Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, - versus - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 191618 Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: November
23, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NACHURA, J.:
Confronting us is an undesignated
petition[1]
filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4,[2]
Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the
Supreme Court is “authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,” he
chafes at the creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal” complemented by a
budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to
effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly
supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),[3]
specifically:
(1) Rule 3 which provides for
membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are
designated as “Chairman and Members,” respectively;
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the
Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every
member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a
separate “Administrative Staff of the Tribunal” with the appointment of a Clerk
and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may
designate the Clerk of Court (en banc)
as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a
“seal” separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.
Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a
bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the
“appointment of additional personnel.”
Further,
petitioner highlights our decision in Buac
v. COMELEC[4] which peripherally declared that
“contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power.” On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution
of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and
Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in our Resolution dated
April 6, 2010, filed a Comment[5]
thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty.
Macalintal is unspecified and without statutory basis; “the liberal approach in
its preparation x x x is a violation of the well known rules of practice and
pleading in this jurisdiction.”
In
all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:
I
WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION.
II
WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.[6]
In
his Reply,[7] petitioner
maintains that:
1. He
has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental
importance of the issues raised therein;
2. The creation of the PET, a separate
tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and
3. The PET, being a separate tribunal,
exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
We
winnow the meanderings of petitioner into the singular issue of whether the
constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is
unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
But
first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whether petitioner has standing to
file the present petition.
The
issue of locus standi is derived from
the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.[8]
On more than one occasion we have characterized
a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
an injury as a result of the act complained of.[9] The dust has long settled on the
test laid down in Baker v. Carr:[10] “whether the party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult questions.”[11] Until and unless such actual or threatened
injury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to
raise the constitutional question.
Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo[12] illuminate:
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be
suing as a “stranger,” or in the category of a “citizen,” or “taxpayer.”
In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a”
citizen” or “taxpayer.”
x x x x
However, to prevent
just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent “direct
injury” test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted
the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In
People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of
cases, such as, Custodio v. President of
the Senate, Manila Race Horse
Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix.
However, being a
mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. This was done in the 1949
Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v.
Dinglasan, where the “transcendental
importance” of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally.
Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court
resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the “far-reaching implications” of the petition notwithstanding its
categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the
suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity
of laws, regulations and rulings.
x x x x
By way of summary,
the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve
constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of
obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a
showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and
(5)
for legislators,
there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
Contrary to the well-settled actual
and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a generalized interest in
the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Paragraph 2
of the petition reads:
2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioner’s humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition.
But even if his submission is valid,
petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition,
i.e., his appearance as counsel for
former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election
protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal,[13]
because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the constitutional
question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.[14] Such
appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the
first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution.
Although there are recognized
exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he
had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His
failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled
with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for
the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this
score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Prior
to petitioner’s appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, we
had occasion to affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the auspicious case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections.[15] Thus -
Petitioners Tecson, et
al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No.
04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to
designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez
vs. Roxas, as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted
Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and
Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the
Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing
the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.
Former
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more
categorical:
The
Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson
and
“The
Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The word
“contest” in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only
be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice
President. There can be no
“contest” before a winner is proclaimed.[16]
Similarly,
in her separate opinion, Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez declared:
G.R.
Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the
majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for
prematurity. The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to
entertain said petitions.
The
Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are
electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications” of the
President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of
cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise
jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President,
election protest or quo warranto may be filed after
the proclamation of the winner.[17]
Petitioner, a prominent election
lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional
and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003),[18]
cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably,
the overarching framework affirmed
in Tecson v. Commission on Elections[19]
is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Despite the foregoing, petitioner is
adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the
constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may
promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the
constitution of the PET is unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it
allows the Court to appoint additional personnel for the purpose,
notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner’s pastiche arguments are
all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly stick. But
these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court
is allowed to promulgate. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of this adjunct of
judicial power is very restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to
petitioner’s opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
Verba legis
dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court,
speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration[20]
instructs:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
However,
where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful
provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution.[21]
In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils
sought to be prevented or remedied.[22]
Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given
effect.
Last,
ut magis valeat quam pereat – the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:[23]
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
We
had earlier expounded on this rule of construction in Chiongbian v. De Leon, et al.,
[24]
to wit:
[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
On its face, the contentious
constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But
neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains
divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not
include his restrictive view – one which really does not offer a solution.
Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other related provisions
of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals
of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Before we resort to the records of
the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of judicial power
mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme
Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole
judge of election contests involving
our country’s highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in
connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers
implicit in the exercise thereof.
We recall the unprecedented and
trailblazing case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[25]
The
1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three
great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, “the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.” Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
The
Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise
of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the
unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.
The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in
the Article on the executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET,
is evident in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise
of this Court’s judicial power as sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this
purpose, we find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most
instructive:
MR.
DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words “Vice-President,” I propose to add AND MAY
PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to
enact the necessary rules while acting as sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
MR.
REGALADO. My personal position is that
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with respect to its internal
procedure is already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering,
however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is to indicate
the sole power of the Supreme Court without intervention by the legislature in
the promulgation of its rules on this particular point, I think I will
personally recommend its acceptance to the Committee.[26]
x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x.
With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover membership from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?
MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.[27]
On another point of discussion relative
to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen to former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
MR.
CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas
explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.
MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
MR.
CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which
are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.[28]
Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of
judicial power to the Supreme Court, Justice Florenz D. Regalado[29]
and Fr. Joaquin Bernas[30]
both opined:
MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2, the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
May
I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome
of the contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President is purely a political matter and, therefore, should
not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted provision not
impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the
judicial departments of the government?
MR.
REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that
would be a problem. This is a new provision incidentally. It was not in the
1935 Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.
MR. VILLACORTA. That is right.
MR.
REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an
intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because
this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.
MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic Act 7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?
FR.
BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary.
Election contests are, by their nature,
judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we
did not have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate
or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed, that cannot be
given jurisdiction over contests.
So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: “No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions.”
Before the passage of that republic
act, in case there was any contest between two presidential candidates or two
vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what
was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because
the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.[31]
Unmistakable from the foregoing is
that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is
plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact,
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the
phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate
its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith
assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without
intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature
cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential
election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
To
foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of
the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987
Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be
denied.[32]
Consequently,
we find it imperative to trace the historical antecedents of the PET.
Article
VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The
precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and
instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and
vice-presidential elections – from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation
of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the
determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be
contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution that would
hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a
defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for
the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed
candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable
in the then prevailing milieu.
The
omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by
the absence of a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of
the
Delegate Saguin. – For an information. It seems that this Constitution does not contain any provision with respect to the entity or body which will look into the protests for the positions of the President and Vice-President.
President Recto. – Neither does the American constitution contain a provision over the subject.
Delegate Saguin. – But then, who will decide these protests?
President Recto. – I suppose that the National Assembly will decide on that.[33]
To fill the void in the 1935
Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an
independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of
President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively.
Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent
Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent,
or temporarily incapacitated regular members.
The eleven-member tribunal was
empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its proceedings. It was
mandated to sit en banc in deciding
presidential and vice-presidential contests and authorized to exercise powers
similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the issuance of
subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance,
production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish
contemptuous acts and bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate
officers, and employees necessary for the efficient performance of its
functions.
R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed
and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bicameral
legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a
parliamentary government.
With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was
rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not directly chosen by
the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while
the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.
In 1981, several modifications were
introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was restored to the
President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was
formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually,
the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed
anew.
These changes prompted the National
Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled “An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.” This tribunal was composed
of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and
two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided equally
between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang
Pambansa.
Aside from the license to wield
powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend
the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who
in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the
canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns.
The independence of the tribunal was
highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from the national
treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was
empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the
subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers
of the government who were merely designated to the tribunal.
After the historic People Power
Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon Aquino as
President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed.
With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the
1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a
constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:
FR. BERNAS. x x x.
x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.[34]
Clearly,
petitioner’s bete noire of the PET
and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as “Chairman” and
“Members,” respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is
authorized to appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated
to the “Members,” in order to bolster his claim of infirmity in the
establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further attention by the
Court.
Be
that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of
the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.
The following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide
enlightenment:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
Are
we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed
to sit en banc as the sole judge of
all presidential and vice-presidential election contests?
MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion.
MR.
CONCEPCION. This function was discharged
by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme Court was able to dispose of each
case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that was probably
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme
Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who
else would hear the election protests.
MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules provided for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election contest to be decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical background that when R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957, at least three famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up in withdrawal by the protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of the cases. I am referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia against our “kabalen” former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential election contest filed by the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965.
MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when that protest of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want to have a decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and he did not get what he expected so rather than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.
x x x x
MR.
SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would
not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme Court this matter of resolving
presidential and vice-presidential contests?
MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not
have any objection.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power.
MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions.
MR.
SUAREZ. If the election contest proved
to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme
Court sitting en banc would be
occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions
of ballots or election returns, Madam President.
MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for President is dependent upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in other offices are concerned.
MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is mandated to sit en banc?
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. SUAREZ. I see.
MR.
CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this
contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before teams of three,
generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the
“protestee.” It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course,
that can be expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would
choose. There were times that the Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the
same time working, would classify the objections, the kind of problems, and the
court would only go over the objected votes on which the parties could not
agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is
concerned. What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because
each party would have to appoint one representative for every team, and that
may take quite a big amount.
MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioner’s experience which he is sharing with us, what would be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided?
MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court always manages to dispose of the case in one year.
MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.[35]
Obvious from the foregoing is the
intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the
Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and
vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired
by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome
for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary
powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the
PET.
The conferment of additional
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an “awesome”
task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.[36]
We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant
of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme
Court sitting en banc. In the same
vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority
is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
The conferment of full authority to
the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon
the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),[37]
which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.[38]
Particularly cogent are the
discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the
SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the
different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET,
are constitutional bodies, independent
of the three departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary
– but not separate therefrom.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.[39]
The
view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna[40]
and Regalado E. Maambong[41]
is schooled by our holding in Lopez v.
Roxas, et al.:[42]
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
“There shall be an independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal “shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court,” said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
By
the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme
Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that
the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the
nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral
court.
As regards petitioner’s claim that
the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC[43] involved the characterization of the
enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite
which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However,
petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac
which declared, in an obiter,
that “contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power.”
The
issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII
of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial
power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.” Consistent with our presidential system of
government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable” [44] is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”[45]
The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution
and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction
over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts
and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels – city,
provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive
and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of
Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law.
Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2),
Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and
House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.
Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election
contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that
the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[46]
It is also beyond cavil that when the
Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission,[47] Justice
Jose P. Laurel enucleated that “it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels.” In fact,
With the explicit provision, the present
Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s
exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,[48]
the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with
full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated
to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and
the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be
followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12,
Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge
that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI,
explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate
and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the
Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In
the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which
exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same
prohibition.
We have previously declared that the
PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once
again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland[49] proclaimed
that “[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity.” The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically
mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the
grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the
petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of
judicial power.
One final note. Although this Court
has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate a word of
caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s
docket. The petition in the instant case
belongs to that classification.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
|
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
(On Official Leave) MARIANO C.
Associate Justice |
|
ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice
|
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-9.
[2] Paragraph
7.
[3] On
May 4, 2010, the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2010 PET
Rules) took effect.
[4] 465 Phil. 800, 810 (2004).
[5] Rollo, pp. 12-38.
[6]
[7]
[8] Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed., p. 257.
[9]
[10] 369
[11] Gov. Mandanas v. Hon. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806 (2004).
[12] G.R.
Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, and 171424, May 3, 2006,
489 SCRA 160, 216-221. (Citations
omitted.)
[13] Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005, 454 SCRA 142.
[14] Cruz,
Philippine Politcal Law, 1998 ed., p. 263.
[15] G.R.
Nos. 161434, 161634, and 161824, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277, 324-325. (Emphasis supplied.)
[16]
[17]
[18] Atty. Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil.
586 (2003).
[19] Supra
at note 15.
[20] No.
L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 423.
[21] McCulloch v. State of
[22] In
the Philippine context, see Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815, February
22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
[23]
[24] 82
Phil. 771, 775 (1949).
[25] G.R.
No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668, 688-689. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
[26] Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 433. (Emphasis supplied.)
[27]
[28]
[29] Supreme Court.
[30] A Roman Catholic Priest of the
Jesuit Order.
[31] Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 407-408. (Emphasis supplied.)
[32] See Defensor-
[33] Constitutional Convention Record, Vol. X, pp. 471-472.
[34] Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, p. 408.
[35]
[36] McCulloch
v. State of
[37] CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 17.
[38] Sen.
Defensor-Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 294 (1998), citing Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, 250
Phil. 390 (1988); Robles v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990, 181
SCRA 780.
[39] Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 111-112. (Emphasis supplied.)
[40] Supreme Court.
[41] Court of Appeals.
[42] No.
L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756, 762-765. (Emphasis supplied.)
[43] Supra
note 4.
[44] Javellana
v. Executive Secretary, et al.,
151-A Phil. 36, 131 (1973).
[45] CONSTITUTION,
Art. VIII, Sec. 1, second paragraph.
[46] See Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra note
38; Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal,
supra note 38.
[47] 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
[48] See Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-74457, March 20, 1987, 148 SCRA 659, 665; Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924).
[49] Supra note 21.