Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - DENNIS
D. MANULIT, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 192581 Present: VELASCO,
JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PERALTA,* and PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: November
17, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the November 26, 2009 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03776[1]
entitled People of the Philippines v. Dennis
D. Manulit, which affirmed the January
28, 2009 Decision[2] in Criminal Case No. 03-219494
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27 in Pasay City.
Accused-appellant Dennis D. Manulit stands convicted of the
crime of Murder, as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). He was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The charge against accused-appellant stemmed from the
following Information:
That on or about July 6, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed with a firearm, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Reynaldo Juguilon y Mansueto, by shooting the latter several times and hitting him on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.[3]
On November 10, 2008,
accused-appellant was arraigned, and he pleaded “not guilty” to the offense
charged.[4]
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution
presented as its witnesses Lydia Juguilon, Ralphy Villadolid y Laguerta,
Eduardo Juguilon, and Dr. Romeo T. Salen. On the other hand, the defense
presented accused-appellant; his cousin, Marvin Manulit; Maria Fontillar-Liwanag;
and Arlene Manulit-Intal as its witnesses.
The facts culled from the records
are as follows:
On July 6, 2003, at around 9:00 p.m., Anabel Bautista and her
live-in partner, Reynaldo Juguilon, were walking along Dagupan Extension,
Tondo, Manila on their way home when they passed by accused-appellant Manulit,
who was sitting in front of his house across the barangay hall. Upon seeing
them, Manulit stood up and successively shot Reynaldo at the back, resulting in
the latter’s death. He then tucked the gun in his waist, raised his hands, and
shouted, “O, wala akong ginawang
kasalanan at wala kayong nakita.” (I
did not do anything wrong, and you saw nothing.) And he ran towards the direction of the
basketball court adjoining the barangay
hall.
Lydia Juguilon, Manulit’s aunt and the victim’s sister-in-law,
saw what happened but kept quiet about it until, bothered by her conscience,
she decided to issue a statement before the prosecutor of
Ralphy Villadolid, another witness, corroborated
Reynaldo’s father, Eduardo Juguilon, testified as to the
funeral and other miscellaneous expenses he incurred due to the death of his son.[14]
Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Medico-Legal Officer of the Manila Police
District Crime Laboratory, testified that he conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of Reynaldo.[15]
Upon inspection, Dr. Salen found that Reynaldo sustained four (4) gunshot
wounds––two (2) at the back and two (2) at his right hand.[16]
The gunshot wounds on the back exited at the neck and armpit and both were enough
to cause the death of the victim.[17]
The trial court presented his testimony, thus:
1. Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left scapular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.4 cm, 12 cm from the posterior midline with an abraded collar, measuring 0.4 cm inferiorly directed anteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, fracturing the 4th left thoracic ribs, lacerating the lower lobe of the left lung, the larynx, trachea, making a point of exit at the neck, measuring 1.2 [by] 0.8 cm.
2. Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of entry, right scapular region, measuring 0.5 by 0.4 cm, 13 cm from the posterior midline with an abraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm, superiorly directed anteriorwards, downwards, and medialwards, fracturing the scapula and 4th right thoracic ribs, lacerating the upper and lower lobes of the right lung, making a point of exit at the left postaxillary region, measuring 1 by 0.6 cm, 18 cm from the posterior midline.
3. Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of entry, middle third of the right arm, measuring 0.5 by 0.4 cm, along its anterior midline, directed posteriorwards, downwards, and lateralwards, lacerating the soft tissues and muscle, making [a] point of exit at the distal 3rd of the right arm, measuring 1 by 0.6 cm, from its anterior midline.
4. Gunshot wound thru and thru, point of entry, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 0.5 by 0.4 cm, 3 cm from its posterior midline, directed anteriorwards, upwards, lacerating the soft tissues and muscle, making a point of exit at the proximal 3rd left of the left arm, measuring 1 by 0.8 cm, from its posterior midline.[18]
In his defense, Manulit offered a story of self-defense. He testified
that on July 6, 2006, at about 9:00 p.m., he asked his cousin, Marvin Manulit,
to have a drink with him. While they were drinking, Reynaldo barged in holding
a gun with both his hands.[19]
He appeared not to be his normal self with reddish eyes, as if high on drugs.[20] Reynaldo
poked the gun at Manulit and said, “Ano,
Dennis.”[21] Manulit stood up and
countered, “Anong ano?”[22] They
then grappled for the possession of the gun until they reached the alley near
the barangay hall where Manulit got
hold of the gun.[23] Suddenly, Reynaldo opened
a fan-knife.[24] This caused Manulit to
shoot Reynaldo several times, causing him to turn around.[25]
He dropped the gun and went straight to the house of his parents and told them
what happened.[26] His cousin, Marvin
Manulit, corroborated his testimony.[27]
The other defense witness, Maria Fontillar-Liwanag, testified
that the victim had been involved in several mischiefs but that she had no
personal knowledge of the incident.[28]
On the other hand, Arlene Manulit-Intal, sister of Manulit, testified that her brother
was inside the house drinking liquor with Marvin Manulit. When she heard a gun
fired, she hid and saw nothing. She later learned from others that Reynaldo was
shot dead.[29]
After trial, the RTC convicted
Manulit. The dispositive portion of its January 28, 2009 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Dennis Manulit y Diwa, Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, treachery being attendant to qualify the killing, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00, to pay them the additional sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P29,000.00 as actual damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[30]
On November 26, 2009, the CA
affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It held that accused-appellant failed
to prove the presence of unlawful aggression, which is one of the key elements
of self-defense. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no error committed by the trial court in arriving at the assailed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[31]
Manulit
contends in his Brief that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S SELF-DEFENSE;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[32]
The appeal has no merit.
In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial court failed to
appreciate the facts properly as he only acted in self-defense. He contends
that unlawful aggression was present when the victim barged into his house for
no apparent reason and started to point a gun at him.
We do not agree.
The essential elements of
self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.[33]
The person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof of proving all the
elements.[34]
More importantly, “to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was
then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.”[35]
Although all of the three elements
must concur, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense
to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. In other words,
“[t]here can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to
self-defense.”[36]
Unlawful aggression is an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person.[37]
In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the
wrongful intent to cause injury.[38]
It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger––not merely
threatening and intimidating action.”[39]
It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to
one’s life.”[40]
In the instant case, accused-appellant
failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. He wants this Court to
believe that the victim was the aggressor, not him. In his testimony, he stated
that while he and his cousin were drinking at the ground floor of his house,
the victim suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They grappled for the gun
and when he was able to obtain possession of it, the victim opened a fan-knife.
This resulted in his act of shooting down the victim.
The Court is not convinced. After a
careful perusal of the records of this case, this Court finds no plausible
reason to question the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence “that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.”[41]
This rule is even more binding and conclusive when the trial court’s assessment
is affirmed by the appellate court.[42]
In finding accused-appellant
guilty, the trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
credible, while it found the testimony of accused-appellant very self-serving, viz:
The testimonies of the
above-mentioned prosecution witnesses were given at the earliest possible
opportunity. They testified unflinchingly thereon. There was no material
discrepancy between their written statement/affidavit and the testimonies they
gave in open court. It was not shown that they had ill motive that drove them
to make false accusations against the accused. In the case of Lydia Juguilon, she
is closely related to both the accused and the victim. Accused is her nephew
being the son of her elder brother while the victim was her brother in law
being the younger brother of her husband. There is no showing of any reason for
her to testify for one against the other. Thus, the Court gives testimonies of
the said witnesses full faith and credit. In contrast, accused did not bother
to give his version of what happened to the investigating authorities. Right
after the shooting incident, he fled and went into hiding. He was arrested some
five (5) years later by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by this Court.
Moreover, accused’s claim for self-defense was belied by the number and
location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim.[43]
x x x
Clearly, the trial court is correct
in finding no ill motive on the part of any of the prosecution witnesses. The presumption is that their testimonies were
not moved by any ill will and was untainted by bias, and, thus, entitled to
full faith and credit.[44]
Moreover, the fact that
accused-appellant fled and was only arrested five years later belies his claim
of innocence. In People v. Deduyo, this
Court said that flight by the accused clearly evinces “consciousness of guilt
and a silent admission of culpability. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man
pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.”[45]
Therefore,
since no unlawful aggression was present, accused-appellant cannot successfully
invoke self-defense.
In addition, accused-appellant argues
that treachery should not have been appreciated by the trial court considering
that the victim was armed with a gun at the time of the incident. And even
after accused-appellant obtained possession of the gun, the victim had a fan-knife.
We disagree.
Paragraph 16 of Art. 14 of the RPC
defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be properly
appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack
employed by him.[46]
The “essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.”[47]
In the case at bar, the victim was
only walking along the street when accused-appellant suddenly shot him at the
back several times. He had no opportunity to defend himself, because he had no
inkling that an attack was forthcoming. It likewise appears that the means was
deliberately planned. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a
manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.[48]
Evidently, treachery attended the killing.
Noteworthy also is the fact that accused-appellant
harbored a deep-seated grudge against the victim, since the victim filed a case
against accused-appellant before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
In conclusion, all the elements of
the crime of murder, as defined in par. 1, Art. 248 of the RPC, were
successfully proved: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed
that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the
killing is not infanticide or parricide.[49]
Verily, in criminal cases such as
this one, the prosecution is not required to show the guilt of the accused with
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of proof
which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.[50]
We find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of
accused-appellant for the crime of murder with moral certainty.
With respect to the award of
damages, in line with our ruling in People
v. Satonero,[51]
when the imposable penalty is death but cannot be imposed because of Republic
Act No. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, and, instead, the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the following
amounts are to be imposed: PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 75,000 as moral
damages, and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages. And interest at the rate of six percent (6%) should
likewise be added.[52]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03776 finding accused-appellant Dennis Manulit
guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the sum of PhP 29,000 as actual
damages awarded to the heirs of the victim, we increase the awards of civil
indemnity to PhP 75,000 and moral damages to PhP 75,000. Accused-appellant is likewise sentenced to pay
the victim’s heirs the amount of PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, with interest
at the rate of six percent (6%) from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 913 dated November 2, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-15. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 51-55. Penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6] TSN, November 17, 2008, p. 20.
[7]
[8]
[9] “You did not see anything. I did not do anything to Boyet.”
[10] TSN, November 17, 2008, p. 17.
[11]
[12]
[13] TSN, November 24, 2008, pp. 1-27.
[14] TSN, November 18, 2009, pp. 2-19.
[15] TSN, November 25, 2008, pp. 3-4.
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo,
p. 52.
[19] TSN, December 2, 2008, pp. 6-8.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] TSN, December 3, 2008, pp. 3-34.
[28] TSN, December 9, 2008, pp. 5-18.
[29]
[30] CA rollo, p. 55.
[31] Rollo, p. 15.
[32] CA rollo, p. 67.
[33] People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001,
350 SCRA 650, 657; People v. Plazo,
G.R. No. 120547, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 433, 442-443.
[34] People v. Almazan, G.R. Nos. 138943-44, September 17,
2001, 365 SCRA 373, 382.
[35] People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September 10,
2003, 410 SCRA 463, 477.
[36] People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23,
2004, 423 SCRA 535, 540.
[37] People v. Basadre, G.R. No. 131851, February 22,
2001, 352 SCRA 573, 583.
[38] People v. Catbagan, supra note 36, at 557.
[39] People v. Escarlos, supra note 35, at 478.
[40]
[41] People v. Bantiling, G.R. No. 136017, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 47, 60. See also People v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995, 250 SCRA 676.
[42] Vidar v. People, G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010,
611 SCRA 216, 230.
[43] CA rollo,
p. 54.
[44] People v. Quilang, G.R. Nos. 123265-66, August 12, 1999, 312 SCRA 314, 328.
[45] G.R. No. 138456, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 146, 162.
[46] People v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 118649, March 9, 1998, 287 SCRA 229, 238.
[47] People v. Escote, Jr., G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003,
400 SCRA 603, 632-633.
[48] People v. Honor, G.R. No. 175945, April 7, 2009,
584 SCRA 546, 558.
[49] People v. Sameniano, G.R. No. 183703, January 20, 2009,
576 SCRA 840, 850.
[50] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
[51] G.R. No. 186233, October
2, 2009, 602 SCRA 769.
[52] See People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727, 742-743.