Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
-
versus - VELASCO,
JR.,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
PEREZ,
JJ.
DEMETRIO SALAZAR, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant.
October 20, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I
S I O N
VELASCO,
JR., J.:
The Case
This
is an appeal from the June 8, 2007 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (Cebu City) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00553 entitled People of the Philippines v. Demetrio
Salazar, which affirmed with modification the conviction of accused-appellant
Demetrio Salazar in Criminal Case Nos. A-1620 and A-1621 for two (2) counts of
Statutory Rape.
The Facts
On
That on or about the 18th day of
May, 1999, at about 10:00 o’ clock in the evening more or less at [XXX], Municipality
of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is still at
large, with abuse of confidence being his step father, entered the bedroom
where [AAA] was sleeping, with lewd designs, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, cover her mouth and by means of force and
intimidation, and taking advantage of his superior strength, undressed her,
took off her shorts and panty, place on top of her and have sexual intercourse
with one [AAA], who is a minor, 12 years of age, all against the will of the
latter.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[3]
While
the second Information states:
That
on or about the 25th day of June, 1999, at about 12:00 o’ clock
midnight more or less at [XXX], Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern
Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, who is still at large, with abuse of confidence being his
step father, entered the bedroom where [AAA] was sleeping, with lewd designs,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, cover her mouth and
by means of force and intimidation, and taking advantage of his superior
strength, undressed her, took off her shorts and panty, placed on top of her
and have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], who is a minor, 12 years of age,
all against the will of the latter.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[4]
On December 6, 1999, in his
arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. On
Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, AAA
purportedly executed an Affidavit of Desistance wherein she stated that she was
not raped by accused-appellant and that she no longer intends to pursue the
cases filed against accused-appellant. During the hearing, she explained that
her own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon threat of harm.[6]
The
prosecution established that AAA is the daughter of BBB with whom
accused-appellant was cohabiting. AAA, BBB,
and accused-appellant all lived in the same one-room house located in XXX,
Lavezares,
The
first rape occurred at about
When
her mother had arrived, AAA told her about the rape. BBB, however, did not
believe her and simply dismissed her claims.[9]
On
Later,
AAA informed her aunt, DDD, about the second rape. Her aunt brought her to the police station to
report the incident. She was later
examined by the Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares,
For his part, accused-appellant interposed
the defense of alibi, claiming that on
the date of the alleged first rape, he was at his farm at Sitio Napunod, Barangay Caburihan, Lavezares, Northern
Samar, making copra. He claimed that the farm is six (6) kilometers away and
could only be negotiated by hiking for one (1) hour. He further claimed that he was at the farm
from
As to the second alleged rape,
accused-appellant alleged that while he was at their house in XXX, AAA was not
there. He claimed that AAA and her
brother, EEE, asked permission from, and was allowed by, their mother BBB to
watch a show at the town proper of Lavezares in the evening of
At the hearing of the case, the
prosecution presented, among others, DDD, as a witness. DDD testified that AAA is her niece. She also presented a Certificate of Baptism
wherein it is stated that AAA was born on April 10, 1987.[14]
Dr. Ethel Parane Simeon, the
Municipal Health Officer of Lavezares, was also presented as a witness for the
prosecution. She testified that she
conducted a medical examination of AAA on
The defense’s sole witness was
accused-appellant, who alleged that the relatives of the victim’s father, CCC, did
not approve of his relationship with BBB. CCC’s relatives wanted to take custody of AAA.
Accused-appellant claimed that the instant
cases were instituted to wrest custody of AAA from BBB and himself.[16]
Thereafter, the RTC issued its
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, in the light of the prevailing
considerations, the court hereby sentences Demetrio Salazar GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of Statutory Rape as defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 and sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection.
And indemnity is hereby imposed in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(Php 75,000.00); moral and exemplary damages are awarded in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00).
Let the records of the entire cases together
with the transcript of stenographic notes be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme
Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The records of the case were then
transferred to this Court for automatic review. The parties were directed by the Court to
submit their respective briefs. However,
in a Resolution dated
Thereafter, the CA issued the
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this appeal
is DENIED. The Decision dated 07 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial Region, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the death penalty imposed on appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua; appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape; appellant is likewise ordered to pay the
complainant in Criminal Case No. A-1620 the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity; and in Criminal Case No. A-1621 the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The
CA found accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape instead of
statutory rape. The CA reasoned that the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to establish that the rape victim was
twelve (12) years old at the time of the crimes. Further, the CA stated that a baptismal
certificate is not sufficient proof of the age of a person. Thus, the victim’s age was not established.[21] The CA then modified the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant¾from
death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Hence,
we have this appeal.
The Issues
Accused-appellant, in a Manifestation
(In Lieu of Supplemental Brief) dated
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
The Trial Court gravely erred in giving full
faith and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness x x x and in
totally ignoring/disregarding the version of the defense.
II.
The Trial Court gravely erred in convicting
him of the crime charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
The victim’s Affidavit of Desistance
cannot be given any weight
Accused-appellant
claims that the instant case should have been dismissed by the trial court,
considering that AAA had executed an affidavit of desistance exonerating
accused-appellant from the crimes charged. The CA, however, did not give any weight to
such affidavit on the following reasoning:
The
affidavit of desistance relied upon by appellant could not be given any
probative weight considering that it was not duly sworn to. Further, when
private complainant was confronted about it, she testified that her mother
threatened to kill her should she refuse to execute the affidavit.[24]
In any event, AAA’s purported
Affidavit of Desistance cannot cause the dismissal of the case. It must be pointed out that the alleged affidavit
was executed after the case had already been instituted. Thus, the Court already had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and control over the proceedings. As the Court ruled in People v. Montes:[25]
As admitted by appellant, the alleged
Affidavit of Desistance of the victim was never identified by her, but
submitted in court only after the institution of the rape cases. Such being the case, the Affidavit -- even
when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile “private crime” of rape -- is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already
been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the Complaints, the pardon
should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In
People v. Ramirez, Jr.,[26] the
Court was even more circumspect:
As
a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion
and reservation. Jurisprudence has
invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can
easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the
probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution
would thus be interminable.
Indeed, the Affidavit of Desistance of
private complainant is highly suspect.
Apparently, she executed it on the basis of a consideration of P5,000,
which was later increased to P100,000.
After her testimony had been rendered, however, appellant refused to pay
the amount agreed upon, thereby prompting her to recant the Affidavit.
She had stated therein that “the accused is
indeed innocent of the crimes charge[d] since in truth, he never molested me
sexually as charged.” Such statement was
a mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility,
much less truth. More likely, it
emanated not from this young girl’s mouth, but from a trained legal mind. Moreover, while she affirmed her Affidavit on
the stand, she also declared, on clarificatory question from the judge, that
she was 14 years old when she was molested and raped by appellant. These facts
raise doubts as to the reliability of her statements in her Affidavit.
At
this point, we reiterate that, by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in
court. In the present case, private
complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape
charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and must therefore
continue to be heard by the court a quo. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying
People v. Ramirez, Jr. to the instant
case, we find that accused-appellant’s contention¾that AAA’s Affidavit of Desistance merits
the dismissal of the case¾has no basis.
Second Issue:
AAA’s testimony should be given full
weight and credence
Next,
accused-appellant questions the trial court’s reliance on the testimony of AAA.
Citing People v. Domogoy,[27]
accused-appellant posits that AAA’s testimony must be received with caution.
It
must be stressed, however, that the victim in People v. Domogoy was twenty-one (21) years old. Here, the contention is that AAA was only
twelve (12) years old at the time that she was raped. This difference is pivotal in light of our
ruling in People v. Montes:[28]
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled
that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight and
credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely
understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how
she was raped bears the earmarks of credibility, especially if no ill will --
as in this case -- motivates her to testify falsely against the accused. It is
well-settled that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The
accused may thus be convicted solely on her testimony -- provided it is
credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things.
While
in the more recent People v. Basmayor,[29]
the Court ruled:
This Court has held time and again that
testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence,
considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being the subject of a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the
world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is
not true.
Clearly,
the trial court correctly gave great weight to the testimony of AAA.
Moreover,
given the fact that the CA upheld the findings of the trial court on the
factual issues of the case, the Court is bound by the trial court’s assessment
of the witnesses, as the Court held in People
v. Ducabo:[30]
It
is well-entrenched that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a
witness deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge in the
appreciation of testimonial evidence. We have recognized that the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, because of their
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Thus, except for compelling reasons, we are doctrinally bound by the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. (Emphasis supplied.)
Third Issue:
Accused-appellant is guilty of simple rape
The relevant portions of Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code define the crime of rape, as follows:
Chapter Three
Rape
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed.¾Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the
offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied.)
In
order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this
jurisdiction, the Court held in People v.
Tampos[31] that two
(2) elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old, thus:
The two elements of statutory rape are: (1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is
below 12 years of age. Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code is now in Article 266-A, par. 1-d, in view of the
amendments introduced by R.A. 8353.
Statutory rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
par. d, “when the offended party is under 12 years of age.”
Here,
while it is undisputed that the first element is present, accused-appellant
questions the presence of the second. Conformably,
the CA ruled that indeed the fact that the victim was twelve (12) years old at
the time of the commission of the crimes was not sufficiently established.[32] However, contrary to such finding of the CA, this
Court has ruled in People v. Ramos[33]
that in statutory rape cases, a baptismal certificate is sufficient to prove
the age of the victim.
Thus,
without a doubt, the baptismal certificate of AAA that was presented during the
trial of the case coupled with the testimony of DDD, the aunt of AAA, sufficiently
established that the victim was twelve years old at the time the crimes were
committed. Having been born on April 10,
1987, when the first rape occurred on May 18, 1999, AAA was exactly 12 years,
one month, and 8 days old at the first rape incident.
Considering,
however, that AAA was already 12 years old when she was raped, the second
element for statutory rape that “that the victim is below twelve (12) years
old” is not present. Consequently, the
finding of the appellate court for simple rape is correct, not on the ground of
the age of AAA not being proved, but on the fact that she was no longer below
12 years of age at the time the crime was committed.
Fourth Issue:
Reclusion
Perpetua is the proper penalty
The
crime of simple rape having been established, the next question is what penalty
should be imposed upon accused-appellant.
At the time the crimes were committed
by accused-appellant, the penalty for the crime of simple rape was contained in
Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 266-B. Penalty.¾Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall become reclusion perpetua
to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if
the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
l)
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus,
simple rape, when qualified by the circumstance that the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, would
be properly punishable with the death penalty.
Otherwise put, when the two circumstances of minority and relationship
concur, then the proper imposable penalty shall be death—now qualified by
Republic Act No. 9346.[34]
In
the instant case, aside from minority of the victim it was alleged in the
informations filed before the trial court that accused-appellant is the victim’s
stepfather. Minority of AAA and her
relation to accused-appellant was the qualifying circumstance that the trial
court considered in imposing the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, in order to become the victim’s
stepfather, accused-appellant must necessarily have been legally married to AAA’s
mother. This was not the case. No evidence was adduced during the trial to
establish that AAA’s mother and accused-appellant were ever legally married. Moreover, although the fact that
accused-appellant was the common-law husband of the victim’s mother, such
circumstance cannot be appreciated, although proved during the trial, as it was
not alleged in the informations and would thereby violate the constitutional
right of accused-appellant to be informed of the charges against him. Thus, we held in People v. Negosa:[35]
We agree with the appellant’s contention that
he is guilty only of simple statutory rape and not of rape in its qualified
form under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution was burdened to prove the allegation in the Information that the
appellant was the stepfather of the victim. However, the prosecution failed to
prove the same. The evidence on record
shows that the appellant was merely the common-law husband of the victim’s
mother. This special qualifying circumstance, that the appellant was the
common-law husband of the mother of the victim, was not alleged in the
Information. Even if such special
qualifying circumstance was proved, it cannot be appreciated against the
appellant in order to qualify the crime; otherwise, the appellant would be
deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. This
was the ruling of the Court in People vs.
Lizada, thus:
We agree with the accused-appellant that he
is guilty only of two counts of simple rape, instead of qualified rape. The
evidence on record shows that the accused-appellant is the common-law husband
of x x x, the mother of the private complainant. The private complainant, as of October 1998,
was still 13 years old, and under Article 335 as amended by Republic Act 7659,
the minority of the private complainant, concurring with the fact that the
accused-appellant is the common-law husband of the victim’s mother, is a
special qualifying circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
However, the said circumstance was not alleged in the Informations as required
by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which was
given retroactive effect by this Court because it is favorable to the accused.
Hence, even if the prosecution proved the special qualifying circumstance of
minority of the private complainant and relationship, the accused-appellant being
the common-law husband of her mother, accused-appellant is guilty only of
simple rape. Under the given law, the
penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently,
the CA imposed the correct penalty of reclusion
perpetua against accused-appellant as provided under Art. 266-B in relation
to Art. 266-A, paragraph (a) of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
qualifying circumstances.
In
line with prevailing jurisprudence, exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 in each
case shall be awarded to AAA.[36]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 8, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00553 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is found guilty of two (2)
counts of simple rape, and is ordered to pay the offended party, AAA, PhP 30,000
as exemplary damages for each count of rape, in addition to the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP
50,000 as moral damages, also for each count of rape.
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I
C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-17. Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Stephen C. Cruz.
[2] The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610, “An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes”; Republic Act No. 9262, “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes”; Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the “Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,” effective November 5, 2004; and People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[3] CA rollo, p. 11.
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 14.
[7]
[8] CA rollo, p. 24.
[9] Rollo, p. 6.
[10] CA rollo, p. 25.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[20] Rollo, p. 16.
[21]
[22] CA rollo, pp. 30-31.
[23]
[24] Rollo, p. 14.
[25]
G.R. Nos. 148743-45,
[26]
G.R. Nos. 150079-80,
[27] G.R.
No. 116738,
[28] Supra note 25, at 116.
[29] G.R.
No. 182791,
[30]
G.R. No. 175594,
[31]
G.R. No. 142740,
[32] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[33]
G.R. No. 179030,
The Court held thus:
The age of the victim is an essential element of
statutory rape; thus, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
In People v.
Pruna, the Court laid down the following guidelines in determining the age
of the victim:
1. The best
evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the
certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of
the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such
as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the
victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the
victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the
victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live
birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the
prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age
shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
[34] However,
by virtue of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines, which took effect on
[35]
G.R. Nos. 142856-57,
[36] See
People v. Lindo, G.R. No. 189818,