SECOND DIVISION
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SPOUSES ELISEO SEVILLA and ERNA SEVILLA, Petitioners, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PATRICIA VILLAREAL, for herself and in behalf of her children, TRICIA and CLAIRE HOPE VILLAREAL, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 150284 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated: November 22, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
For review in this petition is the
May 22, 2001 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 63518, which affirmed the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City (RTC), finding the petitioners, spouses Eliseo and Erna Sevilla,
jointly and severally, liable for damages to the private respondents.
From the records, it appears that on
March 2, 1987, Patricia Villareal, for herself and in behalf of her children,
Tricia and Claire Hope Villareal (the
Villareals), filed an action for damages against spouses Eliseo and Erna
Sevilla (the Sevillas), on account of
the killing of her (Patricia’s) husband, Jose K. Villareal (Jose). It was alleged that Eliseo, said to be a very
jealous husband, discovered that his wife, Erna was having an illicit affair with
Jose. On the early morning of
Summons could
not be personally served on the Sevillas as they had been residing abroad so
service was made by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The Sevillas failed to file their answer to
the complaint and so the trial court declared them in default and allowed the
Villareals to present evidence ex parte. Also, the trial court allowed the Villareals to
litigate as pauper litigants.
After presenting their evidence ex-parte, the
Villareals filed a “Motion for Leave to Admit an Amended Complaint and for
Extraterritorial Service” to implead additional plaintiffs, include additional
claims for damages and increase their claims for loss of income and moral and
exemplary damages. The RTC admitted their amended complaint and ordered that
summons be served anew on the Sevillas. But despite the proper service of
summons by publication, the Sevillas failed to file their answer. This prompted the RTC to declare them again in
default.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs:
(1)
P30,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of the victim;
(2)
P185, 883.00 for actual damages;
(3)
P10,491,157.00 as consequential damages representing loss of the victim’s
earning capacity;
(4)
P100, 000.00 moral damages
(5)
P25, 000.00 as exemplary damages;
(6)
P50, 000. 00 for attorney’s fees
(7)
Interest on all the foregoing amounts at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the date hereof; and
(8) The costs of suit.
The unpaid additional docket fees on the Amended Complaint shall
constitute a lien to this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled, among others, that the Villareals were
able to establish their cause of action against the Sevillas by preponderance
of evidence. They were, therefore, entitled to recover civil liability from the
Sevillas based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
With this adverse ruling, the Sevillas filed a
motion to lift order and set aside judgment of default. This was denied by the RTC which prompted them
to file a motion for reconsideration and suspension of proceedings while the
criminal case against them was pending. Again,
the motions were denied by the RTC in its
Unwilling to accede, the Sevillas elevated the
matter to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
with Preliminary Injunction.
The CA, on
On
This Court, after careful examination of the
petition, issued on
On
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
On
1. The victim was last seen alive with Erna at the 1851
Club located on the 20th floor of the said building;
2. One of the getaway cars was in fact the same car
driven by Erna in going to the scene of the crime;
3. The car owned by [the Sevillas] was with another car
that sped away and attempted to race with a witness’ car toward the exit of the
car park shortly after the shooting;
4. The car’s plate was substituted with the plate
number of another car owned by [the Sevillas] upon loading of gasoline;
5. Despite the close relationship between the victim
and the [Sevillas], none of them attended the wake nor offered condolences to
the bereaved family;
6. Erna asked her personal accountant to retrieve her
intimate letters to the victim from the victim’s files;
7. [The Sevillas] abruptly departed to a foreign
country, to the extent of removing their children from school; and
8. [The Sevillas] failed to appear as they still refuse
to appear in the criminal case for the killing of the victim – all point to a
single conclusion: [The Sevillas] planned and executed the killing and are now
in hiding to avoid the legal consequences of their actions.[4]
Not
in conformity, the Sevillas filed a Motion for Reconsideration focusing solely
on the extent of the award of unliquidated damages, which was, nonetheless,
denied by the CA.
On
ISSUE
Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Villareals are entitled to
an award of damages for the death of Jose Villareal.
Position of the Petitioners
The
Sevillas argue that the CA rendered a decision based on hearsay, incompetent,
and inadmissible evidence. They claim that the Villareals failed to prove their
case even by circumstantial evidence. Moreover,
they opine that the rule on indigent party was violated when the Villareals
were allowed to litigate as pauper litigants.
Position of the Respondents
Conversely,
the Villareals counter that the petition should be dismissed based on two (2)
grounds, to wit: 1] technical grounds due to a) waiver and expiry of period to
appeal by certiorari, and b) failure to raise questions of law; and 2]
substantial grounds because the petition lacks merit. They agree with the
conclusion of the courts below that there was enough circumstantial evidence to
hold the Sevillas civilly liable for the death of the victim.
The Court finds no solid reason to disturb the findings of the CA. Verily, the
evaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involves consideration
of factual issues - an exercise that is not appropriate for a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may raise
only questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, the Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence introduced in, and considered by, the
tribunals below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact
of the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by
this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions: (1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.[5]
Unfortunately for the Sevillas,
they fail to convince this Court that any of the above exceptions applies in this
case. For this reason, the Court cannot
but respect the findings and conclusions of the lower court. It is precluded
from making further investigation on the facts of the case without violating
established rules of procedure.
At any rate, the Court is convinced
that the decision of the courts below are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides
how preponderance of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
“Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.[6]
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim
by competent evidence. He must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent.
Applying said principle in the
case at bench, the factual circumstances established by the Villareals through their testimonial
and documentary evidences are sufficient and convincing enough to prove that
they are entitled to an award of damages for the death of Jose Villareal compared
to the bare allegations to the contrary of the Sevillas. These circumstances, which
were earlier enumerated, have successfully swayed this Court to believe that indeed
the Sevillas are liable for the death of the victim to the exclusion of others
except their henchmen.
Furthermore, the Court notes that in the course of
their appeal with the CA, the factual conclusions of the RTC were never
assailed by the Sevillas. Instead of questioning the facts that would garner
them a favorable judgment, what they filed were an “urgent motion to resolve one
issue that will make all other issues moot”[7] and
a “motion for reconsideration on the sole issue of the extent of the
award of unliquidated damages.”[8] Consequently,
with the filing of these motions, the factual findings of the lower court were
deemed admitted.
As
correctly held by the CA, the Sevillas had all the opportunities to answer the
criminal and civil cases filed against them, but they chose to run away and
hide from the law. What makes matters worse,
after having been declared in default is that they continually resorted to several
delaying tactics by filing several pleadings in court, to the prejudice of the
victim’s family. All these have brought
about inconceivable financial and emotional hardships to the Villareals in
their quest for truth and justice. As
can be gleaned from the facts, fifteen (15) long years have already elapsed
from the time the victim was killed in June 1986 up to the time the CA rendered
a decision on the main case on
Finally,
adding insult to injury, in anticipation of their properties being levied in
satisfaction of the RTC judgment against them, the Sevillas wittingly disposed all
their properties. This resulted in another
and separate long drawn court battle between the Villareals and the alleged
buyers of the Sevilla properties. Evidently,
all these are but manifestations of bad faith and ill-will prejudicial to the
Villareals who must in the interest of justice be compensated without further
delay.
WHEREFORE,
the
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 6-24. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoli with Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Heirs of Jose Lim, represented by Elenito
Lim v. Juliet Villa Lim, G.R. No. 172690,
[6]
Amoroso v. Alegre, G.R. No. 142766,
[7] Rollo, p. 27.
[8]