SECOND
DIVISION
|
SHS PERFORATED
MATERIALS, INC., WINFRIED HARTMANNSHENN, and HINRICH
JOHANN SCHUMACHER, Petitioners, - versus - MANUEL
F. DIAZ, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 185814 Present: VELASCO,
JR.,*J., Acting
Chairperson, MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: October 13, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners, by
way of this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, seek to
annul and set aside the December 23, 2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100015, which reversed
and set aside the
THE FACTS
Petitioner SHS
Perforated Materials, Inc. (SHS) is a start-up corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the
Manuel F. Diaz
(respondent) was hired by petitioner SHS as Manager for Business Development on
probationary status from P100,000.00. Respondent’s
duties, responsibilities, and work hours were described in the Contract of
Probationary Employment,[5]
as reproduced below:
NAME : Jose
Manuel F. Diaz
TITLE/STATUS : Manager for Business Development
LOCATION :
Industrial
Park II, Calamba, Laguna
REPORTS
TO : Direct to Mr. Winfried
Hartmannshenn
Normal
Working Hours :
subject
to requirements of the job
OVERTIME : ________________________
JOB
DESCRIPTION AND RESPONSIBILITIES:
DAILY/GENERAL
DUTIES:
(a)
Represent the company in any event
organized by PEZA;
(b)
Perform sales/marketing functions;
(c)
Monitor/follow-up customer’s inquiry on
EMPLOYER’s services;
(d)
Monitor on-going job orders/projects;
(e)
Submit requirements as needed in
application/renewal of necessary permits;
(f)
Liaise closely with the other commercial
and technical staff of the company;
(g)
Accomplish PEZA documents/requirements
for every sales made; with legal assistance where necessary at EMPLOYER’s
expense; and
(h)
Perform other related duties and
responsibilities.
OTHER
RESPONSIBILITIES:
(a)
abide by and perform to the best of his
abilities all functions, duties and responsibilities to be assigned by the
EMPLOYER in due course;
(b)
comply with the orders and instructions
given from time to time by the EMPLOYER, INC. through its authorized
representatives;
(c)
will not disclose any confidential
information in respect of the affairs of the EMPLOYER to any unauthorized
person;
(d)
perform any other administrative or
non-administrative duties, as assigned by any of the EMPLOYER’s representative
from time to time either through direct written order or by verbal assignment.
The EMPLOYER may take into account EMPLOYEE’s training and expertise when
assigning additional tasks.
AGREED:
(sgd.
Manuel Diaz).
In addition to
the above-mentioned responsibilities, respondent was also instructed by
Hartmannshenn to report to the SHS office and plant at least two (2) days every
work week to observe technical processes involved in the manufacturing of perforated
materials, and to learn about the products of the company, which respondent was
hired to market and sell.
During
respondent’s employment, Hartmannshenn was often abroad and, because of
business exigencies, his instructions to respondent were either sent by
electronic mail or relayed through telephone or mobile phone. When he would be in
the
During meetings
with the respondent, Hartmannshenn expressed his dissatisfaction over
respondent’s poor performance.
Respondent allegedly failed to make any concrete business proposal or
implement any specific measure to improve the productivity of the SHS office
and plant or deliver sales except for a meagre P2,500.00 for a sample product.
In numerous electronic mail messages, respondent acknowledged his poor
performance and offered to resign from the company.
Respondent,
however, denied sending such messages but admitted that he had reported to the
SHS office and plant only eight (8) times from July 18, 2005 to November 30,
2005.
On
On
The next day, on
This
is to tender my irrevocable resignation from SHS Perforated Materials, Inc,
Philippines, effective immediately upon receipt of my due and demandable salary
for the period covering November 16 to 30, 2005, which
has yet been unpaid and is still currently being withheld albeit illegally. This covers
and amounts to the sum of Php50,000.00 pesos net of all taxes. As my employment
contract clearly shows I receive a monthly salary of Php100,000.00 net of all
taxes.
It
is precisely because of illegal and unfair labor practices such as these
that I offer my resignation with neither regret nor remorse.[6]
In the evening
of the same day,
Petitioners
averred that respondent was unable to give a proper explanation for his
behavior. Hartmannshenn then accepted respondent’s resignation and informed him
that his salary would be released upon explanation of his failure to report to
work, and proof that he did, in fact, work for the period in question. He
demanded that respondent surrender all company property and information in his
possession. Respondent agreed to these “exit” conditions through electronic
mail. Instead of complying with the said conditions, however, respondent sent
another electronic mail message to Hartmannshenn and Schumacher on
Respondent, on
the other hand, claimed that the meeting with Hartmannshenn took place in the
evening of December 1, 2005, at which meeting the latter insulted him and
rudely demanded that he accept P25,000.00
instead of his accrued wage and stop working for SHS, which demands he refused.
Later that same night, he sent Hartmannshenn and Schumacher an electronic mail
message appealing for the release of his salary. Another demand letter for
respondent’s accrued salary for November 16 to
To settle the
issue amicably, petitioners’ counsel advised respondent’s counsel by telephone
that a check had been prepared in the amount of P50,000.00, and was
ready for pick-up on
Respondent countered that his counsel received
petitioners’ formal reply letter only on
On
THE RULING OF THE LABOR
ARBITER
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring complainant as having been
illegally dismissed and further ordering his immediate reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and benefits. It is also ordered that complainant be
deemed as a regular employee. Accordingly, respondents are hereby ordered to
jointly and severally pay complainant the following
1. P704,166.67
(P100,000.00 x 6.5 + (P100,000.00 x 6.5/12) as backwages;
2. P50,000.00 as
unpaid wages;
3. P37,083.33 as
unpaid 13th month pay
4. P200,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages;
5. P99,125.00 as
attorney’s fees.
SO
ORDERED.[8]
The LA found
that respondent was constructively
dismissed because the withholding of his salary was contrary to Article 116
of the Labor Code as it was not one of the exceptions for allowable wage
deduction by the employer under Article 113 of the Labor Code. He had no other alternative but to resign
because he could not be expected to continue working for an employer who
withheld wages without valid cause. The LA also held that respondent’s
probationary employment was deemed regularized because petitioners failed to
conduct a prior evaluation of his performance and to give notice two days prior
to his termination as required by the Probationary Contract of Employment and
Article 281 of the Labor Code. Petitioners’ contention that they lost trust and
confidence in respondent as a managerial employee was not given credence for
lack of notice to explain the supposed loss of trust and confidence and absence
of an evaluation of respondent’s performance.
The LA believed
that the respondent complied with the obligations in his contract as evidenced
by his electronic mail messages to petitioners. He ruled that petitioners are jointly
and severally liable to respondent for backwages including 13th month
pay as there was no showing in the salary vouchers presented that such was
integrated in the salary; for moral and exemplary damages for having in bad
faith harassed respondent into resigning; and for attorney’s fees.
THE RULING OF THE NLRC
On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
in its
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The
Decision dated
(1) dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal for want of merit;
(2) dismissing
the claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees for lack of factual and legal basis; and
(3) ordering
respondents to pay the complainant’s unpaid salary for the period covering
SO ORDERED.[9]
The NLRC
explained that the withholding of respondent’s salary was a valid exercise of
management prerogative. The act was deemed justified as it was reasonable to
demand an explanation for failure to report to work and to account for his work
accomplishments. The NLRC held that the respondent voluntarily resigned as
evidenced by the language used in his resignation letter and demand letters.
Given his professional and educational background, the letters showed
respondent’s resolve to sever the employer-employee relationship, and his
understanding of the import of his words and their consequences. Consequently,
respondent could not have been regularized having voluntarily resigned prior to
the completion of the probationary period. The NLRC further noted that
respondent’s 13th month pay was already integrated in his salary in
accordance with his Probationary Contract of Employment and, therefore, no
additional amount should be due him.
On
THE RULING OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS
The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions in its
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the herein petition is GRANTED and the 29 December 2006
Resolution of the NLRC in NLRC CN RAB-IV-12-21758-05-L, and the 23 May 2007
Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, a new judgment is hereby entered in that petitioner is
hereby awarded separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay, and his
full backwages, other privileges and benefits, or their monetary equivalent
during the period of his dismissal up to his supposed actual reinstatement by
the Labor Arbiter on 15 June 2006.
SO
ORDERED.[10]
Contrary to the
NLRC ruling, the CA held that withholding respondent’s salary was not a valid
exercise of management prerogative as there is no such thing as a management
prerogative to withhold wages temporarily. Petitioners’ averments of
respondent’s failure to report to work were found to be unsubstantiated
allegations not corroborated by any other evidence, insufficient to justify
said withholding and lacking in probative value. The malicious withholding of
respondent’s salary made it impossible or unacceptable for respondent to
continue working, thus, compelling him to resign. The respondent’s immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal could only mean that his resignation
was not voluntary. As a probationary employee entitled to security of tenure,
respondent was illegally dismissed. The
CA ruled out actual reinstatement, however, reasoning out that antagonism had
caused a severe strain in their relationship.
It was of the view that separation pay equivalent to at least one month
pay would be a more equitable disposition.
THE ISSUES
Aggrieved, the
petitioners come to this Court praying for the reversal and setting aside of
the subject CA decision presenting the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE NLRC, WHICH WAS BASED
ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT AFFIRMING THE NLRC’S HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS’
WITHHOLDING OF RESPONDENT’S SALARY FOR THE PAYROLL PERIOD NOVEMBER 16-30, 2005
IN VIEW OF RESPONDENT’S FAILURE TO RENDER ACTUAL WORK FOR SAID PAYROLL PERIOD
WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE LABOR ARBITER’S FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING RESPONDENT SEPARATION PAY EQUIVALENT TO AT
LEAST ONE MONTH PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, FULL BACKWAGES, AND OTHER
PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS, OR THEIR MONETARY EQUIVALENT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT
RESPONDENT VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED FROM PETITIONER SHS AND WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
DISMISSED.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS HARTMANNSHENN
AND SCHUMACHER MAY NOT BE HELD SOLIDARILY AND PERSONALLY LIABLE WITH PETITIONER
SHS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE MONETARY AWARD TO RESPONDENT.
The resolution
of these issues is dependent on whether or not respondent was constructively
dismissed by petitioners, which determination is, in turn, hinged on finding
out (i) whether or not the temporary withholding of respondent’s salary/wages
by petitioners was a valid exercise of management prerogative; and (ii) whether
or not respondent voluntarily resigned.
THE COURT’S RULING
As
a rule, the factual findings of the courts below are conclusive in a petition
for review on certiorari where only errors of law should be reviewed.
The case, however, is an exception because the factual findings of the CA and
the LA are contradictory to that of the NLRC. Thus, a review of the records is
necessary to resolve the factual issues involved and render substantial justice
to the parties.[11]
Petitioners
contend that withholding respondent’s salary from November 16 to November 30,
2005, was justified because respondent was absent and did not show up for work
during that period. He also failed to account for his whereabouts and work accomplishments
during said period. When there is an issue as to whether an employee has, in
fact, worked and is entitled to his salary, it is within management prerogative
to temporarily withhold an employee’s salary/wages pending determination of
whether or not such employee did indeed work.
We disagree with
petitioners.
Management
prerogative refers “to the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working methods,
processes to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees,
supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of
work.”[12]
Although management prerogative refers to “the right to regulate all aspects of
employment,” it cannot be understood to include the right to temporarily
withhold salary/wages without the consent of the employee. To sanction such an
interpretation would be contrary to Article 116 of the Labor Code, which
provides:
ART. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. – It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from
the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force,
stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the
worker’s consent.
Any withholding
of an employee’s wages by an employer may only be allowed in the form of wage
deductions under the circumstances provided in Article 113 of the Labor Code,
as set forth below:
ART. 113. Wage Deduction. – No employer, in his
own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages
of his employees, except:
(a) In cases
where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction
is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the
insurance;
(b) For union
dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been
recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker
concerned; and
(c) In cases
where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary
of Labor.
As correctly
pointed out by the LA, “absent a showing that the withholding of complainant’s
wages falls under the exceptions provided in Article 113, the withholding
thereof is thus unlawful.”[13]
Petitioners argue
that Article 116 of the Labor Code only applies if it is established that an
employee is entitled to his salary/wages and, hence, does not apply in cases
where there is an issue or uncertainty as to whether an employee has worked and
is entitled to his salary/wages, in consonance with the principle of “a fair
day’s wage for a fair day’s work.” Petitioners contend that in this case there
was precisely an issue as to whether respondent was entitled to his salary
because he failed to report to work and to account for his whereabouts and work
accomplishments during the period in question.
To substantiate
their claim, petitioners presented hard copies of the electronic mail messages[14]
sent to respondent on November 22 and 24, 2005, directing the latter to contact
Hartmannshenn; the Affidavit[15]
of Taguiang stating that she advised respondent on or about November 29, 2005
to immediately communicate with Mr. Hartmannshenn at the SHS office; Hartmannshenn’s Counter-Affidavit[16]
stating that he exerted earnest efforts to contact respondent through mobile
phone; Schumacher’s Counter-Affidavit[17]
stating that respondent had not filed any request for official leave; and
respondent’s admission in his Position Paper[18]
that he found it absurd to report to the SHS plant when only security guards
and machinists were present.
Respondent, on
the other hand, presented reports[19]
prepared by him and submitted to Hartmannshenn on November 18 and 25, 2005; a
receipt[20]
issued to him by Taguiang for a client’s payment during the subject period; and
eight notarized letters[21]
of prospective clients vouching for meetings they had with the respondent
during the subject period.
The Court finds
petitioners’ evidence insufficient to prove that respondent did not work from
November 16 to
Furthermore, the
electronic mail reports sent to Hartmannshenn and the receipt presented by
respondent as evidence of his having worked during the subject period were not
controverted by petitioners. The eight notarized letters of prospective clients
vouching for meetings they had with respondent during the subject period may
also be given credence. Although respondent only presented such letters in
support of his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, they may be
considered by this Court in light of Section 10, Rule VII, of the 2005 New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides in part that “the rules of
procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.” While
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are bound by law and practice
to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
justiciable cases presented before them.[23]
In this case, due process was afforded petitioners as respondent filed with the
NLRC a Motion to Set Case for Reception of Additional Evidence as regards the
said letters, which petitioners had the opportunity to, and did, oppose.
Although it
cannot be determined with certainty whether respondent worked for the entire
period from November 16 to November 30, 2005, the consistent rule is that if
doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and that by the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter[24]
in line with the policy mandated by Articles 2 and 3 of the Labor Code to
afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor. For petitioners’ failure to satisfy their
burden of proof, respondent is presumed to have worked during the period in
question and is, accordingly, entitled to his salary. Therefore, the
withholding of respondent’s salary by petitioners is contrary to Article 116 of
the Labor Code and, thus, unlawful.
Petitioners
contend that respondent could not have been constructively dismissed because he
voluntarily resigned as evidenced by his resignation letter. They assert that
respondent was not forced to draft the letter and his intention to resign is
clear from the contents and terms used, and that given respondent’s
professional and educational background, he was fully aware of the import and
consequences of the said letter. They maintain that respondent resigned to
‘save face’ and avoid disciplinary measures due to his allegedly dismal work
performance and failure to report to work.
The Court,
however, agrees with the LA and the CA that respondent was forced to resign and
was, thus, constructively dismissed. In
Duldulao v. Court of Appeals, it
was written:
There is constructive dismissal if
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would foreclose any
choice by him except to forego his continued employment. It exists where there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely,
as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. [25]
What made it
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely for respondent to continue working for SHS
was the unlawful withholding of his salary. For said reason, he was forced to
resign. It is of no moment that he served his resignation letter on
It is worthy to
note that in his resignation letter, respondent cited petitioners’ “illegal
and unfair labor practice”[26]
as his cause for resignation. As correctly noted by the CA, respondent lost no
time in submitting his resignation letter and eventually filing a complaint for
illegal dismissal just a few days after his salary was withheld. These circumstances are inconsistent with voluntary
resignation and bolster the finding of constructive dismissal.
Petitioners cite
the case of Solas v. Power &
Telephone Supply Phils., Inc.[27]
to support their contention that the mere withholding of an
employee’s salary does not by itself constitute constructive dismissal. Petitioners are mistaken in anchoring their
argument on said case, where the withholding of the salary was deemed
lawful. In the above-cited case, the
employee’s salary was withheld for a valid reason - it was applied as partial
payment of a debt due to the employer,
for withholding taxes on his income and for his absence without
leave. The partial payment of a debt due
to the employer and the withholding of taxes on income were valid deductions
under Article 113 paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. The deduction from an employee’s salary for a
due and demandable debt to an employer was likewise sanctioned under Article
1706 of the Civil Code. As to the withholding for income tax purposes, it was prescribed
by the National Internal Revenue Code.
Moreover, the employee therein was indeed absent without leave.
In this case,
the withholding of respondent’s salary does not fall under any of the
circumstances provided under Article 113. Neither was it established with
certainty that respondent did not work from November 16 to
Respondent was
constructively dismissed and, therefore, illegally dismissed. Although respondent was a probationary
employee, he was still entitled to security of tenure. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution
guarantees the right of all workers to security of tenure. In using the expression “all workers,” the
Constitution puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or
regular employee. This means that probationary employees cannot be dismissed
except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees.[28]
This Court has
held that probationary employees who are unjustly dismissed during the probationary
period are entitled to reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other
benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual
reinstatement.[29] Respondent is, thus, entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as
to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. Respondent, however, is not entitled to the additional
amount for 13th month pay, as it is clearly provided in respondent’s
Probationary Contract of Employment that such is deemed included in his salary.
Thus:
EMPLOYEE will be paid a net salary
of One Hundred Thousand (Php100,000.00) Pesos per month payable every 15th
day and end of the month.
The compensation package defined
in this paragraph shall represent all that is due and demandable under this
Contract and includes all benefits required by law such as the 13th
month pay. No other benefits, bonus or
allowance shall be due the employee. [30]
(emphasis
supplied)
Respondent’s
reinstatement, however, is no longer feasible as antagonism has caused a severe
strain in their working relationship. Under the doctrine of strained relations,
the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to
reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. Payment liberates the employee from what
could be a highly oppressive work environment, and at the same time releases
the employer from the obligation of keeping in its employ a worker it no longer
trusts. Therefore, a more equitable
disposition would be an award of separation pay equivalent to at least one
month pay, in addition to his full backwages, allowances and other benefits.[31]
With respect to
the personal liability of Hartmannshenn and Schumacher, this Court has held
that corporate directors and officers are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for termination of employment of corporate employees if effected with
malice or in bad faith.[32] Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imports dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of wrong; it means breach of unknown duty through some motive or interest
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.[33] To sustain such a finding, there should be
evidence on record that an officer or director acted maliciously or in bad
faith in terminating the employee.[34]
Petitioners
withheld respondent’s salary in the sincere belief that respondent did not work
for the period in question and was, therefore, not entitled to it. There was no dishonest purpose or ill will
involved as they believed there was a justifiable reason to withhold his salary. Thus, although they unlawfully withheld
respondent’s salary, it cannot be concluded that such was made in bad faith. Accordingly, corporate officers,
Hartmannshenn and Schumacher, cannot be held personally liable for the
corporate obligations of SHS.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
A T T E S
T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Second Division, Acting Chairperson
C E R T I
F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in
lieu of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Special Order No. 897
dated
* * Per Special Order No. 898 dated
* * * Designated as an additional member in lieu
of Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special
Order No. 905 dated
* * * * Designated as an additional
member in lieu of Associate |Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Special Order No.
904 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-24. Penned by Associate
Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Noel G.
Tijam.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Norkis Trading Co., Inc. v. Gnilo, G.R. No. 159730, February 11,
2008, 544 SCRA 279, 289.
[12] Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit, 425
Phil. 326, 343-344 (2002).
[13] Rollo, p. 883.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 166658,
[24] Phil. Employ Services and Resources, Inc. v. Paramio, 471 Phil.
753, 777 (2004).
[25] Duldulao v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 164893, March 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 191, 199.
[26] Rollo, p. 135.
[27] G.R. No. 162332,
[28] Civil Service
Commission v. Magnaye,
G.R. No. 183337,
[29] Lopez v. Javier, 322
Phil. 70, 81 (1996).
[30] Rollo, p. 121.
[31] Golden Ace
Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200,
[32] Wensha Spa Center,
Inc. v. Yung, G.R. No. 185122,
[33] Malayang Samahan
ng Mga Mangagawa v. Ramos, 409 Phil. 61, 83 (2001).
[34] M + W Zander
Philippines, Inc. and Rolf Wiltschek v. Trinidad Enriquez, G.R. No. 169173,
June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 590, 610-611.