SECOND Division
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VITARICH CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - CHONA LOSIN,
Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 181560 Present: CARPIO J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November
15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the November 26, 2007 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro (CA-CDO), in CA G.R. CV No.73726,[2] which
reversed the August 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, General Santos City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 6287, in favor of petitioner
Vitarich Corporation (Vitarich).
THE FACTS:
Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastfood and catering
services business named Glamours Chicken House, with address at
In the months of July to November 1996, Losin’s orders of dressed chicken
and other meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this said period, Losin’s poultry meat
needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and
Allan Rosa (
On
On P921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her
records and discovered that she had an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of
P500,000.00. She relayed this
fact to Vitarich and further informed the latter that checks were issued and
the same were collected by Directo.[6]
It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to P288,463.30
which were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
(DAIF) or Stop Payment.[7]
On
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant Chona Losin to pay plaintiff the
following:
1. P297,462.50 representing
the three checks which had been stopped payment with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of this Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
2. P101,450.20 representing
the unpaid sales (Exhibits ‘L’ and ‘M’) with interest at 12% from date of this
Decision until the whole amount is fully paid;
3. P20,000.00 in concept of
attorney’s fees; and
4. The cost of suit.
As to the complaint against defendant
Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay, the same is dismissed. The complaint against
Rodrigo Directo still remains and is hereby ordered archived until he could be
served with summons.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Not
satisfied with the RTC decision, Losin appealed to the CA presenting the following:
ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS:
I.
THE
II.
THE
III. THE
On
It is axiomatic that we should not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstances of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted. The reason is that
the trial court is in a better position to determine questions involving
credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial unless there is showing that the findings
of the lower court are totally devoid of support or glaringly erroneous as to
constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. This is such an instance.
By
the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or
authority of the latter. Thus, the
elements of agency are (i) consent, express or implied, of the parties to
establish the relationship; (ii) the object is the execution of a juridical act
in relation to a third person; (iii) the agent acts as a representative and not
for himself; and (iv) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.
The
Civil Code defines a contract of agency as follows:
“Art.
1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some
service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the
consent or authority of the latter.”
As far as Losin
is concerned, Directo was a duly authorized agent of Vitarich Corporation. As such, it fell upon Directo to place her
orders of dressed chicken and other related products to their
A perusal of
the records would show that Vitarich included in their list of collectibles from
Losin several amounts that were not supported by their Charge Sales Invoices
such as P44,987.70, P3,300.00; P28,855.40; P98,166.20;
P73,806.00; and P93,888.80 and which form part of their total claim of P912,083.10. Furthermore, Vitarich also submitted Charge
Sales Invoices showing the amount of P70,000.00, P41,792.40, P104,137.40
and P158,522.80 as part of their exhibits but which amounts are not
included in its summary statement of collectibles against Losin.
It is noted
that the dressed chicken and other related products as manifested by the Charge
Sales Invoices, were taken out of the bodega and received by Directo, who is
now ‘at large.’ There was no evidence
presented by Vitarich to prove that aforesaid stocks were delivered to
Losin. Contrary to what Vitarich claimed
that Directo resigned on
The Civil Code
provides:
“Art. 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the
purpose of contracting with specified persons, its revocation shall
not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof.”
“Art. 1922.
If the agent had general powers, revocation of the agency does
not prejudice third persons who acted in good faith and without knowledge of the revocation. Notice of the revocation in a newspaper of
general circulation is a sufficient warning to third persons.” (Emphasis Ours)
The reason for
the law is obvious. Since the third
persons have been made to believe by the principal that the agent is authorized
to deal with them, they have the right to presume that the representation
continues to exist in the absence of notification by the principal.
Nowhere in the
records can it be found that Losin was notified of the fact that Directo was no
longer representing the interest of Vitarich and that the latter has terminated
Directo’s services. There is also an
absence of any proof to show that Directo’s termination has been published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
It is well
settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to
support the particular contention. In
defendant-appellant’s ‘Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,’ prepared and
signed by Losin’s bookkeeper, Imelda S. Cinco, all the checks enumerated
therein coincides with the bank statements submitted by RCBC, thus
corroborating Losin’s claim that she has paid Vitarich. Vitarich’s contention that ‘defendant Baybay
tried very hard to hide his accountabilities to the plaintiff x x x but failed
to explain why the account remained unpaid,’ confirms its belief that their own
agents as such, are accountable for transactions made with third persons. “As a Sales Supervisor, he is principally
liable for the behavior of his subordinates (Directo & Rosa) and for the
enforcement of company rules” which may have gone beyond their authority to do
such acts.
Anent the third
assigned error that the lower court erred in not finding Vitarich negligent in
the selection of its employees thereby making the former liable for damages
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, We find the same to be without basis as
said article explicitly holds that:
“‘ART.
2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
Xxx xxx xxx
Xxx xxx xxx
Xxx xxx xxx
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Xxx xxx xxx.”
Pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
that vicarious liability attaches only to an employer when the tortuous conduct
of the employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. The question to ask should be whether at the
time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or
concerns of the employer or, independently, in that of his own? Vitarich incurred no liability when Directo’s
conduct, act or omission went beyond the range of his employment.
Section 1, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court provides:
“‘SECTION
1. Preponderance of
evidence, how determined. - In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of
the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.”
“Preponderance
of evidence’ is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater
weight of the evidence’ or greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
x
x x x x x x x x
We
reviewed the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general
rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by the
Supreme Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals:
“xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case,
the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case in his favour, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendants.
The concept of ‘preponderance of evidence’ refers to evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in opposition to
it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.”
Hence, Vitarich
who has the burden of proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with the
former having to rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the defendant-appellant Losin’s.
In this light, we
have meticulously perused the records of this case and [found] that the court a
quo had erred in appreciating the evidence presented.
In deciding
this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that a party who has the burden of
proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action by a preponderance of
evidence. When the evidence of the
parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance
of evidence lies, the party with the
burden of proof fails and the petition/complaint must thus be denied. We find that plaintiff-appellee Vitarich
failed to prove that the goods were ever delivered and received by Losin, said
charge sales invoices being undated and unsigned by Losin being the consignee
of the goods.
On the other
hand, Losin could not also prove that she has overpaid Vitarich. Hence, her contention that she has overpaid
Vitarich and her prayer for refund of the alleged overpaid amount, must
necessarily fail.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the appealed judgment is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this petition for review alleging that---
AS THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SQUARELY CONTRADICTS THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT,
PETITIONER HUMBLY REQUESTS THE SUPREME COURT TO INQUIRE INTO THE ERRONEOUS
CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS MADE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.[12]
As a general rule, a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. Questions of
fact are not reviewable and passed upon by this
Court in its exercise of judicial review. The
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has been well
defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question
of fact, on the other hand, exists if the doubt centers
on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[13]
The rule, however, admits of exceptions,
namely: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.[14]
The aforementioned exceptions, particularly the seventh exception, finds
relevance in the case at bench since the
findings of the CA are clearly in conflict with that of the trial court. For
this reason, the Court is constrained to reevaluate the evidence adduced by
both parties to resolve the issues which boil down to
whether or not Losin is liable to Vitarich and, if so, to what extent.
The
Court resolves the issues partly in favor of Vitarich.
Initially,
Vitarich claims a total of P921,083.10 from respondent Losin,
Directo,
The
RTC ruled in favor of Vitarich, ordering Losin to pay the following: (1) P297,462.50
representing the three (3) checks, the payment for which was stopped, with corresponding
interest at 12% per annum from the date of the RTC decision until fully paid; (2)
P101,450.20 for the unpaid sales also with interest at 12% per annum
from the date of the RTC decision until fully paid; (3) P20,000.00
for attorney’s fees; and (4) cost of suit.[16]
It appears that Vitarich did not challenge this part of the RTC decision anymore.[17]
After
Losin obtained a favorable RTC decision, Vitarich now seeks relief from this
Court through this petition for review.
After
an assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court opines and so holds that
the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision. Losin is clearly liable to Vitarich.
Records
bear out that Losin transacted with Vitarich’s representative Directo.[18] Vitarich presented several charge sales
invoices[19] and
statement of account[20]
to support Losin’s accountability for the products delivered to her. A total of P921,083.10 was initially charged
to her. Losin, on the other hand,
presented a copy of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its
agent Directo,[21] and a
Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich[22]
to support her allegation of payment.
It
is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin failed to make a proper recording
and documentation of their transactions making it difficult to reconcile the
evidence presented by the parties to establish their respective claims.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden
of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC,[23]
the Court ruled that the burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather
than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing
with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131
of the Rules of Court[24]
provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of
his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required
by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she alleges
an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the
opinion that Losin failed to present a single official receipt to prove
payment.[25] This is contrary to the well-settled rule that
a receipt, which is a written and signed acknowledgment that money and goods
have been delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not
exclusive.[26] All she presented were copies of the list of checks
allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo,[27] a
Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich,[28]
and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her checking account with
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only serve as documentary
records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments
made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
The
delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other
mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when
they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was neither confirmed
that the checks issued by Losin were actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the
Court cannot consider that payment, much less overpayment, made by Losin.
Now, the Court ascertains the extent of
Losin’s liability. A perusal of the
records shows that Vitarich included in its list of collectibles,[29]
several amounts that were not properly supported by Charge Sales Invoice, to
wit, (1) P44,987.70;
(2) P3,300.00; (3) P28,855.40; (4)
P98,166.20; (5) P73,806.00; and (6) P93,888.80.[30]
It bears noting that the Charge Sales
Invoices presented for the amounts listed as collectibles were undated and
unsigned by Losin, the supposed consignee of the goods (except Exh. L). Of the
six amounts, the Court particularly considered the P93,888.80 as it was
the amount of one of the checks issued by Losin. Indeed, the Court cannot disregard the fact
that Losin issued a corresponding check for the following amounts: (1)
P93,888.96 (dated P50,265.00 (dated P144,309.50 (dated P93,888.96
and P50,265.00 corresponding to the first two (2) checks. Losin cannot
be held liable for the amount of the third check P144,309.50 because Vitarich did not claim for this
amount. The amount of P144,309.50 for some reason, was not among those
listed in the list of collectibles of Vitarich.[34]
Aside from the earlier mentioned
liabilities¸the Court also holds Losin liable for the amount of P78,281.00
which was also among those listed as collectible by Vitarich. Although the Charge Sales Invoice[35]
bearing this amount was undated, it nevertheless, appears that the goods
corresponding to this amount were actually received by Losin’s mother. This was
even testified to by P18,281.00
as appearing in Exh. L, the other amounts appearing on the rest of the Charge
Sales Invoice and on the Statement of Account presented by Vitarich cannot be
charged on Losin for failure of Vitarich to prove that these amounts are
chargeable to her. Vitarich even failed to prove that the rest of the goods as
appearing on the other Charge Sales Invoices were actually delivered and
received by her or her representative since these Charge Sales Invoices were undated and
unsigned. Thus, Losin is liable to pay Vitarich
the amounts of P93,888.96, P50,265.00
and P78,281.00 or a total of P222,434.96
only.
Inasmuch as the case at bar involves
an obligation not arising from a loan or forbearance of money, but consists in
the payment of a sum of money, the legal rate of interest is 6% per annum of
the amount demanded.[38] Interest
shall continue to run from P921,083.10 from Losin (and not from the time of the filing
of the Complaint) until finality of the Decision (not until fully paid). The rate
of interest shall increase to 12% per annum only from such finality
until its satisfaction, the interim period being deemed to be equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.[39]
Regarding
the grant of attorney’s fees, the Court agrees with the RTC that said award is
justified. Losin refused to pay Vitarich despite the latter’s repeated demands.
It was left with no recourse but to
litigate and protect its interest. We, however, opt to reduce the same to P10,000.00
from P20,000.00.
The
claims against Rosa and Baybay who allegedly did not fully account for their
sales transactions have not been substantially proven by evidence. In fact, it
appears that
WHEREFORE, the November 26, 2007 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 23, is REINSTATED subject to MODIFICATIONS.
Thus, the dispositive portion should read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Chona Losin to pay Vitarich
Corporation the following:
(1) P222,434.96 representing the two checks, with Check
Nos. CX 046324 dated August 27, 1996 and CX 046325 dated August 30, 1996 which had been stopped payment and the amount
as appearing in Charge Sales Invoice marked as Exhibit ‘L’ subject to an
interest rate of 6% per annum from
February 12, 1997, the date when Vitarich demanded payment of the sum amounting
to P921,083.10 from Losin until finality of the Decision. The rate of
interest shall increase to 12% per annum only from such finality until
its satisfaction, the interim period being deemed to be equivalent to a
forbearance of credit;
(2)
P10,000.00 representing attorney’s fees;
and
(3)
Cost
of suit.
The
complaint against Allan Rosa and Arnold Baybay is dismissed. The complaint
against Rodrigo Directo is ordered archived until he could be served with
summons.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-34. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with Associate Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Associate Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
[2] Petitioner Vitarich Corporation was the plaintiff-appellee in CA G.R. CV No.73726 while Chona Losin was the defendant-appellant.
[3] Rollo, p. 21.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo, p. 16.
[11] Rollo, pp. 24-33.
[12]
[13] Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 481 Phil. 550, 561 (2004).
[14] Macasero v. Southern Industrial
Gases Philippines,
G.R. No. 178524,
[15] Records, p. 5.
[16] Rollo, p. 48.
[17]
[18] TSN,
[19] Exhs. “A” to “M.”
[20] Exh. “N.”
[21] Exhs. “1” to “3.”
[22] Exh. “4.”
[23]
G.R. No. 116960, 326 Phil.
89, 95 (1996).
[24]
SECTION 1. Burden of proof.—Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
[25] TSN,
[26] Alonzo v.
[27] Exhs. “1” to “3.”
[28] Exh. “4.”
[29] Exh. “N.”
[30] Rollo,
p. 26; See Exhs. “A” to “N.”
[31] Exh. “W-4.”
[32] Exh. “W-3.”
[33] Exh. “W-2.”
[34] See Exh. “N.”
[35] Exh. “L.”
[36] TSN,
[37] TSN,
[38] Article
2209 of the Civil Code of the
[39] Tropical Homes, Inc. v. CA, 338 Phil. 930, 944 (1997).
[40] See Exh. “X.”