Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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HEIRS OF MARIO
PACRES, namely: VALENTINA Vda. DE PACRES, JOSERINO, ELENA, LEOVIGILDO,
LELISA, and LOURDES all surnamed PACRES, and VEŃARANDA Vda. DE ABABA, |
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G.R. No. 174719 Present: |
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Petitioners, |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, |
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- versus - |
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ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. |
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HEIRS of CECILIA YGOŃA,
namely BAUDILLO YGOŃA YAP, MARIA YAP DETUYA, JOSEFINA YAP, EGYPTIANA YAP
BANZON, and VICENTE YAP[1] and HILARIO RAMIREZ, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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May 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
While contracts are generally obligatory
in whatever form they may have been entered into, it remains imperative for a
party that seeks the performance thereof to prove the existence and the terms
of the contract by a preponderance of evidence.
Bare assertions are not the quantum of proof contemplated by law.
This Petition
for Review[2] assails
the Decision[3]
dated
WHEREFORE,
with the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 13,
No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO
ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Lot No. 9 is a 1,007 square meter
parcel of land located at Kinasang-an, Pardo,
On the same
year, the heirs leased[9] “the
ground floor of the [ancestral home] together with a lot area of 300 square
meters including the area occupied by the house” to respondent Hilario Ramirez
(Ramirez), who immediately took possession thereof. Subsequently in 1974, four of the Pacres siblings[10] (namely,
Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia and Margarita) sold their shares in the ancestral
home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez.
The deeds of sale described the subjects thereof as “part and portion of
the 300 square meters actually in
possession and enjoyment by vendee and her spouse, Hilario Ramirez, by
virtue of a contract of lease in their favor.”[11] The Deed of Sale of Right in a House executed
by Rodrigo and Francisco was more detailed, to wit:
x x x do hereby sell, cede, transfer and convey,
forever and in absolute manner, our shares interests and participation in a
house of mixed materials under roof of nipa which is constructed inside Lot No.
5506[12] of the
Cadastral Survey of Cebu, the lot on which the house is constructed has already
been sold to and bought by the herein vendee from our brothers and sisters;
that this sale pertains only to our rights and interests and participation in
the house which we inherited from our late father Pastor Pacres.[13]
With the sale, respondent Ramirez’s possession as lessee turned
into a co-ownership with petitioners Mario and Veńaranda, who did not sell
their shares in the house and lot.
On
various dates in 1971, Rodrigo,[14]
Francisco,[15]
and Simplicia[16]
sold their remaining shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygońa (Ygońa). In 1983, Margarita[17]
also sold her share to Ygońa. The total
area sold to Ygońa was 493 square meters.
In 1984,
Ygońa filed a petition to survey and segregate[18]
the portions she bought from Lot No. 9. Mario objected on the ground that he wanted to
exercise his right as co-owner to redeem his siblings’ shares. Vendee Rodrigo also opposed on the ground that
he wanted to annul the sale for failure of consideration. On the other hand, Margarita and the widow of
Francisco both manifested their assent to Ygońa’s petition. By virtue of such manifestation, the court
issued a writ of possession[19]
respecting Margarita’s and Francisco’s shares in favor of Ygońa. It is by authority of this writ that Ygońa
built her house on a portion of Lot No. 9.
Considering, however, the objections of the two other Pacres siblings, the
trial court subsequently dismissed the petition so that the two issues could be
threshed out in the proper proceeding.
Mario filed the intended action while Rodrigo no longer pursued his
objection.
The
complaint for legal redemption,[20]
filed by Mario and Veńaranda, was dismissed on the ground of improper exercise
of the right. The decision was affirmed
by the appellate court[21]
and attained finality in the Supreme Court[22]
on
On
On
1.
That our father the late Pastor Pacres died
instestate at Kinasang-an, Pardo,
2.
That he left some real properties, one
of which is a parcel of land (Lot No. 9, PCS 07-01-000006, Cebu Cad., located
at Kinasang-an, Pardo, Cebu City);
3.
That after the death of Pastor Pacres,
the above-named children declared themselves extra-judicially as heirs of
Pastor Pacres and they likewise adjudicated unto themselves the above described
lot and forthwith MADE AN ORAL PARTITION;
4.
That in that ORAL PARTITION, the shares or portion to be allotted to
Mario Pacres and Veńaranda Pacres Vda. de Ababa shall be fronting the national
highway, while the shares of the rest shall be located at the rear;
5.
That recently, the said heirs had the
said lot surveyed to determine specifically their respective locations in
accordance with the oral partition made after the death of Pastor Pacres;
6.
That a sketch of the subdivision plan is
hereto attached, duly labeled, indicating the respective locations of the
shares of each and every heir.
On
The court dismissed Mario’s assertion that his siblings
sold the rear lots to Ramirez. It held
that the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez clearly described the object of the
sale as the ancestral house and lot.[26] Thus, Ramirez has a right to continue
occupying the property he bought. The
court further held that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot, at the very least, the
parties are co-owners thereof. Co-owners are entitled to occupy the co-owned
property.[27]
The Complaint for Specific Performance
On
Their other cause of action is directed solely at Ygońa,
whom they insist agreed to additional, albeit unwritten, obligations other than
the payment of the purchase price of the shares in Lot No. 9. Veńaranda and Mario’s heirs insist that Ygońa
contracted with her vendors to assume all obligations regarding the payment of
past and present estate taxes, survey Lot No. 9 in accordance with the oral
partition, and obtain separate titles for each portion. While these obligations were not written into
the deeds of sale, petitioners insist it is not subject to the Statute of
Frauds since these obligations were allegedly partly complied with by Ygońa. They cite as evidence of Ygońa’s compliance
the survey of her purchased lots and payment of realty taxes.
Respondents
denied privity with the heirs’ oral partition. They further maintained that no
such partition took place and that the portions sold to and occupied by them
were located in front of Lot No. 9; hence they are the ones entitled to the
expropriation payment.[29]
They sought damages from the unfounded
suit leveled against them. To discredit petitioners’ assertion of an oral
partition, respondents presented Exhibit No. 1, which petitioner Valentina
herself executed during her testimony. Exhibit No. 1 demonstrated Valentina’s
recollection of the actual occupation of the Pacres siblings, their heirs and
vendees. The sketch undermined
petitioners’ allegation that the heirs partitioned the property and immediately took possession of their allotted lots/shares. Ygońa also denied ever agreeing to the additional
obligations being imputed against her.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court ruled in favor of
respondents.[30] It held that petitioners failed to prove partition
of the lot in accordance with petitioners’ version. Instead, the trial court held that the
parties’ actual occupation of their portions in Lot No. 9, as evidenced by
petitioner Valentina’s sketch, is the real agreement to which the parties are
bound. Apparently unsatisfied with the
parties’ state of affairs, the trial court further ordered that a survey of the
lot according to the parties’ actual occupation thereof be conducted.
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied.[31] Unsatisfied with the adverse decision,
petitioners appealed to the CA questioning the factual findings of the trial
court and its reliance on Exhibit 1.
They maintained that Valentina was incompetent and barely literate;
hence, her sketch should not be given weight.
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
The
appellate court sustained the ruling of the trial court insofar as it dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for lack of evidence.
It held that the oral partition was not valid because the heirs did not
ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with their oral
agreement. Moreover, the CA ruled that Ygońa’s
sole undertaking under the deeds of sale was the payment of the purchase
price. Since petitioners did not
question the validity of the deeds and did not assail its terms as failing to
express the true intent of the parties, the written document stands superior
over the allegations of an oral agreement.
It,
however, reversed the trial court on the latter’s order to survey the lot in
accordance with Valentina’s sketch. The
appellate court explained that while it was conclusive that Ygońa and Ramirez
bought portions of the property from some of the Pacres siblings, the issue of
the actual area and location of the portions sold to them remains
unresolved. The CA narrated all the
unresolved matters that prevented a finding that definitively settles the
partition of Lot No. 9. The CA
emphasized that the question regarding ownership of the front lots and the
expropriation payment should be threshed out in the proper proceeding.
The CA
likewise found no basis for the award of damages to either party.
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration[32]
was denied,[33]
hence this petition.
Issues
Petitioners
formulated the following issues:[34]
1.
Whether or
not this complaint for specific performance, damages and attorney’s fee [sic] with
a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and later on issuance of a
writ of permanent injunction is tenable.
2.
Whether or
not the area purchased and owned by respondents in Lot No. 9 is located along
or fronting the national highway.
3.
Whether or
not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion by rendering a decision
not in accord with laws and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court,
resulting to the unrest of this case.
4.
Whether or
not it is lawful for the respondents to claim ownership of the P220,000.00
which the government set aside for the payment of the expropriated area in Lot
No. 9, fronting the highway, covered by the road widening.
Consolidated
and simplified, the issues to be resolved are:
I
Whether petitioners were able to
prove the existence of the alleged oral agreements such as the partition and
the additional obligations of surveying and titling
II
Whether the issue of ownership
regarding the front portion of Lot No. 9 and entitlement to the expropriation
payment may be resolved in this action
Our Ruling
Whether petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral
agreements such as the partition and the additional obligations of surveying
and titling
Both the trial
and appellate courts dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that they had
failed to prove the existence of an oral partition. Petitioners now insist that the two courts
overlooked facts and circumstances
that are allegedly of much weight and will alter the decision if properly considered.[35]
Petitioners
would have the Court review the evidence presented by the parties, despite the CA’s
finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented
during the trial. This goes against the
rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.
“Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not
the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish
a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.”[36]
Questions like
these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review of
cases decided by the CA only to questions of law, which may be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value
of the evidence presented.[37]
We find no compelling reason to deviate
from the foregoing rule and disturb the trial and appellate courts’ factual
finding that the existence of an oral partition was not proven. Our examination of the records indicates that,
contrary to petitioners’ contention, the lower courts’ conclusion was
justified.
Petitioners’
only piece of evidence to prove the alleged oral partition was the joint
affidavit (entitled “Confirmation of
Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate”) supposedly executed by some of the
Pacres siblings and their heirs in 1993, to the effect that such an oral
partition had previously been agreed upon.
Petitioners did not adequately explain why the affidavit was executed
only in 1993, several years after respondents Ygońa and Ramirez took possession
of the front portions of Lot No. 9.[38] If there had been an oral partition allotting
the front portions to petitioners since Pastor’s death in 1962, they should
have immediately objected to respondents’ occupation. Instead, they only asserted their ownership
over the front lots beginning in 1993 (with the execution of their joint
affidavit) when expropriation became imminent and was later filed in court.
Petitioners’
assertion of partition of Lot No. 9 is further belied by their
predecessor-in-interest’s previous assertion of co-ownership over the same lot
in the legal redemption case filed 10 years before.[39] The allegations therein, sworn to as truth by
Mario and Veńaranda, described Lot No. 9 as a parcel of land that is co-owned
by the Pacres siblings pro indiviso. It was further alleged that Ygońa bought the undivided shares of Rodrigo, Francisco,
Margarita, and Simplicia.
The statements
in the legal redemption case are extrajudicial admissions,[40] which were
not disputed by petitioners. These
admissions may be given in evidence against them.[41] At the very least, the polarity of their
previous admissions and their present theory makes the latter highly suspect.
Moreover,
petitioners failed to show that the Pacres siblings took possession of their
allotted shares after they had supposedly agreed on the oral partition. Actual possession and exercise of dominion
over definite portions of the property in accordance with the alleged partition
would have been strong proof of an oral partition.[42] In this case, however, petitioners failed to
present any evidence that the petitioners took actual possession of their
respective allotted shares according to the supposed partition. In fact, the evidence of the parties point to
the contrary. Petitioner Valentina
herself drew a sketch[43] showing
the location of the actual occupants
of Lot No. 9, but the actual occupation shown in her sketch is not in
accordance with the terms of the alleged oral partition.[44] According to the terms of the alleged oral
partition, the front portions of Lot No. 9 were supposed to have been occupied
by petitioners, but Valentina’s sketch indicates that the actual occupants of
the said portions are respondents.
In fine, we rule
that the records contain ample support for the trial and appellate courts’
factual findings that petitioners failed to prove their allegation of oral
partition. While petitioners claim that
the trial and appellate courts did not appreciate their evidence regarding the
existence of the alleged oral partition, the reality is that their evidence is
utterly unconvincing.
With respect to
the alleged additional obligations which petitioners seek to be enforced
against respondent Ygońa, we likewise find that the trial and appellate courts
did not err in rejecting them.
Petitioners allege that when Ygońa bought portions of Lot No. 9 from petitioners’
four siblings, aside from paying the purchase price, she also bound herself to
survey Lot No. 9 including the shares of the petitioners (the non-selling
siblings); to deliver to petitioners, free of cost, the titles corresponding to
their definite shares in Lot No. 9; and to pay for all their past and present
estate and realty taxes.[45] According to petitioners, Ygońa agreed to
these undertakings as additional consideration for the sale, even though they
were not written in the Deeds of Sale.
Like
the trial and appellate courts, we find that these assertions by petitioners
have not been sufficiently established.
In the first
place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable
here). Thus, only a party to the
contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations arising under said
contract.[46] Consequently, petitioners, not being parties
to the contracts of sale between Ygońa and the petitioners’ siblings, cannot
sue for the enforcement of the supposed obligations arising from said
contracts.
It is true that
third parties may seek enforcement of a contract under the second paragraph of
Article 1311, which provides that “if a contract should contain some
stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment.” This refers to stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the
benefit of third parties. However, the written
contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the
petitioners. While petitioners claim
that there was an oral stipulation, it
cannot be proven under the Parol Evidence Rule.
Under this Rule, “[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.”[47] While the Rule admits of exception, no such
exception was pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners.
The Parol
Evidence Rule applies to “the parties and their successors in interest.” Conversely, it has no application to a
stranger to a contract. For purposes of
the Parol Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an
alleged stipulation pour autrui in a
contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who
avails himself of a stipulation pour
autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract.[48] This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary
of a stipulation pour autrui is
required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation.
Moreover, to
preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that “at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a
party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.”[49] A beneficiary of
a stipulation pour autrui obviously
bases his claim on the contract. He therefore
cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the
Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings
invoked by petitioners may be deemed stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners’ claim cannot prosper, because they
are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.
Whether the issue of ownership regarding the front portion of
Petitioners characterize respondents’ claim over the
expropriation payment as unlawful on the ground that the expropriated portion
belongs to petitioners per the alleged oral partition. They also maintain that Ygońa is barred by
laches from claiming the front portion because she waited 13 years from the
time of the sale to claim her share via petition for subdivision and survey.
On the
other hand, respondents charge petitioners with forum-shopping on the ground
that the issue of ownership had already been submitted to the expropriation
court. The trial court affirmed this
argument stating that petitioners resorted to forum-shopping, while the
appellate court ruled that it could not determine the existence of
forum-shopping considering that it was not provided with the pleadings in the
expropriation case.
We agree
with the CA on this score. The parties
did not provide the Court with the pleadings filed in the expropriation case,
which makes it impossible to know the extent of the issues already submitted by
the parties in the expropriation case and thereby assess whether there was
forum-shopping.
Nonetheless,
while we cannot rule on the existence of forum-shopping for insufficiency of
evidence, it is correct that the issue of ownership should be litigated in the
expropriation court.[50] The court hearing the expropriation case is
empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned
property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation
case.[51] This is due to the intimate relationship of
the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment. Petitioners’ objection regarding respondents’
claim over the expropriation payment should have been brought up in the
expropriation court as opposition to respondent’s motion. While we do not know if such objection was
already made,[52]
the point is that the proper venue for such issue is the expropriation court,
and not here where a different cause of action (specific performance) is being
litigated.
We also
cannot agree with the trial court’s order to partition the lot in accordance
with Exhibit No. 1 or the sketch prepared by petitioner Valentina. To do so would resolve the issue of ownership
over portions of Lot No. 9 and effectively preempt the expropriation court, based
solely on actual occupation (which was the only thing which Exhibit No. 1 could
have possibly proved). It will be
remembered that Exhibit No. 1 is simply a sketch demonstrating the portions of
Lot No. 9 actually occupied by the parties.
It was offered simply to impeach petitioners’ assertion of actual
occupation in accordance with the terms of the alleged oral partition.
Let it be made clear that our ruling, just like those of the
trial court and the appellate court, is limited to resolving petitioners’ action
for specific performance. Given the
finding that petitioners failed to prove the existence of the alleged oral
partition and the alleged additional consideration for the sale, they cannot
compel respondents to comply with these inexistent obligations. In this connection, there is no basis for
petitioners’ claim that the CA Decision was incomplete by not definitively
ruling on the ownership over the front lots.
The CA decision is complete. It
ruled that petitioners failed to prove the alleged obligations and are
therefore not entitled to specific performance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed October 28, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 174719, as well as its August 31, 2006
Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice |
JOSE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E
R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Per Order dated
[2] Rollo, pp. 11-19.
[3]
[4] CA rollo, pp.
153-154.
[5] Rollo, p. 28.
[6] Lot No. 9 is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
61114 in the name of the Heirs of Pastor Pacres.
[7] TSN (Valentina Vda. De Pacres),
[8]
[9] Exhibit “C” dated
The
lessors hereby lease unto the lessee the ground floor of the House No. 1277,
together with a lot area of 300 square meters including the area occupied by
the house, of which the lessors are the co-owners, owning undivided interest
over the house and lot.
[10] Namely Simplicia, Margarita, Francisco, and Rodrigo Pacres.
[11] Exhibit “5”, Deed of Sale executed by Simplicia Pacres. Exhibit 6, which is the Deed of Sale executed
by Margarita Pacres in favor of Ramirez, describes the object of the sale as
“forming part and portion of the 300 square meters under the occupancy of the
vendee and her husband, Mr. Hilario Ramirez, by virtue of a Lease Contract in
their favor.”
[12] Lot No. 9 consists of two consolidated lots, Lot Nos. 5504 and
5506, as confirmed by the description in TCT No. 61114 (Exhibit “37”).
[13] Exhibit “7” dated
[14] Exhibit “3” dated
[15] Exhibit “3” dated
[16] Exhibit “23” dated August 1971.
The deed of sale described its object as “the portion sold shall be
taken along the provincial highway.”
Exhibit 24 dated December 1971. Simplicia sold an additional 50 square
meters to Ygońa with the proviso “x x x that my sister Margarita Pacres is
giving me an equivalent area of 50 square meters, in exchange of the portion
sold to hereunder Cecilia Ygońa, the vendee.”
[17] Exhibit “25” dated
[18] Exhibit “27” dated
[19] Exhibit “26”. It stated
that
[20] Exhibit
“26” dated
x x x x
II Plaintiffs
are among the co-owners of a pro-indiviso parcel of land which they and the
herein defendants brothers and sisters, inherited from their father x x x
III Recently,
plaintiffs were verily informed and therefore allege that herein defendants
PACRES on one hand and defendant Cecilia Ygońa on the other, connived,
confederated and mutually helped one another in having the former’s undivided
shares, consisting of 492 square meters sold clandestinely in favor of the
latter (Cecilia Ygońa), a stranger, without giving written notice to the other
pro-indiviso co-owners, in violation of Article 1623, New Revised Civil Code of
the Philippines;
x x x x
V Proper
demands were made upon the defendants, for plaintiffs’ desire to redeem the
undivided portions purchased clandestinely by defendant Cecilia Ygońa, but the
latter refused and ignored and still continue to refuse and ignore the said
plaintiffs’ plea;
x x x x
VII Plaintiffs
are likewise verily informed and so allege that the price or consideration
stated in the deeds of sale have been jacked up, for obvious reasons, hence the
consideration stated in the said deeds of sale are not reasonable, and
therefore it should be fixed or determined first so that the correct and
reasonable redemption price could be consignated and/or paid accordingly,
pursuant to law x x x
[21] CA-G.R. CV No. 14654.
Exhibit “33”.
[22] Entry of Judgment in G.R. No. 97185. Exhibit “35”.
[23]
Rollo, p. 67.
[24]
[25] Exhibit “N”.
[26] Civil Case No. R-32715, RTC Decision, p. 5.
[27]
[28] Records, pp. 1-8.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] CA rollo, pp. 138-150.
[33]
[34] Rollo, p. 235.
[35]
[36] Paterno v. Paterno,
G.R. No. 63680,
[37] Pagsibigan v. People,
G.R. No. 163868,
[38] Ygońa started her occupation of the front lot in 1984 by
authority of the writ of possession issued in her favor; while Ramirez’
possession began in 1968 by virtue of the contract of lease and continues until
the present by virtue of the sale by heirs Rodrigo, Francisco, Simplicia and
Margarita.
[39] Exhibit “26”.
[40] Extrajudicial admissions are those made out of court, or in a
judicial proceeding other than the one under consideration. Francisco,
Evidence, 2nd Ed. (1994), p. 33.
[41] Rules of Court,
Rule 130, Section 26. “The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”
[42] See Quimpo, Sr. v. Vda. De
Beltran, G.R. No. 160956, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 174, 182-184; Arrogante v. Deliarte, G.R. No. 152132,
July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 63, 71; Avila v.
Barabat, G.R. No. 141993, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 8, 17; Vda. De Ape v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133638, April 15, 2005,
456 SCRA 193, 208-210; Maestrado v. Court
of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 431-433 (2000); Crucillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 375 Phil. 777, 793-794
(1999); Tan v. Lim, 357 Phil.
452, 470-472 (1998); Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 203
(1947).
[43] Exhibit “1”.
[44] Records, p. 140.
[45]
[46] Young v. Court of Appeals,
251 Phil. 189, 193-195 (1989).
[47] Rules of Court,
Rule 130, Section 9.
[48] See MOF Company, Inc. v.
Shin Yang Brokerage Corporation, G.R. No. 172822, December 18, 2009; Mendoza
v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 90 Phil. 836, 846-847 (1952).
[49] See Lechugas v. Court of
Appeals, 227 Phil. 310, 319 (1986).
[50] Records, p. 92.
[51] Republic v. Court of First Instance,
144 Phil. 643, 648-650 (1970).
[52] While petitioners’ Verification (attached to the Complaint) (RTC
Records, p. 8) confirms that they opposed respondent Ygońa’s motion to withdraw
the deposit in Civil Case No. CEB-14150, the records before the Court is silent
regarding the nature of and the grounds for the opposition.