THIRD DIVISION
|
SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - HEIRS OF MANUEL HUMADA ENAÑO, represented by
VIRGILIO A. BOTE, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 190754 Present: CARPIO
MORALES, Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: November
17, 2010 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For consideration is petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution of February 15, 2010
denying outright its petition for review on certiorari for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decision and resolution.
The
antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondents filed on August 17, 2006 a
complaint for quieting of title with damages against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, which complaint was raffled to
Branch 93 thereof.
On October 20, 2006, petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss[1] on the
ground that the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over it due to
improper service of summons. It argued
that, among other things, there was no observance of the rule that service of
summons on a defendant-corporation must be made upon its president, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
Respondents contended, however, that
the Officer’s Return showed that the summons addressed to petitioner was served
upon and received by Jay Orpiada (Orpiada), its manager. They thus moved to declare petitioner in
default for failure to file an Answer within the reglementary period.[2]
Close to 11 months after petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss or on September 10, 2007, it filed a Motion to
Withdraw [its still unresolved] Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer. On even date, the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion to dismiss and, acting on the motion of respondents which they
had filed after petitioner’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss, declared
petitioner in default.
Petitioner
challenged the trial court’s order of default via certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals.
By
Decision of August 12, 2009,[3] the
appellate court dismissed the petition, holding that, among other things, the trial
court properly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner via manager Orpiada; any flaw in the service of summons was cured by
petitioner’s voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction when it
filed the Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer; and the
trial court unerringly declared petitioner in default for failure to file an
Answer within the reglementary period.
Its
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated December 17,
2009,[4]
petitioner sought relief from this Court via petition for review on certiorari.[5]
As
reflected earlier, the Court denied outright the petition by Resolution of
February 15, 2010.[6]
In
the present Motion for Reconsideration,[7] petitioner
avers that, among other things, service of summons upon Orpiada violated the
rules and cannot bind it; the trial court
should have been more liberal considering that it took more than 10 months
to resolve petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss; and on the merits, it would
have been able to establish its ownership of the property subject of the
case.
In
its Comment[8] on the
Motion for Reconsideration filed in compliance with this Court’s Resolution[9] of
August 18, 2010, respondents maintain that Orpiada is the Manager of petitioner
corporation within the contemplation of Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court upon whom service of summons can be made, as in fact Orpiada had previously
received, on behalf of petitioner, a document from the RTC of San Pedro,
Laguna; and no Answer of petitioner had
actually been filed since the trial court had denied its Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer.
Replying
[With Motion to Cite Respondents and their Counsel in Direct Contempt of
Court],[10]
petitioner maintains that the service of summons upon Orpiada was patently
defective, but more importantly, argues that respondents should be cited in
contempt for submitting a forged Certification[11]
dated May 4, 2010 allegedly signed by Acting Deputy Register of Deeds Marites
C. Tamayo of the Land Registration Authority of Calamba, Laguna stating that
the original copies of petitioner’s TCT Nos. T-309608, 309609 and 309610 could
not be located, which certification was disowned by Atty. Tamayo herself in her
letter-reply[12] of June
7, 2010.
After
a considered hard look at the case, the Court finds petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration impressed with merit.
In
view of petitioner’s prayer for the remand of the case to the trial court which
amounts to submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction, the Court finds it
unnecessary to dwell on the issue of service of summons.
What
is crucial is the trial court’s assailed declaration of default.
Petitioner
correctly points out that the rule is that a defendant's answer should be
admitted where it is filed before
a declaration of default and no prejudice
is caused to the plaintiff. Indeed,
where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in
default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the
case, the answer should be admitted.[13]
In
the case at bar, it is inconsequential that the trial court declared petitioner
in default on the same day that petitioner filed its Answer. As reflected above, the trial court slept
on petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for almost a year, just as it also slept
on respondents’ Motion to Declare petitioner in Default. It was
only when petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer
that it denied the Motion to Dismiss, and acted on/granted respondents’ Motion
to Declare petitioner in Default. This is
procedurally unsound.
The policy of the law is to have every litigant's case tried on the merits as much as possible. Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.[14]
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Court’s Resolution of February 15, 2010
is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, which is directed to admit
petitioner’s Answer and to thereafter take appropriate action with dispatch on
the case.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 62-67.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Id. at 185-199.
[9] Id. at 184.
[10] Id. at 201-214.
[11] Id. at 219
[12] Id. at 220-221.
[13] Sablas
v. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568,
[14]