THIRD DIVISION
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SOLIDBANK
CORPORATION (now known as FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION), Petitioner, - versus - ERNESTO U.
GAMIER, ELENA R. CONDEVILLAMAR, JANICE L. ARRIOLA and OPHELIA C. DE GUZMAN, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 159460 |
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SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and/or its
successor-in-interest, FIRST METRO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, DEOGRACIAS N. VISTAN AND EDGARDO Petitioners, - versus - SOLIDBANK UNION
AND ITS DISMISSED OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, namely: EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA
C. LUALHATI, ISAGANI P. MAKISIG, REY S. PASCUA, EVELYN A. SIA, MA. VICTORIA
M. VIDALLON, AUREY A. ALJIBE, REY ANTHONY M. AMPARADO, JOSE A. ANTENOR,
AUGUSTO D. ARANDIA, JR.,
JANICE L. ARRIOLA, RUTH SHEILA MA. BAGADIONG, STEVE D. BERING, ALAN ROY I. BUYCO, MANALO T. CABRERA, RACHE M.
CASTILLO, VICTOR O. CHUA, VIRGILIO Y. CO, JR., LEOPOLDO S. DABAY, ARMAND V.
DAYANG-HIRANG, HUBERT V. DIMAGIBA, MA. M. DEGALA, EPHRAIM
RALPH A. DELFIN, KAREN M. DEOCERA, FETIZANAN, SAMUEL
A. FLORENTINO, MENCHIE R. FRANCISCO, ERNESTO
U. GAMIER, MACARIO RODOLFO N. GARCIA, JOEL S. GARMINO, LESTER MARK Z.
GATCHALIAN, MA. JINKY P. B. MACATANGAY, NORMAN C. MANACO, CHERRY LOU B. MANGROBANG,
MARASIGAN G. EDMUNDO, ALLEN M.
MARTINEZ, EMELITA C. MONTANO, ARLENE
P. NOBLE, SHIRLEY A. ONG, LOTIZ E. ORTIZ LUIS, PABLITO M. PALO, MARY JAINE D.
PATINO, GEOFFREY T. PRADO, OMEGA MELANIE
M. QUINTANO, ANES A. RAMIREZ, RICARDO
D. RAMIREZ, DANIEL O. RAQUEL, RAMON B. REYES,
SALVACION N. ROGADO, ELMOR R. ROMANA, JR., LOURDES U. SALVADOR, ELMER S. SAYLON, BENHARD E. SIMBULAN, MA. TERESA
S. SOLIS, MA. Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 159461 Present: CARPIO
MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA,
JR., and SERENO,
JJ. Promulgated: November
15, 2010 |
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The
consolidated petitions before us seek to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated
The Antecedents
Sometime
in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees’
In
his Order[4] dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
issued:
a. Directing
Solidbank Corporation and Solidbank Union to conclude their Collective
Bargaining Agreement for the years 2000 and 2001, incorporating the
dispositions above set forth;
b. Dismissing
the unfair labor practice charge against Solidbank Corporation;
c. Directing
Solidbank to deduct or check-off from the employees’ lump sum payment an amount
equivalent to seven percent (7%) of their economic benefits for the first (1st)
year, inclusive of signing bonuses, and to remit or turn over the said sum to
the Union’s authorized representative, subject to the requirements of
check-off;
d. Directing
Solidbank to recall the show-cause memos issued to employees who participated
in the mass actions if such memos were in fact issued.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Dissatisfied
with the Secretary’s ruling, the Union officers and members decided to protest
the same by holding a rally infront of
the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in Intramuros, Manila,
simultaneous with the filing of their motion for reconsideration of the March
24, 2000 Order. Thus, on
As a result of the employees’ concerted
actions, Solidbank’s business operations were paralyzed. On the
same day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a
memorandum[7] addressed to all
employees calling their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE
office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at
risk as they will be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for
participating in the union-instigated concerted action. The employees’ work abandonment/boycott
lasted for three days, from
On the third day of the concerted
work boycott (April 5, 2000), Vistan issued another memorandum,[8] this time
declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for
work starting April 6, 2000 “provided these employees were/are not part of
those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in
this illegal act.” Out of the 712
employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513 returned
to work and were accepted by the bank. The
remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistan’s directive, which included herein
respondents Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and
Ophelia C. De Guzman. For their failure
to return to work, the said 199 employees were each issued a show-cause memo
directing them to submit a written explanation within twenty-four (24) hours
why they should not be dismissed for the “illegal strike x x x in defiance of x
x x the Assumption Order of the Secretary of Labor x x x resulting [to] grave
and irreparable damage to the Bank”, and placing them under preventive
suspension.[9]
The herein 129 individual respondents
were among the 199 employees who were terminated for their participation in the
three-day work boycott and protest action.
On various dates in June 2000, twenty-one (21) of the individual
respondents executed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Solidbank.[10]
On
The
This Office cannot give due course to the
In the meantime, the Monetary Board
on
Respondents Gamier, Condevillamar,
Arriola and De Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on April 28, May 15 and May 29, 2000,
respectively (NLRC NCR Case Nos.
[S]30-04-01891-00, 30-05-03002-00 and 30-05-02253-00). The cases were consolidated before Labor
Arbiter Potenciano S. Cañizares, Jr. Respondent
Labor Arbiters’ Rulings
In his Decision dated
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring complainants’ dismissal as illegal and unjustified and
ordering the respondents Solidbank Corporation and/or its successor-in-interest
First Metro Investment Corporation and/or Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
and/or Deogracias Vistan and/or Edgardo Mendoza to reinstate complainants to
their former positions. Concomitantly,
said respondents are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay the
complainants their full backwages and other employee’s benefits from the time
of their dismissal up to the date of their actual reinstatement; payment of ten
(10%) percent attorney’s fees; payment of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00)
each as moral damages and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) each
as exemplary damages which are computed, at the date of this decision in the
amount of THIRTY THREE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY TWO PESOS and 80/100 (P33,794,222.80), by the Computation and
Examination Unit of this branch and becomes an integral part of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. [18]
Respondents Gamier, Condevillamar,
Arriola and De Guzman appealed the decision of Labor Arbiter Cañizares, Jr. to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC NCR CA No 027342-01). Petitioners likewise appealed from the
decision of Labor Arbiter Flores (NLRC NCR CA No. 028510-01).
Rulings of the NLRC
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice for lack of
merit. As equitable relief, respondents
are hereby ordered to pay complainants separation benefits as provided under
the CBA at least one (1) month pay for every year of service whichever is
higher.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The
Second Division ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees on
On
the charge of forum shopping with respect to twenty-one (21) individual
complainants who have voluntarily settled their claims against Solidbank, the
said cases not having been dismissed by the Labor Arbiter despite proper motion,[23] the Second
Division found that complainants admitted in their Answer that the said
employees preferred to pursue their own independent action against the bank and
their names were stricken out from the original complaint; hence, the Labor
Arbiter erred in granting relief to said employees. Nevertheless, it held that the
complaint will not be dismissed on this ground as the issue of forum shopping should
have been raised in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.[24]
Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration while the petitioners filed a partial motion
for reconsideration. Both motions were
denied under Resolution[25] dated
As
to respondents’ appeal, the NLRC’s Third Division by Decision[26] dated
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered finding the respondent Solidbank Corporation liable
for the illegal dismissal of complainants Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena P.
Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Maria Ophelia C. de Guzman, and ordering
the respondent bank to reinstate the complainants to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights and to pay full backwages reckoned from the
time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their actual/payroll
reinstatement. Should reinstatement not
be feasible, respondent bank is further ordered to pay complainants their separation
pay in accordance with the provisions of the subsisting Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The Third Division held that the
protest action staged by the bank’s employees before the DOLE did not amount to
a strike but rather an exercise of their right to express frustration and
dissatisfaction over the decision rendered by the Secretary of Labor. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the
activity is per se illegal or violative of the assumption order considering
that at the time, both parties had pending motions for reconsideration of the
Secretary’s decision. Moreover, it was
found that Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman were not fully
investigated on the charge that they had instigated or actively participated in
an illegal activity; neither was it shown that the explanations submitted by
them were considered by the management.
Since said employees had presented evidence of plausible and acceptable
reasons for their absence at the workplace at the time of the protest action,
their termination based on such alleged participation in the protest action was
unjustified.[28]
Respondents filed a “partial motion”
while the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated
On November 20, 2001, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA assailing the July 23, 2001 Decision and Resolution dated September 28,
2001 of the NLRC’s Second Division insofar as it ordered the payment of
separation benefits to the 129 terminated employees of Solidbank who
participated in the mass action/strike (CA-G.R.
SP No. 67730).[30]
On May 23, 2002, petitioners filed a
separate petition in the CA (CA-G.R. SP
No. 70820) seeking the reversal of the January 31, 2002 Decision and
Resolution dated March 8, 2002 of the NLRC’s Third Division and praying for the following reliefs: (1)
immediate issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain/enjoin
the NLRC from issuing a writ of execution in NLRC CA No. 027342-01; (2) the
petition be consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 67730 before the Thirteenth
Division and CA-G.R. SP No. 68054 before the Third Division, or if
consolidation is no longer possible, that the petition be resolved
independently of the aforesaid cases; and (3) granting the petition by
annulling and setting aside the January 31, 2002 Decision of the NLRC, and
reinstating the November 14, 2000 Decision of Labor Arbiter Cañizares, Jr.[31]
On August 9, 2002, petitioners filed
a Manifestation before the Fifteenth Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 67730) attaching
thereto a copy of the Decision[32] (dated July 26,
2002) rendered by the CA’s Special Third Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 68998, a
petition for certiorari separately filed by Metrobank which also sought to
annul and set aside the July 23, 2001 Decision of the NLRC’s Second Division
insofar as it ordered the payment of separation benefits to the dismissed
employees of Solidbank. In the said decision,
the CA’s Fourteenth Division gave due course to the petition of Metrobank and
affirmed the
On September 11, 2002, respondents
filed an Omnibus Motion and Counter-Manifestation arguing that petitioners’
Manifestation constitutes a judicial admission that Metrobank engaged in forum
shopping; it was thus prayed that CA-G.R. SP No. 68998 be consolidated with
CA-G.R. SP No. 67730, the latter having a lower case number. Further, respondents attached a copy of the
Decision[34]
dated August 29, 2002 rendered by the CA’s Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
68054, the petition separately filed by the Union and the 129 terminated employees
of Solidbank from the July 23, 2001 Decision of the NLRC’s Second Division. The CA’s Second Division granted the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 68054 and reinstated the
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 67730 and 70820 were
consolidated before the Twelfth Division.
Court of Appeals’ Ruling
On
WHEREFORE, the twin petitions are hereby DENIED. The dismissal of private respondents are hereby
declared to be illegal. Consequently,
petitioner is ordered to reinstate private respondents to their former
position, consonant with the Decision of this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 68054.
SO ORDERED.[36]
First,
on the issue of forum shopping, the CA found that while there were indeed two
cases filed respecting the same matter of illegality of the dismissal of
certain employees of Solidbank, it appears that the individual complainants
have no hand in initiating the case before the Labor Arbiter for which the
Union filed the complaint in behalf of its members. Hence, the individual
complainants cannot be said to have deliberately or consciously sought two
different fora for the same issues and causes of action. Petitioners, moreover, failed to call the
attention of the Labor Arbiter as to the fact of filing of similar complaints
by four employees.
As to the nature of the mass action
resorted to by the employees of Solidbank, the CA ruled that it was a
legitimate exercise of their right to free expression, and not a strike
proscribed when the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the impassé between
Solidbank and the Union in the collective bargaining negotiations. The CA thus reasoned:
… while conceding that the aggregated acts of the
private respondents may have resulted in a stoppage of work, such was the
necessary result of the exercise of a Constitutional right. It is beyond cavil that the mass action was done, not to exert any undue pressure on the
petitioner with regard to wages or other economic demands, but to express
dissatisfaction over the decision of the Labor Secretary subsequent to his
assumption of jurisdiction. Surely, this is one course of action that
is not enjoined even when a labor dispute is placed under the assumption of the
said Labor Secretary. To allow an
act of the Labor Secretary – one man in the Executive Department – to whittle
down a freedom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights would be to place upon that
freedom a limitation never intended by the several framers of our Constitution.
In effect, it would make a right enshrined in the Fundamental Law that was
ratified by the Sovereign People, subordinate to a prerogative granted by the
Labor Code, a statutory enactment made by mere representatives of the People. This anomaly We cannot allow.
x x x x
Was private respondents’ act of massing in front of
the
On
The Petitions
G.R. No. 159460
Petitioners argued that the CA erred
in holding that the mass action of
Petitioners assail the CA in not
considering the damage and prejudice caused to the bank and its clients by
respondents’ illegal acts.
Respondents’ mass actions crippled banking operations. Over-the-counter transactions were greatly
undermined. Checks for clearing were significantly delayed. On-line transactions were greatly hampered,
causing inestimable damage to the nationwide network of automated teller
machines. Respondent
In view of the illegal strike
conducted in violation of the Secretary’s assumption order, petitioners
maintain that the dismissal of respondents was not illegal, as consistently
ruled by this Court in many cases. Even
granting arguendo that their
termination was illegal, the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of
respondents and holding that Solidbank, FMIC and Metrobank are solidarily
liable to the respondents. Lastly, the CA
erred in not finding that respondents were guilty of forum shopping as respondents’
claim that they did not know the Union had filed a complaint was unbelievable
under the circumstances.[39]
G.R.
No. 159461
Petitioners
contend that the CA erred in ruling that the dismissal of respondents Gamier,
Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman was illegal, considering that this was not
an issue raised in the petition for certiorari before the appellate court. What
was raised by petitioners was only the propriety of the award of separation pay
by the NLRC which in fact declared their dismissal to be valid and legal.
Petitioners maintain that respondents
are not entitled to separation pay even if the dismissal was valid because they
committed serious misconduct and/or illegal act in defying the Secretary’s
assumption order. Moreover, the CA also
erred in disregarding the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim executed by twenty-one (21)
individual respondents who entered into a compromise agreement with Solidbank.[40]
Issues
The
fundamental issues to be resolved in this controversy are: (1) whether the
protest rally and concerted work abandonment/boycott staged by the respondents
violated the Order dated
Our Ruling
Article
212 of the Labor Code, as amended, defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.[41] The term “strike” shall comprise not
only concerted work stoppages, but
also slowdowns, mass leaves,
sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities
and similar activities.[42] Thus, the fact that the conventional term
“strike” was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course
of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.[43]
After a thorough review of the
records, we hold that the CA patently erred in concluding that the concerted mass
actions staged by respondents cannot be considered a strike but a legitimate
exercise of the respondents’ right to express their dissatisfaction with the
Secretary’s resolution of the economic issues in the deadlocked CBA
negotiations with petitioners. It must
be stressed that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the
protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on
In
Petitioner
Union contends that the protests or rallies conducted on February 21 and 23,
2001 are not within the ambit of strikes as defined in the Labor Code, since
they were legitimate exercises of their right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances. Mainly relying on the
doctrine laid down in the case of Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., it argues that the
protest was not directed at
The
While the facts
in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization are similar in some
respects to that of the present case, the
x x x x
Applying
pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, we rule that the protest actions
undertaken by the Union officials and members on
Moreover, it is explicit from the
directive of the Secretary in his January 18, 2000 Order that the Union and its
members shall refrain from committing “any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation,”[45] which certainly
includes concerted actions. For
all intents and purposes, therefore, the respondents staged a strike ultimately
aimed at realizing their economic demands. Whether such pressure was directed
against the petitioners or the Secretary of Labor, or both, is of no
moment. All the elements of strike are
evident in the Union-instigated mass actions.
The right to strike, while
constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions.[46] Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides:
Art.
264. Prohibited activities.
– (a) x x x
No
strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
x
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has consistently ruled that once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a
labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout.[47] A strike that is undertaken despite the
issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification
is a prohibited activity and thus illegal.[48]
Article
264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, also considers it a prohibited
activity to declare a strike “during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the same strike.”[49] There is no dispute that when respondents
conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the
Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for
reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the
aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration
simultaneous with concerted work abandonment/boycott.
Notwithstanding
the illegality of the strike, we cannot sanction petitioners’ act of
indiscriminately terminating the services of individual respondents who
admitted joining the mass actions and who have refused to comply with the offer
of the management to report back to work on
Art.
264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
x
x x x
Any worker
whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout
shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike
may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
x x x x
The foregoing shows that the law makes
a distinction between union officers and members. For knowingly participating
in an illegal strike or participating in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from
employment. The law grants the employer
the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right
and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.[50]
However, a worker merely participating
in an illegal strike may not be
terminated from employment. It is only
when he commits illegal acts during a strike
that he may be declared to have lost employment
status.[51] We have held that the responsibility of union
officers, as main players in an illegal strike,
is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of
dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal
strike is in order.[52] Hence, with respect to respondents who are
union officers, the validity of their termination by petitioners cannot be
questioned. Being fully aware that the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor
were still pending as in fact they filed a motion for reconsideration of the
March 24, 2000 Order, they cannot invoke good faith as a defense.[53]
For the rest of the individual respondents
who are union members, the rule is that an ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed
illegal acts during a strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances,
which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Liability for prohibited acts is to be
determined on an individual basis.[54]
Petitioners have not adduced evidence
on such illegal acts committed by each of the individual respondents who are
union members. Instead, petitioners
simply point to their admitted participation in the mass actions which they
knew to be illegal, being in violation of the Secretary’s assumption
order. However, the acts which were held
to be prohibited activities are the following:
… where the
strikers shouted slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of the
vessels; where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene language or epithets
to prevent other laborers to go to work, and circulated
libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice; where the
protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons of a place
of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade
customers to withdraw their patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon
and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity
of the workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists
and threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to
proceed to the workplace. x x x[55]
The dismissal of herein respondent-union
members are therefore unjustified in the absence of a clear showing that they
committed specific illegal acts during the mass actions and concerted work
boycott.
Are these dismissed employees entitled
to backwages and separation pay?
The award of backwages is a legal
consequence of a finding of illegal dismissal.
Assuming that respondent-union members have indeed reported back to work
at the end of the concerted mass actions, but were soon terminated by
petitioners who found their explanation unsatisfactory, they are not entitled
to backwages in view of the illegality of the said strike. Thus, we held in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante[56]--
It can now
therefore be concluded that the acts of respondents do not merit their
dismissal from employment because it has not been substantially proven that
they committed any illegal act while participating in the
illegal strike. x x x
x x x x
With respect
to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor”
remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If
there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless,
of course, the laborer was able,
willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working. While it was
found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work, the
latter exception cannot apply in this case.
In Philippine Marine Officers’
Guild v. Compañia Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees
Union, the Court stressed that for
this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation
that does not obtain in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the circumstances, respondents’
reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief. But since
reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from
the occurrence of the strike, not to mention the fact that Solidbank had long
ceased its banking operations, the award of separation pay of one (1) month
salary for each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.[57] For the twenty-one (21) individual
respondents who executed quitclaims in favor of the petitioners, whatever
amount they have already received from the employer shall be deducted from
their respective separation pay.
Petitioners contended that in view of
the blatant violation of the Secretary’s assumption order by the striking
employees, the award of separation pay is unjust and unwarranted. That respondent-members themselves knowingly
participated in the illegal mass actions constitutes serious misconduct which
is a just cause under Article 282 for terminating an employee.
We are not persuaded.
As we stated earlier, the Labor Code
protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who participated in such a
strike from losing his job, provided that he did not commit
an illegal act during
the strike.[58] Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides for such acts which are generally prohibited during concerted
actions such as picketing:
No person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners have not adduced
substantial proof that respondent-union members perpetrated any act of
violence, intimidation, coercion or obstruction of company premises and public thoroughfares. It did not submit in evidence photographs,
police reports, affidavits and other available evidence.
As
to the issue of solidary liability, we hold that Metrobank cannot be held
solidarily liable with Solidbank for the claims of the latter’s dismissed
employees. There is no showing that
Metrobank is the successor-in-interest of Solidbank. Based on petitioners’ documentary evidence,
Solidbank was merged with FMIC, with Solidbank as the surviving corporation, and
was later renamed as FMIC. While indeed Solidbank’s banking operations had been
integrated with Metrobank, there is no showing that FMIC has ceased business
operations. FMIC as successor-in-interest of Solidbank remains solely liable
for the sums herein adjudged against Solidbank.
Neither
should individual petitioners Vistan and Mendoza be held solidarily liable for
the claims adjudged against petitioner Solidbank. Article 212 (e)[59]
does not state that corporate officers are personally liable for the unpaid
salaries or separation pay of employees of the corporation. The liability of corporate
officers for corporate debts remains governed by Section 31[60]
of the Corporation Code.
It is basic that a corporation is invested by
law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself
sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.[61]
In labor cases, in particular, the Court has held corporate directors and
officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of
employment of corporate employees done with malice or in bad faith.[62] Bad faith is never
presumed.[63]
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence -- it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[64]
Respondents have not
satisfactorily proven that Vistan and
WHEREFORE,
the petitions are PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated
The NLRC is hereby directed to determine who among the individual
respondents are union members entitled to the separation pay herein awarded,
and those union officers who were validly dismissed and hence excluded from the
said award.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
|
MARIA Associate Justice |
|
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 128-142. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (deceased) and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Danilo B. Pine.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] G.R. Nos. 143013-14,
[22] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 643-646.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 67730), pp. 2-43.
[31] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 70820), pp. 2-43.
[32] CA rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 67730), pp. 457-467. Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[33]
[34]
[35] Supra note 1.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Rollo,
Vol. II, pp. 1729-1730.
[40]
[41]
[42] Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines,
Inc.-NAFLU v. Suplicio Lines, Inc.,G.R. No. 140992, March 25, 2004, 426
SCRA 319, 326, citing Sec. 2, P.D. No. 823, as amended by P.D. No. 849.
[43] Bangalisan v. Hon. CA, 342 Phil. 586,
594 (1997) cited in Gesite v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 123562-65, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 51, 57.
[44] G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789,
[45] Supra note 3.
[46] Philcom
Employees
[47] Telefunken Semiconductors Employees
[48] Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global
Communications, supra note 46 at 243. See also Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Brillantes, G.R. No. 119360, October 10, 1997, 280 SCRA
515, 516, citing Phil. Airlines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R.
No. 88210, January 23, 1991, 193
SCRA 223; Union of Filipro Employees v.
Nestle Philippines, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192
SCRA 396; Federation of Free Workers v.
Inciong, G.R. No. 49983, April 20,
1992, 208 SCRA 157; and St.
Scholastica’s College v. Torres, G.R.
No. 100158, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 565.
[49] Philcom Employees
[50] Steel Corporation of the Philippines v. SCP
Employees Union-National Federation of Labor Unions, G.R. Nos. 169829-30,
April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 594, 612, citing Santa
Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 437, 458-459 and Stamford Marketing Corp. v. Julian, G.R.
No. 145496, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 633, 648.
[51]
[52] Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 158190-91, 158276 and 158283, June 21,
2006, 491 SCRA 604, 624, citing Association
of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120505, March
25, 1999, 305 SCRA 219.
[53] See
Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 150437, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 336, 348, citing First
City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sec. Confesor, 338 Phil. 635,
644 (1997).
[54]
[55]
[56] G.R.
No. 160303,
[57]
[58]
[59] Art.
212. x x x
x x
x x
(e) “Employer” includes any person acting in the interest
of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor
organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.
[60] SEC.
31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors
or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable
jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
x x x x
[61] Carag v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 147590,
[62] Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M.
Greenfield v. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 77, 93-94.
[63] See
McLeod v. NLRC, G.R. No.
146667, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 222, 246, citing Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 60 (2000) and Del Rosario v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 85416, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 777.
[64] Ford Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99039,