Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner, - versus - METROPOLITAN
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 187023
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November
17, 2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the July 3,
2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061, setting aside the
November 22, 2005 Order[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, as well as its
subsequent Resolution dated March 3, 2009,[3]
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline
D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo,
Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank
whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding
Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained
loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes
signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several
demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC
rendered a decision[4] in favor
of Metrobank. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court renders a judgment in favor of [Metrobank] ordering defendants, C.P. Dazo
Tannery, Inc., Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Evangelina D.
Imani, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce to pay
[respondent] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
1. Under the First Cause of Action, the sum
of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank
charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole amount is fully paid;
2. Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum
of P92,158.85 plus the stipulated interest, penalty charges and bank
charges from February 24, 1985, and until the whole amount is fully paid;
3. The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the total amount due under the First and Second Cause of Action; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs
of suit and expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Therein defendants appealed to the
CA. On September 29, 1997, the CA issued
a Resolution dismissing the appeal.[6] Consequently, on October 22, 1997, the CA
issued an Entry of Judgment.[7]
Metrobank then filed with the RTC a
motion for execution,[8] which
was granted on December 7, 1999.[9] A writ of execution[10]
was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name
of petitioner. A public auction was
conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
Metrobank undertook to consolidate
the title covering the subject property in its name, and filed a Manifestation and Motion,[11]
praying that spouses Sina and Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) for
cancellation. Petitioner opposed the
motion and filed her Comment with Urgent
Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution, the Auction
On June 20, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order[13]
denying Metrobank’s motion, explaining that:
[Petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani incurred the
obligation to [Metrobank] by the mere fact that she executed the Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of [Metrobank].
The loan proceeds were not intended for [petitioner] Evangelina D.
Imani. It cannot therefore be presumed
that the loan proceeds had redounded to the benefit of her family. It is also worth stressing that the records
of this case is bereft of any showing that at the time of the signing of the
Suretyship Agreement and even at the time of execution and sale at public
auction of the subject property, [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani has the
authority to dispose of or encumber their conjugal partnership properties. Neither was she conferred the power of
administration over the said properties.
Hence, when she executed the Suretyship Agreement, she had placed the
Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated. The law could have not allowed this in
keeping with the mandate of protecting and safeguarding the conjugal
partnership. This is also the reason why
the husband or the wife cannot dispose of the conjugal partnership properties
even onerously, if without the consent of the other, or gratuitously, as by way
of donation.[14]
The RTC decreed that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Metrobank’s]
motion for issuance of an Order directing Spouses Sina Imani and Evangeline
Dazo-Imani to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan for cancellation, is DENIED.
On
the other hand, [petitioner’s] Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on
Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale with respect to the real
property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is GRANTED.
The
Levy on Execution and the
SO
ORDERED.[15]
Metrobank filed a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the
motion, asserting that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.[16] Attached to her opposition were an Affidavit[17]executed
by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the property, attesting that spouses
Sina and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the subject property; and the photocopies
of the checks[18]
allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
However, despite petitioner’s
opposition, the RTC issued an Order dated August 15, 2005, setting aside its
June 20, 2005 Order. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion
for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
Order dated June 20, 2005 is set aside.
Evangelina Dazo-Imani is hereby ordered to surrender TCT No. T-27957
P(M) to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan for cancellation.
The
effectivity of the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and the Certificate of
Sale with respect to the real property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is
reinstated.
SO
ORDERED.[19]
But
on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated November
22, 2005,[20]
reinstating its June 20, 2005 Order. In
so ruling, the RTC relied on the affidavit of Crisanto Origen, and declared the
property levied upon as conjugal, which cannot be held answerable for
petitioner’s personal liability.
Metrobank
assailed the November 22, 2005 Order via a petition for certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC for annulling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and
for canceling the certificate of sale.
On
July 3, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Order dated November 22, 2005 of the
SO ORDERED.[21]
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 3, 2009.[22]
Hence,
this recourse by petitioner, arguing that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRS (sic) IN
REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL
IN NATURE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES.[23]
II
THE UNSUPPORTED TEMPORARY RULING THAT THE
PROPERTY IS NOT CONJUGAL AND THE SUGGESTION TO VINDICATE THE RIGHTS OF SINA
IMANI AND THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN A SEPARATE ACTION UNDER SEC. 16, RULE 39
ENCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND VIOLATE THE POLICY OF THE RULES FOR
EXPEDIENT AND INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS.
III
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, B[EI]NG A ROAD
RIGHT OF WAY, IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXECUTION UNDER SEC. 50, 2ND PARAGRAPH,
OF PD [NO.] 1529.[24]
First,
the procedural issue on the propriety of the course of action taken by petitioner
in the RTC in vindication of her claim over the subject property.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA
ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the
writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the
property, she insists, can be adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC
correctly gave due course to her motion.
She asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of a
separate case to vindicate her claim.
We
agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this
wise:
Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant
or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer
effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy
thereof upon the judgment creditor. By
the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be
answerable for damages. A third-party
claimant may also resort to an independent “separate
action,” the object of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of
the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful
seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a “separate action” is the recourse, the
third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction an
action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being
enforced, even before or without need of
filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be
availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition
sine qua non to the institution of a “separate action.”
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should
have availed of the remedy of “terceria” authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39
which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a party to the case
against [petitioner]. Instead, the trial
court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to cancel and nullify the
levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M). [Petitioner] then argue[s] that it is the
ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the moment a
third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an
affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property levied upon,
the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant unless
the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s] motion was already
pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen,
the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.
In the instant case, the one who availed of
the remedy of terceria is the [petitioner], the party to the main case and not
the third party contemplated by Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the one who made the affidavit is
not the third-party referred to in said Rule but Crisanto Origen who was the
former owner of the land in question.[25]
Apparently, the CA lost sight of our
ruling in Ong v. Tating,[26] elucidating
on the applicability of Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
When the sheriff thus seizes property of a
third person in which the judgment debtor holds no right or interest, and so
incurs in error, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized
execution may be invoked by the third person.
Upon due application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the
Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or possessor.
What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a
determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment, more specifically,
if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment
debtor. The Court does not and cannot
pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of
finality. It can treat the matter only
in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or
not. x x x.
x x x x
Upon
the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the
execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto,
any relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, only the
executing court; and this is
true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.[27]
The filing of the motion by
petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of
sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. As
further held by this Court:
Certain it is that the Trial Court has
plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for the enforcement of its
judgments. It has undeniable competence
to act on motions for execution (whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary
upon the Court), issue and quash writs, determine
if property is exempt from execution, or fix the value of property claimed
by third persons so that a bond equal to such value may be posted by a judgment
creditor to indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages, resolve questions
involving redemption, examine the judgment debtor and his debtors, and
otherwise perform such other acts as may be necessary or incidental to the
carrying out of its decisions. It may
and should exercise control and supervision over the sheriff and other court
officers and employees taking part in the execution proceedings, and correct
them in the event that they should err in the discharge of their functions.[28]
Contrary to the CA’s advice, the
remedy of terceria or a separate
action under Section 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because
he is not deemed a stranger to the
case filed against petitioner:
[T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot
be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.[29]
Thus, it would have been inappropriate
for him to institute a separate case for annulment of writ of execution.
In Spouses Ching v. Court of
Appeals,[30] we
explained:
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit
but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse
being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, we answered
this question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan City declared
the wife to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was
issued against her. Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal
properties of the wife and her husband. The wife initially filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals
praying for the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was
adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then
filed a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ of
execution, alleging therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made to
answer for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The executing party
moved to dismiss the annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals, in Mariano, ruled
that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to hear the annulment case, had not
interfered with the executing court. We reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling
and held that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the
execution of the CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the husband of the
judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted
and adjudged against his wife, which would allow the filing of a separate and
independent action.
The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was inappropriate
for petitioners to institute a separate case for annulment when they could have
easily questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the collection
case. We note in fact that the trial court in the Rizal annulment case specifically informed petitioners that
Encarnacion Ching's rights could be ventilated in the
There have been instances where we ruled that
a spouse may file a separate case against a wrongful execution. However, in
those cases, we allowed the institution of a separate and independent action
because what were executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a
spouse who was not a party to the case. In those instances, said spouse can
truly be deemed a "stranger." In the present case, the levy and sale
on execution was made upon the conjugal property.
Ineluctably, the RTC cannot be considered
whimsical for ruling on petitioner’s motion.
The CA, therefore, erred for declaring otherwise.
Now, on the merits of the case.
Petitioner asserts that the subject
property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
As such, it cannot be made to answer for her obligation with
Metrobank. She faults the CA for
sustaining the writ of execution, the public auction, and the certificate of
sale.
We sustain the CA ruling on this
point.
Indeed, all property of the marriage
is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party
who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Proof of acquisition during
the coverture is a condition sine qua non
to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[31] Thus, the time when the property was acquired
is material.[32]
Francisco v. CA[33] is instructive, viz.:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides
that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.” However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party
who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to
say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage
and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired.[34]
To support her assertion that the property
belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit[35] of
Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of
the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks[36]
allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said
Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that
the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed
out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto
Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:
The basic rule of evidence is that unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their
affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected
for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of
written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial
for cross-examination. [37]
In the same vein, the photocopies of
the checks cannot be given any probative value.
In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño,
Jr.[38]
and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of
Appeals,[39]
we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value and is
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said
pieces of evidence.
Similarly, the certificate of title could
not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the
land was registered in the name of Evangelina
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired
during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof
are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing.[40]
Indubitably, petitioner utterly
failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership. Thus, it cannot be
rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.
As a last ditch effort, petitioner
asserts that the property is a road right of way; thus, it cannot be subject of
a writ of execution.
The argument must be rejected because
it was raised for the first time in this petition. In the trial court and the CA, petitioner’s
arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well settled that issues raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are
barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought
to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing
court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments
raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair
play, justice, and due process.[41]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining the validity of the writ of
execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
ROBERTO
A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Also referred to as Evangelina D. Imani in the records.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 37-53.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 45-47.
[3] Rollo, pp. 73-74.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 48-51.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Supra note 1, at 53.
[22] Supra note 3.
[23] Rollo, p. 30.
[24]
[25]
[26] 233 Phil. 261 (1987).
[27]
[28]
[29] Mariano
v. Court of Appeals, 255 Phil. 766, 773 (1989).
[30] 446 Phil. 121, 131-132 (2003). (Citations omitted.)
[31] Pintiano-Anno v. Anno, G.R. No. 163743, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 419, 423-424.
[32] See De
[33] 359 Phil. 519 (1998).
[34]
[35] Supra note 17.
[36] Supra note 18.
[37] Alba v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 451, 463 (2005).
[38] 389 Phil. 474 (2000).
[39] 265 SCRA 733, 757 (1996).
[40] Francisco v. CA, supra note 35, at 529.
[41]