A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC – Re: Letter of the
UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
Promulgated:
October
19, 2010
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DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
Ordering the 37 respondent members of
the UP Law Faculty to “show cause” in this indirect contempt case is like
ordering the little boy who exclaimed that “the emperor has no clothes” to
explain why he should not be crucified for his public observation. It is true
that the little boy in the present case may have aggravated the situation by
adding that the unclothed emperor did not present a flattering figure in his
natural state, but the analogy remains true – that the subject UP Law Faculty
members have been prematurely adjudged guilty and asked to explain why such
prejudgment should be reversed simply for expressing what they believed was the
truth. There may have been exaggeration in the UP Law Faculty's process of
expression, but this tempest is nothing that the Supreme Court has not
similarly weathered in the past and faced with equanimity. What is so grievous
about this whole contempt proceeding is that it comes in the wake of the gross
injury that the Court has inflicted upon the virtue of honesty in learned
discourses by labeling plagiarism as not plagiarism in the related case involving
one of its members.[1]
With all
due respect to my colleagues, it is not the place of the Court to seek revenge
against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the
courage to say what is wrong with it. The Court finds its legitimacy in
demonstrating its moral vein case after case, not in flaunting its judicial
brawn. There is nothing to be gained for the administration of justice in not
letting this one instance pass just because feelings have been hurt and the
urge to retaliate must be satisfied. If the 37 members of the UP Law Faculty
are wrong, there will be recompense in their loss of esteem among the academic
community and the legal profession. But if they are right, then the Court will
have made martyrs out of those who – in their temporary passion – may have
acted recklessly but truthfully and sincerely. Indeed, should they be proven
right, they may even rise in esteem in the eyes of international academic and
legal circles, for being the object of prosecution by one’s Supreme Court for
bold but intelligent reformist language can be deemed a badge of honor similar
to that bequeathed by history to the great thinkers who were persecuted by
society’s reactionary forces.
Indirect
contempt is committed in any of the acts enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court. The majority Resolution, which is the written charge
required by said rule, fails to cite which particular mode of committing
indirect contempt appears to have been violated. It is axiomatic to due process
that the accused be informed specifically of the charge against them. A
proceeding for indirect contempt is criminal in nature; thus, adherence to due
process is more stringently required of this Court.
From
a reading of the majority Resolution, it can be inferred that the following
constitute the portions of the text of the UP Law Faculty Statement that draw
the charge of indirect contempt: (a) the accusation that “an extraordinary act
of injustice has been committed against the brave Filipinas who suffered abuse
during a time of war”; (b) the casting of the decision as “a reprehensible act
of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land”; (c) the further attempt to educate
the Court on how to go about the review of the case; (d) imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the Vinuya case; (e) the dismissal of
the petition on the basis of “polluted sources”; (f) alleged indifference to
the cause of petitioners; (g) the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
majority Resolution believes that the UP Law Faculty's comments have no purpose
other than to “discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Court's honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for
its reconsideration.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Despite
the description of what it considers the allegedly offending language of the
Faculty Statement, the majority Resolution must still identify the specific
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 71 of which the UP Law Faculty appears guilty and
must not leave it to the reader to infer the basis of the complaint for
indirect contempt.
Beyond
the majority Resolution's failure to satisfy the technical requirements of
Section 3, Rule 71 is the failure to see the purpose for vesting the Court with
contempt powers. Contempt powers are given to and inhere in the judicial
function because these are indispensable to the administration of justice.
Thus, such powers must be exercised only when there is a causal relationship
between the act sought to be reproved and the positive effect such reproof
would have on the administration of justice. Sans this causal relationship, the
exercise may be viewed as tinged with vindictiveness. It must be kept in mind
that Rule 71 under Section 3 (c) and (d) is concerned with the “processes and
proceedings of a court” and the “administration of justice,” not with the
personal convenience of a judge.
This
Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the
motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by
the UP Law Faculty's statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to
enforce its future orders would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty
Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received by the public
is well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by
the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can
claim that its honesty, integrity and competence could be eroded by an
extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is honest, has
integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities
other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even
more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP
Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the
phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says:
“Given the Court's recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it
cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without
sanction, as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial
system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court cannot regain its
credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In
the same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all
controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial
and professional ethics.”
These
statements indicate the Faculty’s passionate desire to see the torch of justice
carried with honor and dignity by the highest court of the land, its steps
unfaltering from moral or professional weakness. Instead of denigrating the
Court, the Faculty wants the Court to remain the champion of justice, but the
Court can only remain so if it demonstrates beyond question that it remains
faithful to the ideals of truth and justice in every form, including in the
honesty with which it makes use of its reference materials. The UP Law Faculty
has in fact not only suggested ways by which the Court can uphold this role vis-à-vis
the Vinuya decision, suggestions that this Court may ignore – it has fearlessly
articulated a thought that is already so common in the minds of Philippine law
practitioners: that sacrifice must accompany the act of atonement required of
this Court for a breach of the standards of professional ethics.
Neither
can I agree that Dean Marvic Leonen should be asked to show cause why he should
not be punished for sending the Chief Justice mere dummies of the statement. In
most cases, this Court merely gives the parties’ counsel the opportunity to
satisfy the missing requirements. In any case, he has already submitted the
signed original statement, so what is the Court fretting over? This use of a
heavy hand on a small matter is profoundly disturbing.
The
reason, I think, is that this Court has already prejudged the respondents.
Reviewing the events, I realize that the language used in the majority Decision
in the matter of the plagiarism charges[2],
and the circumstances under which this “show cause” order is being issued,
paint a chilling picture of the Court. When the UP Law Faculty statement was
issued, the Court was taken aback, teetering a little from the blast of what
they thought was the power of 81 signatures of the UP Law Faculty, including
that of a retired justice. Then it found out that Dean Leonen, when ordered,
was actually ready to transmit a statement with only 37 signatures. The Court
recovered its composure and seethed that it could have been so destabilized.
This turn of events may account for the victorious tone used by the plagiarism
majority Decision when it referred to the UP Law Faculty Statement as a
statement that had “appeared like solid teeth in the dummy [but] turned out to
be broken teeth in the original . . . [a]nd retired Justice V.V. Mendoza did
not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented.” It seems to
have gloated over the realization that now the antagonist is more manageable,
consisting only of these 37 law professors, sans any retired Supreme Court
justice. With more reason should the Court
evaluate its mental and emotional frame before issuing the “show cause”
order. Is it ready to squarely face the fact that the moral consequences of the
plagiarism majority Decision are too horrible to imagine?
The
timing of the “show cause” order; the implication in the related Decision[3]
that the complainants in the plagiarism charge against Justice del Castillo are
“hypocrites”; the needling over a small matter such as submission of a dummy vis-à-vis
the original signed copies; and the apparent effect that the submission of the
Statement had on the Court – all of these betray a Court that is bent on seeing
itself redeemed not by hard and honest work, with the undertaking of proper
remedial actions for when a member is in breach of ethics, but by showing who,
in the land of lawyers, has power.
It is
with sadness that I view the issuance of the “show cause” order embodied in the
majority Resolution and dissent therefrom.
MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice