Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
CONSTANCIA G. TAMAYO, JOCELYN G. TAMAYO, and ARAMIS
G. TAMAYO, collectively known as HEIRS OF CIRILO TAMAYO, Petitioners, - versus - ROSALIA ABAD SEÑORA, ROAN ABAD SEÑORA, and JANETE
ABAD SEÑORA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 176946
Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
and MENDOZA,
JJ. Promulgated: November 15, 2010 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners Constancia G. Tamayo (Constancia), Jocelyn G.
Tamayo, and Aramis G. Tamayo are assailing the Decision[1]
dated March 22, 2006 and the Resolution[2]
dated February 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63171. The
CA affirmed, with modification, the decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The factual antecedents, as found by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA, are as follows:
On September 28, 1995, at about 11:00
a.m., Antonieto M. Señora (Señora), then 43 years old and a police chief
inspector of the Philippine National Police (PNP),[4] was
riding a motorcycle and crossing the intersection of
The
tricycle was driven by Leovino F. Amparo (Amparo), who testified that it was
the delivery van that bumped Señora’s motorcycle. He said that he did not see
how the motorcycle could have been hit by his tricycle since he was looking at
his right side, but when he heard a sound, he looked to his left and saw Señora
already underneath the delivery van. He also said that when he was brought to
the police station for investigation, he brought his tricycle to disprove the
claim of the delivery van driver by showing that his tricycle sustained no
damage.[6]
The delivery van, on the other hand,
was driven by Elmer O. Polloso (Polloso) and registered in the name of Cirilo
Tamayo (Cirilo). While trial was ongoing, Cirilo was suffering from lung cancer
and was bedridden. His wife, petitioner
Constancia, testified on his behalf. Constancia narrated that she and her
husband were managing a single proprietorship known as Tamayo and Sons Ice
Dealer. She testified that it was Cirilo who hired their drivers. She claimed that, as employer, her husband
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection,
hiring, and supervision of his employees, including driver Polloso. Cirilo would
tell their drivers not to drive fast and not to be too strict with customers.[7]
One of Cirilo’s employees, Nora
Pascual (Pascual), also testified. She alleged that she was working as auditor
and checker for Tamayo and Sons Ice Dealer. She testified that she and another
employee were with Polloso in the delivery van at the time of the incident. She
narrated that, while they were traversing
On
March 2, 1999, the court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
defendants Leovino F. Amparo, Elmer O. Polloso and Cirilo Tamayo are found
liable jointly and severally to plaintiffs and ordered to pay the latter the
amounts of P105,100.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for loss of
life, P1,152,360.00 for loss of earnings and P30,000.00 for
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The RTC found Polloso guilty of
negligence. It held that Polloso failed to slow down or come to a full stop at
the intersection, causing the delivery van to run over Señora. The RTC also found
that the truck was traveling fast on the outer lane, the lane customarily
considered to be for slow-moving vehicles.[10]
The RTC held Amparo similarly guilty
of negligence. It found that the tricycle had bumped into Señora’s motorcycle
and pushed it towards the truck’s path. It said that the statement to that
effect made by witness Pascual was made immediately after the accident and
could be considered a “spontaneous reaction to a startling occurrence.”[11]
However, the RTC said that, even if
the tricycle bumped into Señora’s motorcycle from behind, the collision could
have been avoided had Polloso observed the elementary rule of driving that one
must slow down, or come to a full stop, when crossing an intersection.[12]
In addition, the RTC found Cirilo to
be solidarily liable for Señora’s death. It held that Constancia’s testimony was
hearsay and unsupported by any documentary evidence. The RTC also brushed aside
Pascual’s testimony because, as checker and auditor, she had no participation
in hiring the company’s drivers. Thus, Cirilo was held vicariously liable for
the acts and omissions of Polloso.[13]
Finally, in determining the liability
for loss of income, the RTC modified the formula in determining life expectancy,
2/3 x (80 – age of victim at the time of death). The RTC considered the
retirement age of the members of the PNP, which was 55 years old. Thus, the
formula that the RTC used was 2/3 x (55 – age of the victim at the time of
death).
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision, but modified the finding on the deceased’s net earning capacity. The
CA used the formula:
Net earning capacity = life expectancy x gross annual income less
living expenses[14]
with life expectancy computed as ¾
2/3 x (80 – age of deceased)[15]
and living expenses fixed at half of the
victim’s gross income.
Thus, Señora’s net earning capacity
was computed to be P1,887,847.00.[16]
The CA disposed of the case in this
wise:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated March 2, 1999 rendered by the P1,887,847.00
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 6, 2007.[18]
Petitioners are now before this Court,
assailing the CA’s Decision and Resolution. They raise the issues of who was
negligent in the incident and what was the proximate cause of Señora’s death.[19] In
particular, they submit the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GR[IE]VOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT ELMER POLLOSO NEGLIGENT UNDER THE OBTAINING CIRCUMSTANCES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE JOINT NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS LEOVINO AMPARO AND ELMER POLLOSO TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF ANTONIETO SEÑORA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT CIRILO TAMAYO SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF ANTONIETO SEÑORA.[20]
The petition has no merit and is
hereby denied.
As
a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the CA is
limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court.[21]
The issues raised by petitioners are
questions of fact necessarily calling for a reexamination and reevaluation of the
evidence presented at the trial.
A question of fact arises when the
doubt or difference pertains to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or
when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence,
considering the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevance of
specific circumstances, and their relation to one another and to the whole
situation.[22]
The
Court has consistently ruled that findings of fact of
trial courts are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed, except
for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position
to examine the demeanor of witnesses while testifying. It is not a
function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over again.[23]
The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and
conclusive;[24] hence,
they are binding on this Court.
The Court will not
disturb such factual findings unless there are compelling or exceptional
reasons.[25]
No such reasons exist in this case.
The
Court holds that the RTC and the CA correctly found Polloso negligent.
To be
credible, testimonial evidence should not only come from the
mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible,
reasonable, and in accord with human experience.[26]
It should be positive
and probable such that it is difficult for a rational mind not to find it
credible.[27]
If, as Pascual testified, the truck stopped
when the tricycle bumped the motorcycle from behind,[28]
then there would have been no accident. Even if the motorcycle was nudged into
the path of the truck, as she claimed, there would have been no impact if the
truck itself was not moving, and certainly not an impact that would pin the
motorcycle’s driver under the truck and throw the motorcycle a few meters away.
The Court likewise finds that the CA
did not err in upholding Cirilo’s solidary liability for Señora’s death. The RTC
correctly disregarded the testimonies of Cirilo’s wife and his employee,
leaving no other evidence to support the claim that he had exercised the degree
of diligence required in hiring and supervising his employees.
Finally,
the Court sustains the award for loss of earning capacity by the CA.
The award of damages for loss of
earning capacity is concerned with the determination of losses or damages
sustained by respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased.
This consists not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support which
they received or would have received from him had he not died as a consequence
of the negligent act. Thus, the amount recoverable is not the loss of the
victim’s entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received.[29]
Indemnity for loss of earning
capacity is determined by computing the net earning capacity of the victim.[30]
The CA correctly modified the RTC’s
computation. The RTC had misapplied the formula[31]
generally used by the courts to determine net earning capacity, which is, to
wit:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and necessary living expenses).
Life expectancy shall be
computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted from the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience
Table of Mortality.[32]
Hence, the RTC erred in modifying the formula and using the retirement age of
the members of the PNP instead of “80.”
On the other hand, gross annual
income requires the presentation of documentary evidence for the purpose of
proving the victim’s annual income.[33]
The victim’s heirs presented in evidence Señora’s pay slip from the PNP,
showing him to have had a gross monthly salary of P12,754.00.[34] Meanwhile,
the victim’s net income was correctly pegged at 50% of his gross income in the
absence of proof as regards the victim’s living expenses.[35]
Consequently, the Court sustains the
award of P1,887,847.00 as damages for loss of earning capacity. All
other aspects of the assailed Decision are affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated March 22, 2006 and the Resolution
dated February 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63171 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE CATRAL
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman, with Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a retired member of this Court) and Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-50.
[2]
[3] Penned by Judge Rolando G. How; CA rollo, pp. 72-78.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 49.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Romago Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 964, 975 (2000).
[22] Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 589, 605-606, citing Secretary of Education, The v. Heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr., G.R. No. 164748, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 452, 460.
[23] Local Superior of the Servants of Charity
(Guanellians), Inc. v. Jody King Construction & Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 141715, October 12, 2005, 472
SCRA 445, 451, citing Uriarte v.
People, 403 Phil. 513, 519 (2001).
[24] Larena v. Mapili, 455 Phil. 944, 950 (2003).
[25] Spouses Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 632, 647 (2003).
[26] People v. Mallari, 452 Phil. 210, 220 (2003), citing People v. Atad, 334 Phil. 235, 248 (1997); People v. Gonzales, 396 Phil. 11, 30 (2000); People v. Magallano, 334 Phil. 276, 283 (1997).
[27] See People v. Del Mundo, G.R. No. 169141, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 554.
[28] TSN, December 10, 1997, p. 871.
[29] Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Sugata-on,
G.R. No. 163212, March 13, 2007, 518 SCRA 221, 236, citing Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511.
[30] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 174479, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 616, 640.
[31] Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Sugata-on, supra note 29, at 235.
[32]
[33] Licyayo v. People, G.R. No. 169425, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 598, 615.
[34] Records, p. 160.
[35] Licyayo v. People, supra note 33, at 616.