Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
IRENE K.
NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU, and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners, - versus - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 187752
Present: CARPIO, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, VILLARAMA,
JR., PEREZ,
SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: November
23, 2010 |
|
|
|
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated December 24, 2008 and Resolution[2]
dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held that Irene K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise
Service Officer III at the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), assigned
at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ), was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed upon
her the penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.
The case arose from the following facts:
On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No.
99-003, prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees
from PEZA-registered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the said regulation
read:
Effective
immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation services required by
economic zone export-producers for incoming and outgoing shipments x x x FREE
OF OVERTIME FEES/CHARGES x x x.
x
x x x
Economic
zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders, truckers and other
service providers and enterprises are strictly prohibited from offering
financial and/or non-financial tokens, compensation, etc. to any PEZA official
and/or personnel, in connection with PEZA overtime services rendered and/or
other transactions.
In
addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders,
truckers and other service providers and enterprises are enjoined to notify
ranking PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager, Officer-in-Charge, Deputy
Director Generals and the Director General) on any difficulties or problems
they encounter, particularly those pertaining to lack of service-orientation or
improper behavior of any PEZA officer
and/or personnel.[3]
Sometime
in September 2001, Edison (
Acting
on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary investigation,
during which Atty. Norma B. Cajulis, PEZA’s lawyer, interviewed Rey Ligan
(Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan attested, among others, that the
overtime fees went to Nacu’s group, and that, during the time Nacu was confined
in the hospital, she pre-signed documents and gave them to him.
On
November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA Legal Services
Group requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to verify the
genuineness of Nacu’s signatures appearing on the Statements of Overtime
Services (SOS).[4] Original
copies of 32 SOS and a specimen of Nacu’s signature were then sent to the NBI
for comparison.
On
January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that “no definite opinion can
be rendered on the matter” since “the standards/sample signatures of the
subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and appropriate to serve as basis for a
specific comparative examination.” The NBI then requested that, should PEZA still
want it to conduct further examination, it be furnished with additional
standard/sample signatures, in the same style and pattern as that of the
questioned document, appearing in official/legal documents on file, executed before,
during, and after the date of the questioned document.[5]
PEZA
referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of Nacu’s signatures/initials,
to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for
determination of the genuineness of Nacu’s signature appearing therein.
In
Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002, Rosario C. Perez,
Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her findings, thus –
1. Scientific comparative examination and
analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked “Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15,
Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24, Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32” and the submitted standard initials/signatures
of Irene K. Nacu marked “S-1 to S-19” inclusive reveal significant divergences
in the matter of execution, line quality and stroke structure.
2. Scientific comparative examination and
analysis of the questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked “Q-7
to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26” and the submitted standard signatures/initials
of Irene K. Nacu marked “S-1 to S-19” inclusive reveal significant similarities
in the manner of execution, line quality and stroke structure.
x x x x
CONCLUSION
1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE
NACU/I. NACU marked “Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23 to Q-25,
Q-27 to Q-32” appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces [of] Statement of Overtime
Services and the submitted standard initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked
“S-1 to S-19” inclusive WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE
NACU/I. NACU marked “Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26” appearing in
the ten (10) pieces of Statement of Overtime Service and the submitted standard
initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked “S-1 to S-19” inclusive WERE
WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.[6]
Finding
a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA
Director General Lilia B. de Lima (Director General De Lima) filed a Formal Charge
against her for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully charged P3,500.00
overtime fee from EBCC on ten occasions (covered by the ten SOS which the PNP
Crime Lab found to have been written by Nacu), for a total amount of P35,000.00.
Nacu
denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing statements
were hers. She averred that it was
impossible for her to charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware
that PEZA employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no
actual notice of Memorandum Order No.
99-003; and that she caused no damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC.
During
the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario Perez, the document
examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. Dante Quindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ,
who testified that Nacu was one of the officials authorized to sign the
documents; Romy Zaragosa, Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who
attested that meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002,
wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to Nacu; Roberto
Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of PEZA, who testified that
he knows Nacu’s signature and that he was certain that the signatures appearing
on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana, EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC
paid, through Ligan, overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho,
PEZA Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum Order No.
99-003;[7] and
Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at the BEZ, who testified that he
was responsible for the implementation of PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning
examiners upon the request of zone enterprises and brokers.[8]
On
February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation, and
Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima, found Nacu guilty
of the acts charged, thus:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation and Discipline (CBIID) –
1. resolves – that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which constitutes a ground for disciplinary action and finds her guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the best interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and (27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and hereby
2. recommends that – respondent be dismissed from service pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV, Revised Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory penalties of:
a) cancellation of eligibility;
b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and
c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service.[9]
Nacu
moved for a reconsideration of the CBIID’s findings, but the motion was denied.
By way of appeal, Nacu elevated the case to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated
Resolution No. 070327, affirming the CBIID’s resolution, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service Officer III, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005 issued by Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and disqualification from being re-employed in the government service is AFFIRMED.[10]
Nacu
filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327, but the motion
was denied in Resolution No. 071489 dated
August 1, 2007.[11]
Nacu forthwith filed a petition for
review with the CA, assailing the CSC
resolutions. On September 17, 2007, while the case was pending
resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu (husband),
Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son), herein petitioners.
The CA, in the assailed Decision dated
December 24, 2008, affirmed the CSC resolutions. The CA could not believe Nacu’s
claim that she was not aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the
order was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a PEZA
employee, Nacu had the obligation to keep herself abreast of everything that
transpires in her office and of developments that concern her position. It stressed
that even if Nacu had not actually received a copy of the memorandum order, such circumstance will not
foreclose the order’s effectivity;
and that it is merely an internal regulation which does not require
publication for its effectivity.[12]
The CA brushed aside Nacu’s objections
to (a) Ligan’s written statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan
was not presented as witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Lab’s
findings for being unreliable in light of the NBI’s own finding that the
samples were not sufficient; and (c) Margallo’s testimony identifying Nacu’s
signatures on the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert
witness. The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are not
strictly governed by technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they are
required to be disposed of summarily.
In particular, the CA found pointless Nacu’s
criticism of the PNP Crime Lab’s findings based on the NBI’s opinion on the
samples given. To counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact that the NBI’s
opinion did not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It
stressed that Nacu failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to contradict
the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, relying merely on the NBI’s opinion which, to the
mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner.
According to the CA, Memorandum Order
No. 99-003, the PNP’s findings, and the witnesses’ testimonies, taken together,
were sufficient to hold Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained
of. Nacu was not denied due process, considering that she was given the
opportunity to explain her side and present evidence, and that she had, in
fact, participated in the hearing.
The dispositive portion of the
assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
A motion for reconsideration was filed
by petitioners, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution[14]
dated May 6, 2009. They then elevated the case to this Court through this
petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners submit to this Court the issue
of whether the finding that Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is supported by
substantial evidence.
Petitioners’ arguments focus largely
on the weight given by the CA to the PNP Crime Lab’s report, which, they insist,
should not be given credence as it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the questioned
document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert. Secondly, the
signature samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient references for a
comparative examination. Thirdly, the sample signatures used were obtained in
violation of Nacu’s right against self-incrimination. And lastly, the report
merely states that there were similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke
structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not translate to a
finding that the signatures appearing on the SOS are genuine.
Petitioners
also object to the CA’s reliance on the statements made by Ligan during the
preliminary investigation, which were not given under oath. They contend that Nacu
was denied due process when Ligan was not presented as witness during the trial,
and that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s statements.
And
finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not aware of
the issuance and implementation of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing that
the said order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy
thereof furnished to Nacu.
We find no merit in this petition.
Substantial
evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings, means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.[15] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground
to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.[16]
Overall, the testimonies of the
witnesses, the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary investigation,
and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on
the SOS, amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported the
conclusion that Nacu was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners’
allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the
evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu.
For
one, petitioners cite the PNP’s findings as unreliable in light of the NBI’s
opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Lab—the same samples
submitted to the NBI—were not sufficient to make a comparative examination.
We
do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the findings of
one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover, as pointed out by
the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the NBI’s finding referred only
to the insufficiency of the samples given; the NBI did not actually make a determination
of the genuineness of the signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples
to be insufficient, such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime
Lab’s own findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the
signatures found on the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The
difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could only
mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from that used by the
NBI in the examination of handwriting.
Instead of just discrediting the PNP
Crime Lab’s findings, Nacu should have channeled her efforts into providing her
own proof that the signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries.
After all, whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving
the same by clear and convincing evidence.[17]
Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged weakness of the complainant’s
evidence without offering stronger evidence to contradict the former.
In any case, the CA did
not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in concluding that the signatures
appearing on the ten SOS were Nacu’s. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the
same position as Nacu, also identified the latter’s signatures on the SOS. Such
testimony deserves credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may
testify on a signature he is familiar with.[18]
Anyone who is familiar with a person’s writing from having seen him write, from
carrying on a correspondence with him, or from having become familiar with his
writing through handling documents and papers known to have been signed by him
may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that person’s purported signature
when it becomes material in the case.[19]
Petitioners
also posit that Nacu was denied her right against self-incrimination when she
was made to give samples of her signature. We do not agree. The right against
self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must
be claimed; otherwise, the protection does not come into play. Moreover, the
right must be claimed at the appropriate time, or else, it may be deemed
waived.[20] In
the present case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against
self-incrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked
to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have waived her
right against self-incrimination.
Next, petitioners assail the
credibility of Ligan’s statement because it was not made under oath and Ligan was
not presented as witness during the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due
process when she was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan.
It is settled that, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[21] In a recent case, a party likewise protested
against the non-presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity
to cross-examine the said witness. Addressing
the issue, the Court held that the contention was unavailing, stating that -
In another case, the Court addressed a
similar contention by stating that the petitioner therein could not argue that
she had been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took
place. [Citing Casimiro v. Tandog,
459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[22]
The
measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. It is,
therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies.[23]
In
addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s
statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed documents
during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these pre-signed
documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in the formal
charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in the hospital on the
dates indicated in the said billings.
To
set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the dates indicated
in the pre-signed documents were also the days when Nacu was confined in the
hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed some documents during the time
that she was in the hospital, and that she gave these documents to him. Neither
did he state that these pre-signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the
formal charge against Nacu. It was petitioners’ own assumption that led to this
baseless conclusion.
In Nacu’s defense,
petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of the existence of Memorandum
Order No. 99-003. They aver that there was no evidence showing that Memorandum
Order No. 99-003 was posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be
said that the order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the
BEZ. Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of the said
order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof.
Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the
existence of the said order. As correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to
believe that Nacu, one of the employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum
order, was not in any way informed—by posting or personal notice—of the implementation
of the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been
issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were employees of PEZA
and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident that the prohibition against
charging and collecting overtime fees was common knowledge to them.
At any rate, no publication is required for such a
regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal
regulation that clearly falls within the administrative
rules and regulations exempted
from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing
case of Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera:[24]
Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.[25]
At the very least, Nacu should have
been aware that collecting payments directly from PEZA-registered enterprises
was strictly prohibited. Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was
promulgated, PEZA had already put a stop to the practice of collecting direct
payments for overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises under Office Order
No. 99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter specifically provides that
“overtime shall be paid only through the regular payroll system,” and that
overtime claims shall be supported by the required documents.[26]
This was followed by PEZA General Circular No. 99-0001 (Prescribing New Rates
of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone Enterprises, Customs Brokers And Other Entities
Concerned) dated August 10, 1999, providing that –
4.5. All
payments to be made by requesting parties shall be covered by official receipts.
IN NO CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL.
4.6 No
additional charges or fees shall be paid by requesting parties, nor shall they
offer gifts, “tips” and other financial/material favors to PEZA employees
rendering overtime services.
4.7 At
the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment of overtime services
shall be supported by the following documents:
4.7.1.
Copies of written requests by enterprises and other parties;
4.7.2.
Certificate of service or DTR;
4.7.3.
Authority to render overtime services; and
4.7.4.
Certificate of accomplishment.[27]
Petitioners desperately
argue that Nacu could not have charged and collected overtime fees from EBCC as it was well aware of Memorandum
Order No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners
are, in effect, saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule prohibiting a
certain act would absolutely prevent one from doing the prohibited act. This
premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of fact, judicial institutions have
been founded based on the reality that not everyone abides by the law.
All
told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and penalized with
dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. The general rule is that where the findings of the administrative body
are amply supported by substantial evidence,
such findings are accorded not only respect but also
finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence.[28]
Nacu’s
length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has not been
clearly established. We cannot reasonably take them into consideration in
reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances cannot serve to mitigate
the violation, considering the gravity of the offense and the fact that Nacu’s
act irreparably tarnished the integrity of PEZA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated December 24, 2008
and its Resolution dated May 6, 2009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
|
|
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice (On Official
Leave) |
|
LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate
Justice |
|
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate
Justice |
|
JOSE Associate Justice |
JOSE
CATRAL Associate
Justice |
MARIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 55-71.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Supra note 1, at 71.
[14] Supra note 2.
[15] Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175451, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 357, 362.
[16] Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 589, 608.
[17] Aznar Brothers Realty v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 95, 112 (2000).
[18] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 50
provides:
SEC. 50. Opinion of
ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding —
x
x x x
(b)
A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.
[19] FRANCISCO, R.J., Evidence, Rule of
Court in the
[20] People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989, 175 SCRA 216, 228.
[21] Ocampo
v. Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 28 (2000).
[22] Donato, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 1, G.R. No. 165788, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 48, 60.
[23] Marcelo v. Bungubung, supra note 16, at 603-604.
[24] 230
Phil. 528 (1986).
[25]
[26] Rollo, p. 98.
[27]
[28] Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001).