SECOND Division
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MICHELLE I. PINEDA, Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M.
MONTESA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 181643 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 17, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 filed by petitioner Michelle I. Pineda (Pineda) seeking to annul
and set aside the June 15, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA),
which reversed the March 14, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City (RTC) directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction enjoining respondent Department of Education (DepEd)
from enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year lease of the school canteen.
It appears from the records that on
May 14, 2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (May-MOA)[2]
with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Alice
B. Blas (Dr. Blas), for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a
monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly
for the school’s feeding program as well as medicines for the school clinic.
Thereafter, Pineda renovated the canteen and equipped it with new utensils,
tables, chairs, and electric fans.[3]
On August 5, 2004, the faculty and
personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent, Dr. Ma.
Luisa Quiñones (Dr. Quiñones),
questioning the validity of the May-MOA.[4] Dr. Blas sent a letter-reply on September 17,
2004 and an exchange of correspondence followed.[5]
Meanwhile, on August 14, 2004, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA)[6]superseding
the May-MOA. This time, the August-MOA followed the standard form under
Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998[7] or
the “Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to
Teachers Cooperatives.”
In this regard, on October 20, 2004, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent Isabelita M. Santos (Ms. Santos) and Administrative
Officer Vicente N. Macarubbo (Mr.
Macarubbo) wrote a letter to Dr. Quiñones relaying their observations on
the controversy and recommending that their findings “be submitted to the DepEd
- Central Office for its final word on the matter.”[8] Ms.
Santos and Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any
rule in executing the August-MOA. They even found the lease to Pineda
beneficial to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiñones wrote the DepEd seeking its
decision on the matter.
On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd,
through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon (Usec. Gascon), declared
the August-MOA “null and void ab initio” and ordered it “cancelled.” Pineda
was also ordered to “cease and desist” from further managing and operating the
canteen. DepEd made clear that the management and operation of the canteen should
revert to the Home Economics Department of the School.[9] This
prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction before the RTC.
On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement
of Usec. Gascon’s decision.[10] DepEd,
represented by Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo (Ms.
Camilo), who succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the dismissal
of Pineda’s petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter failed to
state a cause of action. On June 7, 2005, the trial court denied its motion.[11] For said reason, DepEd, this time represented
by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel M. Montesa (Asec. Montesa), filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the March 14, 2005
and June 7, 2005 orders of the RTC.
The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005
order of the RTC denying DepEd’s motion to dismiss but reversed its March 14,
2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. According to the CA, DepEd’s order cancelling the August-MOA had
already been partially implemented as Pineda herself recognized such fact in
her amended petition before the RTC. In effect, this was the status quo. In
addition, the CA held that Pineda appeared to have no clear or unmistakable
right to be protected since the MOA that granted her the right to operate the
school canteen was, in fact, invalidated by the DepEd for not being sanctioned
by its existing rules and regulations. Finally, the CA also held that there was
no pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which would warrant the
issuance of the injunctive writ as the purported damage to Pineda, if she would
not able to operate the canteen, was readily quantifiable.[12]
Hence, Pineda filed this petition for
certiorari relying on the following
GROUNDS:
I
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION THROUGH ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMILO MIGUEL M.
MONTESA, IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO IT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE GLARING FACT THAT IT WAS
NOT A PARTY AT ALL IN SCA NO. 2797, HENCE, WITH NO LOCUS STANDI.
II
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS OUTRIGHT THE PETITION
SINCE NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED FROM THE ORDERS DATED MARCH 14,
2005, GRANTING THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE
ORDER DATED JUNE 7, 2005, DENYING RESPONDENTS’ (USEC JOSE LUIS MARTIN C.
GASCON, SUPT. MA. LUISA QUINONES AND OLYMPIADA CAMILO) MOTION TO DISMISS, IN
MANIFEST VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISSOLVED THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION ISSUED
BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 153, PASIG CITY, IN SCA NO. 2797, THEREBY
UNJUSTIFIABLY INTERFERING WITH THE LOWER COURT’S DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE WRIT
OF INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONER WHO HAS A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE
LEGAL RIGHT TO BE AFFORDED THIS REMEDY AND CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT
FILE A MOTION TO DISSOLVE BOND WITH THE TRIAL COURT OR AT LEAST FILED
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OPPOSITION.[13]
On November 18, 2009, after the
parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court gave due course to the
petition and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[14]
On the first ground, Pineda argues
that the CA gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the petition for
certiorari of DepEd considering that Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to
file the petition. She adds that, even
assuming that DepEd had the locus standi
to file said petition before the CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to
do so.
The Court cannot accommodate the view
of Pineda.
In her petition for certiorari before
the RTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo in their
official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent and Principal
of Lakandula High School, respectively. Although the petition mentioned that
Usec. Gascon was merely a nominal party, it stated therein that Dr. Quiñones
and Ms. Camilo were being sued for “having been tasked to immediately carry
out” his order of February 11, 2005. The Court is of the view that DepEd was
the proper party and Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo were just its
representatives. Thus, they were sued in
their official capacities.
A review of Usec. Gascon’s order discloses
that the cancellation of Pineda’s August-MOA was pursuant to DepEd’s existing
guidelines on the turn over of school canteens to teachers’ cooperatives, laid
out in Department Order No. 95, series of 1998. He was simply applying a DepEd
policy when he ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was actually being assailed
by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd’s
existing guidelines with the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by
Dr. Blas, then principal of LHS.[15] As
Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly
authorized to institute the petition before the CA in order to advance and
pursue the policies of his office – DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will surely be
affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case before
the RTC.
Thus, it would be absurd not to
recognize the legal standing of Asec. Montesa, as representative of DepEd, but consider
Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they were merely tasked
to implement a directive emanating from a superior official (Asec. Montesa) of
the DepEd.
On the second ground, Pineda questions
DepEd’s failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on
certiorari.
The general rule is that a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an
opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[16] There
are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil
action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v.
Sandiganbayan,[17]
it was written:
The rule is, however, circumscribed by
well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because
the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[18]
(underscoring supplied)
As previously discussed, the present
case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had
been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest
of the government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the
operation of the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public
interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying the
relaxation of the settled rule.
Still on the second ground, Pineda
points out that the March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was received by the DepEd
on March 16, 2005 and the latter filed its petition before the CA on June 28,
2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day reglementary period. Going over
DepEd’s petition before the CA, it appears that DepEd reckoned the 60-day
period from June 28, 2005, the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of
the RTC. Pineda’s Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raise this
procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put forth her own arguments in
support of the two RTC orders.
The rule in pleadings and practice is
that that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due
diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.[19]
Thus, it is too late in the day for Pineda to question the procedural lapse.
At any rate, the Court finds no cogent
reason for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the RTC. The very
writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the
acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated.[20] The
DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly
ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the
operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC’s preliminary writ should
be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained:
A preliminary injunction is a provisional
remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain
rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the
merits of the case can be heard fully.
Status quo is defined as the last actual,
peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that
which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial
court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status.
In the case at bench, the Decision of
Undersecretary Gascon dated February 11, 2005, ordering Pineda to cease and
desist from operating and managing the school canteen and to revert the
management thereof to the Home Economics Department and to the Principal, has
already been partially implemented. This is evident from the allegations of
Pineda in her amended petition, to wit:
“Earlier, in the dawn of same date, 22 February
2004 (should be 2005), the guards of Lakandula High School, taking strict
orders from respondents Mrs. Camilo and Dr. Quiñones who immediately executed
the assailed illegal decision from the respondent undersecretary, prevented the
canteen workers from entering the school and the delivery of softdrinks such as
Pop Cola to the petitioner. On the same date, more canteens sprouted, in
addition to those found in the H.E. and dressmaking rooms, operated by the teachers,
under the guise that they were doing service to the students in the meantime
that the canteen was closed. x x x.”[21]
Finally, while the grant or denial of
a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave
abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual,
peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. If there
is such a commission, it is correctible through a writ of certiorari.[22]
In this case, the status quo ante litem
or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case was that
Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said
reason, the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said
status.[23]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 55-71. Penned by Associate Justice
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando
and Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.
[2] Id. at 125.
[3] Id. at 56.
[4] Id. at 136.
[5] Petition, id. at 10.
[6] Id. at 137.
[7] Id. at 127.
[8] Id. at 143.
[9] Id. at 145.
[10]
Id. at 187.
[11] Id. at 191.
[12] Id. at 65-67.
[13] Id. at 28-30.
[14] Id. at 534.
[15] Republic Act No. 6655: “Sec. 7.
Nationalization of Public Secondary Schools. – To effectively implement the
system, the establishment, renaming, conversion, integration, separation,
administration, supervision and control of all public secondary schools and
public secondary school teachers and other personnel, including the payment of
their salaries, allowances and other fringe benefits as well as those already
provided by local governments are hereby vested in the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (now the Department of Education).”
[16] Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 182382-83, February 24,
2010.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Toshiba Information Equipment
(Phils.), Inc. v. CIR,
G.R. No. 157594, March 9, 2010; citing Director of Lands v. CA, 363 Phil
117, 128 (1999).
[20]Caneland Sugar Corporation v. Alon, G.R. No. 142896, September 12,
2007, 533 SCRA 28, 33.
[21] Rollo, p.
65.
[22] Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration v. Chavez, G.R. Nos. 169802, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 451, 471-472.
[23] Id.