Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), DIONISIO BANLASAN, ALFREDO T. TAFALLA, TELESFORO D. RUBIA,
ROGELIO A. ALVAREZ, DOMINADOR A. ESCOBAL, and ROSAURO PANIS, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 180045
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November
17, 2010 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1]
and the Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50450.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondents Dionisio Banlasan, Alfredo
T. Tafalla, Telesforo D. Rubia, Rogelio A. Alvarez, Dominador A. Escobal, and
Rosauro Panis were employed as security guards by DNL Security Agency (DNL
Security). By virtue of the service
contract entered into by DNL Security and petitioner Government Service
Insurance System on May 1, 1978, respondents were assigned to petitioner’s P1,400.00. Sometime in July 1989, petitioner voluntarily
increased respondents’ monthly salary to P3,000.00.[3]
In February 1993, DNL Security
informed respondents that its service contract with petitioner was terminated.
This notwithstanding, DNL Security instructed respondents to continue reporting
for work to petitioner. Respondents worked as instructed until April 20, 1993, but
without receiving their wages; after which, they were terminated from
employment.[4]
On June 15, 1995, respondents filed with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
VIII,
On September 30, 1997, Labor Arbiter
(LA) Benjamin S. Guimoc rendered a decision[5]
against DNL Security and petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in this manner[,] to wit:
1. Finding no illegal dismissal of complainants;
2. Ordering respondent DNL Security Agency only
to pay complainants the amount of P176,130.00 representing separation
pay; the amount of P42,666.40 representing
wages of complainants from February 1993 to April 20, 1993;
3. Ordering as joint and solidary liability by
the respondents DNL Security Agency and GSIS the amount of P48,385.87
representing salary differential[;] the amount of P55,564.92 as 13th
month pay; all in the aggregate sum of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN & 19/100 (P322,747.19) to be paid by both or
either of the said respondent within ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision and to be deposited with the cashier of this office for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The LA found that respondents were not
illegally terminated from employment because the employment of security guards is
dependent on the service contract between the security agency and its client. However,
considering that respondents had been out of work for a long period, and consonant
with the principle of social justice, the LA awarded respondents with separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, to be paid by
DNL Security. Because DNL Security instructed respondents to continue working for
petitioner from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, DNL Security was also made to
pay respondents’ wages for the period. The LA further granted respondents’
claim of salary differential, as they were paid wages below the minimum wage,
as well as 13th month pay. For these monetary awards, petitioner was
made solidarily liable with DNL Security, as the indirect employer of
respondents.[7]
DNL Security filed a motion for
reconsideration, while petitioner appealed to the NLRC.[8]
In a resolution[9]
dated December 9, 1997, the NLRC treated DNL Security’s motion for
reconsideration as an appeal, but dismissed the same, as it was not legally
perfected. It likewise dismissed petitioner’s appeal, having been filed beyond
the reglementary period.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. On September 7, 2006, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision[10]
affirming the NLRC ruling. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied by the CA on September 27, 2007.
Hence, the present petition raising
the following errors:
The Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in finding that the public respondent NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the appeal of the petitioner GSIS, considering that:
1.
The Court of Appeals disregarded the facts
and circumstances evidencing the timeliness of the petitioner GSIS’ appeal
before the NLRC and sacrificed substantial justice in the altar of dubious
technicalities; and
2.
The Court of Appeals misapplied the law and
mistakenly affirmed the public respondent NLRC’s decision that the petitioner
GSIS is jointly and severally liable with DNL Security Agency for payment of
the unsubstantiated amounts of Salary Differentials and the 13th
Month Pay to the private respondent security guards.[11]
Petitioner
insists that its appeal before the NLRC was filed on time, having been filed through
registered mail on October 27, 1997, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 34581
countersigned by the postmaster. It adds that, even assuming that the appeal
was indeed filed one day late, the NLRC should not have strictly applied the
Rules in order to effect substantial justice. Petitioner also claims that
although the body of the LA decision made DNL Security solely liable for
respondents’ wages from February 1993 to April 20, 1993, and for their separation
pay, the dispositive portion thereof made petitioner solidarily liable for said
awards. Petitioner further questions the award of monetary benefits for lack of
evidence to substantiate said claims. Lastly, petitioner argues that the
enforcement of the decision is impossible, considering that petitioner’s
charter unequivocally exempts it from execution.[12]
We partly
grant the petition.
The resolution of the petition before
us involves the appreciation and determination of factual matters, mainly on
the issue of whether petitioner’s appeal was seasonably filed before the NLRC.
Timeliness of an appeal is a factual
issue. It requires a review or evaluation of the evidence which would show when
the appeal was actually mailed to and received by the NLRC.[13]
In this case, to prove that it mailed the notice of appeal and appeal
memorandum on October 27, 1997, instead of October 28, 1997, as shown by the
stamped date on the envelope, petitioner presented Registry Receipt No. 34581
bearing the earlier date.
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, where the filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders,
judgments, and all other papers with the court/tribunal is made by registered
mail, the date of mailing, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or
the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of filing.[14]
Thus, the date of filing is
determinable from two sources: from the
post office stamp on the envelope or from the registry receipt, either of which
may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing of the pleadings. If the date
stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the
date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry
receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the
tribunal where they are presented.[15]
In any
case, even if the appeal was filed one day late, the same should have been
entertained by the NLRC. Indeed, the appeal must be perfected within the
statutory or reglementary period. This
is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal on time renders
the assailed decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court or
body of the legal authority to alter the final judgment, much less entertain
the appeal. However, this Court has, time and again, ruled that, in exceptional
cases, a belated appeal may be given due course if greater injustice will be
visited upon the party should the appeal be denied. The Court has allowed this
extraordinary measure even at the expense of sacrificing order and efficiency
if only to serve the greater principles of substantial justice and equity.[16]
Technicality should not be allowed to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
obligations of the parties. We have consistently held that technical rules are
not binding in labor cases and are not to be applied strictly if the result
would be detrimental to the working man.[17]
The Court
notes, however, that while the CA affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC of
petitioner’s appeal for being filed out of time, it nonetheless delved into the
merits of the case. This notwithstanding, we do not entirely agree with the
appellate court’s conclusion affirming in
toto the LA decision.
In this
case, the LA’s discussion of the issues appears to be in conflict with his
final conclusion. This would have
required a measure of clarification. But instead of looking into the errors
allegedly committed by the LA, the NLRC dismissed the appeal on a mere
technicality. The CA likewise failed to correct the apparent mistake in the LA
decision. Thus, we are constrained to review the merits of the case.
We need not
discuss DNL Security’s responsibility as respondents’ direct employer because
DNL Security’s failure to interpose an appeal from the LA decision has resulted
in the finality of the LA decision. The
only issue that we should resolve is the matter of petitioner’s liability as
indirect employer.
The fact that there is no
actual and direct employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondents does not absolve the former from liability for the latter’s
monetary claims. When petitioner contracted DNL
Security’s services, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents,
pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code, which reads:
ART. 107. Indirect employer. – The
provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work, task,
job or project.
After DNL Security failed
to pay respondents the correct wages and other monetary benefits, petitioner,
as principal, became jointly and severally liable, as provided in Articles 106
and 109 of the Labor Code, which state:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor.
– Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor and of the
latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
In the event that the contractor
or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with
this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable
to employees directly employed by him. x x x.
x x x x
ART. 109. Solidary liability. – The
provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or
indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or
subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall
be considered as direct employers.
This statutory scheme is
designed to give the workers ample protection, consonant with labor and social
justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution.[18]
This Court’s
pronouncement in Rosewood Processing,
Inc. v. NLRC[19] is
noteworthy:
The joint and several liability of
the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions
of the Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The contractor or
subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct
employer, and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor’s
employees. This liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the
workers’ compensation, thus, giving the workers ample protection as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. Should
the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover whatever
amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between
itself and the contractor.[20]
Petitioner’s liability
covers the payment of respondents’ salary differential and 13th
month pay during the time they worked for petitioner. In addition, petitioner is
solidarily liable with DNL Security for respondents’ unpaid wages from
February 1993 until April 20, 1993. While it is true that respondents continued
working for petitioner after the expiration of their contract, based on the
instruction of DNL Security, petitioner did not object to such assignment and allowed
respondents to render service. Thus, petitioner impliedly approved the extension
of respondents’ services. Accordingly,
petitioner is bound by the provisions of the Labor Code on indirect employment.
Petitioner cannot be allowed to deny its
obligation to respondents after it had benefited from their services. So long as the work,
task, job, or project has been performed for petitioner’s benefit or on its
behalf, the liability accrues for such services.[21]
The principal is made liable to its indirect employees because, after all, it
can protect itself from irresponsible contractors by withholding payment of
such sums that are due the employees and by paying the employees directly, or
by requiring a bond from the contractor or subcontractor for this purpose.[22]
Petitioner’s liability,
however, cannot extend to the payment of separation pay. An order to pay
separation pay is invested with a punitive character, such that an indirect
employer should not be made liable without a finding that it had conspired in
the illegal dismissal of the employees.[23]
It should be understood,
though, that the solidary liability of petitioner does not preclude the
application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement
from its co-debtor, viz.:[24]
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of
the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary
debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim
from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest
for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no
interest for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors
cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the
obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to
the debt of each.
Lastly, we
do not agree with petitioner that the enforcement of the decision is impossible
because its charter unequivocally exempts it from execution. As held in Government Service Insurance System v.
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds
and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be
read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial
solvency of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to
finance the retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members.
Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered.
Any interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all
GSIS assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State
in Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an exemption from tax, lien,
attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be read together
with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its “excess funds” under Section
36 of the same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the ancillary power
to invest in business and other ventures for the benefit of the employees, by
using its excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise of such
function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar to a
private corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly granted
by its charter x x x.[27]
To be sure,
petitioner’s charter should not be used to evade its liabilities to its
employees, even to its indirect employees, as mandated by the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution dated September 7, 2006 and September 27, 2007, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50450, are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
Government Service Insurance System is declared solidarily liable with DNL
Security to PAY respondents their
wage differentials, thirteenth month pay, and unpaid wages from February 1993 to
April 20, 1993, but is EXONERATED
from the payment of respondents’ separation pay.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican
and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, concurring; rollo,
pp. 35-47.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Penned
by Presiding Commissioner Irenea Ceniza, with Commissioners Bernabe S. Batuhan
and Amorito V. Cañete, concurring; id. at 77-81.
[10] Supra
note 1.
[11] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[12]
[13] Mangahas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
173375, September 25, 2008, 566 SCRA 373, 389.
[14] San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 259
Phil. 765, 769 (1989).
[15]
[16] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno,
G.R. No. 164156, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 204, 221.
[17]
[18] Manila Electric Company v. Benamira, 501
Phil. 621, 644 (2005); Mariveles Shipyard
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 249, 267 (2003).
[19] 352
Phil. 1013 (1998).
[20]
[21] New
[22] Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. NLRC,
supra, at 1034.
[23]
[24] Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,
supra note 18, at 645.
[25] G.R.
Nos. 175393 and 177731, December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 552.
[26] 476
Phil. 623 (2004).
[27] Government Service Insurance System v.
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, supra note 25, at 583-584.
(Citations omitted.)