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NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners, - versus - MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. Respondents. |
G.R. No. 160067
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Petitioners, - versus - SPS. GERARD AND MARICEL JOSON Respondents. |
G.R. No. 170410 |
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL.,
Petitioners, -
versus - HILARION FELIX, ET AL.,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 171622 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PERALTA * and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: November
17, 2010 |
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PEREZ, J.:
Filed
pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari at bench primarily assail the
decisions rendered in the following cases, viz.:
(a) Decision dated 4 September 2003 of
the then Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No.
74030;[1]
(b) Decision dated 26 October 2005 of said Court’s then Special Eighth Division
in CA-G.R. No. 81262;[2]
and, (c) Decision dated 17 February 2006 of the same Court’s then Special Sixth
Division in CA-G.R. No. 87906.[3]
The Facts
At
or about 2:00 o’clock in the morning of 11 May 2001, along the portion of the
There
were multiple damages on the vehicles.
Much more tragic than that, the accident resulted in the death of Noel
Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van, and seven of its passengers, namely,
Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all surnamed Felix; and,
Antonio Landoy. Although they survived
the mishap, on the other hand, respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix and Jasmin
Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately brought to
the nearest hospital for treatment.
As a
consequence of the collisions, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage
to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial on
16 May 2001. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 01-99 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon.[5]
On
3 July 2001, a complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco
and Imperial against respondents Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the Fuso six-wheeler
truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja, its
alleged registered owner, and respondent Maricel Joson, its alleged present
owner. Anchored on the supposed fact
that the accident was caused by the recklessness and gross negligence of respondent
Giganto, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0296 before Branch
22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On
6 August 2001, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2001-0296 before the Naga RTC, on the ground of litis pendentia. Invoking the “interest of justice rule”,
said respondents argued that Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC
should be maintained despite petitioners’ earlier filing of their complaint for
damages before the Naga RTC. Likewise
invoking litis pendentia and relying
on the earlier filing of their complaint, on the other hand, petitioners filed
a motion dated 28 September 2001, seeking the dismissal of the complaint for
damages respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson filed against them before the
Valenzuela MeTC. In a supplement to
their motion to dismiss dated 4 February, 2002, however, respondents Giganto
and the Spouses Joson argued that it was the case before the Naga RTC which
should be dismissed since petitioners not only failed to implead their respective
spouses and that of respondent Pedraja but had already received payment from
their insurer, the Standard Insurance Company, Inc., for the damages sustained
by the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck.[7]
With
the Valenzuela MeTC’s 28 February 2002 dismissal of the complaint filed against
them by respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson, petitioners amended their
complaint before the Naga RTC for the purpose of impleading the following
additional defendants: (a) the respective spouses of respondents Giganto, Cubeta,
Maricel Joson and Leticia Pedraja; (b) the driver of the KIA Besta Van,
respondent Lazo; and (c) the surviving spouse of the registered owner thereof,
respondent Agnes Tagle. In said amended
complaint, petitioners averred, among other matters, that the vehicular
accident was caused by negligence of respondents Giganto and Lazo, the drivers
of the Fuso six-wheeler truck and the KIA Besta Van, respectively. In a motion dated 16 March 2002, however,
respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson sought the reconsideration of the
dismissal of their complaint by the Valenzuela MeTC on the ground that
petitioners’ claim of priority was effectively discounted by the fact that
their amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 did not retroact to the
date of filing of their original complaint before the Naga RTC.[8]
In
the meantime, respondents Lazo, Tagle, Felix and Galvez joined respondents
Gregorio Felix and Antonio Landoy, the heirs/relatives of the deceased
passengers of the KIA Besta Van, in filing a complaint for damages against
petitioners on 13 September 2001.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0325 before Branch 74 of the RTC of Parañaque
City, said complaint asseverated that petitioner Francisco’s negligence was the
direct and proximate cause of the mishap.
In a motion filed on 19 November 2001 before the Parañaque RTC, however,
petitioners sought the dismissal of said complaint in view of the complaints
for damages then still pending before the Naga RTC and the Valenzuela
MeTC. In turn utilizing the pendency of Civil
Case No. 01-0325 before the Parañaque RTC alongside their complaint before the
Valenzuela MeTC, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson filed a motion dated 18
March 2002 praying for the dismissal of petitioners’ amended complaint before
the Naga RTC on the ground of litis
pendentia.[9]
On
2 August 2002, the Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners’
amended complaint on the ground that the same was barred by the complaint for
damages filed against them before the Parañaque RTC. Differentiating said pleading from a
supplemental pleading which only serves to bolster or add something to a
primary pleading, the Naga RTC ruled that petitioners’ amended complaint
supplanted and did not retroact to the time of their original complaint.[10] Subsequent to the Naga RTC's 16 September
2002 denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order,[11]
the Valenzuela MeTC went on to issue an order dated 30 September 2002
reconsidering its earlier dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314 and requiring
petitioners to file their answer to the complaint filed by respondents Giganto
and the Spouses Joson. [12]
In view of the Parañaque RTC's further issuance of the 7 October 2002 order
denying their motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-0325,[13]
petitioners assailed all of the foregoing orders in the petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 74030.[14]
On
4 September 2003, the CA's then Tenth Division issued a decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74030 to the following effect: (a) nullifying the Valenzuela MeTC's 30
September 2002 order which reinstated Civil Case No. 8314; (b) affirming the 2
August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders issued by the Naga RTC which dismissed
petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 on the ground of litis pendentia; and, (c) affirming the
Parañaque RTC's 7 October 2002 order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 01-0325. Finding that the
damages in the aggregate sum of P576,876.03 asserted by respondents
Giganto and Spouses Joson in Civil Case No. 8314 were beyond the jurisdictional
amount then cognizable by the Valenzuela MeTC, the CA Tenth Division ruled that
no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the Naga RTC and the Parañaque
RTC whose combined orders gave premium to Civil Case No. 01-0325 over Civil
Case No. 2001-0296. In the absence of
proof that the greater number of cases pending thereat would actually result in
the violation of petitioners' right to a speedy trial, the jurisdiction of the
Parañaque RTC was upheld with the added ground that it was the venue most
accessible to majority of the parties.[15]
Aggrieved,
petitioners assailed the foregoing order in the 9 November 2003 petition for
review on certiorari docketed before
this Court as G.R. No. 160067.[16] In the meantime, the Sariaya MTC proceeded to
conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after
petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled
in the case.[17] Thru his counsel, Atty. Aristotle Dominguez,
petitioner Francisco proposed the following facts for stipulation with the
prosecution, to wit:
"(a) that the assistant public prosecutor had told
the undersigned counsel inside the courtroom during a court break[sic] (upon
undersigned's inquiry) that he had already interviewed Arnel Lazo (the driver
of the Besta Van carrying the people who were injured and several others who
eventually died);
(b) That Arnel Lazo declared during said interview to
Prosecutor Zabella that, as opposed to the affidavits of the driver and
'pahinante' of the FUSO 6-wheeler truck, Arnel Lazo clearly saw the driver of
the FUSO 6-wheeler truck attempt an overtake, which attempt was rendered
unsuccessful because it was hit by the on-coming 10-wheeler truck driven by the
accused herein; and
(c) that for some reason, (the) prosecutor did not and
still does not believe the version of events as declared to him by Arnel Lazo
in that interview."[18]
In
view of Prosecutor Rodolfo Zabella,
Jr.’s refusal to stipulate on the foregoing matters, the Sariaya MTC went on to
issue a pre-trial order dated 14 August 2001 stating, in part, that "1.Atty. Dominguez made a proposal for
stipulation and admission to the effect that sometime after the arraignment of
the accused, he (Atty. Dominguez) was able to talk and interview Arnel Lazo,
the driver of the Besta Van who admitted to him that it was his 6-wheeler truck
which attempted to overtake another vehicle thereby causing the vehicular (accident)
subject of the instant case. The Public
Prosecutor did not agree."[19] As a consequence, petitioner Francisco filed
on 30 August 2001 a motion styled as one “to compel and disqualify Prosecutor
Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order” on the ground that the latter
cannot refuse to stipulate on matters of which he has personal knowledge and
that the Judge’s recollection of the proposed stipulation was different from
that actually proposed.[20] With
the Sariaya MTC’s denial of said motion in an order dated 18 October 2001,[21]
petitioner Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration on 19 November 2001.[22]
On
9 January 2002, the Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying petitioner
Francisco’s motion for reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial conference
be set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia
and the appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case.[23] Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco filed on 1
April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil
Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of the Lucena City RTC. Likewise contending that the nine
postponements of the pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 were
capricious, vexatious and oppressive, petitioner Francisco further moved for
the dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Upon the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002 denial
of said motion as well as the motion for reconsideration he subsequently
interposed, petitioner Francisco filed yet another petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-90 before Branch 58 of
the Lucena RTC and, later, consolidated with Civil Case No. 2002-37.[24]
On 23 June
2003, the Lucena RTC rendered a consolidated decision in Civil Case Nos. 2002-37
and 2002-90, dismissing petitioner Francisco’s petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for
lack of merit.[25] Elevated by petitioner Francisco to the CA
via the petition for certiorari thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81262, said decision
was upheld in the 26 October 2005 decision rendered in the case by said court's
then Special Eighth Division.[26] Brushing aside the grave abuse of discretion
petitioner Francisco imputed against the Lucena RTC, the CA ruled that: (a) the
pre-trial order cannot be corrected in the absence of evidence of the error
supposedly reflected therein; (b) the Public Prosecutor cannot be compelled to
enter into any stipulation that would substantially affect the theory of the
prosecution; and, (c) the postponements of the hearings a quo were brought about by the assignment of at least three Public
Prosecutors to the case and cannot, therefore, be considered capricious and
violative of petitioner Francisco’s right to a speedy trial.[27] Undaunted, the latter filed the petition for
review on certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 170410.[28]
In Civil Case
No. 01-0325, on the other hand, petitioners Francisco and Imperial filed with
the Parañaque RTC their 14 December 2002 answer, with motion to admit the third-party
complaint therein incorporated against respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto,
Cubeta and their respective spouses.[29] Upon receipt of the Parañaque RTC’s 2 June
2003 order requiring them to pay the necessary filing and other docket fees
relative to their third-party complaint,[30]
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 June 2003, pleading as
ground for non-payment of said fees the pendency of their petition for
certiorari assailing, among other matters, the Naga RTC’s dismissal of Civil
Case No. 2001-0296.[31] Having issued the 14 November 2003 order
holding petitioners’ payment of the same fees in abeyance pending the final
outcome of said petition for certiorari,[32]
the Parañaque RTC, upon the motion dated 20 May 2004 filed respondents Felix,
Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy,[33]
issued the 8 June 2004 notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on 16
August 2004 and requiring the parties to file their pre-trial briefs.[34]
However, for
failure of petitioners and their counsel to attend the pre-trial conference and
to file their pre-trial brief, the Parañaque RTC issued the order dated 16
August 2004 authorizing respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as well as
respondents Tagle and Landoy to present their evidence ex parte. In said order, respondent
Evelyn Felix was likewise declared non-suited alongside respondents Galvez and
Lazo whose complaints were, as a consequence, dismissed without prejudice in
view of their failure to attend the same pre-trial conference.[35] Aggrieved by the Parañaque RTC’s 6 October
2004 denial of their motion for reconsideration of said order,[36]
petitioners filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition which, under
docket of CA-G.R. SP No. 87906, was subsequently denied for lack of merit in
the 17 February 2006 Decision eventually rendered by CA’s then Special Sixth
Division.[37] Petitioners’ petition for review on
certiorari questioning said decision rendered by the CA was docketed before
this Court as G.R. No. 171622[38]
and, pursuant to the 16 May 2006 report submitted by the Clerk of Court of this
Court's Second Division,[39]
was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410.
The Issues
In
G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and Imperial essentially fault the CA
for upholding the jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC over the Naga RTC with
respect to the parties’ causes of action for damages against each other. Calling attention to the lesser case load of
the Naga RTC, petitioners argue that the cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the case will not be served by the Parañaque RTC. Despite said court’s relative proximity to
majority of the parties, petitioners likewise maintain that majority of the
witnesses material to the complete disposition of the case live closer to the
Naga RTC.[40]
In
G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, petitioner Francisco argues that the CA
erred in failing to appreciate the fact that the nine postponements of the
pre-trial conference in the case attributable to the prosecution amounted to a
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.[41]
In
G.R No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial maintain that the CA
incorrectly discounted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Lucena RTC
when it authorized Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as well as respondents Tagle and
Landoy to present their evidence ex parte
in Civil Case No. 01-0325.[42]
The Court’s Ruling
It bears emphasizing at the outset
that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition petitioners filed before the
CA were all anchored on the grave abuse of discretion supposedly imputable
against the RTCs of Naga, Lucena and Parañaque for issuing the rulings therein
assailed. Like prohibition,[43]
however, the rule is settled that certiorari
may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Because their function is limited to keeping
inferior courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction,[44]
the writs therefor may be issued only in cases of lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the context of said special civil actions,
it has been consistently held that grave abuse
of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.[45]
In G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and
Imperial argue that grave abuse of discretion is imputable against both the
Naga and Parañaque RTCs for, respectively, dismissing Civil Case No. 2001-0296
and denying the motion to dismiss they have filed in Civil Case No.
01-0325. Contending that the speedy
disposition of the parties’ causes of action for damages against each other
will be better achieved by the Naga RTC, petitioners contrast said court’s 121
pending cases as of 31 October 2002[46]
to the Parañaque RTC’s 1,019 pending cases as of September 2002.[47] While conceding that the Parañaque RTC is
nearer to the respective residences of all the parties,[48]
petitioners also maintain that the cause for inexpensive resolution of the
parties’ cases would be best served by the Naga RTC which is purportedly more
accessible to the material witnesses whose testimonies are indispensable to the
just resolution of the case, namely, Santiago Carale and Manuel Nacion,
respondent Francisco's two pahinantes,;
and, Martin, Marvin and Jan-Jon Sadiwa, the passengers of the KIA Besta Van.[49]
Although
the Constitution concededly guarantees that “(a)ll persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies”,[50]
it is evident that petitioners’ arguments in G.R. No. 160067 have more to do
with the wisdom of the assailed rulings of the RTCs of Naga and Parañaque than
said courts’ jurisdiction to issue the same.
Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction,[51] however, the rule is settled that errors of
judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the
province of a petition for certiorari.[52] Not being intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling,[53] a
writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case.[54] As long as the trial court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the exercise of its discretion
will, therefore, amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgments,
correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.[55]
Even prescinding from the foregoing considerations, our perusal of the
record also shows that, by filing their answer and third-party complaint
against respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta in Civil Case No.
01-0325, petitioners have already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the Parañaque RTC. In addition,
petitioners have filed before said court the following motions and incidents, viz.:
(a) 17 June 2003 motion for reconsideration of the 2 June 2003 order directing
the payment of the filing and other docket fees for said third-party complaint;
(b) 11 June 2003 opposition to set the case for hearing;[56]
and, (c) 2 September 2004 urgent motion for reconsideration and to set aside
order of default.[57] Having filed their third-party complaint as
aforesaid and repeatedly sought positive relief from the Parañaque RTC, it
stands to reason that petitioners' should no longer be allowed to question said
court's jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 01-0325 which, unlike the suit for
damages pending before the Naga RTC, additionally involves all the parties
indispensable to the complete resolution of the case.
Under the “interest of justice rule”, moreover, the determination of
which court would be “in a better position to serve the interests of justice”
also entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature of the
controversy; (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties;
and, (c) other similar factors.[58] Considering that majority of the parties live
closer to the Parañaque RTC,[59]
we cannot hospitably entertain petitioners’ insistence that the abatement of the
case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC would
promote the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the parties’ complaints
for damages against each other which are indisputably personal in nature. Even
assuming that they would all be called to testify regarding the circumstances
surrounding the subject vehicular accident, it also appears that, as residents
of Brgy. Inocencio Salud, General Emilio Aguinaldo (GMA),
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, we find that petitioner
Francisco is similarly out on a limb in insisting that the Lucena RTC gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the Sariaya MTC’s denial of his motion to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 01-99 on the ground that his constitutional right to
a speedy trial has been violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of
the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite
time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is
considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays.[61] In
the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,[62]
this Court significantly ruled as follows:
“While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient
is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be
definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to
be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude
the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the
rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
A balancing test of applying societal
interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to
approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In
determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s
assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.” xxxx
Petitioner Francisco claims that his right to a speedy trial was
violated when the Public Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the
nine hearings scheduled by the Sariaya MTC on 10 and 17 October 2001, 7
November 2001, 23 January 2002, 13 March 2002, 4 September 2002, 6 November
2002, 15 January 2003 and 5 March 2003.
Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays
entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent,
attributable to petitioner Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary remedies
against the interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment
of at least three public prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo
Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia and Joel Baligod.
Indeed, the record shows that, on 30 August 2001, petitioner filed a
motion styled as one to compel Prosecutor Zabella to agree to his proposed
stipulations and/or to disqualify him from the case as well as to correct the
pre-trial order issued on 14 August 2001.[63] Considering that said motion was denied by
the Sariaya MTC only on 18 October 2001,[64]
we find that Prosecutor Zabella's absence at the 10 and 17 October 2001
pre-trial conference in the case can hardly be considered capricious, vexatious
and oppressive.
The record
further shows that, upon the Sariaya MTC’s issuance of the 9 January 2002 order
denying his motion for reconsideration of said 18 October 2001 order and
setting anew the pre-trial conference in the case,[65]
petitioner Francisco proceeded to file on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No.
2002-37 before Branch 58 of the Lucena City RTC.[66] Although Prosecutor Sia, as replacement of
Prosecutor Zabella, failed to attend
the 7 November 2001, 23 January, 2002 and 13 March 2002 hearings scheduled in
the case, petitioner Francisco cannot, consequently, complain of violation of
his right to speedy trial in view of his pending petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus which raised, among other matters, issues pertinent to
the conduct of the pre-trial conference by the Sariaya MTC. Without even taking into consideration the
additional time Prosecutor Sia understandably needed to study the case, we find
that the foregoing developments justified the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002
denial of the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Francisco on the ground
that the cancellation of the hearings on the aforesaid dates violated his right
to the speedy disposition of the case.[67]
With the Sariaya MTC’s 18 July 2002 denial of his motion for
reconsideration of said 17 April 2002 order, petitioner Francisco once again
elevated the matter to Branch 58 Lucena RTC via the petition for certiorari
and prohibition which, under docket of Civil Case No. 2002-90, incorporated a
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to stop further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 01-99.[68] The same prayer for provisional relief
petitioner was reiterated in his 2 January 2003 and 14 March 2003 supplement to
the petition which, respectively, took issue against the absence of a
prosecutor and/or the complaining witnesses at (a) the 4 September 2002 and 6
November 2001 pre-trial conferences before the Sariaya MTC;[69]
and, (b) the similar settings scheduled for 15 January 2003 and 5 March 2003.[70] To our mind, petitioner Francisco’s harping
on his right to a speedy trial before the Sariaya MTC is materially attenuated
by his motion for the disqualification of Prosecutor Zabella from the case and,
later, his repeated prayer for the stoppage of the proceedings a quo in
his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Lucena RTC.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
concededly mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of
the pre-trial order[71]
and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days,[72]
Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence. In
determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are
"required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[73]
Viewed in the context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as
the further reassignment of the case
to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer to another government office, we
find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the
postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC
were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
Finally in G.R. No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial take
issue against the Parañaque RTC's issuance of the 8 June 2004 order setting the
pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 01-0325 and requiring the parties to
file their respective pre-trial briefs.
Calling attention to the fact that respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto,
Cubeta had yet to file an answer to the third-party complaint incorporated in
their 14 December 2002 answer, petitioners argue that the Parañaque RTC's
issuance of said 8 June 2004 order was both premature and attended with grave
abuse of discretion. Further claiming
that they did not receive a copy of said 8 June 2004 order, petitioners
asseverate that CA should have nullified the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which: (a)
authorized respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix, Tagle and Landoy to present
their evidence ex parte; and, (b)
dismissed the complaint without prejudice insofar as it concerned respondents
Evelyn Felix, Galvez and Lazo who were declared non-suited.
Despite the
Parañaque RTC's issuance of the 14 November 2003 order holding in abeyance the
payment of the filing and other docket fees for petitioners' third-party
complaint, the record is, indeed, bereft of any showing that summons were
issued requiring respondents Pedraja,
Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to file their answer to the aforesaid pleading. If only in the interest of the orderly,
expeditious and complete disposition of the parties' complaints for damages
against each other, we find that the Parañaque RTC should have first awaited
the full joinder of the issues before its 8 June 2004 grant of the motion to
set the case for hearing filed by respondents Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo
and Landoy. More so, when it is borne
in mind that the necessity for respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to be accorded a chance to
participate in the case was rendered imperative by the Naga RTC's 2
August 2002 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-0296 and the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC pursuant to the 4 September 2003
decision rendered by the CA's Tenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 74030.
Although what constitutes a valid
ground to excuse litigants and their counsel is also subject to the sound
discretion of the judge,[74]
the fact that petitioners have filed their answer and third-party complaint in
Civil Case No. 01-0325 also militates against the Parañaque RTC's 16 August
2004 order which, at bottom, amounted to their being declared in default. Inasmuch as procedural rules are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise been
exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases
justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.[75] Time and again, this Court has espoused a
policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon,
as a case is
best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their respective
claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support thereof.[76]
Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than
the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[77]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410 are both DENIED
for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
171622, the petition is GRANTED and
the 17 February 2006 decision in CA-G.R. No. 87906 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
another is entered NULLIFYING the
Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order and directing said court to: (a) order
petitioners Francisco and Imperial to pay the filing and other docket fees for
their third-party complaint; (b) order the issuance of summons to respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta with
respect to said third-party complaint; and, thereafter, (c) to conduct the
mandatory pre-trial conference without further delay.
|
SO ORDERED. JOSE
Associate
Justice |
|
|
WE CONCUR: RENATO C.
CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA Associate Justice |
|
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo per Special Order No. 913 dated 2 November 2010.
[1] Rollo, G.R. No. 160067, pp. 53-64.
[2] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, pp. 69-83.
[3] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, pp. 424-428.
[4] Rollo, G.R. No. 160067, p. 80.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, p. 70.
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, pp. 185-193.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, pp. 71-72.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, pp. 157-175.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] Rollo, G.R. No. 160067, pp. 31-32.
[41] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, pp. 41-65.
[42] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, pp. 71-79.
[43] Sec. 2, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[44] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 479 Phil. 768, 778 (2004).
[45] Sonic Steel Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165976, 29 July 2010.
[46] Rollo, G.R. No. 160067, p. 87.
[47]
[48] Petitioners Francisco and Imperial (Naga City); respondents Cubeta and Spouses Joson (Valenzuela City); respondent Giganto (Mandaluyong City); respondent Pedraja (Antipolo City); respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix (Paranaque City); respondent Evelyn Felix (Laguna), respondent Galvez (Negros Occidental); respondent Tagle (La Union); and, respoindents Lazo and Landoy (Taguig).
[49] Respondent Francisco’s two
pahinantes, namely Santiago Carale and Manuel Nacion (
[50] Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16.
[51] Flaminiano
v. Adriano, G.R. No. 165258, 04
February 2008, 543 SCRA 605, 611.
[52] Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010.
[53]
[54] A.F. Sanchez Brokerage, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 488 Phil. 430, 440 (2004).
[55] Deutsche
Bank
[56] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, pp. 218-222.
[57]
[58] Victronics
Computers, Inc. v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati, G.R. No.
104019, 25 January 1993, 217 SCRA 517, 534, citing Roa-Magsaysay v. Magsaysay, G.R. No. L-49847, 17 July 1980, 98 SCRA 592, 605-606.
[59] Supra, note 48.
[60] Rollo, G.R. No. 160067, p. 81.
[61] Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 428-429 (2005) citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-313.
[62] 484 Phil. 899, 917-918 (2004).
[63] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, p. 18.
[64]
[65] Rollo, G.R. No. 171622, p. 205.
[66] Rollo, G.R. No. 170410, pp. 71-72.
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71] Sec. 1. Time to prepare for trial. – After a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. The trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.
[72] Section 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. – Trial once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other shot-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
[73] Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 139, 154-155.
[74] Khonghun vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154334, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 320, 324.
[75] Go vs. Tan, 458 Phil. 727, 735 (2003).
[76] Sablas v. Sablas, G.R. No. 144568, 3 July 2007, 526 SCRA 292, 299.
[77] Acance vs. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 676, 689 (2005).