Republic of the
Supreme Court
NICEAS M. BELONGILOT,
Petitioner, -
versus - ROLANDO S. CUA, ROEL ERIC C. GARCIA, LORENZO R. REYES, AUGUSTO P.
QUIJANO, IANELA G. JUSI-BARRANTES and SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 160933
Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: November 24, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
|
|
|
D E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
|
BRION, J.: |
|
|
|
|
Before this Court is the Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1] assailing
the Office of the Ombudsman’s (Ombudsman’s)
Resolution[2]
and Order[3]
dated June 10, 2003 and October 20, 2003, respectively, in OMB-C-C-03-0045-B.
The assailed Resolution dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Niceas M.
Belongilot against respondents Salvador P. Ramos, Rolando S. Cua, Roel Eric C.
Garcia, Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano and Ianela G. Jusi-Barrantes, for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended. The challenged Order denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner’s wife, Leonarda
Belongilot, was the owner of several parcels of land in Bulacan, covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 0-359. Sometime in 1979, Juanito Constantino forcibly entered and took
possession of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the subject
lots) covered by OCT No. 0-359, and converted them into a fishpond.
Leonarda filed an ejectment complaint against Constantino before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Board (PARAB),
docketed as R-03-02-8138’98.[4]
Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) Gregorio B.
Sapora, in his Decision of May 21, 2001,
directed Constantino and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
subject lots. Constantino moved to reconsider this decision, but PARAD Sapora
denied his motion.
Constantino filed, on October 8,
2001, a notice of appeal before the PARAB, but PARAD Toribio F. Ilao, in his
Order of April 16, 2002,[5]
dismissed this notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On
Constantino, through Atty. Restituto
David, filed, on May 21, 2002, a petition for injunction with application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO)[7] before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), without asking for the reconsideration of the dismissal of
his notice of appeal. He prayed that the implementation of PARAD Sapora’s May
21, 2001 Decision be restrained and that his notice of appeal, dated October 8,
2001, be given due course.
In the meantime, the DARAB sheriff[8]
enforced the writ of execution on May
31, 2002, and evicted Constantino from the subject lots. Consequently, the
possession of the subject lots was turned over to the petitioner in his
capacity as general administrator of Leonarda’s properties. The petitioner,
thereafter, raised thousands of “bangus”
and “sugpo” fingerlings in the
fishpond.
On November 15, 2002, or more than five (5) months after the filing of
the petition for injunction, the DARAB issued a TRO in Constantino’s favor, in
an Order that partly reads:
After taking into account the petitioner’s
allegations and arguments set forth in the pleadings filed as well as other
supporting documents, it appears that grave and irreparable damage or injury
would result to the petitioner before a hearing on the preliminary injunction
can be held and to preserve the status quo of the parties pending the
resolution of the instant case, the
Motion is hereby GRANTED restraining the public respondents and/or any other
persons acting under his authority from issuing a writ of execution, or from
implementing the same, if one had already been issued.
This
restraining order is effective for a period of twenty (20) days.
In the meantime, respondents are directed to
submit their Answer/Comment to the instant Motion within a period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this Order.
Let the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a Writ of Injunction be set on
No Motion for Postponement shall be
entertained.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Leonarda filed, on November 21, 2002,
a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction, alleging that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the petition because of Constantino’s failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2002 Order of PARAD Ilao. She
further argues that the decision sought to be restrained had already been
implemented.[10]
On
On January 20, 2003, the petitioner
filed with the Ombudsman an amended criminal
complaint,[12] for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019,[13]
against the respondents in their capacity as officers[14]
and members[15] of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the DARAB, respectively. This case was
docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0045-B.
In
its Resolution of
It is, therefore, apparent that the vital
issue to be resolved is whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to
act on the petition filed by Juanito Constantino and subsequently issue the
restraining order despite the finality of the PARAD Decision due to the belated
filing of the Notice of Appeal, non-payment of appeal fee and non-filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dismissing his appeal – all pursuant to
the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Assuming arguendo that the public
respondents’ issuance of the restraining order suffers from procedural
infirmities, the same is better addressed to the Court which has administrative
and supervisory powers over administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions.
x x x x
This Office, therefore, cannot forestall the
power of the Courts to take cognizance of matters which squarely fall under
their jurisdiction.
In sum, private complainant is not left
without any recourse in the light of all the allegations and issues broached
out before us. Nonetheless, complainant must ventilate its cause of action in
the proper forum.
Prescinding from above, the charge against
the public respondents must necessarily fail.
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
SO RESOLVED.[16]
The petitioner moved to reconsider
this resolution, but the Ombudsman denied his motion in its Order dated
In the present petition, the petitioner essentially claims that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint against the respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), avers
that the petition must be dismissed outright because the petitioner availed of
the wrong remedy. It further argues that the Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine the existence of probable cause, that is, whether a criminal case
should be filed or not.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we find the
petition meritorious.
I.
Procedural Issue
We note at the outset that the
petitioner, in seeking to annul the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dated
In Soriano v. Cabais,[19]
this Court had the occasion to discuss the appropriate recourse to take from
decisions or resolutions of the Ombudsman, and said:
In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. This ruling has been repeatedly reiterated
in subsequent cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
Here, petitioner’s
complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada
v. Desierto, we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original
action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of
Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the
Ombudsman’s finding of lack
of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of
Appeals. This rule was subsequently
restated in Acuña v. Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon where we held that the remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the
Ombudsman is to file with this Court a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
The petitioner’s complaint before the
Ombudsman, charging the respondents with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, is undoubtedly criminal in nature. The petitioner’s recourse
to this Court should have, therefore, been through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, instead of a
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Thus, from a procedural perspective, the OSG’s claim that the
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy appears to be correct.
We would have readily agreed with the
OSG’s conclusion had the petitioner simply dwelt on errors of law in his
petition. Our reading of the petition,
however, and as our discussions below will show, readily reveals that the
petition, while entitled and presented as a petition for review on certiorari, in fact, outlines and
charges acts that collectively constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman.[20]
In other words, while the petitioner followed the Rule 45 procedures, the
substance of the petition handily satisfies the requirements of a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari. Thus viewed, the
issue before us is whether the procedure and its form or substance should have
primacy.
Our choice when faced with this kind
of conflict, particularly one that involves grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is clear.
No less than the Constitution under Section 1, Article VIII expressly directs
the Judiciary, as a matter of power and duty, not only “to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable”
but, “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
We, thus, have the duty to take cognizance of the allegations of grave
abuse of discretion; in the performance of this duty, we see no legal stumbling
block if we deviate from the requirements of form and procedure that stand in
the way in favor of substance.[21]
II. The Grave Abuse of Discretion Issue
Grave abuse of discretion is the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned, which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[22]
A careful review of the petition and an
examination of the records reveal a collective pattern of action – done
capriciously, whimsically and without regard to existing rules and attendant
facts – that shows a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of judgment. We discuss all
these below.
a.
The Ombudsman
erred in refusing to act on the petitioner’s criminal complaint
The Ombudsman, in
its resolution of June 10, 2003, did not give a definitive ruling on whether
there was probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; instead, it dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the issue was “better addressed to the Court which has administrative and
supervisory powers over administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions.”[23]
To justify its
refusal to take cognizance of the complaint, it cited the 1980 case of Citizens’ League of Free-Workers v. Court of
Industrial Relations.[24]
We find this reliance misplaced, as the facts and ruling in this cited case are
totally foreign to the present case.
This cited case dealt with the issue of whether this Court could review
the Court of Industrial Relations’ refusal to act on a late breaking
development in the case – the union’s motion for reinstatement and payment of
backwages whose denial was alleged to be constitutive of an unfair labor
practice act. The Court ruled that it
was grave abuse of discretion for the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
to refuse to consider and resolve the belatedly brought unfair labor practice
charge: the labor court’s action was rigid and severe in its application of the
Industrial Peace Act (Commonwealth Act No. 103), and disregarded the fact that
the new charge referred to new developments related to the unfair labor charge
already pending with the labor court.
This ruling – involving
a labor case under the Industrial Peace Act – has no relevance whatsoever to
the issue presented before the Ombudsman, i.e.,
whether there was probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. If the ruling is
remotely related at all, it is on the point of whether the lower tribunal
should act on a matter that, by law, is under its jurisdiction. From this perspective, the cited law, in fact,
supports the petitioner’s case. In the
same manner that the labor court should have entertained the belated charge of
unfair labor practice, the Ombudsman should have squarely ruled on the question
of whether probable cause exists in the criminal complaint brought before it.
We note that
instead of ruling on the issue of probable cause, the Ombudsman simply held
that the propriety of the restraining order and injunction the DARAB ordered is
a matter “better addressed to the Court which has administrative and supervisory
powers over administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial functions.”[25] In short, the Ombudsman viewed the case as a recourse the petitioner had taken
against the restraining order and injunction the DARAB issued, not as a
criminal charge for having violated the anti-graft law in issuing the
restraining order/injunction. In
this light, the Ombudsman’s action is undoubtedly one tainted with grave abuse
of discretion, as it made the wrong considerations in ruling on the probable
cause issue.[26]
The Ombudsman’s
duty to act on the petitioner’s complaint is undisputed. The mandate of the
Ombudsman is expressed in Section 12, Article XI of the
Constitution which states:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13, Article
XI of the Constitution enumerates
the powers, functions, and duties of the Ombudsman, among
which is to:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
The Ombudsman Act
of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) likewise provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have the following power, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases.
These constitutional and statutory
provisions grant the Ombudsman full and unqualified authority, as well as the duty, to investigate and
prosecute violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. They embody the duty to rule on probable
cause issues that the Ombudsman cannot shirk away from. By ruling as it did, the Ombudsman
effectively ran away from this duty.
b. The Existence of Probable Cause
The Ombudsman
attempted to remedy its error by stating in its Order denying the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, that “[t]he alleged procedural infirmities
committed by the public respondents in issuing the Restraining Order and the
Resolution do not, by themselves, establish a demonstrable violation of the
provision of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.”[27] Generally, we do not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause,
except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. But when,
as in this case, the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration
in the determination of probable cause, our intervention is in order to correct
the grave abuse of discretion.[28]
A
finding of probable cause simply requires the existence of facts that are
“sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” The facts of this case establish sufficient
basis to find probable cause to institute a charge for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public
officers. ― In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x
x x x
(e) Causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Reduced to its
elements, a violation under this provision requires that:
1.
the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;
2.
he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and
3.
that
his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.[29]
Among these
elements, the first element is a given while the third element is in part
dependent on the second element; the injury the petitioner suffered would be
undue if the second element is present. The second and critical element provides
the different modes for violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, that is,
through “manifest partiality,” “evident bad faith,” or “gross inexcusable
negligence.”
In Uriarte v. People,[30] this Court explained that “Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused
acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as
when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. ‘Evident bad faith’ connotes
not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. ‘Gross
inexcusable negligence’ refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.”[31]
In issuing the TRO and
preliminary injunction, and accepting Constantino’s appeal, the respondents demonstrated
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, which,
oddly enough, the Ombudsman failed to take into consideration in determining
the existence of probable cause.[32]
A glaring
characteristic of the Ombudsman’s handling of the petitioner’s Section 3(e)
charge is its patent failure to note and consider the DARAB’s omission to observe the most basic rules in considering
a petition for injunction and TRO, as we outline below.
First, the respondents granted the petition
for injunction when nothing could anymore be enjoined because the act sought to
be prevented or prohibited had already been accomplished. We stress that the
DARAB issued a TRO and a preliminary injunction on
Second, the respondents entertained the injunction petition despite
Constantino’s failure to attach an affidavit of merit, as required by Section
1, Rule X of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure (1994 DARAB Rules), which provides:
SECTION 1. Preliminary
Injunction When Granted. A preliminary injunction, restraining order or a
status quo order may be granted by the Board or any two (2) of its Members or
the Adjudicator, when it is established on the basis of allegations in the
sworn complaint or motion which shall be
duly supported by affidavits of merit that the acts being complained of, if not
enjoined, would cause some grave and irreparable damage or injury to any of the
parties in interest so as to render ineffectual the decision in favor of such
party. Should the Board or the Adjudicator believe that it is necessary to
post a bond, it shall fix the amount of the bond to be executed by the party
applying for the injunction in favor of the party sought to be enjoined to
answer for the damages the latter might suffer thereby, if it is finally
determined that the complainant or petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon the
filing and approval of such bond, injunction may be issued.
The above situation raises questions
not only on the propriety of the TRO and the preliminary injunction, but – for
purposes of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman – on the character of the
action made in relation to those who acted.
Apart from the questionable grant of
the TRO and preliminary injunction, the respondents also considered the
petition as an appeal, and ordered the elevation of the records of the case,
completely ignoring the fact that the PARAD decision had not only become final,
but had long been executed.
Constantino received the
Neither can Constantino’s petition
for injunction be considered as a certiorari
petition (recognized under Section 3, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules [39] against
the PARAD order dismissing his notice of appeal. The provision declares that a petition for certiorari filed with the DARAB cannot
be entertained without filing a motion for reconsideration with the Adjudicator
a quo within five days from receipt
of the order subject of the petition.
Under the above-listed
circumstances, we hold that enough indicators exist to convince a reasonable
man that the respondents grossly neglected to note and consider the facts and
the law in the petition for injunction filed before them, to the proven
prejudice of the petitioner. The Ombudsman
joined this chorus of neglect and committed grave abuse of
discretion when – through the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations and its
own failure to properly examine the underlying DARAB case – it concluded that
there was no reason to charge the respondents of violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. To be sure, the
respondents may have a valid defense against such charge, but the merits of the
petitioner’s case and the respondents’ defenses must be ventilated in an
appropriately filed criminal case before the proper forum. In the meanwhile, the filing of a criminal
case is in order and one must first be brought before the proper courts.
Lest this
Decision be misinterpreted, we reiterate that not every error of the Ombudsman
in the determination of probable cause can be directly submitted to this Court
for remedial action. We can only directly
intervene through the extraordinary writ of certiorari
when, as in this case, a grave abuse of discretion exists.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we hereby GRANT
the petition. The Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dated June 10, 2003 and
October 20, 2003, respectively, in OMB-C-C-03-0045-B, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Ombudsman is ORDERED TO FILE in
the proper court the necessary Information for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 against respondents Rolando S. Cua, Roel Eric C. Garcia,
Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, and Ianela G. Jusi-Barrantes.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Annex “E”; rollo, pp. 125-149.
[3] Annex “G”; id. at 157-170.
[4] Based on Section 2, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, vesting the PARAD the jurisdiction to hear, determine and
adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection
therewith, arising within his assigned territorial jurisdiction.
[5] Annex “A”; rollo, pp. 41-44.
[6] Annex “A-1”; id. at 45-47.
[7] Annex “B”; id. at 48-53.
[8] Sheriff Virgilio Robles, Jr.
[9] Rollo,
pp. 63-64.
[10] Id. at 65-72.
[11]
[12]
[13] Section
3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers.
– In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x
x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers
and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
[14]
Respondent Salvador P. Ramos holds the position of Trial Attorney II at the
DAR, while respondent Rolando S. Cua is the OIC-Executive Director of the DAR.
[15]
Respondents Roel Eric C. Garcia, Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, and
Ianela G. Jusi-Barrantes are all members of the DARAB.
[16] Rollo, pp. 146-148.
[17] Id. at 163-164.
[18] The
records disclose that the petitioner did not take any action to annul the
DARAB’s November 15, 2002 TRO and December 27, 2002 injunction; id. at 137.
[19] G.R.
No. 157175,
[20] The
petitioner alleged that “the Ombudsman has wittingly or unwittingly ignored or
did not take into consideration certain material and indisputable facts that
proved beyond doubt of the respondent’s guilt of the offense charged. x x x the
Ombudsman appeared to be manifestly and evidently partial in the performance of
its official function in this case in favor of the respondents [.]” Rollo,
pp. 17 and 20.
[21] See People v. Romualdez, G.R. No. 166510,
[22] See Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans v. Tabasondra, G.R. No. 133756,
[23] Rollo, p. 147.
[24]
No. L-38293,
[25] Rollo, p. 146.
[26] The
cases of Varias v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010, and Pecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182865, December 24,
2008, 575 SCRA 634 (citing Almeida v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159124, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 681), although
not squarely in point, provide the basis for a conclusion that a decision or
determination based on wrong considerations may be considered a grave abuse of
discretion. See also Mitra v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 191938,
[27] Rollo, p. 163.
[28] Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 169727-28, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 375, 394, citing Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129 (2002).
[29] Collantes v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos.
167006-07, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 142, 152.
[30] G.R.
No. 169251, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 471, 487.
[31]
[32] The
Ombudsman merely defined the concepts of manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, without explaining why the respondents’
acts did not constitute to these.
[33] Annex
“D”; rollo, pp. 55-56.
[34] See Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 384 Phil. 95 (2000).
[35] Rollo, p. 42.
[36]
Constantino’s notice of appeal was denied by PARAD Ilao in his Order of April 16,
2002; supra note 5.
[37] SECTION
1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal
may be taken from an order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator to the
Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a period
of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision
appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, if the appeal
is in writing.
[38] Rollo, pp. 96-97.
[39] Section
3, Rule VIII in part provides:
x x x x
The
Order or resolution of the Adjudicators on any issue, question, matter or
incident raised before them shall be valid and effective until the hearing
shall have been terminated and the case is decided on the merits, unless
modified and reversed by the Board upon a verified petition for certiorari
which cannot be entertained without filing a motion for reconsideration with the
Adjudicator a quo within five (5)
days from receipt of the order, subject of the petition. Such interlocutory order shall not be the subject
of an appeal.