Republic
of the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
|
THE HEIRS
OF ROMANA SAVES, namely: FIDELA ALMAIDA, EMILIANO ALMAIDA, JESUS ALMAIDA,
CATALINA ALMAIDA, ALFREDO RAMOS, GINA RAMOS, LUZ ALMAIDA, ANITA ALMAIDA,
PETRA GENERAL, EDNA GENERAL, ESTHER ALMAIDA, DIONISIA ALMAIDA, CORNELIA
ALMAIDA, FELIMON ALMAIDA (represented by SINFROSA ALMAIDA); The Heirs of RAFAELA SAVES, namely:
JULIANA DIZON, HILARIA DIZON, JOVENCIO DIZON, MAURA DIZON, BABY DIZON &
ULDARICO AMISTOSO (represented by ULDARICO AMISTOSO); The Heirs of JANUARIA SAVES, namely: FELICIDAD MARTINEZ,
MARLOU MARTINEZ, ROWENA MARTINEZ, BABY LOU MARTINEZ, BOBERT MARTINEZ, JERRY
MARTINEZ (represented by FELICIDAD MARTINEZ); The Heirs of MAXIMO SAVES, namely: ELPIDIO AMIGO, CELESTINA
DEMETRIA AMIGO, MEREN (daughter of SEVERA SAVES), FRUTO ROSARIO (represented
by ELPIDIO AMIGO); The Heirs of BENEDICTA
SAVES, namely: AUTEMIA JUCOM, CATALINA JUCOM, DOLORES JUCOM, SERGIA JUCOM,
BENEDICTA JUCOM, JOSEFINA JUCOM, FLORDIVIDA REMETILLO, FELINA REMETILLO and
ANNA MARIE REMETILLO, (represented by AUTEMIA JUCOM),
Petitioners, - versus
- THE
HEIRS OF ESCOLASTICO SAVES, namely: REMEDIOS SAVES-ADAMOS, LUZ
SAVES-HERNANDEZ and DODONG SAVES, and ENRIQUETA CHAVES-ABELLA,
Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 152866
Present: CORONA,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: October 6, 2010 |
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the Decision[1]
promulgated on June 28, 2001 by the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, entitled “The
Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al.,”
reversing the Decision[2]
dated May 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch
39 in Civil Case No. 7678, in
favor of the petitioners.
The facts of this case as narrated in the assailed
Court of Appeals’ Decision are as follows:
Sometime on January 1921, several persons filed their respective claims
before the then, Court of First Instance of the province of Oriental Negros for
the titling of the respective lots they occupy, among them were Severo Chaves
and Benedicta Chaves, who filed their claim for Lot No. 382, to be titled in
their names, together with Escolastico Saves, Maximo Saves, Romana Saves,
Rafaela Saves, and Januaria Saves, in Cadastral Case No. 15.
On April 22, 1921, a Decision was rendered by the court, adjudicating
several parcels of land to different claimants, among the lots adjudicated,
were as follows:
1.
Lote No. 382 – Se adjudica pro indiviso y en partes
iguales a los hermanos Benedicta Saves, Escolastico Saves, Romana Saves, finado
Rafaela Saves, Januaria Saves y Maximo Saves finado en la proindiviso de una
sixta parte cada uno. La parte que corresponde a los difuntos Romana Saves y
Maximo Saves perteneceran a sus hijos respectivos;
2.
Lote No. 383 – Se adjudica con las mejores
existentes en el a la acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y
Gaudencia Valencia;
3.
Lote No. 386 – Se adjudica con las mejoras
ixistentes en el a la acciedad conyugal formada por Escolastico Saves y
Gaudencia Valencia;
Also on April 22, 1921, Decree No. 177831 was issued by the United
States of America for the Court of First Instance of the Province of Negros
ordering the registration of Lot No. 382 in the names of Benedicta Saves,
Escolastica Saves, the sons of Romana Saves, deceased, Rafaela Saves, Januaria
Saves, and the sons of Maximo Saves, deceased.
Thereafter, Severo Saves died intestate, leaving his wife, Teresa
Ramirez, his four (4) surviving children, and the heirs of his two children who
predeceased him.
On June 21, 1941, Adelaida S. Martinez and Felicidad S. Martinez, who
were the heirs of Januaria Saves, who predeceased them, sold their 1/6 share in
Lot No. 382 to a certain Gaudencia Valencia evidenced by a public instrument,
with Doc. No. 1029, Page 46, Book IV, Series of 1941, of the notarial register,
per allegation in a Motion for the Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title,
filed by Gaudencia Valencia.
On June 30, 1941, a Deed of Sale was executed by the heirs of Romana
Saves, namely: Sinforosa Alimayda, Juan Alimayda, Vicente Alimayda, Felimon
Alimayda and Porferia Alimayda; the sole heir of Rafaela Saves, Pablo Saves
Dizon; and the sole heir of Escolastico Saves, Teodoro Saves, their respective
1/6 share in Lot No. 382, or 3/6 of the property, to Gaudencia Valencia.
On June 6, 1947, Benedicta Saves and Marcela Saves, the sole heir of
Maximo Saves, sold their respective 1/6 share in Lot No. 382, also to Gaudencia
Valencia, or 2/6 of the property, as embodied in a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Considering that all the 1/6 share, rights, and participation of each
co-owner in Lot No. 382 were already sold to Gaudencia Valencia, she initiated
the titling of the said property under her name in a Motion for Issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148 was issued by the
Register of Deeds for Negros Oriental in the name of Gaudencia Valencia.
Sometime in 1961, Gaudencia Valencia sold the entire property to
Enriqueta Chavez Abella, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 was issued
in the name of Enriqueta Chavez, who was married to Charles Abella.
In 1979, Meleriana Saves, who was then residing in Cebu, wrote her
relatives in Negros Oriental, the herein appellees, asking them to verify from
the Register of Deeds information pertaining to Lot 382, as they were among the
heirs entitled to said property.
On March 17, 1981, a case for Reconveyance, Partition, and Damages was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental by
plaintiffs-appellees, alleging, inter alia, that Lot No. 382 was
fraudulently acquired by Gaudencia Valencia, and that Gaudencia Valencia
fictitiously sold the lot to her grandchild Enriqueta Chaves Abella.
The complaint was amended twice by plaintiffs considering that the
original plaintiffs and defendants were all deceased.
The parties failed to arrive to an amicable settlement during the
pre-trial stage, but have agreed to exclude Lot 386 in the litigation and
limited the issues as to the ownership of lots 382 and 383, thus, trial ensued.[3] (Citations omitted.)
The trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the
petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered –
1. Dismissing
defendants’ counterclaim;
2. Declaring
the Deed of Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio; and
being derived from a polluted source, whatever documents Gaudencia Valencia
executed in favor of defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella in relation to Lot No.
382, Dumaguete Cadastre and the issuance of TCT No. 110 covering said lot,
suffers the same legal infirmity that of a total nullity;
3. Ordering
defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to convey and deliver unto the plaintiffs
their shares of Lot No. 382, Dumaguete Cadastre in the proportion of their
respective rights and interests thereto which they are entitled to participate
and succeed from the shares of their predecessors-in-interest who are the
original registered owners of the aforesaid lot; and after which, the parties
are ordered to effect physical division and partition of the lot in question to
avoid further animosity between and among themselves;
4. Ordering
defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella to pay plaintiffs P6,000.00 as litigation expenses and P2,500.00 as plaintiff’s counsel court
appearances as well as moral damages in the sum of P120,000.00;
5.
Dismissing
plaintiff’s claim of Lot No. 383, Dumaguete Cadastre, for lack of merit, the
same is originally titled in the name of Escolastico Saves, married to
Gaudencia Valencia; and
6.
Defendant Enriquita Chavez Abella is ordered to pay
the costs.[4]
(Citations omitted.)
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the Court
of Appeals which reversed and set aside the same in the herein assailed Court
of Appeals Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated, May 23, 1995 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 39, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and a new one entered, declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110 in the
name of Enriqueta Chaves Abella as valid and subsisting, and the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs is DISMISSED for lack of merit.[5]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
this was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[6]
promulgated on March 7, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.[7]
Unperturbed by the adverse Court of Appeals
Decision, petitioners come before this Court and raise the following issues:
(a) Can the
Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, consider as evidence
exhibits not formally offered as such by the defendants (now respondents) in
the trial court?
(b) Are
exhibits (Exhibits “7”, “8” and “13”) not formally offered as evidence by the
defendants in the trial court subject to judicial notice by the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of utilizing the same as basis for the reversal of the
trial court’s decision?
(c) Is it
legally correct to consider a rule of evidence simply as a rule of procedure? x
x x.[8]
Petitioners also put into issue the failure of the
Court of Appeals to consider respondent Enriquita Chaves-Abella (hereinafter
“Abella”) a purchaser and registrant in bad faith[9]
and the reasonableness of its declaration that, even if petitioners are indeed
co-owners of Lot No. 382, they are already barred due to the equitable
principle of estoppel by laches in asserting their rights over the same.[10]
We find the instant petition to be without merit.
The first three issues propounded by petitioners
can be summed up into the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals can
consider evidence not formally offered in the trial court as basis for the
herein assailed Court of Appeals ruling.
Petitioners draw attention to the fact that
respondents did not formally offer Exhibits “7,” “8” and “13” at the trial
court proceedings. In accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court,[11]
the trial court did not consider them as evidence. Despite this, the Court of Appeals allegedly
utilized the same as basis for reversing and setting aside the trial court’s
decision.
It is a basic procedural rule that the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.[12] A formal offer is necessary because judges
are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is
to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. On
the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object
to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.[13]
However, in People v. Napat-a,[14]
citing People v. Mate,[15]
we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be
admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements
are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in
the records of the case.[16]
In the case at bar, the records would show that the
above requisites have been satisfactorily complied with respect to Exhibit “7.”
With regard to Exhibit “7,” which is a document
entitled “Motion for the Issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title”
filed by Gaudencia Valencia (hereinafter “Valencia”) in the same trial court
that led to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 148, the
records would show that it is the same document that petitioners’ witness Fruto
Rosario identified in his March 5, 1984 testimony and marked as
petitioner-plaintiffs’ Exhibit “I.” He
testified as follows:
Empleo Here is another
document, Mr. Rosario, which appears to be a motion for issuance of transfer
certificate of title, dated March 9, 1948, in 3 pages. Will you please go over
this certified true copy of the motion in Cad. Case No. 1, GLRO Rec. No. 140,
Lot 382, and find out if these are among the documents which you have obtained
in connection with your verification?
A Yes, this is the one, these
are among the documents.
Empleo We request that this certified true
copy of the motion for issuance of transfer certificate of title in Cad. Case
No. 1, GLRO Rec. No. 140, Lot 382, be marked as Exhibit “I” for page one; “I-1”
for page two and “I-2” for page 3.
Appearing on Exh. I is a
third paragraph, which states, “that Maximo Saves, owner of 1/6 of Lot 382 is
now dead, upon his death Marcela Saves is the only heiress and successor of his
rights and interest in and over 1/6 portion of said lot.” Do you understand
that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Is it true that Maximo Saves
left only one heir named Marcela Saves?
A No, Sir, it is not true.
Q Why is it not true?
A Because Maximo had two
children, Sir.
Empleo We request that paragraph 3 be
marked as Exhibit “I-3”.
Court
(to witness): Who died ahead Severa or
Maximo?
A Maximo, Sir.
Court Who died ahead Marcela or Severa?
A Severa.
Court Did Severa die before 1948?
A No, Sir, because she died
before the war; she died in 1940.
Court So, when this motion for issuance
of certificate of title was filed on March 10, 1948, Severa had already died?
A Yes, Sir.
Court And when this motion was filed on
March 10, 1948, Marcela was still alive?
A Yes.
Court That is why the motion and which
resulted to a certificate of title had only claim Marcela as a surviving heir
of Maximo?
A That is not so, Sir,
because what about us the children of Severa?
Court ORDER
The
hour of noon having come, continuance of the direct examination of fifth
plaintiffs’ witness Fruto Rosario, as already scheduled, will be done tomorrow
at 10:30 a.m.[17]
Verily, Exhibit “7” was incorporated and made part
of the records of this case as a common exhibit of the parties.[18] That only plaintiffs were able to formally
offer the said motion as Exhibit “I” most certainly does not mean that it can
only be considered by the courts for the evidentiary purpose offered by
plaintiffs. It is well within the
discretion of the courts to determine whether an exhibit indeed serves the
probative purpose for which it is offered.
Likewise, Exhibit “13,” which is TCT No. 110[19]
or the Torrens title that was issued to respondent Abella after she bought Lot
No. 382 from Valencia, complies with the requirements enunciated in Napat-a and Mate.
The records of the case bear out that Exhibit “13”
was identified by respondent Abella during the continuation of her direct
examination on March 15, 1988. This much
was noted even by the trial court in its Decision dated May 23, 1995, to wit:
During
the continuation of the direct examination, witness Enriquita Chavez Abella testified and identified the TCT No.
110 of Lot No. 382 registered in the name of Enriquita Chavez which priorly
reserved and now marked Exh. “13.” x x x.[20]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, it cannot be denied that Exhibit “13” was
included in the records that was elevated to the Court of Appeals.[21] In fact, the Court of Appeals correctly noted
Abella’s testimony regarding this document in resolving petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.[22]
It is likewise worth emphasizing that under the
Revised Rules on Evidence, an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof – such
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it is made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.[23]
The existence of Exhibit “13” was not only known to
petitioners but it was expressly alleged in their Appellees’ Brief[24]
filed with the Court of Appeals and their Petition for Review[25]
filed with this Court that Lot No. 382 is registered in the name of respondent
Abella.
Indeed, petitioners did not merely acknowledge the
existence of TCT No. 110 (respondents’ Exhibit “13”), but in fact relied upon
it in order to put forward their main theory that the sale from Valencia to
respondent Abella is fictitious or void because, according to petitioners, it
appears from the said title that respondent Abella was supposedly only nine
years old at the time of the transaction.
Verily, it is inconsistent for petitioners to claim that Exhibit “13”
proves its theory and in the same breath assail it as inadmissible.
Lastly, petitioners’ present objection to Exhibit
“8” hardly deserves any credit. Exhibit “8” is a rather innocuous document
which has no bearing on any of the significant issues in this case. Its existence was only referred to in the
second paragraph of page 7 of the RTC Decision wherein it is identified as an
“Order of the Hon. Court dated May 11, 1948.”[26] Though it never formed part of the records of
this case upon appeal, a careful perusal of the assailed Court of Appeals’
Decision would reveal that Exhibit “8” was not in any way used or referred to
by the Court of Appeals in arriving at the aforementioned ruling.
Anent the issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in failing to consider that respondent Abella is a purchaser in
bad faith, petitioner insists that “for failing to exercise prudent (sic) and
caution in buying the property in question,”[27]
respondent Abella is a buyer in bad faith.
She did not investigate closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia
Valencia, her grandmother, over Lot No. 382 which a buyer in good faith should
have done under the circumstances. She
did not even bother to know the persons from whom her grandmother acquired the
parcel in question. [28]
Respondents argue that the issue of good faith or
bad faith of Enriquita Chaves-Abella was not raised in the Complaint filed by
petitioners in the RTC. Petitioners’
original theory of the case is that the sale by Gaudencia Valencia to Enriquita
Chaves-Abella was fictitious because the latter was only nine years old at the
time of the sale. However, during trial,
it was clearly established by common evidence that Enriquita was already
married to Charles Abella when she bought the lot in 1961, and, as a matter of
fact, the purchase money was provided by her husband, Charles. Confronted with
the above situation which completely destroyed their theory of the case,
petitioners switched from their “fictitious sale to a 9-year old” theory to an
entirely different theory, to wit: that Enriquita Chaves-Abella is a purchaser
in bad faith.[29]
Despite this, the RTC declared that respondent
Abella is a purchaser in bad faith because “[s]he did not investigated (sic)
closely the basis of the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia over Lot No. 382 which
a buyer in good faith should have done under the circumstances.”[30]
The Court of Appeals reversed the above finding and
ruled that respondent Abella is an innocent purchaser for value and in good
faith because the “[r]ecords reveal that appellant derived her title of Lot No.
382 from the title of Gaudencia Valencia, who sold the entire property to the
former. Appellant relied on the face of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148 in the name of Gaudencia Valencia, which
was free from any encumbrances or annotation.”[31]
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling in this
regard.
It is a well-settled doctrine that one who deals
with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the same,
but only has to rely on the certificates of title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the certificates.[32]
In the case at bar, TCT No. 110, which represented
proof of respondent Abella’s ownership of Lot No. 382, did not contain any
encumbrance or annotation that was transferred from its title of origin - TCT
No. 148. It must be recalled that the
plaintiffs called Abella as one of their witnesses during the trial of this
case. It is Abella’s unrebutted
testimony, elicited as a hostile witness for the plaintiffs, that her
predecessor-in-interest’s (Valencia’s) title was clean when she (Abella)
purchased the property.[33] To be sure, the burden to prove that Abella
had notice of any defect in the title of her predecessor lies with the
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs failed to
substantiate their contention. On the
contrary, their own evidence tended to prove that Abella was a purchaser in
good faith of the property.
Likewise, there is no cogent reason or legal
compulsion for respondent Abella to inquire beyond Valencia’s title over the
property at issue since the latter had been in possession of Lot No. 382 prior
to the sale. Settled is the rule that a buyer of real property in possession of
persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of
those in possession, for without such inquiry the buyer can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith and cannot have any right over the property.[34] As pointed out by the assailed Court of Appeals’
Decision, Valencia had been occupying the property prior to its sale to
respondent Abella. Herein petitioners
were never in possession of the property from the very start, nor did they have
any idea that they were entitled to the fruits of the property not until
co-petitioner Meleriana Saves wrote her relatives, co-petitioners in this case,
about the possibility of having a claim to the property. [35]
Neither does the plaintiffs’ insistence that
Exhibits “G” and “H” (the deeds of sale executed in favor of Valencia) were
void support their theory that Abella is a purchaser in bad faith. To begin with, we agree with the Court of
Appeals’ ruling that the purported irregularities in Exhibits “G” and “H”
relied upon by the trial court hardly suffice to deem the said contracts as
null and void. There is no need to
repeat the Court of Appeals’ comprehensive and apt discussions on this point
here. What must be highlighted, however,
is the fact that Abella had no participation in the execution of Exhibits “G” and
“H” which were signed by the parties thereto when she was very young. Like any stranger to the said transactions,
it was reasonable for Abella to assume that these public documents were what
they purport to be on their face in the absence of any circumstance to lead her
to believe otherwise.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and
interest of another person in the same property.[36] Clearly, the factual circumstances
surrounding respondent Abella’s acquisition of Lot No. 382 makes her an
innocent purchaser for value or a purchaser in good faith.
Finally, on the issue of whether or not petitioners,
in the remote possibility that they are co-owners of Lot No. 382, are barred
from asserting their claims over the same because of estoppel by laches,
petitioners argue that they are not guilty of unreasonable and unexplained
delay in asserting their rights, considering that they filed the action within
a reasonable time after their discovery of the allegedly fictitious deeds of
sale, which evinced Lot No. 382’s transfer of ownership to Valencia, in
1980. They maintain that the delay in
the discovery of the simulated and fictitious deeds was due to the fact that
Escolastico Saves with spouse Valencia committed the acts surreptitiously by
taking advantage of the lack of education of plaintiffs’ ascendants.[37]
Respondents counter petitioners’ claims by
underscoring the fact that, since the 1940’s when their
predecessors-in-interest sold their shares in and over Lot No. 382 up to the
filing of this case in 1981, petitioners had never taken possession of Lot No.
382 nor did they file any claim adverse to the ownership of Gaudencia Valencia.
Since the sale of Lot No. 382 by Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 up to
1981 when this case was filed, petitioners had continued to sleep on their
professed rights. As found by the Court
of Appeals, “[p]laintiffs were never in possession of the property from the
very start, nor did they have any inkling that they were entitled to the fruits
of the property, not until one of the plaintiffs wrote her relatives about the
possibility of being heirs to the property.”[38]
On this issue, we again hold in favor of
respondents.
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert
it.[39] In the case at bar, plaintiffs, assuming that
they or their predecessors-in-interest had rights over the land in question,
obviously neglected to exercise these rights by failing to assert any adverse
claim over the property or demand any share of its fruits for many years. Not unlike their predecessors, petitioners
never interposed any challenge to Valencia’s continued possession under title
of ownership over Lot No. 382 ever since the entire property was sold to her in
1947 which led to the issuance of TCT No. 148 in her name. Likewise, petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest did not mount any opposition to the sale of Lot No.
382 by Valencia to respondent Abella in 1961 which prompted the issuance of TCT
No. 110. It was not only until 1981, or
34 years from Valencia’s acquisition of the entire lot and 20 years from the
transfer of ownership over the same to respondent Abella, that petitioners
decided to assert their alleged rights over the property in a proper action in
court.
Petitioners contend that the delay is attributable
to the surreptitious manner by which Valencia acquired Lot No. 382 from their
predecessors-in-interest but, on this point, petitioner’s evidence gravely
lacks credibility and weight as shown by the records. Instead, the evidence thus presented by both
parties, as found by the Court of Appeals, would lean towards the conclusion
that petitioners’ inaction for the past so many years belies any present
conviction on their part that they have any existing interest over the property
at all. Thus, even if we grant that
petitioners are co-owners of the property at issue, it is only fair and
reasonable for this Court to apply the equitable principle of estoppel by
laches against them in order to avoid an injustice to respondent Abella who is
the innocent purchaser for value in this case.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated June 28, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 51058, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
|
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice |
|
* Per Raffle dated September 27, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 17-25; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
[2] Id. at 26-39.
[3] Id. at 19-21.
[4] Id. at 38-39.
[5] Id. at 25.
[6] Id. at 40-42.
[7] Id. at 42.
[8] Id. at 92.
[9] Id. at 93.
[10] Id. at 102.
[11] Offer of Evidence. – The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
[12] Sec. 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court.
[13] Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha, G.R. No. 155483, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 410, 416.
[14] G.R. No. 84951, November 14, 1989, 179 SCRA 403.
[15] 191 Phil. 72 (1981).
[16] Mato Vda. de Oñate v. Court of
Appeals, 320 Phil. 344, 350 (1995).
[17] TSN, May 28, 1985, pp. 17-20.
[18] Records, pp. 168-170.
[19] Id. at 210.
[20] Id. at 275; see also TSN, March 15, 1988, pp. 16-17.
[21] Records, p. 210.
[22] Rollo, p. 42.
[23] Capangpangan v. People, G.R. No. 150251, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 279, 289, citing Sec. 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court.
[24] CA rollo, p. 69.
[25] Rollo, p. 9.
[26] Id. at 32.
[27] Id. at 101.
[28] TSN, March 15, 1988, p. 10.
[29] Rollo, p. 79-80.
[30] Id. at 37.
[31] Id. at 80.
[32] Barstowe Philippines Corporation v. Republic, G.R. No. 133110, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 148, 189; Republic v. Mendoza, Sr., G.R. No. 153726, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 203, 231.
[33] TSN, February 5, 1985, p. 12.
[34] Tanglao v. Parungao, G.R. No. 166913, October 5, 2007, 535 SCRA 123, 132.
[35] Rollo, p. 22.
[36] Chua v. Soriano, G.R. No. 150066, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 68, 78.
[37] Rollo, p. 102.
[38] Id. at 81-82.
[39] Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 197, 218; Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616, 635; Republic v. Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH, G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 19, 28; Cañezo v. Rojas, G.R. No. 148788, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 242, 259.
[40] Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513, 530.