HIS RESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSE STATEMENT, PETITIONER
DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO MISINFORM THE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL
RESIDENCE. HENCE, HIS COC WAS CORRECTLY
DENIED DUE COURSE AND CANCELLED.
B.
THE MAJORITY ERRED IN
EXONERATING MITRA FROM THE VIOLATION OF A MANDATORY PROVISION OF LAW WHICH
ENTAILS BOTH ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES BY INVOKING THE PURPOSE OF
THE LAW WHERE SUCH RESORT IS NOT CALLED FOR IN VIEW OF THE GIVEN FACTS AND EVIDENCE
PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
VII.
JURISPRUDENCE RELIED ON BY
THE MAJORITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
A.
THE CASE OF TORAYNO V.
COMELEC IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
B.
THE CASE OF ASISTIO V.
TRINIDAD PE-AGUIRRE IS LIKEWISE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
C.
THE CASE OF VELASCO SHOULD
BE APPLIED STRICTLY TO THE PRESENT CASE.[5]
Our Ruling
We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for
reconsideration and for oral arguments.
We note at the outset
that the COMELEC and private respondents’ arguments are mere rehashes of their
previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we
already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents
failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments
proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’ original
submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do
not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall require.
Having
said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the
motions touched upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.
First, both the COMELEC and the private
respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize
that Mitra’s petition failed to allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the
COMELEC’s findings of fact to be final and non-reviewable.
The
COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of
questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are
not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari – is wholly erroneous.
This submission appears to have confused the standards of the Court’s
power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the
COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitra’s petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case
before us via a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.
Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our review (under
the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not under the Rule 45
question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground, i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of
whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The basis for the Court’s review of COMELEC
rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which provides that “[U]nless otherwise provided by [the]
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” For this reason, the Rules
of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This
Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari,
subject to the exception clause – “except as hereinafter provided.”[6]
In Aratuc
v. Commission on Elections[7]
and Dario v. Mison,[8]
the Court construed the above-cited constitutional provision as relating to the
special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 (although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule
65, except as therein provided. In Ocate v. Commission on Elections,[9]
we further held that:
The purpose of a petition for
certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The
COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself,[10] in defining judicial power, pointedly states
that –
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything
else, identifies the power and duty of
this Court in grave abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this
authority from the power of review by appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
defines.
Based on these considerations, we
cannot accept the COMELEC’s position that patently confuses the mode of review
in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the
appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
We likewise reject the COMELEC and
the private respondents’ proposition that the Court erred in exercising its
limited certiorari jurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final
arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution[11]
and the Rules of Court[12]
provide, we stress that in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our
constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away from intervention
simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve the
factual issues.
As we emphasized in our Decision, we
have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule that the Court
ordinarily does not review in a certiorari
case the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. One such exception is when the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion
to the point of being grossly unreasonable.
In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to intervene
and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of
discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitra’s
submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion, namely, that the
COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC
proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false
material representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitra’s petition plainly argued that
the COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider
that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the
process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every
step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of the evidence.
Second, the
private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-legal
standards (i.e., interior decoration
of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely stated how it perceived
Mitra’s alleged residence. The private
respondents additionally claim that the quantum of evidence necessary to overturn
the findings of the COMELEC should be clear and convincing evidence, which
level of evidence does not obtain in the present case.
The assailed COMELEC ruling speaks
for itself on the matter of the standards the COMELEC used. We found that the COMELEC plainly used a
subjective non-legal standard in its analysis and thereby, the COMELEC used
wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitra’s residence at
the Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence contemplated by law.
We reiterate that the COMELEC based
its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the
photographs of Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed
premises could not have been a residence because of its assessment of the
interior design and furnishings of the room.
Thus, the COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not merely
conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this,
it ruled that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for
lack of the qualities of a home that the Second Division wanted to see. To quote:
The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed “residence” are telling. The said pictures show a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is located on the second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse. These pictures likewise show that the “residence” appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any [personality] which would have imprinted Mitra’s personality thereto such as old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. In fact, an appreciation of Mitra’s supposed “residence” raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there. Verily, what is lacking therein are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence. Perhaps, at most, and to this Commission’s mind, this small room could have served as Mitra’s resting area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.
This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and customers of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitra’s residence is located in an unsavory location, considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had been Maligaya Feed Mill’s office just a few months back, militates against Mitra’s claim that the same has been his residence since early 2008. These information make it clear to this Commission that this room is not a home.[13]
Thus presented, the COMELEC’s
requirement of what should be considered a “residence” cannot but be a highly
subjective one that finds no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.
Third, we
cannot likewise agree with the private respondents’ theory that the quantum of
evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be
clear and convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the
COMELEC’s findings because it used the wrong considerations in arriving at its
conclusions.
The private respondents fail to
realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to
questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main
critical points are the alleged deliberate
misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in
Aborlan, Palawan.
While it is undisputed that Mitra’s
domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by
substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning
2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.
As our Decision discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution,
the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence
that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly
misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the
submitted evidence.
To convince us of their point of
view, the private respondents point out that we (1) totally disregarded the other
evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other hand, properly
considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease
contract, which showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and
(3) disregarded the evidence showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile
of origin.
These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly
considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this point, we only need to address some
of the private respondents’ misleading points in order to clear the air.
1. The
private respondents’ reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to
disprove Mitra’s claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence,
is misplaced. This argument is flimsy
since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred
and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the
parties. That a lease is fixed for a
one-year term is a common practice. What
is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the
parties, the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed.[14]
2.
In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto
Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for
Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitra’s alleged Puerto
Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
dated February 3, 2009[15]
allegedly showing Mitra’s signature. To
recall, we found that based on the
records before us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the
signature of Mitra. Although the private
respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently submitted colored copy of the
February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding; the “alleged
signature” appears to us to be a mere
hazy “superimposition” that does not bear any resemblance at all to
Mitra’s signature. We, thus, stand by
our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little
evidentiary value. It did it not at all
carry Mitra’s signature; his secretary’s positive testimony that she secured
the CTC for Mitra, without the latter’s participation and knowledge, still stands
unrefuted.
3.
The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification,
dated July 17, 2010,[16]
from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not
have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission
was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in
Aborlan. The Certification pertinently
states:
This
is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration
in our office regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub,
Aborlan, Palawan. However, the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of
gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value
Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida Subdivision, Puerto Princesa City for whatever legal purposes may serve him best.
We cannot give any evidentiary value
to this submission for two reasons. First, it was filed only on
reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was
submitted for resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed
late, the Certification does not prove anything; it is, on its face,
contradictory. On the one hand, it
categorically states that there are no existing records of any pineapple
plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it also
expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is “on the
process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High
Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.”[17] Under what law or regulation the certifying
office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural business interests
in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we
reiterate that Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in the
present case. Not only was Mitra able to
present photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of
ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo
Temple and other witnesses.
4.
The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that
Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. We likewise see no merit in this claim. One important point in the present case is
that the private respondents failed to prove that there was deliberate material
misrepresentation in Mitra’s statement on his required residency prior to the
May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap
in the private respondents’ case:
We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitra’s favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of an equipoise, i.e., when weighed, Mitra’s evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents’ evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.
The character of Mitra’s representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitra’s feedmill residence. For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error – one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment. By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation in Mitra’s COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.
The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.
We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELEC’s use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitra’s feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his house. These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC’s highly subjective non-legal standards do.
Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.[18]
5.
The private respondents submit that the Court erred in relying on
jurisprudence (Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC[19]
and Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre[20])
not applicable to the present case. They
additionally argue that our ruling in Velasco
v. COMELEC[21] should be applied strictly to the
present case.
These submissions are wrong, as they do not
consider the purposes and the specific points of law for which we cited these
cases. Torayno, Asistio and Velasco, read in their proper
perspective, fully support our findings and conclusions in this case.
While Torayno
does not share the exact factual situation in the present case, we cited
the case to illustrate that it is not unknown in this jurisdiction to have a
situation where a candidate, due to legal developments (such as
reclassification of a component city to a highly urbanized city), is compelled
to transfer residence to allow him to continue his or her public service in
another political unit that he or she cannot legally access as a candidate,
without a change of residence. In the
present case, as in Torayno, Mitra
would not have had any legal obstacle to his gubernatorial bid were it not for
the reclassification of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly
urbanized city. The adjustment he had to
make was solely in his residence, as he already had, as a Puerto Princesa City
resident, knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the Palawan
electorate.
The factual antecedents of Asistio are likewise not exactly the same as the facts of the
present case, but the Court’s treatment of the COC inaccuracies in Asistio fully supports our conclusion
that Mitra has established his Aborlan domicile. In Asistio,
we held that Asistio’s mistake in his residency statement in his COC “is not
sufficient proof that he has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that
he has established residence outside of Caloocan City.”[22] In the present case, Mitra did not commit any
inaccuracies in his COC. In fact, any
inaccuracy there may have been was committed by third persons on documents
(such as the building permit, contract of sale of the Temple property, and his
CTC) that do not have any bearing on his candidacy. Under these circumstances, we would apply a
harsher rule to Mitra if we conclude that he has not established his Aborlan
domicile.
Our July 2, 2010 Decision finds
commonality with our ruling in Velasco
in the recognition, in both cases, of the rule of law. But as we explained in our Decision, the
similarity ends there as the facts to which the law was applied differed. We thus ruled:
These cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v. COMELEC where the COMELEC cancelled the COC of Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis of his undisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC, that his inclusion and registration as a voter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a material fact that he had clearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the denial of his application to register and yet concealed his non-voter status when he filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed the COMELEC’s action in cancelling his COC.
If there is any similarity at all in Velasco and the present case, that similarity is in the recognition in both cases of the rule of law. In Velasco, we recognized – based on the law – that a basic defect existed prior to his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and the vice-mayor-elect’s assumption to the office. In the present case, we recognize the validity of Mitra’s COC, again on the basis of substantive and procedural law, and no occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post.[23]
To summarize, both the COMELEC and private
respondents have not shown, through their respective motions, sufficient
reasons to compel us to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010 Decision.
Other Developments,
Issues and Rulings
In the course of the Court’s
consideration of this case, a dissent was entered that contained its own
arguments on why our Decision of July 2, 2010 should be reversed. For a complete treatment and presentation of
the issues raised, the arguments in the dissent and the refutation are
discussed below, separately from the arguments the COMELEC and private
respondents themselves raised.
First, the dissent asserts that our conclusion that
the private respondents’ evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto
Princesa City resident is “way off point” since the private respondents showed,
as the COMELEC has found, that Mitra could not have stayed and resided at the
mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill located at Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
Palawan.[24] In concluding that Mitra remained to be a
Second, the
dissent faults us for not giving weight to the sworn statements of Maligaya
Feed Mill’s customers and former employees, who testified that Mitra did not
reside at the mezzanine portion of the Feed Mill. It emphasizes the undisputed point that the
room at the mezzanine neither has the usual comfort room nor a kitchen
area. Additionally, it argues that we
conveniently failed to cite any statutory standard with respect to the
determination of whether Mitra’s alleged residence constitutes a “residence” as
defined by law.[26]
Third, the
dissent submits that we gravely erred
“in giving credence to Mitra’s gratuitous claims of business interests in
Aborlan Palawan” to justify our finding that “Mitra’s transfer of residence was
accomplished not in one single move but, through an incremental process.”[27] It notes that Mitra failed to submit material
proofs to prove his substantial business interests in Aborlan,
Fourth, the dissent argues that we erred in
unduly relying on the “dubious” lease contract for being ante-dated. It stresses that the ponencia unreasonably gave credence to the lease contract despite
“indicators” of its invalidity, which should have forewarned the Court that the
same is not what it purports to be.[30] It also adds that our justification that the
lease contract by law may be impliedly renewed from month to month lacks
factual basis, since Mitra himself, in his Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 13, 2010 before the COMELEC en
banc, stated that “he had moved to his own new house physically residing in
his newly completed home in Aborlan.”[31]
Fifth, the dissent implores the Court to
apply to the present case our June 15, 2010 Decision in G.R. No. 192127, Mario Joel T. Reyes v. Commission on
Elections and Antonio V. Gonzales,[32]
where we resolved to dismiss Reyes’ petition via a minute resolution for failure to sufficiently show that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Reyes’ COC for his
deliberate misrepresentation on his transfer and establishment of a new
residence in Aborlan, Palawan.
Finally, the dissent submits that the mere
fact that Mitra won in the May 10, 2010 gubernatorial elections cannot
disregard the mandatory one-year residency requirement to qualify as a
gubernatorial candidate. It cites our
ruling in Velasco v. Commission on
Elections,[33]
where we ruled that the provisions on material qualifications of elected
official should always prevail over the will of the electorate in any given
locality; to rule otherwise, would be “to slowly gnaw at the rule of law.”
These arguments are addressed in the
same order they are posed under the topical headings below.
The
private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence
that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
The
evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports
our conclusion that the private respondents’ evidence failed to show that Mitra
remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately
proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to
Aborlan beginning 2008, concluding his transfer in early 2009. Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies
with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
Proof to the contrary is sadly
lacking, as the dissent’s reliance on the Certification of the Punong Barangay
of Sta. Monica,
This is to CERTIFY that ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, is a bonafide resident of Purok El Rancho this (sic) Barangay.
CERTIFIES FURTHER, that on February 3, 2009, he secure (sic) community tax certificate in this Barangay with CTC No. 16657723.[34]
To be sure, a bare certification – in
a disputed situation – cannot suffice to conclusively establish the existence
of what the certification alleged. The purported CTC, on the other hand, was
neither signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication
that it had been adopted and used by Mitra as his own. In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly
emphasized that the Puerto Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all,
carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia Camora’s (Mitra’s secretary)
positive declaration that she was the one who procured it, while Mitra’s
Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitra’s own signature. Camora fully
explained the circumstances under which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009
and her statement was never disputed.
On the other hand, Commodore
Hernandez’ declaration on its face did not controvert Carme E. Caspe’s sworn
statement which adequately proved that Mitra’s transfer to Aborlan was
accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that
started in early 2008 and concluded in March 2009. Thus, we emphasized in our Decision:
A sworn statement
that has no counterpart in the respondents’ evidence in so far as it provides details
(particularly when read with the statement of
The
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence
and in using wrong considerations which lead it to incorrectly conclude that
Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate
misrepresentation in his COC.
Contrary to the
dissent’s view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmill’s customers and
former employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine
portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these
statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight and
credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E.
Caspe’s testimony, cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a
process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental
process that started in early 2008. It
is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger
than negative testimony.[36]
Additionally, we
noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, as
it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence clearly pointed to fact
that Mitra effectively transferred his residence to Aborlan, viz:
Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra made definite, although incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed business interests he has established in Aborlan in 2008; by lease of a dwelling he established his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take care of, and who was establishing at the same time his significant presence in the whole Province of Palawan.[37]
The
dissent’s observation that the ponencia
conveniently failed to cite any statutory standard with respect to the
determination of whether Mitra’s alleged residence constitutes a “residence” as
defined by law is simply not true.[38] Our July 2, 2019 Decision was particularly
sensitive to the matter of standards, as we noted that the COMELEC used
personal and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitra’s dwelling when,
in fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e.,
the dwelling must be where a person permanently intends to return and to
remain. Thus, we held:
In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused solely on its consideration of Mitra’s residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs of the premises. In the COMELEC’s view (expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra’s residence because it is cold and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s personality and that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence. This was the main reason that the COMELEC relied upon for its conclusion.
Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a person’s residence based solely on very personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial.[39]
To buttress our finding that the
COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment standards instead of the
standards prescribed by law, we cited Coquilla
v. COMELEC,[40]
which characterized the term residence as referring to “domicile” or legal residence, that is
“the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain (animus manendi).
Mitra’s
business interests in Aborlan remain undisputed and are supported by the
evidence on record.
The
dissent’s view that Mitra’s business interests are not supported by the
evidence on record is not accurate. As
discussed above and in our July 2, 2010 Decision, Mitra’s business interests in
Aborlan stand undisputed in the present case.
On the one hand, the private respondents failed to present any iota of
evidence to disprove Mitra’s claims that he had significant investments in
Aborlan, such as the expiremental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and
cock farm.
On the other hand, Mitra submitted
photographs[41]
of his experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm to
prove his business interests in Aborlan.
Carme E. Caspe’s and Ricardo Temple’s statements also corroborated
Mitra’s claim that he owns the pineapple plantation which is located in a
property near the Maligaya Feedmill. In
this regard, Carme E. Caspe’s sworn statement pertinently declared:
3. Since 2001, Congressman Mitra has been
frequently visiting my farm and we often meet at the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm
located along National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya, Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
4. Sometime in January 2008, Congressman Mitra together with his brother Ramon B. Mitra and his Chief of Staff, Atty. Winston T. Gonzales and some of their friends started an experimental pineapple growing project in a rented farmland located near the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm.
5. At about the time that they started the
pineapple project, Congressman Mitra and Ramon Mitra would from time to time
stay overnight in the residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill located along
National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya, Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
6. Sometime in February 2008, inasmuch as Congressman Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra and Ramon B. Mitra would want to permanently stay in Aborlan, as Congressman Mitra would want to be nearer and have easier access to the entire 2nd Congressional District and as they intend to invest in a chicken layer venture in Aborlan in addition to their pineapple project, we ented onto a contract of lease covering the residential portion of the Maligaya Feedmill as their residence, a chicken layer house and a growing house for chickens. We also agreed that Congressman Mitra has the option to purchase a portion of the Feedmill where he can erect or contruct his own house if he so desires later.
7. Congressman Mitra, pursuant to our agreement, immediately renovated and refurbished the residential part in a portion of the Feedmill and as of March 2008 he started to occupy and reside in the said premises bringing with him some of his personal belongings, clothes and other personal effects.
10. That in January 2009, Congressman Mitra
decided to purchase a nearby farmland located behind the
11. Sometime in May 2009, Congressman Mitra caused the construction of a house and established a game fowl/fighting cock farm in the lot that he purchased but he continued to reside in the Maligaya Feedmill up to the present.[42]
The photographs of the experimental pineapple
plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm, coupled with the sworn statements of
Carme E. Caspe and Ricardo Temple, substantially prove the existence of Mitra’s
business interests in Aborlan. Thus,
Mitra’s failure to submit permits or licenses, tax declarations, real estate
tax payments and other proofs of commercial transactions does not negate the
fact that he has substantial business interests in Aborlan as he claims.
Incidentally, the dissent’s
invocation of the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence[43]
is erroneous, since it does not arise when the evidence is at the disposal of
both parties. [44]
In the present case, the required proofs of commercial transactions the dissent
cites are public documents which are at the disposal of both parties; they are
not solely under the custody of Mitra and can be easily obtained from the
municipal offices of Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do
so. The bottom line is that no such
evidence was ever presented in this case, and none can and should be considered
at this point.
The
validity or invalidity
of
the lease contract is not determinative of question of Mitra’s residence in
Aborlan.
Beyond
the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is
significant for purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to the
present case. As we emphasized in our
Decision:
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he indeed resided there. The notary’s compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties’ affirmation before a notary public of the contract’s genuineness and due execution.[45]
The
dissent’s thesis – that Mitra’s allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration
(dated February 13, 2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already transferred to the newly constructed
house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible
from month to month - is misleading. The
significance of Mitra’s statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he had
already transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be read
in isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitra’s explicit
intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through an incremental
transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
(1) his initial transfer through the
leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill;
(2) the purchase of a lot for his
permanent home; and
(3) the construction of a house on
this lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the
completion of his house.
All these should of course be read
with the establishment of Mitra’s business interest in Aborlan and his transfer
of registration as a voter.
Reyes
v. Commission on Elections is not applicable in the present case.
In invoking the applicability of our
June 15, 2010 ruling in Reyes v.
Commission on Elections, the dissent cites the “explanatory note” penned by
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales recommending the dismissal of Reyes’
petition. The explanatory note states:
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (1) actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that the petitioner had not sufficiently established a change of his domicile from Coron, Palawan, his domicile of origin, to Aborlan, Palawan, his supposed domicile of choice, for failure to show, among others things, (1) actual presence at Aborlan, Palawan, and (2) abandonment of his residence at Coron, Palawan. It thus correctly relied on the Court’s pronouncement in Dumpit-Michelena v. Boado that without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of the requirements for a change of domicile, the domicile of origin continues.
Reading Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code with the constitutional qualifications for a Member of the House of Representatives, petitioner’s false representation in his COC regarding his residence, which affects his qualifications, gave cause for the COMELEC to cancel the same.[46]
On
June 15, 2010, the Court issued a Minute Resolution dismissing Reyes’ petition,
which states:
The Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for failure thereof to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Commission on Elections in rendering the challenged resolutions which, on the contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.[47]
This
Resolution found no grave abuse of discretion and upheld the March 25, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division[48]
and May 7, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC en
banc.[49] In
this March 25, 2010 Resolution, the COMELEC Second Division found:
An evaluation, however, of the evidence presented by the parties vis-ŕ-vis the three requirements for a successful change of domicile would show that the petitioner is correct.
First, the alleged residence of respondent is a mere beach house or a lodging house with a roof made of pawid as shown in the Declaration of Real Property of Clara Espiritu Reyes, the wife of the respondent. This description of the property is confirmed by two photographs attached to the Memorandum of the petitioner. By its very nature, a beach house is a mere temporary abode, a lodging house where people stay merely as transients. It is not meant to be a permanent place to live in. As the Supreme Court declared in Dumpit Michelena v. Boado, a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation and it can hardly be considered a place of residence. With this kind of property, it can scarcely be said that respondent has the intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite period of time.
Second,
respondent has failed to show actual presence at his domicile of choice. Respondent himself admitted that he goes only
to Aborlan whenever he gets reprieves from work as most of the time he stays at
Third,
respondent failed to show that he already cut his ties with Coron,
Respondent tried to wiggle out from this tight spot by explaining that it was secured by his secretary, who through force of habit inadvertently got it for him. However, such explanation proved futile when respondent was confronted with the fact that he still used the said CTC in establishing his identity when he signed a Special Power of Attorney on January 12, 2009 and when he signed a contract in behalf of the Palawan Provincial Government on August 10, 2009 even when he has supposedly secured another CTC from Aborlan on April 7, 2009.
Thus, even in August of 2009, less than a year prior to the May 10, 2010 election, respondent still portrayed himself as a resident of Coron. The intention then to abandon the said place as his domicile is wanting.
Based on the foregoing discussions alone, it is at once apparent the three-point requirements for the abandonment of a domicile and the establishment of a new one do not concur in the case of the respondent.[50]
Contrary
to the dissent’s view, no parallelism can be drawn between this ruling and the
present case, so that this ruling cannot apply to the latter.
First, the
dissent’s citation of Justice Carpio-Morales’ explanatory note recommending the
dismissal of Reyes’ petition cannot be considered a precedent that should be
made applicable to the present case. The
explanatory note, while reflective of the Court’s thinking, is not a decision
nor an opinion of the Court. It remains
what its description connotes – an explanatory note provided by one Justice and
approved by the Court – and nothing more; what binds the Court is its
pronouncement that no grave abuse of discretion transpired in the COMELEC’s
consideration of the case. Under this legal situation, what assumes
significance are the COMELEC Resolutions that the Court effectively upheld when
it issued the June 15, 2010 Minute Resolution dismissing Reyes’ petition.
Second, the
factual circumstances in Reyes are
entirely different from the present case; no parallelism can be drawn so that
the application of the ruling in Reyes cannot
be bodily lifted and applied to Mitra.
In Reyes, the COMELEC ruled
that Reyes committed a material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared
that his residence is Tigman, Aborlan,
In contrast, we found in the present
case that Mitra did not deliberately misrepresent his Aborlan residence to
deceive or mislead the Palawan electorate since he in fact adduced positive
evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents failed to
sufficiently controvert. In this regard,
we noted with emphasis that Mitra undertook “incremental moves” to his new
domicile in Aborlan as evidenced by the following: (1) his expressed intent to
transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible
for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008;
(3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial
transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a
lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot
which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion of his
house.[52] The issue regarding Mitra’s CTC, too, was
satisfactorily explained and is far different from the obtaining facts in the
case of Reyes.
No
occasion exists to apply the rule of the primacy of the will of people since
Mitra did not commit any deliberate misrepresentation; in fact, he proved that
he transferred his residence to Aborlan within the period required by law.
The dissent contends that Mitra’s
election as Governor “did not render the present case moot and academic or lift
the statutory one-year residency requirement for him to qualify for the
gubernatorial post.”[53] The dissent apparently perceives Mitra’s
electoral victory as a major consideration in our Decision of July 2,
2010. Unfortunately, the dissent is mistaken
in its appreciation of the thrust of our Decision; we in fact ruled that no
reason exists to appeal to the primacy of the electorate’s will since Mitra did
not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC. We said:
We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate. Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people.
Quite recently, however, we warned against a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling, as it may carry dangerous significance to the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information for an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office. Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we thus made the following clarification:
We
distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past
by the clarification that COC defects beyond
matters of form and that involve material
misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC
mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after
the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath
is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as
well with an assault on the will of the people of the
Earlier, Frivaldo v. COMELEC provided the following test:
[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. [Emphasis supplied.]
With the conclusion that Mitra did not
commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case
to appeal to the primacy of the electorate’s will. We cannot deny, however, that the people of
Under
these terms, we cannot be any clearer.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and
motion for oral arguments now before us.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I maintain my dissent
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice I dissent
(please see dissenting opinion)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice (on leave) ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice I join the
dissent of J. Velasco, Jr. JOSE
Associate Justice |
(on leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1176-1185.
[2] Id. at 1188-1250.
[3] Id. at 1123-1154.
[4] Id. at 1176.
[5] Id. at 1198-1200.
[6] Pates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 481. Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.”
[7] Nos. L-49705-09 and L-49717-21, February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.
[8] G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84.
[9] G.R. No. 170522, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 426, 437.
[10] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2.
[11] Article IX(C), Section 2(2), par. 2, of the 1987 CONSTITUTION provides: “Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.”
[12] Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provides: “[f]indings of fact of the [COMELEC], supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.”
[13] Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[14] See Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
[15] Annex “1” of the Private Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration dated July 20, 2010; rollo, p. 1253.
[16] Annex “2” of the Private Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration dated July 20, 2010; id. at 1254.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Id. at 1146-1148.
[19] G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574.
[20] G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010.
[21] G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590.
[22] Supra note 20.
[23] Rollo, p. 1150.
[24] Justice Velasco’s Dissenting Opinion, p. 3.
[25] Id. at 3-4.
[26] Id. at 7.
[27] Id. at 7-8.
[28] Id. at 8-9.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Id. at 11.
[32] In a Resolution dated August 3, 2010, the Court resolved to deny with finality the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Mario Joel T. Reyes.
[33] Supra note 21.
[34] Rollo, p. 136.
[35] Id. at 1144-1145.
[36] Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118231, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 334.
[37] Rollo, p. 1146.
[38] Justice Velasco’s Dissenting Opinion, p. 7.
[39] Rollo, pp. 1145-1146.
[40] G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607, 616, citing Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, 420 (1995).
[41] Mitra also submitted the sworn affidavit dated December 9, 2009 of Ryan A. Natividad (Natividad) who personally took the photographs. Natividad narrated:
1. On
08 December 2009, I personally went to Sitio Tagpit and Sitio Maligaya, both in
Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
2. In particular, I took photographs in the (a) the pineapple and corn farm of Congressman Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra in Sito Tagpit; (2) Maligaya Feedmill and the residential unit within the Feedmill located along National Hi-way, Sitio Maligaya and (3) the gamefowl and/or fighting cock farm and house under construction of Congressman Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra.
3. I caused the printing of the photographs of I (sic) took.
4. There are a total of forty (40) photographs and each photograph bears my signature and the date shown thereon.
5. I am executing this affidavit to prove that the printed photographs attached herewith with my signature and date thereon are faithful and unaltered images of the photographs I personally took and cause to be printed. Rollo, p. 199.
[42] Rollo, p. 730.
[43] Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
x x x x
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
x x x x
[44] People v. Navaja, G.R. No. 104044, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 624.
[45] Rollo, p. 1144.
[46] Cited in Justice Velasco’s Dissenting Opinion, p. 11.
[47] G.R. No. 192127, Mario Joel T. Reyes v. The Commission on Elections and Antonio V. Gonzales, rollo, p. 548.
[48] Id. at 39-56.
[49] Id. at 57-63.
[50] Id. at 48-50.
[51] G.R. Nos. 163619-20, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290.
[52] See p. 3 of this Resolution.
[53] Justice Velasco’s Dissenting Opinion, p. 12.
[54] Rollo, pp. 1151-1152.