Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
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DELFIN LAMSIS,
MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA, represented
by EUGENE KITMA, |
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G.R. No. 173021 Present: |
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Petitioners, |
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CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, |
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VELASCO, JR., |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, |
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versus - |
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DEL CASTILLO, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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MARGARITA SEMON
DONG-E, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent.
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October 20, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
There is laches when a party is aware,
even in the early stages of the proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional
objection, and has every opportunity to raise said objection, but fails to do
so, even on appeal.
This
is a Petition for Review[1]
assailing the March 30, 2006 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006
Resolution[3] which
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the judgment dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual
antecedents
This
case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of
land, denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is located along Km. 5 Asin
Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of
186,090 square meters. While petitioners
are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof
and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners.
According to respondent Margarita
Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her family’s ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1
can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap.[5] Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was
inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square
meter property, which included Lot No. 1.[6] On the same year, they declared the property
for taxation purposes in the name of “The Heirs of Ap-ap.”[7] The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation
that reads: “Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated May 10,
1922 per true of same presented.”[8]
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed,
for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim[9] on
February 26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margarita’s
father).
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,[10] Gilbert
Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and
Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their
respective families.[11] They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma
died sometime in the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis (Delfin)
and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain portions of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square meters of Lot
No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000 square meters thereof.[12] Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon
tolerated the acts of their first cousins.
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,[13] his
children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted
Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.[14] Since then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty
tax over Lot No. 1[15] and occupied
and improved the property together with her husband; while at the same time,
tolerating her first cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot.
This state of affairs changed when
petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on
the subject property and selling portions thereof.[16] Delfin allegedly sold a 400-square meter
portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard[17]
Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose
Valdez (Jose).[18]
With such developments, Margarita
filed a complaint[19] for
recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages against all four
occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio
City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch 59.
The complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose
and for petitioners to vacate the portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to them by
Margarita.[20] Margarita claimed that, as they are her first
cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1,
provided that she retains the power to choose such portion.[21]
Petitioners denied Margarita’s
claims of ownership and possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and Agustin, Lot No. 1 is
a public land claimed by the heirs of Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).[22] The Smiths gave their permission for Delfin
and Agustin’s parents to occupy the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented their neighbors who
testified that it was Delfin and Agustin as well as their respective parents
who occupied Lot No. 1, not Margarita and her parents.
Delfin and Agustin also assailed the
muniments of ownership presented by Margarita as fabricated, unauthenticated,
and invalid. It was pointed out that the
Deed of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap’s children, failed to
include two – Rita Bocahan and Stewart Sito.[23] Margarita admitted during trial that Rita
Bocahan and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not explain why they
were excluded from the quitclaim.
According to Maynard and Jose,
Delfin and Agustin were the ones publicly and openly in possession of the land
and who introduced improvements thereon.
They also corroborated Delfin and Agustin’s allegation that the real
owners of the property are the heirs of Joaquin Smith.[24]
In order to debunk petitioners’
claim that the Smiths owned the subject property, Margarita presented a
certified copy of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying the
Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject property as part of their
ancestral land.[25]
The resolution explains that the application had to be denied because the
Smiths did not “possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of the property x x
x. The actual occupants (who were not
named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible are not in any way
related to the applicant or his co-heirs.”[26]
To bolster her claim of ownership
and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of
the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her
siblings’ ancestral land claim over a portion of the 186,090-square meter
property.[27] The said resolution states:
The land subject of the instant
application is the ancestral land of the herein applicants. Well-established is the fact that the land
treated herein was first declared for taxation purposes in 1922 under Tax
Declaration No. 363 by the applicant’s
grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application was reconstructed in 1965 after
the original got lost during the war.
These tax declarations were issued and recorded in the Municipality of
Tuba, Benguet, considering that the land was then within the territorial
jurisdiction of the said municipality.
That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his heirs x x x transferred the
tax declaration in their name, [which tax declaration is] now with the City
assessor’s office of Baguio.
The
land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX
THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly approved
by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in the name of Ap-Ap (one
name). In 1964, the same land was the
subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as petitioner, before the Court
of First Instance of the City of Baguio in the reopening of Judicial
Proceedings under Civil Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration
and the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land registration case was however
overtaken by the decision of the Supreme Court declaring such judicial
proceedings null and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.
It
has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to and at the
time of the pendency of the land registration case and henceforth up to and
including the present, the herein applicants by themselves and through their
predecessor-in-interest have been in exclusive, continuous, and material
possession and occupation of the said parcel of land mentioned above under
claim of ownership, devoting the same for residential and agricultural
purposes. Found are the residential
houses of the applicants as well as those of their close relatives, while the
other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are permanent stone
and earthen fences, terraces, clearings, including irrigation gadgets.
On
the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and qualifications, there is
no doubt that they are members of the National Cultural Communities,
particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are
the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along the Asin Road
area. His legal heirs are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita
Ap-Ap, married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to Oragon Wakit; and
Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common
name of their father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the early
Ibalois. x x x
On
the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap-Ap, it is important to
state [that] Gilbert Semon consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole
heir in 1964, by way of a “Deed of Quitclaim” executed by the heirs in his
favor. As to the respective share of the
applicants[’] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in 1989 with the
execution of an “Extrajudicial Settlement/ Partition of Estate with Waiver of
Rights.”
With
regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state that application No.
Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has already been denied by us in our Resolution dated
November 1997. As to the other adverse
claims therein by reason of previous conveyances in favor of third parties, the
same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction of the area originally
applied from ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE METERS,
more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering
the foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural obstacle in giving
due course to the instant application.
Now
therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for Recognition of
Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by
Juanito Semon, be granted [and] a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be issued to the herein applicants
by the Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Visayas
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Regional Executive Director,
DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Street, Baguio City.
The area of the claim stated herein above is however subject to the
outcome of the final survey to be forthwith executed.
Carried
this 23rd day of June 1998.[28]
The
resolution was not signed by two members of the CSTFAL on the ground that the
signing of the unnumbered resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA). The IPRA removed the authority
of the DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and transferred the same
to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).[29] The Ancestral Land Application No. Bg-L-064
of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon was transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera
Administrative Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as Case No.
05-RHO-CAR-03.[30]
The petitioners filed their protest in the said case before the NCIP. The same has been submitted for resolution.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[31]
After summarizing the evidence
presented by both parties, the trial court found that it preponderates in favor
of respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of ownership over the subject
property.[32] The survey plan of the subject property in
the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap executed way back in 1962 and the tax
declarations thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all support
her claim that her family and their predecessors-in-interest have all been in
possession of the property to the exclusion of others. The court likewise gave credence to the
documentary evidence of the transfer of the land from the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent’s
father and, eventually to respondent herself.
The series of transfers of the property were indications of the
respondent’s and her predecessors’ interest over the property. The court opined that while these pieces of
documentary evidence were not conclusive proof of actual possession, they lend
credence to respondent’s claim because, “in the ordinary course of things,
persons will not execute legal documents dealing with real property, unless
they believe, and have the basis to believe, that they have an interest in the
property subject of the legal documents x x x.”[33]
In contrast, the trial court found
nothing on record to substantiate the allegations of the petititioners that
they and their parents were the long-time possessors of the subject property.
Their own statements belied their assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both
admitted that they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau of
Lands because there were pending ancestral land claims over the property.[34] Petitioner Agustin’s Townsite Sales
Application over the property was held in abeyance because of respondent’s own
claim, which was eventually favorably considered by the CSTFAL.[35]
The dispositive portion of the trial
court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent]
and against the [petitioners] –
(1)
Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of PSU 198317 made by the
[petitioner] Delfin Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr. null and void;
(2)
Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis, Agustin Kitma, Menard
Mondiguing and Jose Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently
occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317 belonging to the [respondent] and
to surrender possession thereof to the [respondent];
(3)
To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00;
and
(4)
To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[36]
It
appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed before the trial
court. Nevetheless, the trial court issued
an Order[37]
allowing the petitioners’ Notice of Appeal.[38]
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals[39]
The sole issue resolved by the
appellate court was whether the trial court erred in ruling in favor of
respondent in light of the adduced evidence.
Citing the rule on preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the
respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving her title and interest
to the subject property. Her documentary
evidence were amply supported by the testimonial evidence of her
witnesses.
In contrast, petitioners only made
bare allegations in their testimonies that are insufficient to overcome
respondent’s documentary evidence.
Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration[40]
of the adverse decision but the same was denied.
Hence this petition, which was initially
denied for failure to show that the CA committed any reversible error.[41] Upon
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,[42] the
petition was reinstated in the Court’s January 15, 2007 Resolution.[43]
Petitioners’
arguments
Petitioners assign as error the CA’s
appreciation of the evidence already affirmed and considered by the trial
court. They maintain that the change in
the presiding judges who heard and decided their case resulted in the
appreciation of what would otherwise be inadmissible evidence.[44] Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their
petition from the general rule that a trial judge’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal.
To support their claim that the
trial and appellate courts erred in ruling in favor of respondent, they
assailed the various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed
by the Heirs of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks the parties’ and witnesses’
signatures. Moreover, it is a mere
photocopy, which was never authenticated by the notary public in court and no
reasons were proferred regarding the existence,
loss, and contents of the original copy.[45] Under
the best evidence rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and
should have been disregarded by the court.
Respondent did not prove that she
and her husband possessed the subject property since time immemorial. Petitioners argue that respondent admitted
possessing and cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject
property.[46]
Petitioners next assail the weight
to be given to respondent’s muniments of ownership, such as the tax
declarations and the survey plan. They
insist that these are not indubitable proofs of respondent’s ownership over the
subject property given that there are other claimants to the land (who are not
parties to this case) who also possess a survey plan over the subject property.[47]
Petitioners then assert their
superior right to the property as the present possessors thereof. They cite pertinent provisions of the New
Civil Code which presume good faith possession on the part of the possessor and
puts the burden on the plaintiff in an action to recover to prove her superior
title.[48]
Petitioners next assert that they
have a right to the subject property by the operation of acquisitive
prescription. They posit that they have
been in possession of a public land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in
the concept of owners for more than 30 years.
Respondent’s assertion that petitioners are merely possessors by
tolerance is unsubstantiated.[49]
Petitioners also maintain that the
reivindicatory action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of
the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes involving ancestral lands and domains to the NCIP.[50] They assert that the customary laws of the
Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be applied to their dispute as
mandated by Section 65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: “When disputes
involve ICCs/IPs,[51]
customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.”
In the alternative that jurisdiction
over an accion reivindicatoria is
held to be vested in the trial court, the petitioners insist that the courts
should dismiss the reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.[52] They likewise argue that NCIP has primary
jurisdiction over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere “when
the dispute demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x In cases where the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.”[53] The courts should stand aside in order to
prevent the possibility of creating conflicting decisions.[54]
Respondent’s
arguments
Respondent opines that the appellate
court did not commit any reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision. The present petition is a mere
dilatory tactic to frustrate the speedy administration of justice.[55]
Respondent also asserts that
questions of fact are prohibited in a Rule 45 petition.[56] Thus, the appreciation and consideration of
the factual issues are no longer reviewable.[57]
The issue of lack of jurisdiction is
raised for the first time in the petition before this Court. It was never raised before the trial court or
the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the trial court’s
jurisdiction over the case. Citing Aragon v. Court of Appeals,[58] respondent
argues that the jurisdictional issue should have been raised at the appellate
level at the very least so as to avail of the doctrine that the ground lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings even on appeal.[59]
Respondent maintains that there is
no room for the application of litis
pendentia because the issues in the application for ancestral land claim
are different from the issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP is whether the
Government, as grantor, will recognize the ancestral land claim of respondent
over a public alienable land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before
the trial court is ownership, possession, and right to recover the real
property.[60]
Given that the elements of lis
pendens are absent in case at bar, the allegation of forum-shopping is also
bereft of merit. Any judgment to be
rendered by the NCIP will not amount to res
judicata in the instant case.[61]
Issues
The petitioners present the
following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the appellate court disregarded
material facts and circumstances in affirming the trial court’s decision;
2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject
property by prescription;
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to
decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted;
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction,
whether the ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP should take precedence
over the reivindicatory action.[62]
Our
Ruling
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts
and circumstances in affirming the trial court’s decision
Both the trial and the appellate
courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of ownership and possession
with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners
now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to review the evidence of
both parties, despite the CA’s finding that the trial court committed no error
in appreciating the evidence presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions
of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. A question of fact exists if the uncertainty
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[63] “Such questions as whether certain items of
evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or
spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.”[64]
Since
it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be
dismissed for it is settled that only
questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari.[65] There is a question of law when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions of law can be resolved without
having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted.[66] The instant case does not present a compelling
reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and
appellate courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as
against petitioners’ claims. Their
factual findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great
respect.
In any case, even if petitioners’
arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim
executed in favor of respondent’s father are well-taken, it will not suffice to
defeat respondent’s claim over the subject property. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim,
respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported
and corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial court’s observation
that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to
execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they
have reason to believe that they have an interest over the same.[67]
The fact that respondent’s documents
traverse several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that
she and her family never abandoned their right to the property and have
continuously exercised rights of ownership over the same.
Moreover, respondent’s version of
how the petitioners came to occupy the property coincides with the same
timeline given by the petitioners themselves.
The only difference is that petitioners maintain they came into
possession by tolerance of the Smith family, while respondent maintains that it
was her parents who gave permission to petitioners. Given the context under which the parties’
respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to believe the
respondent’s version, as both the trial and appellate courts have concluded,
since her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.
Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by
prescription
Assuming that the subject land may
be acquired by prescription, we cannot accept petitioners’ claim of acquisition
by prescription. Petitioners admitted
that they had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim
that they have acquired the property by prescription unless they can prove acts
of repudiation. It is settled that
possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one claimed by
petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other
party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere
tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
Possession by tolerance is not adverse
and such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do not start the
running of the period of prescription.[68]
In
the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege much less prove any act
of repudiation sufficient for the reckoning of the acquisitive
prescription. At most, we can find on
record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of parts of the property to
petitioners Maynard and Jose; but the same was done only in 1998, shortly
before respondent filed a case against them.
Hence, the 30-year period necessary for the operation of acquisitve
prescription had yet to be attained.
Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over
the reivindicatory action
The application for issuance of a
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a
registration proceeding. It also seeks
an official recognition of one’s claim to a particular land and is also in rem.
The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of “officially
establishing” one’s land as an ancestral land.[69] Just like a registration proceeding, the
titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership[70] upon
the applicant but only recognizes ownership[71] that
has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his
predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time
immemorial. As aptly explained in
another case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a
certificate of title. Registering land
under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because registration
is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.
Corollarily, any question
involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x
x x The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties
will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject
properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x x[72]
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise
apropos is the following explanation:
The fact that the [respondents] were able to
secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to vest upon them ownership of
the property. The Torrens system does
not create or vest title. It has never
been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the
[respondents] wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a
judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to have the land
registered under their respective names. x x x Certificates of title do not
establish ownership.[73]
(Emphasis supplied)
A
registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another
case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant
is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case
and have the title transferred to his name.[74]
Given that a registration proceeding
(such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive adjudication
of ownership, it will not constitute litis
pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is ownership.[75] “For litis pendentia to be a ground for the
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case.”[76] The third element is missing, for any
judgment in the certification case would
not constitute res judicata or be conclusive
on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to
be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with
petitioners’ contention that respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that “forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.”[77]
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the
case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted
For the first time in the entire
proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court’s alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity[78] of the
IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the
NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived
by the parties or vested by the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails
at the time of the filing of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been
carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal
case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[79] the
Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the
court’s lack of jurisdiction. Laches is
defined as the “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.”[80] Wisely, some cases[81] have
cautioned against applying Tijam,
except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the
proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. When the case reached the
appellate court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their
pleadings therein. It was only after
receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety awoke from its
slumber and filed a motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for
reconsideration. The CA certified the
matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety was already barred by
laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of
the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of
laches cannot be ignored. If the surety
in Tijam was barred by laches for
raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for
petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first time in
their petition before this Court.
At the time that the complaint was
first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never
raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the
jurisdictional value for the RTC. They
obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
When the amended complaint was filed
in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court’s lack
of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded
to trial, all the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the
cross-examination[82]
conducted by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it was revealed
that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its
jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the
IPRA. They assailed the validity of the
CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been
rendered functus officio under the
IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still
did not question the trial court’s jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the
appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court’s appreciation of
the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again assailed the
CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered functus
officio by the enactment of IPRA.[83] But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial
court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight
years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already
conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate
court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have
twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that
petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the
litigation and resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.
Thus,
even assuming arguendo that
petitioners’ theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need
not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their
jurisdictional objection under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006 Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-24.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 124-133; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag.
[3] Id. at 153.
[4] CA Decision, p. 10; id. at 133.
[5] Records, p. 100.
[6] Id. at 276.
[7] Id. at 277.
[8] Exhibit “B-1”; id. at the back of p. 277.
[9] Id. at 100 and 297.
[10] Id. at 101.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 102-103.
[13] Id. at 99.
[14] Id. at 102 and 300-301.
[15] There were two tax receipts in the name of Margarita Semon available in the records. One is dated 12-20-1990 (id. at 293), while the other is dated 4-22-1991 (id. at 292).
[16] Id. at 103-104.
[17] Sometimes spelled as
Menard in some parts of the records.
[18] Records, p. 105.
[19] Id. at 99-109. Upon petitioners’ motion (id. at 62-64), the
original complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the value of
the property (at P500 and improvements valued at P200) did not
meet the jurisdictional amounts for the RTC (Order dated February 3, 1999; id.
at 69-70). The respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and to admit the amended complaint (id. at 71-87), which
motion was granted by the trial court (id. at 98).
[20] Id. at 107-108.
[21] Id. at 103.
[22] TSN Folder, pp. 116-117 and 140.
[23] Records, pp. 142-146.
[24] Id. at 138-141.
[25] Id. at 309-310.
[26] Id. at 309.
[27] The Heirs of Ap-ap applied for a certificate of ancestral land claim over the 186,090 square meters but the CSTFAL approved their claim over 110,342 square meters only (id. at 505).
[28] Id. at 504-506.
[29] Testimony of Guillermo S. Fianza (Chairman of CSTFAL), p. 263; testimony of Alfonso P. Aroco (Member of the CSTFAL), pp. 297-306.
[30] In the Matter of Application for Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim over a Parcel of Land Located at Res. Sec. “L” Km. 5, Asin Road, Baguio City: Heirs of Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, applicant, Delfin Lamsis, et al. Protestants, Peter Sito, Protestant-Intervenor (rollo, pp. 169-173).
[31] Records, pp. 644-653. Penned by Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes.
[32] Decision, p. 5; id. at 648.
[33] Id. at 6; id. at 649.
[34] Id. at 6-7; id. at 650-651.
[35] Id. at 9-10; id. at 652-653.
[36] Id. at 10; id. at 653.
[37] Records, p. 656.
[38] Id. at 655.
[39] CA rollo, pp. 124-133.
[40] Id. at 134-144.
[41] Resolution dated August 23, 2006 (rollo, p. 153).
[42] Id. at 159-167.
[43] Id. at 179.
[44] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 18-19; id. at 233-234.
[45] Id. at 19-20; id. at 234-235.
[46] Id. at 27; id. at 242.
[47] Id. at 27-30; id. at 242- 245.
[48] Id. at 34-35; id. at 249-250.
[49] Id. at 38-41; id. at 253-356.
[50] Id. at 14; id. at 229.
[51] Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
[52] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 14; rollo, p. 229.
[53] Id. at 15; id. at 230.
[54] Id. at 17; id. at 232.
[55] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 8; id. at 205.
[56] Id. at 8; id. at 205.
[57] Id. at 11-12; id. at 208-209.
[58] 337 Phil. 289 (1997).
[59] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo, p. 206.
[60] Id. at 10-11; id. at 207-208.
[61] Id. at 13; id. at 210.
[62] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 10; id. at 225.
[63] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R. No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, 335.
[64] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636.
[65] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, 451 Phil. 368, 377 (2003).
[66] New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., supra.
[67] Decision, p. 6; records,
p. 649.
[68] Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 561, 572-573.
[69] Section 7 (c), Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as “The Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997.”
[70] Heirs of Clemente Ermac v. Heirs of Vicente Ermac, supra note 64 at 377; Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., G.R. No. 142766, June 15, 2007, 524 SCRA 641, 653-655; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 283, 295 (2000); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114, 126 (2004); Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652, 660-661 (1998).
[71] Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 107, 118 (1999); Spouses Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil 729, 748 (1999); Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[72] Heirs of De Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70 at 126-127.
[73] Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 70.
[74] “The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another. The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected.” Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 444, 449 (1938). Citations omitted.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA Law likewise provides for cancellation of illegally acquired titles and reconveyance to the rightful ICCs/IPs (Section 9, Part I, Rule VIII).
[75] “An accion de reivindicatoria x x x is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership. It is an action whereby the plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and the awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner.” Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr., supra note 70 at 653.
[76] City of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145004, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 45, 55-56.
[77] Development Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Gatal, 493 Phil. 46,
53 (2005).
[78] Effective November 22, 1997.
[79] 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
[80] Id. at 563.
[81] Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63; Calimlim v. Ramirez, 204 Phil. 25 (1982).
[82] TSN Records, pp. 234-286.
[83] Appellants’ Brief, p. 17; CA rollo, p. 63.