Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SHINRYO
(PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, - versus - RRN INCORPORATED,* Respondent. |
G.R. No. 172525 Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR.,** LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*** PERALTA, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: October 20, 2010 |
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves
the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 22, 2006, affirming the Decision of
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), and the CA Resolution[2] dated April 26, 2006, denying herein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The facts, as
accurately narrated in the CA Decision, are as follows.
Petitioner Shinryo
(Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation
organized under Philippine laws. Private
respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent) is likewise a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws.
Respondent filed a claim for
arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which
consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused
materials in the total sum of P5,275,184.17 and legal interest in the
amount of P442,014.73. Petitioner
filed a counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96.
The parties admitted several facts
before the CIAC. It was shown that
petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract
(hereafter Agreement signed on June 11, 1996 and June 14, 1996,
respectively. Respondent signified its
willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects, a part
or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of
Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract documents.
On June 11, 2002, the parties
executed a “Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical
Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation” for the Phillip Morris
Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos.
4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00
respectively, or a total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will
perform variation orders in the Project.
In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable
against respondent.
Respondent was not able to finish
the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003],
respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding
for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back charges in
the amount of P4,063,633.43. On
September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as
material back charges. Thereafter, on
October 16, 2003, respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet
and settle their dispute.
On January 8, 2004, respondent sent
another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use
of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August
12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account and
the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.
On September 3, 2004, respondent,
through its new counsel, advised petitioner of their intention to submit the
matter to arbitration. Thereafter, their dispute was submitted to arbitration.
During the preliminary conference, the parties agreed in their Terms of
Reference to resolve eight issues, to wit:
1.
What should be the basis in
evaluating the variation cost?
1.1 How
much is the variation cost?
2.
Is the Respondent (petitioner in the
instant case) justified in charging claimant (herein respondent) the equipment
rental fee and for the use of the scaffoldings?
If so, how much should be charged to Claimant?
3.
What should be the basis in
evaluating the total cost of materials supplied by Respondent to the Project
which is chargeable to Claimant?
3.1 How
much is the total cost of materials supply chargeable to Claimant?
4.
How much is the value of the
remaining works left undone by the Claimant in the project?
5.
Is the Claimant's claim for
inventory of excess materials valid? If
so, how much is the value thereof?
6.
Is the Respondent entitled to its
claim for an overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96?
7.
Is Claimant entitled to its claim
for interest? If so, how much?
8.
Who between the parties shall bear
the cost of Arbitration?
The CIAC rendered the assailed
decision after the presentation of the parties' evidence. [The dispositive portion of said decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the claimant and respondent is ordered to pay claimant its
unpaid account in the sum of P3,728,960.54 plus legal interest of 6%
reckoned from June 25, 2003 up to the filing of the case on October 11, 2004
and 12% of P3,728,960.54 from the finality of the judgment until fully
paid and arbitration cost of P104,333.82 representing claimant's share
of the arbitration cost which respondent should reimburse.
SO ORDERED.]
Petitioner
accepts the ruling of the CIAC only in Issue No. 1 and Sub-Issue No. 1.1 and in
Issue No. 2 in so far as the amount of P440,000.00 awarded as back charges
for the use of scaffoldings. x x x[3]
On
February 22, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the
decision of the CIAC. The CA upheld the
CIAC ruling that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that the parties
had an agreement regarding charges for respondent's use of the manlift. As to the other charges for materials, the CA
held that the evidence on record amply supports the CIAC findings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said
ruling, but the same was denied per Resolution dated April 26, 2006.
Hence,
this petition where it is alleged that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR MANLIFT
EQUIPMENT RENTAL IN THE AMOUNT OF P511,000.00 DESPITE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
THAT RESPONDENT RRN ACTUALLY USED AND BENEFITED FROM THE MANLIFT EQUIPMENT.
II.
IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
AND QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CIAC AWARD FOR THE VALUE OF INVENTORIED
MATERIALS CONSIDERING THAT:
A. RESPONDENT RRN ADMITTED THE VALIDITY OF THE
DEDUCTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF MATERIAL SUPPLY, WHICH INCLUDED THE INVENTORIED
MATERIALS.
B. RESPONDENT RRN HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM BECAUSE
ENGR. BONIFACIO ADMITTED THAT RESPONDENT RRN FAILED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE
MATERIALS CAME FROM RESPONDENT RRN OR FROM PETITIONER AND THAT IT WAS
PETITIONER THAT ACTUALLY INSTALLED THE SAID MATERIALS AS PART OF REMAINING
WORKS THAT PETITIONER TOOK OVER FROM RESPONDENT RRN.
C. THE CLAIM FOR THE VALUE OF INVENTORIED
MATERIALS IS A DOUBLE CLAIM OR DOUBLE ENTRY BECAUSE IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE
FINAL ACCOUNT, RESPONDENT RRN WAS CREDITED THE FULL CONTRACT PRICE AND THE COST
OF VARIATIONS, WHICH INCLUDED THE INVENTORIED MATERIALS.
IV.
IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION
AND QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN THAT IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE PROVISION OF THE SUBCONTRACT, WHICH
ALLOWED PAYMENT OF ACTUAL COST INCURRED BY PETITIONER IN COMPLETING THE
REMAINING WORKS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT ADMITTEDLY FAILED TO COMPLETE.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON ACTUAL
COST INCURRED BY PETITIONER IN COMPLETING THE REMAINING WORKS.
VI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CIAC AWARD FOR INTERESTS AND ARBITRATION
COSTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT RRN.[4]
The petition is bereft of merit.
Despite petitioner's attempts to
make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that
what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has
presented before the CIAC. It insists
that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for
respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the
supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the
use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the principle
of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also
questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs
incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished by respondent.
As reiterated by the Court in IBEX
International, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance System,[5]
to wit:
It is settled that findings of fact
of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular,
factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and
conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
This rule, however, admits of
certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales
Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development
Corporation, we said:
In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled
that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be
reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was
evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were
disqualified to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and
willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced;
or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them,
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to
them was not made.
Other recognized exceptions are
as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a
fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when
an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3)
when a party is deprived of administrative due process.[6]
A perusal of the records would reveal
that none of the aforementioned circumstances, which would justify exemption of
this case from the general rule, are present here. Such being the case, the Court, not being a
trier of facts, is not duty-bound to examine, appraise and analyze anew the
evidence presented before the arbitration body.[7]
Petitioner's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment
is likewise misplaced. The ruling of the
Court in University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc.[8] is
highly instructive, thus:
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.[9]
As found by both the CIAC and
affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use of
the manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their
contract. Thus, the third requisite, i.e.,
that the enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is
missing. In addition, petitioner's claim
is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite − that the plaintiff
has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict
− is also absent. Clearly, the
principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case.
The other issues raised by
petitioner all boil down to whether the CIAC or the CA erred in rejecting its
claims for costs of some materials.
Again, these
issues are purely factual and cannot be properly addressed in this petition for
review on certiorari. In Hanjin
Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Dynamic Planners and
Construction Corp.,[10]
it was emphasized that mathematical computations, the propriety of arbitral
awards, claims for “other costs” and “abandonment” are factual questions. Since the discussions of the CIAC and the CA
in their respective Decisions show that its factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, there is no reason why this Court should not accord
finality to said findings. Verily, to
accede to petitioner's request for a recalibration of its evidence, which had
been thoroughly studied by both the CIAC and the CA would result in negating
the objective of Executive Order No. 1008, which created an arbitration body to
ensure the prompt and efficient settlement of disputes in the construction
industry. Thus, the Court held in Uniwide Sales Realty and
Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation,[11]
that:
x x x The Court will not review the factual findings of an
arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that such body had
"misapprehended facts" and will not pass upon issues which are, at
bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as "legal
questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the
arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. The
Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it the
issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal,
save only where a clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual
conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful
to one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or
loss of jurisdiction.[12]
As discussed above, there is nothing in the records that
point to any grave abuse of discretion committed by the CIAC.
The awards for interests and
arbitration costs are, likewise, correct as they are in keeping with prevailing
jurisprudence.[13]
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 22, 2006 and its Resolution
dated April 26, 2006 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* The Court of Appeals, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, the Honorable Beda G. Fajardo, Joel J. Marciano and Guillermo Claridad, in their capacities as Chairman and Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, who were initially included as respondents in the petition should not be included as such pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle dated October 20, 2010.
*** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 905, dated October 5, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 66-76..
[2] Id. at 78-79.
[3] Id. at 66-69.
[4] Id. at 17-19.
[5] G.R. No. 162095, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 306.
[6] Id. at 314-315. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7] Diesel Construction v. UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 154885, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 12, 30.
[8] 482 Phil. 693 (2004)
[9] Id. at 709-711. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[10] G.R. Nos. 169408 & 170144, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 541, 558, 565, 568.
[11] G.R. No. 126619, December 20, 2006 (quoting David v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 479 Phil. 578 [2004]), 511 SCRA 335.
[12] Id. at 362.
[13] See Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v.
Dynamic Planners and Construction Corp., supra note 10, at 576.