Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
MA. IMELDA PINEDA-NG,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 189533 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 15, 2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated July
10, 2009.
The facts are summarized as follows:
On December 19, 2007, an
Information[3]
for Qualified Theft was filed against: (1) Richard Francisco (Francisco),
Branch Manager of private complainant Philippine Business Bank (bank) located
in Dolores, City of
The prosecution found that
Aquino had drawn and issued the following checks in favor of petitioner:
|
Drawee Bank |
Check No. |
Date |
Payor |
Amount |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Planters Bank |
0204036 |
February 07,
2007 |
Imelda Ng |
|
|
China
Bank |
A0666301 |
February 21,
2007 |
Imelda Ng |
1,180,000.00 |
|
China Bank |
A0666309 |
February 26, 2007 |
Cash |
1,560,000.00 |
|
China Bank |
A0666310 |
February 26, 2007 |
Cash |
1,390,000.00 |
|
China Bank |
A0666308 |
February 27, 2007 |
Imelda Ng |
2,080,000.00 |
|
Planters Bank |
0204030 |
February 28, 2007 |
Imelda Ng |
900,000.00 |
|
China Bank |
A0661638 |
February 28, 2007 |
Cash |
1,000,000.00 |
|
|
|
|
TOTAL: |
|
In turn, petitioner
presented these seven (7) checks for payment before the bank by virtue of her
Bill Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco, who, in excess of his
authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact that each
check had a face value of more than P100,000.00 and that the same were
actually drawn from Closed Accounts and/or drawn against insufficient funds.[6]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[7] which was, however, denied by the City Prosecutor
because the Information was already filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of P400,000.00; while she ordered the
dismissal of the case against Aquino and petitioner for absence of probable
cause. Aggrieved, the bank filed its Motion for Reconsideration,[10]
to which petitioner filed her own Comment and Opposition.[11]
On April 30, 2008, Judge
Reyes, acting on the bank’s motion for reconsideration, issued an Order[12]
reversing her earlier ruling, this time finding probable cause against Aquino
and petitioner, cancelling the bail fixed for Francisco, and directing the
issuance of warrants of arrest to all the accused. No bail was recommended.
Unperturbed, petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA. In its Decision[13]
dated July 10, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA
took note that, while it appeared that Judge Reyes, other than exhaustively
quoting People v. CA,[14]
failed to fully amplify her own findings, it could not be said that she did not
review the records of the case, and that she merely relied on the findings of
the City Prosecutor. The CA stressed that, at the outset, in her Order dated
January 11, 2008 issued in petitioner’s favor, Judge Reyes categorically
indicated that she reviewed the records of the case. The CA ratiocinated that the
judge already had knowledge of the case and that she need not reiterate or
mention in the assailed Order that she reviewed the case. After all, Judge
Reyes had the power to set aside her previous Order. Moreover, the CA held that
while it is true that there is no crime of “Conspiracy to Commit Qualified
Theft” as argued by petitioner, the Information charged all the accused with
consummated Qualified Theft; thus, Aquino and petitioner were charged as
principals by direct participation. Subsequently, the CA denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[15]
dated September 8, 2009.
Hence, this Petition ascribing
grave abuse of discretion to the CA insofar as “the impugned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
inconsistent with and not supported by the law, the facts, as well as, the
settled jurisprudence laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter of
filing of criminal cases against the accused where there is no evidence
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.”[16]
Petitioner claims that
being a bank client and not an employee of the bank, she could not be held
liable for Qualified Theft, and that there is no such crime as Conspiracy to
Commit Qualified Theft. Petitioner avers that Judge Reyes merely relied on the
findings and recommendation of the City Prosecutor when she did not clearly
state the basis for the assailed Order, thus, violating petitioner’s constitutional
rights to liberty and presumption of innocence.[17]
On the other hand, respondent
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asseverates
that the petition for certiorari
filed before the CA was validly dismissed because the assailed RTC Order was
based on Judge Reyes’ fair evaluation of the records; hence, there was no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the judge when she issued the order. The OSG also states that the petition raises
factual matters, and issues of fact are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, the same being limited to
issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. The OSG then submits that
the determination of what should be charged in the Information is within the
exclusive authority of the executive branch.[18]
We deny the Petition.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of
the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt
and requires more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction.[19]
The general rule is
that this Court does not review factual findings of the trial court, which
include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It is only in exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the
conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial court judge on the existence of
probable cause, such as cases when the Court finds it necessary in order to
prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly
administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the
application of the exception.[20]
Moreover,
we respect the findings of the CA when it held that Judge Reyes did not solely
rely on the findings of the City Prosecutor in reversing her earlier Order. We
observed, among others, that when Judge Reyes quoted our ruling in People v. CA,[21]
she underscored a portion thereof, clearly indicative of her reliance on said
jurisprudence. Thus, it cannot be validly argued that Judge Reyes simply and
blindly adhered to the recommendation of the City Prosecutor in rendering the
assailed Order, bereft of any factual and legal basis. Furthermore, we also
accord respect to the factual findings of the City Prosecutor and the CA that
petitioner indeed encashed these allegedly anomalous checks. Suffice it to
state that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction – it is enough that there
is a reasonable belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.[22]
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, we find no further
need to resolve the other issues raised by petitioner, absent any reversible
error on the part of the CA in rendering the assailed Decision.
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is DENIED. No
Costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-42.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. de Leon and
Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; id. at 113-124.
[3]
[4] Also referred to as Maidala
Marilag-Aquino in some pleadings and documents.
[5] Also referred to as Imelda Ng in
some pleadings and documents.
[6] Supra note 3; please also see City
Prosecutor’s resolution dated December 19, 2007 (rollo, pp. 53-60).
[7] Rollo, pp.
61-65.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 2.
[14] 361 Phil. 401 (1999).
[15] Rollo, pp. 126-127.
[16]
[17] Supra note 1; please see petitioner’s
Reply ( id. at 184-191).
[18] Rollo, pp.
153-179.
[19] Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065,
March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 337, 352.
[20] De Joya v. Marquez, G.R. No. 162416,
January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 376, 381.
[21] Supra note 14, at 415-416.
[22] Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129, 142.