FIRST DIVISION
|
EUGENIO
R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN
GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners,
-versus- LIBRADA
F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 175080 Present:
Chairperson
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,* and
PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: November 24, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Subject of this petition is the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated
Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of
a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four
thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No.
T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of
Eugenio. The subject property was
adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before
the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now
deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment
of contract denominated as Kasunduan and
between Librada and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession
with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of
the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered
tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land;
that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees,
seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that
through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the
preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan
dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had
the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro
Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was
illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan
were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the
weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada
in the execution of the Kasunduan
rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all
illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order
for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation
of the subject property. Respondents
likewise demanded payment of damages.[2] During trial, respondents presented a
leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the
existing tenancy agreement.[3]
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed
between him and respondents. He
clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the subject premises was based on the
former’s mere tolerance and accommodation.
Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person
to sign such an agreement. He maintained
that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to
the Kasunduan and that she was fully
aware of the contents of the document.
Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00
from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also
questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested
on the regular courts. Eugenio also asserted that Leonida had no legal
personality to file the present suit. [4]
Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the
Provincial
Adjudicator[5]
concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the
surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject
land. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio
and against defendant Eugenio R. Reyes and order is hereby issued:
1.
Declaring
the kasunduan null and void;
2.
Ordering
defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff Librada
Mauricio over the subject landholding;
3.
Ordering
plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00
to herein defendant;
4.
No
pronouncement as to costs.[6]
On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up
by the DARAB, namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the
parties; and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan
dated
Eugenio
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on
Aggrieved
by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On
Undaunted,
Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio
submits that no tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He insists that the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo
and Susana in 1993 giving the former the right to occupy and cultivate the
subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into
without his knowledge and consent. Eugenio
further asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no
leasehold contract was entered into by Godofredo and Eugenio with respect to
the disputed property. Eugenio
attributes error on the part of the Court of Appeals in concluding that a
tenancy relationship existed between the parties despite the absence of some of
the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship such as personal cultivation
and the subject land being agricultural.
Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan entered into between him and Librada wherein the latter
agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered into
and the contents thereof were mutually understood by the parties.[11]
In a
Resolution dated
In
her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the
jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law and not of
facts.[13]
In
the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and
Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond
the province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.[14] Absent any of the obtaining exceptions[15]
to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed
by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.
The
DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and the
Mauricio’s came about, thus:
This Board, after a thorough
evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that the Mauricios are former tenants
of the parents of the herein Defendant-Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit “H” which is the Tax
Declaration of the property in controversy proves that upon the death of the
parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their
extra-judicial partition/settlement and this property was initially under the
ownership of the appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the same
property was finally acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact
that the Mauricios are really the tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily
executed the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the
property and to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest
of Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes.
x x x. The “Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan” alleging that their tenancy relationship
began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain until
further revised.[16]
This
is a contest of “Kasunduans.” Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of tenancy.
Librada claims that her late husband had been
working on the land since 1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan dated
This second Kasunduan
is the subject of the instant complaint.
In its disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:
x x x Insofar as this “Kasunduan” is concerned, and after
reading the transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this
Board is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her
from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to return the money she
received because the contents of the document was never explained to her being
illiterate who cannot even read or write.
This Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the
testimonies that while the document was allegedly signed by the parties in
Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila,
thus, the Notary Public was not in a position to explain much less ascertain
the veracity of the contents of the alleged “Kasunduan” as to whether or not Plaintiff-Appellee Librada Mauricio
had really understood the contents thereof.
This Board further adheres to the principle that it cannot substitute
its own evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal
evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the case at bar, had the
best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while
testifying on the circumstances relevant to the execution of the alleged “Kasunduan.” Furthermore, this Board
adheres to the principle that in all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other handicap, the courts (and in
the case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New
Civil Code). In the case at bar,
Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read
nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her thumbmark.[17]
Applying the principle that only questions of law
may be entertained by this Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the
Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which
clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor
on the witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana
and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be
extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or
by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the
landholding. Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural
Tenancy Act provides:
SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity
of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household
may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the
contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land does
not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the
purchaser or transferee shall assume
the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant.
In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his
rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code
of Agrarian Reforms of the
SEC. 10. Agricultural
Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal
possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor. (Emphasis supplied)
As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as
a party was also assailed by Eugenio.
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of
Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir.
Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada,
thus, not a legal heir.[18]
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when
it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the
instant petition.[19]
It is
settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.[20] Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book “Civil Code of the
The
legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code
(article 335) which provides: “The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void.” This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.”
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.[21]
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of
The
same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,[24]
this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.[25] Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes,[26]
the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
subject to collateral attack.[27]
Against
these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from
the case for annulment of the “Kasunduan”
that supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant
petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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JOSE
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WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 913,
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta is designated as additional member in
place of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo who is on official leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Magdangal M. De
Leon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 44-51.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Gregorio D. Sapera.
[6] Rollo, p. 88.
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, p. 159.
[10] Rollo,
pp. 49-50.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Tarona
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170182, 18 June 2009, 589 SCRA 474, 482; Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 172146, 30 July 2008, 560 SCRA 545, 567.
[15] (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and
its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. See Cornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., id.
[16] Rollo,
p. 95.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
[22] G.R. No. 181174,
[23]
[24] G.R. No. 167405,
[25]
[26] G.R. No. L-23079,
[27]