SECOND DIVISION
|
LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE
BALLESTEROS, Petitioner, - versus - RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN INC.,
represented by its Liquidator, the philippine deposit insurance
corporation, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 176260 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: November 24, 2010 |
X
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
X
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the August
15, 2006 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 82711, modifying the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga), in Civil Case No. IR-3128, by ordering the consolidation
of the said civil case with Special Proceeding Case No. M-5290 (liquidation case) before the
It appears
from the records that on
In her complaint, Lucia alleged that
her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2) parcels of land located in San
Nicolas, Baao, Camarines Sur, each with an area of 357 square meters; that on March 6, 1995, without her knowledge
and consent, her children executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver
of the estate of her husband wherein all the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to
allot the two parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico); that, still, without
her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the estate in favor of
RBCI which mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle the loan secured
by the lot; and that Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no other place to
live. She prayed that the deed of extrajudicial
partition and waiver, and the subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be declared
null and void having been executed without her knowledge and consent. She also prayed for damages.
In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in
1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico which represented her share in
the estate of her husband. The extrajudicial
partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed with the knowledge and consent
of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI further claimed
that Parcel B had already been foreclosed way back in
1999 which fact was known to Lucia through the auctioning notary public. Attorney’s fees were pleaded as counterclaim.
The case was then set for pre-trial
conference. During the pre-trial, RBCI’s
counsel filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would
handle the case as RBCI had already been closed and placed under the
receivership of the PDIC. Consequently,
on
On
On
This resolves
the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc.,
premised on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action. This issue of
jurisdiction was raised in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
Ong v. C.A. 253 SCRA 105 and in the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc., G.R. No. L-29791 dated
It is in view
of this jurisprudential pronouncement made by no less than the Supreme Court,
that this case is, as far as defendant Rural Bank of Canaman Inc., is
concerned, hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice on the part of the
plaintiff to ventilate their claim before the
SO ORDERED.
Not in conformity, Lucia appealed the
RTC ruling to the CA on the ground that the RTC-Iriga erred in dismissing the
case because it had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. IR-3128 under the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction.
On
…The consolidation is desirable in order to prevent
confusion, to avoid multiplicity of suits and to save unnecessary cost and
expense. Needless to add, this procedure
is well in accord with the principle that the rules of procedure shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding (Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Yap, 126 SCRA 500 [1983]; Suntay v. Aguiluz, 209 SCRA 500 [1992]
citing Ramos v. Ebarle, 182 SCRA 245 [1990]). It would be more in keeping with the demands
of equity if the cases are simply ordered consolidated. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1, Revised Rules
of Court, the rules on consolidation should be liberally construed to achieve
the object of the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their cases (Allied
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 371 [1996]). …
The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL
THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, in such a way
that the dismissal of this case (Civil Case No. IR-3128) is set aside and in
lieu thereof another one is entered ordering the consolidation of said case
with the liquidation case docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-5290 before
Branch 59 of the
SO ORDERED.[3]
Lucia filed
a motion for reconsideration[4]
but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
GROUNDS
(I)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
(II)
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. IR-3128 WITH THE LIQUIDATION CASE
DOCKETED AS SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. M-5290 BEFORE BRANCH 59 OF THE
Given the foregoing arguments, the
Court finds that the core issue to be resolved in this petition involves a
determination of whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case
wherein the main cause of action is not a simple money claim against a bank
ordered closed, placed under receivership of the PDIC, and undergoing a
liquidation proceeding.
Lucia
contends that the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
3128, the constitution of the liquidation court notwithstanding. According to her, the case was filed before the
RTC-Iriga on
She further
argues that the consolidation of the two cases is improper. Her case, which is for annulment of deed of
partition and waiver, deed of mortgage and damages, cannot be legally brought
before the RTC-Makati with the liquidation case considering that her cause of
action against RBCI is not a simple claim arising out of a creditor-debtor relationship,
but one which involves her rights and interest over a certain property
irregularly acquired by RBCI. Neither is
she a creditor of the bank, as only the creditors of the insolvent bank are
allowed to file and ventilate claims before the liquidator, pursuant to the August
10, 2001 Order of the RTC-Makati which granted the petition for assistance in
the liquidation of RBCI.
In its
Comment,[7]
PDIC, as liquidator of RBCI, counters that the consolidation of Civil Case No.
3128 with the liquidation proceeding is proper.
It posits that the liquidation court of RBCI, having been established,
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
claims against the said bank.
After due
consideration, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Lucia’s argument,
that the RTC-Iriga is vested with jurisdiction to continue trying Civil Case
No. IR-3128 until its final disposition, evidently falls out from a strained
interpretation of the law and jurisprudence.
She contends that:
Since the
RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the case it should continue
exercising such jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. The
jurisdiction of a court once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings
or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it
finally disposes of the case (Aruego
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711).
When a court
has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not affected by a
new legislation transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to another
tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA 211). Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is
retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v. Court of Appeals,
263 SCRA 323).[8]
The afore-quoted
cases, cited by Lucia to bolster the plea for the continuance of her case, find
no application in the case at bench.
Indeed, the
Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that such
principle is not without exceptions. It
is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is
not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of
jurisdiction. However, the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change
in jurisdiction is curative in character (Garcia
v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, 149 SCRA
432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
For sure,
Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the
liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in
the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section (formerly
Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366
SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court says:
xxx The
requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of
actions against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and
orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of
litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA,
253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body
contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible, should pass
upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citing Central
Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 [1988]).[9]
As regards Lucia’s contention that
jurisdiction already attached when Civil Case No. IR-3128 was filed with, and
jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the liquidation
case before the RTC-Makati, her stance fails to persuade this Court. In refuting this assertion, respondent PDIC cited
the case of Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal[10]
where it was held that the time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial, viz:
It is the
contention of petitioners, however, that the placing under receivership of
Respondent Bank long after the filing of the complaint removed it from the
doctrine in the said Morfe Case.
This contention
is untenable. The time of the filing of
the complaint is immaterial. It is the
execution that will obviously prejudice the other depositors and
creditors. Moreover, as stated in the
said Morfe case, the effect of the judgment is only to fix the amount of the
debt, and not to give priority over other depositors and creditors.
The cited Morfe
case[11]
held that “after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent and
has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets
for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking
institution are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after
its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by
an attachment, execution or otherwise.”
Thus, to
allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a
possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of
RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would
defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.
Anent the second issue, Lucia faults
the CA in directing the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 with Special
Proceedings No. M-5290. The CA committed
no error. Lucia’s complaint involving
annulment of deed of mortgage and damages falls within the purview of a
disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A. 7653 (The New Central
Bank Act). The jurisdiction should be lodged with the liquidation court. Section
30 provides:
Sec. 30. Proceedings
in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or
quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become
due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not include
inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in
the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as
determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving
probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order
under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which
amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which
cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing
forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking
institution.
For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized
competence in banking or finance may be designated as receiver.
The receiver shall immediately gather and take
charge of all the assets and liabilities of the institution, administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a
receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of
administrative expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the
transfer or disposition of any asset of the institution: Provided, That the
receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in non-speculative
investments. The receiver shall
determine as soon as possible, but not later than ninety (90) days from take
over, whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise placed in such
a condition that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public: Provided, That any
determination for the resumption of business of the institution shall be
subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board.
If the receiver determines that the institution
cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with the
next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board
of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the
liquidation of the institution. The
receiver shall:
(1) file ex parte with the proper regional
trial court, and without requirement of prior notice or any other action, a
petition for assistance in the liquidation of the institution pursuant to a
liquidation plan adopted by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for
general application to all closed banks.
In case of quasi-banks, the liquidation plan shall be adopted by the
Monetary Board. Upon acquiring
jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion by the receiver after due notice,
adjudicate disputed claims
against the institution, assist the enforcement of individual liabilities of
the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as may be
material to implement the liquidation plan adopted. The receiver shall pay the cost of the
proceedings from the assets of the institution.
(2) convert
the assets of the institution to money, dispose of the same to creditors and
other parties, for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution in
accordance with the rules on concurrence and preference of credit under the
Civil Code of the Philippines and he may, in the name of the institution, and
with the assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such actions as may
be necessary to collect and recover accounts and assets of, or defend any
action against, the institution. The
assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation shall be deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the
receiver and shall, from the moment the institution was placed under such
receivership or liquidation, be exempt from any order of garnishment, levy,
attachment, or execution. [Emphasis supplied]
x
x x
“Disputed claims” refers to all
claims, whether they be against the assets of the insolvent bank, for specific
performance, breach of contract, damages, or whatever.[12] Lucia’s
action being a claim against RBCI can properly be consolidated with the
liquidation proceedings before the RTC-Makati.
A liquidation proceeding has been explained in the case of In Re:
Petition For Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD
(Benguet), Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue[13]
as follows:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a
number of cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a
two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the approval and
disapproval of claims. Upon the approval
of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation
of a closed entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed
with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration by the
liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other
hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the
latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred,
and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution
plan prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies
in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim
were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much
property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of
the liquidation proceeding - payment of all allowed claims in accordance with
the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.
x x x
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition
by the Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled,
"Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking
Corporation.” All claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation
court. Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment
is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to
a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims
unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and distinct from the others.
x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear,
therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims,
including that of Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v. Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation,[14]
regular courts do not
have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an insolvent bank,
unless there is a clear showing that the action taken by the BSP, through the
Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions was in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. The same is not obtaining in this
present case.
The power and authority of the
Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them thereafter when public
interest so requires is an exercise of the police power of the State. Police power, however, is subject to judicial
inquiry. It may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious,
discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is tantamount to a denial of
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.[15]
In sum,
this Court holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the
liquidation court has jurisdiction over Lucia’s action. It would be more in keeping with law and
equity if Lucia’s case is consolidated with the liquidation case in order to
expeditiously determine whether she is entitled to recover the property subject
of mortgage from RBCI and, if so, how much she is entitled to receive from the
remaining assets of the bank.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 16-24.
Penned by Associate
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia
[2] Annex C of petition, id. at 29.
[3]
[4] Annex I of petition, id. at 65.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] 238
Phil. 246, 252 (1987).
[11] Central Bank of the
[12]
Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. 169334, September
8, 2006, 501 SCRA 288, 298, citing Ong v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 126,
131 (1996).
[13] G.R. No. 158261, December 18, 2006, 511 SCRA 123, 149-150, citing Pacific Banking Corporation Employees’ Organization (PaBCEO) v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 578 (1995).
[14] G.R.
No. 169334,
[15] Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 169334, September 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 288, 297, citing Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 70054, 68878, 77255-58, 78766, 78767, 78894, 81303, 81304, 90473, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 767, 798.