SECOND
Division
|
Petitioner, - versus - CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DE BAIS, INC. [CAB], represented by its President, ANTONIO STEVEN
L. CHAN, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 186605 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 17, 2010 |
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D
E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Central Azucarera De
Bais Employees Union-National Federation of Labor (CABEU-NFL) seeking to
reverse and set aside: (1) the September 26, 2008 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03238, which reversed
the July 18, 2007 Decision[2]
and September 28, 2007 Resolution[3]
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated
the July 13, 2006 Decision[4]
of the Labor Arbiter (LA); and (2) its January 21, 2009 Resolution[5]
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of CABEU-NFL.
THE FACTS
Respondent Central Azucarera De Bais,
Inc. (CAB) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the
CABEU-NFL is a duly registered labor
union and a certified bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file employees, represented
by its President, Pablito Saguran (Saguran).
On
On
On
On account of the impasse, “CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The
NCMB then assumed conciliatory-mediation jurisdiction and summoned the parties
to conciliation conferences.”[9]
In its
CAB replied through its
At the
outset, it observed that the letter signed by Mr. Pablito Saguran who is no
longer an employee of the Central for he was one of those lawfully terminated
due to an authorized cause x x x.
More
importantly, the declared purpose of the requested conciliation meeting has
already been rendered moot and academic because: (1) the Union which Mr.
Saguran purportedly represents has already lost its majority status by reason
of the disauthorization and withdrawal of support thereto by more than 90% of
the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit of Central sometime in
January, 2005, and (2) the workers themselves, acting as principal, after
disauthorizing the previous agent CABEU-NFL have organized themselves into a
new Union known as Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Labor Association
(CABELA) and after obtaining their registration certificate and making due
representation that it is a duly organized union representing almost all the
rank and file workers in the Central, had concluded a new collective bargaining
agreement with the Central on April 21, 2005 in Dumaguete City. The aforesaid
CBA had been duly ratified by the rank and file workers constituting 91% of the
collective bargaining unit x x x.
Clearly,
therefore, the request for further conciliation conference will serve no lawful
and practical purpose. In view of the foregoing, and for the sake of continued
industrial peace prevailing in the Central, we beseech the Honorable Office to
disregard the aforesaid request.
It appears that the NCMB failed to act
on the letter-response of CAB. Neither did it convene CAB and CABEU-NFL to
continue the negotiations between them.
Reacting from the letter-response of
CAB, CABEU-NFL filed a Complaint for Unfair Labor Practice[12]
for the former’s refusal to bargain with it.
On
The procedure in the discharge of the duty to bargain
collectively is provided for in Article 250 of the Labor Code: (1) the party who
desires to negotiate an agreement shall serve a written notice upon the other
party with a statement of proposals; (2) the other party shall make a reply
thereto not later than ten (10) days from receipt of notice; (3) if the dispute
is unsettled resulting in a deadlock, the NCMB shall intervene upon the request
or at its own initiative and call the parties to conciliation Meeting x x x (4)
if the NCMB fails to effect an agreement, the Board shall exert all efforts to
settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary
arbitrator; (5) the parties may also go on strike or declare a lockout as the
case may be after complying with legal requirements. Subject, of course, to the
plenary power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute or to certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
In the case at bar, the record shows that respondent CAB
replied to the complainant Union’s CBA proposals with its own set of
counterproposals x x x. Likewise, respondent CAB responded to the Union’s
subsequent counterproposals x x x. Record further shows that respondent CAB
participated in a series of CBA negotiations conducted by the parties at the
plant level as well as in the conciliation/mediation proceedings conducted by
the NCMB. Unfortunately, both exercises resulted in a deadlock.
At this juncture it cannot be said, therefore, that
respondent CAB refused to negotiate or that it violated its duty to bargain
collectively in light of its active participation in the past CBA negotiations
at the plant level as well as in the NCMB. x x x
x x x x x x x
x x
We do not agree that respondent CAB committed an unfair
labor practice act in questioning the capacity of Mr. Pablito Saguran to represent
complainant union in the CBA negotiations because Mr. Pablito Saguran was no
longer an employee of respondent CAB at that time having been separated from
employment on the ground of redundancy and having received the corresponding
separation benefits. x x x.
So also, we do not find respondent CAB guilty of unfair
labor practice by its act of writing the NCMB Director in a letter dated June
24, 2005, stating its legal position on complainant’s request for further
conciliation to the effect that since almost [all] of the rank and file
employees, the principals in a principal-agent relationship, have withdrawn
their support to the complainant union and that in fact they have already
organized themselves into a DOLE-registered labor union known as CABELA, any
further conciliation will serve no lawful and practical purpose. x x x.
At this juncture, it was incumbent upon the NCMB to make a
ruling on the request of the complainant union as well as upon the
corresponding comment of respondent CAB. If the NCMB chose not to pursue
further negotiation between the parties, respondent CAB should not be faulted
therefor. x x x.
Under the facts obtaining, when the
conciliation/mediation by the NCMB has not been officially concluded, we find
the instant complaint for unfair labor practice not only without merit but also
premature.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the case is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the NLRC in its
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent
company committed an unfair labor practice for violation of its duty to bargain
collectively in good faith.
x x x x x x x
x x
The important event to discuss in the instant case is
respondent’s act of concluding a CBA with CABELA. As gleaned from respondent’s
letter to NCMB dated
In resolving the issue of whether respondent’s act of
concluding a CBA with CABELA is warranted under the circumstances is to examine
the validity of such act. The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in
motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present,
namely: 1) possession of the status of majority representation of the
employees’ representative in accordance with any of the means of selection and
designation provided for by the Labor Code, 2) proof of majority
representation, and 3) a demand to bargain under Article 250, par. (a) of the
Labor Code x x x.
In the instant case, it is undeniable that complainant is
the certified collective bargaining agent of the regular workers and seasonal
employees of respondent. Its status as such was determined in a certification
election conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). As such,
there was no reason for respondent to deal and negotiate with CABELA since the
latter does not have such status of majority representation. x x x.
X x x. Based on this premise, respondent violated its
duty to bargain with complainant when during the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings before the NCMB it concluded a CBA with another union as a
consequence, it refused to resume negotiation with complainant upon the
latter’s demand.
With respect to respondent’s observation that the request
for conciliation meeting was signed by one who is not eligible and authorized
to represent any union with the company since he is no longer an employee,
suffice it to state that at the time the request was made, such employee has
questioned the validity of his dismissal with then NLRC. X x x.
Respondent’s failure to act on the request of the
complainant to resume negotiation for no valid reason constitutes unfair labor
practice. Consequently, the proposed CBA as amended should be imposed to
respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another one is entered declaring that respondent
Central Azucarera de Bais is guilty of unfair labor practice. As such, the
proposed CBA of complainant, as amended is imposed to respondent Central
Azucarera de Bais.
SO ORDERED.
CAB moved for a reconsideration but
the motion was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
Unsatisfied, CAB elevated the matter to the CA by way of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in reversing the LA decision
and issuing the questioned resolution.
On
x x x x
x x x x x
First. This Court has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent CABEU-NFL. Through its
counsel of record, CABEU-NFL already filed its extensive comment on the instant
petition. Hence, it is now useless to contend that it was denied notice of the
same and the opportunity to be heard on it. x x x.
x x x x x x x
x x
Second.
Petitioner CAB was not shown to have violated the rule requiring parties to
certify in their initiatory pleadings against forum shopping. Private
respondent CABEU-NFL alleges in its comment that the two cases are pending
before this Court: CA-G.R. No. 03132 and CA-G.R. No. 03017 involving the same
parties as in the case at bar. Unfortunately, CABEU-NFL did not explain how the
issues in those pending cases are related to or similar to those involved in
this proceeding. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
Third. x x x
x x x x x x
In the case at bar, private
respondent CABEU-NFL failed in its burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor practice. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of public respondent referred merely to two (2)
circumstances which allegedly support the conclusion that the presumption of
good faith had been rebutted and that bad faith was extant in petitioner’s
actions. To recall, these circumstances are: (a) the execution of a supposed
collective bargaining agreement with another labor union, CABELA; and (b) CAB’s
sending of the letter dated
x x x x x x x
x x
x x x petitioner CAB was not
scuttling the ongoing negotiations towards a new collective bargaining
agreement. It was simply propounding a position to the NCMB for the latter to
rule on. That the negotiations did not push through was not the result of CAB
management’s intransigence because there was none – at least so far as the case
record confirms. There is nothing that establishes petitioner’s predetermined
resolve not to budge from an initial position – perhaps stubbornness of some
ambiguous sort but not the absence of good faith to pursue collective
bargaining. x x x.
x x x x x x x
x x
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
CABEU-NFL moved
for a reconsideration but its motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution
dated
Hence this
petition.
In its Memorandum,[17] CABEU-NFL raised the following:
ISSUES
I) WHETHER OF NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PETITIONER WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED THE FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) WHICH HELD RESPONDENT GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.[18]
II) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO
RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 65, SECTION 1 AND SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 04-94, ON
CERTIFICATION ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING.[19]
In sum, the petition raises three (3) issues for the Court’s
consideration which are whether or not the CA erred: (1) in giving due course
to the petition for certiorari despite service of the copy of the
petition to CABEU-NFL’s counsel and not to itself ; (2) in giving due course to
the petition for certiorari despite the failure of CAB to indicate the
address of CABEU-NFL in the petition; and (3) in absolving CAB of unfair labor
practice.
CABEU-NFL insists that the CA erred in giving due course to
the petition for certiorari because respondent CAB served a copy of its
CA petition to CABEU-NFL’s counsel and not to CABEU-NFL itself. CABEU-NFL, likewise,
harps on the failure of CAB to indicate CABEU-NFL’s full address in the said
petition as required in petitions for certiorari, citing Section 1, Rule
65[20]
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46.[21]
Ultimately, CABEU-NFL aggressively
asserts that CAB is guilty of unfair labor practice on the ground of its
refusal to bargain collectively. CABEU-NFL claims to be the duly certified
bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file employees such that it requested to
bargain through a letter-request which was subsequently turned
down by CAB in its letter-response. Anchored on the admission in the CAB letter-response
of a supposed CBA with CABELA, CABEU-NFL charges that such act constitutes a violation of CAB’s duty to bargain collectively
under Article 253 of the Labor Code[22]
and consequently an act of unfair labor practice prohibited under Article 248
(g) of the Labor Code.[23] CABEU-NFL also submits that CAB violated the prohibition against forum shopping when it filed its petition in
the CA. CABEU-NFL claims that
the failure of CAB’s counsel to disclose to the CA the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 033132 and CA-G.R. SP No. 03017 constituted forum shopping, a
sufficient ground to dismiss the said petition.
In its Memorandum,[24]
CAB claims that service of the copy of the petition for certiorari to
CABEU-NFL’s counsel was sufficient. It vehemently denies its alleged failure to
indicate CABEU-NFL’s name and address in its petition. CAB also stresses
that CA-G.R. SP No. 033132 and CA-G.R. SP No. 03017 “were
initiated exclusively by members of CABEU and by CABEU itself, respectively,
and not by CAB.”[25] CAB further argues
that there was no identity of issues or causes of action between the two
abovementioned cases and this case.
On the issue of unfair labor practice, CAB counters that
in view of the disassociation of more than 90% of rank-and-file workers from CABEU-NFL,
it was constrained to negotiate and conclude in good faith a new CBA with
CABELA, the newly established union by workers who disassociated from CABEU-NFL.
CAB emphasizes that it declined further
negotiations with CABEU-NFL in good faith because to continue with it would
serve no practical purpose. Considering that the NCMB has yet to resolve CAB’s
query in its letter-response, CAB was left without any choice but accede to the
demands of CABELA. In concluding a CBA
with CABELA, CAB claims that it acted in the best interest of the rank-and-file
workers which belied bad faith.
THE COURT’S RULING
The petition lacks merit.
On the technical issues, CABEU-NFL’s insistence that service
of the copy of the CA petition should have been made to it, rather than to its
counsel, is unavailing.
On
the matter of service, Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in a petition filed originally in the
CA, the petitioner is required to serve a copy of the petition on the adverse
party before its filing. If the adverse party appears by counsel, service
shall be made on such counsel pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13.[26]
With respect to the alleged failure of
CAB to indicate the address of CABEU-NFL in the CA petition, it appears that CABEU-NFL
is misleading the Court. A perusal of the petition[27]
filed before the CA reveals that CAB indeed indicated both the name[28]
and address[29]
of CABEU-NFL. Moreover, the indication in said petition by CAB that CABEU-NFL could
be served with court processes through its counsel was substantial compliance
with the Rules.[30]
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain CABEU-NFL’s
contention on forum shopping against CAB.
By forum
shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals, grounded
on the same cause, hoping that one or the other tribunal would favorably
dispose of the matter. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.[31]
In the case at bench, CABEU-NFL merely raised the fact of the
pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 033132 and CA-G.R. SP No. 03017
in its comment on the petition for certiorari[32] filed before the CA without
demonstrating any similarity in the causes of action between the said cases and
the present case. The CA, citing the ruling
in T’boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi[33] as authority, points out that:
This Court cannot take judicial notice of what CA-G.R. No. 03132
and CA-G.R. No. 03017 involve because:
“As a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before
them of the contents of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been tried or are actually pending before the
same judge. Courts may be required to take judicial notice of the
decisions of the appellate courts but not of the decisions of the coordinate trial
courts, or even of a decision or the facts involved in another case tried by
the same court itself, unless the parties introduce the same in evidence or the
court, as a matter of convenience, decides to do so. Besides, judicial notice
of matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions is only discretionary upon the court. It is not mandatory.”
In the absence of evidence to show that the issues involved in
these cases are the same, this Court cannot give credence to private
respondent’s claim of forum shopping.
The Court now proceeds to determine whether or
not respondent CAB was guilty of acts constituting unfair labor practice by refusing
to bargain collectively.
The
Court rules in the negative.
CAB is being accused of
violating its duty to bargain collectively supposedly because of its act in
concluding a CBA with CABELA, another union in the bargaining unit, and its
failure to resume negotiations with CABEU-NFL.
The
concept of unfair labor practice is provided in Article 247 of the Labor Code
which states:
Article 247. Concept of Unfair Labor
Practice and Procedure for Prosecution thereof. -- Unfair labor practices
violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization,
are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each
other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace
and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
x
x x x x x x x x
The Labor Code, likewise,
enumerates the acts constituting unfair labor practices of the employer, thus:
Article
248. Unfair Labor Practices of
Employers.––It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
x x x x x x x x x
(g) To
violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code.
For a charge of unfair
labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that CAB was motivated by ill will,
“bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social
humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety resulted x x x” in
suspending negotiations with CABEU-NFL. Notably, CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no
longer the representative of the workers.[34]
It just wanted to foster industrial peace
by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its rank and file
workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with CABELA.”[35]
Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to
be punished in cases of unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is
presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By
imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof
to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor
practice.[36] Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the
circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the
supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend the
negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions. The Court is of the view that CABEU-NFL, in
simply relying on the said letter-response, failed to substantiate its claim of
unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption of good faith.
Moreover, as correctly
determined by the LA, the filing of the complaint for unfair labor practice was
premature inasmuch as the issue of collective bargaining is still pending
before the NCMB.
In the resolution of labor cases, this Court has always been
guided by the State policy enshrined in the Constitution that the rights of
workers and the promotion of their welfare shall be protected.
The Court is, likewise, guided by the goal of attaining industrial peace by the
proper application of the law. Thus, it cannot favor one party, be it labor or management, in
arriving at a just solution to a controversy if the party has no valid support
to its claims. It is not within this Court’s power to rule beyond the ambit
of the law.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO
A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A
T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 435-460. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier with Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Section 1. Petition for certiorari.
x x x x x x x x x
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
[21] Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. --- The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. xxx
x x x x x x x x x
It
shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of
service thereof on the respondent x x x.
[22] Art. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.
[23] ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.––It
shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practice:
x
x x x
(g) To violate the duty to bargain
collectively as prescribed by this Code.
[24] Rollo, pp. 584-619.
[25]
[26] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 163745, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 158, 165-166, citing New Ever Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140555, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 284, 294.
[27] Rollo, pp. 65-100.
[28]
[29]
[30] OSM Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 446 Phil. 793, 803, (2003).
[31] Chavez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010, 610 SCRA 399, 403, citing Cruz v. Caraos, G.R. No. 138208, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 510, 522 and Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Dy, G.R. No. 156887, October 3, 2005, 472 SCRA 1, 6.
[32] Rollo, pp. 348-364.
[33] 442 Phil. 499, 513 (2002).
[34] Tunay Na Pagkakaisa Ng Manggagawa Sa Asiabrewery v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 162025, August 3, 2010, citing Union of Filipro Employees-Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Nestlé Philippines, Incorporated, G.R. Nos. 158930-31 & 158944-45, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 323, 335, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Del Rosario, G.R. Nos. 168194 & 168603, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 604, 619.
[35] Rollo, p. 600.
[36] Union of Filipro
Employees-Drug, Food And Allied Industries Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno
(UFE-DFA-KMU) v. Nestlé
[37] Samahang Manggagawa Sa Top Form
Manufacturing United Workers of The