THIRD DIVISION
|
JERRY
M. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, - versus - |
G.R. No. 190545 Present: |
|
BAHIA
SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and/or CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA, and FRED OLSEN CRUISE
LINES, LTD., Respondents. |
CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson, J., BRION,
BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: November 22, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.
Jerry M. Francisco (petitioner)
entered into a shipboard employment contract on April 5, 2004 with respondent Bahia
Shipping Services, Inc. (Bahia Shipping) to work for its co-respondent foreign
principal Fred Olsen Cruise Lines Ltd. as ordinary seaman on board the
ocean-going vessel M/S Black Prince
for a period of nine (9) months, with a monthly guaranteed pay of US$467.00,
inclusive of basic salary, fixed overtime and leave pay.[1]
This was the fourth contract of petitioner with respondents since May 2002.[2]
On April 20, 2004, petitioner went through the
mandatory Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) with Maritime Clinic for
International Services, Inc., (the Clinic) which noted that he was repatriated
in January 2004 while serving under a previous contract with respondents due to
a Generalized Tonic-Clonic Type Seizure Disorder which was possibly
alcohol-induced;[3] that during
the repatriation, petitioner was treated from January 9, 2004 up to January 30,
2004 by the company-designated physician Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim) who assessed
him “to consider seizure disorder.”[4] The Clinic nevertheless found him fit to work,
hence, he, on April 24, 2004, boarded the vessel for the fourth time.
Petitioner boarded the vessel on
April 24, 2004 but was repatriated on June 3, 2004, after his tonic-clonic
seizures recurred, having suffered four to five fits of seizures nighttime
of May 26, 2004, and the ship doctor having found that petitioner was not fit
to continue employment at sea.[5]
Following his repatriation, he was
attended by Dr. Lim who advised him to undergo 21 Channel EEG and cranial CT scan,
and referred him to a neurologist.[6]
Dr.
Lim found the Seizure Disorder, Generalized Tonic-Clonic Type[7] with which petitioner was affected was not
work-related.[8]
Petitioner continued to avail of his
follow-up check-ups and re-evaluations with the company-designated physicians
from June to September 2004.[9]
After the lapse of the 120-day period following petitioner’s repatriation,
respondents informed him that further medical expenses would be on his own
account.
On October 14, 2004, respondents paid
petitioner his full sickness benefit amounting to P104,234.40.[10]
On
April 21, 2005, petitioner consulted a private, independent physician, Dr.
Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), who issued a Medical Certificate declaring him to
be suffering from a seizure disorder with an Impediment Grade X (20.15%).[11] Dr. Vicaldo deemed petitioner’s illness as
work-aggravated, found him unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity and was
not expected to land a gainful employment.[12]
Petitioner
thus filed on May 9, 2005 a Complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for payment of disability benefits, illness allowance,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against
respondents.[13]
Respondents disclaimed that petitioner’s
illness is compensable, the same not being an occupational disease and was pre-existing.[14]
By Decision of December 19, 2005,[15]
the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, holding that he got ill during
the effectivity of his employment contract, hence, entitled to disability
benefits. Had the illness been pre-existing,
the Labor Arbiter held that it could have been discovered during the PEME.
By Decision of March 31, 2008,[16] the
NLRC overturned the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision holding that the illness of petitioner was pre-existing in nature
because it was the same illness for which he was medically repatriated under a
previous contract with respondents;[17]
that petitioner was fit to work at the time of his engagement could not be the basis
to grant compensation as the results of PEME is not a measure of the seafarer’s
true state of health;[18] and
it was error for the Labor Arbiter to award sickness wages, as it was manifest
from the records that petitioner was duly paid therefor on October 14, 2004.[19]
The
Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the NLRC, by Decision[20] of
August 13, 2009, holding that under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Authority (POEA) Standard Employment Contract, for disability to be compensable,
it must be the result of work-related injury or illness, unlike in the 1996
POEA Standard Employment Contract in which it was sufficient that the seafarer
suffered injury or illness during his term of employment;[21] that
the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract defines a work-related illness as
any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of the Contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied; and that while any illness not listed in Section 32 is
disputably presumed to be work-related, such disputable presumption was
sufficiently rebutted when the company-designated doctors categorically stated
that petitioner’s seizure disorder was not work-related.
The appellate court noted that no
substantial evidence was presented by petitioner to show that there is a
reasonable connection between the nature of his employment or working
conditions and his illness;[22]
and that the findings of the
company-designated physicians deserve greater weight viz-a-viz the conclusion of petitioner’s private doctor which was
arrived at after only one consultation.[23]
His
motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision having been
denied,[24]
petitioner lodged the present petition for review on certiorari, arguing in the
main that his illness is presumed to be work-related.
The
petition fails.
Petitioner’s illness was already existing
when he commenced his fourth contract of employment with respondents, hence, not
compensable.[25] Given that
the employment of a seafarer is governed by the contract he signs every time he
is rehired and his employment is terminated when his contract expires,[26] petitioner’s
illness during his previous contract with respondents is deemed pre-existing during
his subsequent contract.
That petitioner was subsequently rehired
by respondents despite knowledge of his seizure attacks does not make the latter
a guarantor of his health. A seafarer
only needs to pass the mandatory PEME in order to be deployed on duty at sea. Notably,
petitioner was consistently declared “fit to work” at sea after every PEME.
However, while PEME may reveal enough for respondents to decide whether a
seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon as
reflective of petitioner’s true state of health. The PEME could not have revealed
petitioner’s illness as the examinations were not exploratory.[27]
But even granting arguendo that petitioner’s illness was
not pre-existing, he still had to show that his illness not only occurred during the term of his contract but
also that it resulted from a work-related
injury or illness, or at the very least aggravated by the conditions of the
work for which he was contracted for.[28] Petitioner failed to discharge this burden, however.[29]
That the exact and definite cause of petitioner’s
illness is unknown cannot be used to justify grant of disability benefits,
absent proof that there is any reasonable connection between work actually
performed by petitioner and his illness.
It bears noting that the
company-designated physician of respondent who monitored petitioner’s condition
and treatment for several months categorically stated that petitioner’s illness
is not work-related was controverted by petitioner’s own physician, however. Section 20 (B) of the POEA Standard Contract
provides that [I]f a doctor appointed by
the seafarer disagrees with the assessment,
a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The
third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. This procedure however was not availed of
by the parties.
While the Court adheres to the
principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA Standard
Contract, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the
evidence presented then negates compensability, the claim must fail, lest it
causes injustice to the employer.[30]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
MARIA Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) records, p.3.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Rollo, pp.94-102.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc, v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 161104. September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 595.
[26] Millares
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524,
[27] Supra note 25 at 60.
[28] Masangcay v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 172800, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 592, 593
[29] See Estate of Poseido Ortega vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175005, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 649.
[30] Ibid.