SECOND DIVISION
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TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners, - versus - MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 143591 Present: BRION, J., Acting
Chairperson, VILLARAMA,
JR.,* PEREZ, and Promulgated: May 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O
N
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision[1]
dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin
de Leon, P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Ben Yu
Lim, Jr., and ruled that the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City,
did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reinvestigation
and recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,
and 6686.
The
factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña (Atty. Peña) instituted a civil case for recovery of
agent’s compensation and expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees[2]
against Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental,
In
view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, Atty. Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit[9]
with the Office of the City Prosecutor,
In
a Resolution[12]
dated 24 September 1998, the City Prosecutor found probable cause for the
indictment of petitioners for four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing
Falsified Documents, penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor
concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories
untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that
petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the
signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record
of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support
of their motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their answer and in their
Pre-Trial Brief.[13] Subsequently,
the corresponding Informations[14]
were filed with the MTCC,
On
1 October 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants
of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.[16]
Petitioners insisted that they were
denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were not
afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that since no such
counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners,
the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the
respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of Court. Petitioners further prayed that the
information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Moreover, one of the accused, i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a
director of Urban Bank, contrary to what complainant stated. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal
cases should have been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed
out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order[17]
dated 13 November 1998, the MTCC denied the omnibus motion primarily on the
ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case –
which fell within the jurisdiction of the first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of
the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules
of Court. Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the
validity of the warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue
involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and, thus, denied
the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the
Informations contained all the facts necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners
immediately instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the Court of Appeals,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest,
reiterating the arguments in their omnibus motion.[18]
They, likewise, questioned the court’s
conclusion that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to
assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On
20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.[19]
Thus, petitioners filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a
criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable cause
required for the filing of an Information in court?
If
the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause,
should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very
least, require the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can
a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal
knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable
cause?
C.
Where
there is offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the
record of the preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable
cause, should not the judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the
criminal case, or at the very least, require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in determining the existence of
probable cause?
D.
Can
a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can
this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?[20]
On the other hand, respondent
contends that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become moot and
academic when the latter posted bail and were already arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this
Court issued a TRO[21]
enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal
Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the entire period that the case is
pending before, or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss
the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the
petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were
already arraigned.
It appears from the
records that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then the
officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled
date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the
court a quo entered a plea of “Not
Guilty” for them.
The erstwhile ruling of
this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded
from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if
he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto.[22]
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:[23]
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in application. Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It behoved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the petitioner’s petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.
Herein
petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or
For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained
a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity
of their arrest.[24] On the date of their arraignment, petitioners
refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of
their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid
waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of
Appeals or this Court. The posting of
bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The ruling to which we have returned in People
v. Red[25] stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island and Province of Marinduque by order of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were no court sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of these circumstances and the number of the accused, it may properly be held that the furnishing of the bond was prompted by the sheer necessity of not remaining in detention, and in no way implied their waiver of any right, such as the summary examination of the case before their detention. That they had no intention of waiving this right is clear from their motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on which they furnished a bond, and the fact that they renewed this petition on February 23, 1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of the summary examination; the first motion being denied by the court on January 24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the second remaining undecided, but with an order to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be said to have waived the right granted to them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 3042.
The
rest of the issues raised by the petitioners may be grouped into two, which
are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e.,
whether the prosecution and the court a
quo properly observed the required procedure in the instant case, and, (2)
the substantive aspect, which is whether there was probable cause to pursue the
criminal cases to trial.
The
procedural aspect:
Petitioners
contend that they were denied due process as they were unable to submit their
counter-affidavits and were not accorded the right to a preliminary
investigation. Considering that the
complaint of Atty. Peña was filed in September 1998, the rule then applicable
was the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to the
issue are Sections 1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section 1. Definition.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial.
Sec.
3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court
shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted
in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known
address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies
as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability,
a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.
Sec.
9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal.— If the
complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the
procedure outlined in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the complainant. (underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged was defined and penalized
under second paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified
documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent
to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such
damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding
article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be
punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods translates to
imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day.[26] The next lower in degree to prision correccional is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period which translates to 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months[27] of imprisonment. Since the crime committed is not covered by
the Rules of Summary Procedure,[28] the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts but applying the ordinary
rules. In such instance, preliminary investigation as defined in Section 1,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable since such
section covers only crimes cognizable by the RTC. That which is stated in Section 9(a) is the
applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause
should first be determined before an information may be filed in court, the
prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his
counter-affidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause, the
prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant. If
he does not find probable cause, the prosecutor may dismiss outright the
complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient reason to proceed with
the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim,
is as follows:
COMPLAINT – AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, Filipino, of
legal age, with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, after
having been sworn in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1.
I
am the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Bago City entitled “Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña v. Urban Bank, et al” Impleaded
therein as defendants of the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan,
Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim Jr.,
Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel.(underlining ours)
2.
I filed the said case to collect my fees as
agent of Urban Bank, Inc.(hereinafter referred to as the “bank”) in ridding a
certain parcel of land in Pasay City of squatters and intruders. A certified
true copy of the Complaint in the said case is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
3.
In
the Motion to Dismiss dated 12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which is
attached as Annex “B”), Answer dated 28 October 1996 (Annex “C”), and Pre-Trial
Brief dated 28 January 1997 (Annex “D”) filed by the bank and the respondent
members of the board, the said respondents used as evidence the following
documents:
a.
Letter dated 19 December 1994 supposedly
signed by a certain Herman Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar Company (ISC)
(a copy of which is attached as Annex “E”), which states:
December 19, 1994
Urban
Bank
Urban
Avenue,
Metro
Gentlemen:
This has
reference to your property located among
In line with
our warranties as the Seller of the said property and our undertaking to
deliver to you the full and actual possession and control of said property,
free from tenants, occupants or squatters and from any obstruction or
impediment to the free use and occupancy of the property and to prevent the
former tenants or occupants from entering or returning to the premises. In view
of the transfer of ownership of the property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary
for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Peña likewise as its authorized representative
for purposes of holding/maintaining continued possession of the said property
and to represent Urban Bank in any court action that may be instituted for the
abovementioned purposes.
It is
understood that any attorney’s fees, cost of litigation and any other charges
or expenses that may be incurred relative to the exercise by Atty. Peña of his
abovementioned duties shall be for the account of Isabela Sugar Company and any
loss or damage that may be incurred to third parties shall be answerable by
Isabela Sugar Company.
Very truly
yours,
Isabela Sugar
Company
By:
HERMAN
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 supposedly
executed by a certain Marilyn Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is hereto
attached as annex “F”, which states:
December 7,
1994
To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA
From: MARILYN G. ONG
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña, who has
been assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to take charge of inspecting the
tenants would like to request an authority similar to this from the Bank to new
owners. Can you please issue something like this today as he (unreadable) this.
b.
Letter
dated 9 December 1994 supposedly executed by the same Marilyn Ong, a copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex “G”, which states:
December 9, 1994
Atty.
Ted Borlongan
URBAN
BANK OF THE
Attention:
Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear
Mr. Borlongan
I would like
to request for an authority from Urban Bank per attached immediately – as the
tenants are questioning authority of the people who are helping us to take
possession of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c.
Memorandum
dated 20 November 1994, copy of which is attached as annex “H”, which states:
MEMORANDUM
To: Atty.
Magadaleno M. Peña
Director
From: Enrique C. Montilla III
President
Date: 20
November 1994
You are
hereby directed to recover and take possession of the property of the
corporation situated at
ENRIQUE C.
MONTILLA III
President
4.
The
respondent member of the board of the bank used and introduced the aforestated
documents as evidence in the civil case knowing that the same are falsified.
They used thae said documents to justify their refusal to pay my agent’s fees,
to my damage and prejudice.
5.
The
19 December 1994 letter (Annex ‘E”) is a falsified document, in that the person
who supposedly executed the letter on behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and
Julie Abad did not actually affix their signatures on the document. The
execution of the letter was merely simulated by making it appear that Ponce and
Abad executed the letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in fact do so.
6.
No
persons by the name of Herman Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders,
officers, employees or representatives of ISC. In the letter, Herman Ponce was
represented to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the Corporate Secretary.
However, as of 19 December 1994, the real President of plaintiff was Enrique
Montilla, III and Cristina Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy of the
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC for the year 1994, during which Montilla,
et al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex “I”. On the otherhand, a list
of the stockholders of ISC on or about the time of the transaction is attached
as Annex “J”.
7.
The
same holds true with respect to the Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and athe
letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody
by the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.
8.
Lastly,
with respect to the supposed Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III his
signature thereon was merely forged by respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did
not affix his signature on any such document.
9.
I am executing this affidavit for the purpose of
charging Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon
M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel, Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P.
Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime of use of falsified documents
under Artilce 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.(underlining ours)
10.
I
am likewise executing this affidavit for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
It
is evident that in the affidavit-complaint, specifically in paragraph 1, respondent
merely introduced and identified “the board of the bank, namely, Teodoro
Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric
Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr.” However, in the accusatory portion of the
complaint which is paragraph number 9, Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr. was not included among those charged with the crime of use of
falsified documents under Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The omission indicates that respondent did not
intend to criminally implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was acknowledged to
be a member of the board. And there was
no explanation in the Resolution and Information by the City Prosecutor why Mr.
Ben Lim, Jr. was included. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body of the
complaint and the specific averments therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never
mentioned.
The City Prosecutor
should have cautiously reviewed the complaint to determine whether there were
inconsistencies which ought to have been brought to the attention of the respondent
or, on his own, considered for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring a man to trial
for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed
with ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role
in the administration of justice. It
should be realized, however, that when a man is hailed to court on a criminal
charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his
family as well. Therefore, it
behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon
to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information
in court. Anything less would be a
dereliction of duty.[29]
Atty. Peña, in his
Second Manifestation[30]
dated 16 June 1999, averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., were
already estopped from raising the
fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a member of the board of directors of Urban
Bank, as the latter participated and appeared through counsel in Civil Case No.
754 without raising any opposition. However,
this does not detract from the fact that the City Prosecutor, as previously
discussed, did not carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty. Peña, which did
not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of any crime.
What tainted the procedure
further was that the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners,
including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation raising among others the
issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a member of the board of directors. With the filing of the motion, the judge is
put on alert that an innocent person may have been included in the complaint. In the Order[31]
dated 13 November 1998, in denying the motion to quash, Judge Primitivo Blanca
ruled that:
Courts
in resolving a motion to quash cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information because said motion is hypothethical
admission of the facts alleged in the information x x x. (citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the mistake of respondent judge since
it was at the expense of liberty. This
cannot be condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the mandate of the Constitution is for the judge to personally
determine the existence of probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal
Trial Court. — If the complaint or information is filed directly with the
Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule
shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in writing and
under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers.
Enshrined in our
Constitution is the rule that “[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.”[32] Interpreting the words “personal
determination,” we said in Soliven v.
Makasiar[33] that
it does not thereby mean that judges are obliged to conduct the personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to unduly laden them
with preliminary examinations and investigations of criminal complaints instead
of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before them. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
as to the existence of probable cause. To
this end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutor's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. What he is
never allowed to do is to follow blindly
the prosecutor's bare certification as to the existence of probable cause.
Much more is required by the constitutional provision. Judges
have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutor's certification.
Although the extent of the judge's personal examination depends on the
circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot
just rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is because the warrant of arrest issues
not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the
records which sustain it.[34]
He should even call for the complainant
and the witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances warrant.[35]
An arrest without a
probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy
of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.[36]
Measured against the constitutional
mandate and established rulings, there was here a clear
abdication of the judicial function and a clear indication that the judge
blindly followed the certification of a city prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect to all of
the petitioners. The careless inclusion
of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of arrest gives flesh to the bone of
contention of petitioners that the instant case is a matter of persecution
rather than prosecution.[37]
On this ground, this Court may enjoin
the criminal cases against petitioners. As a general rule, criminal
prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However, there are recognized exceptions
which, as summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,[38]
are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;[39]
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;[40]
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;[41]
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;[42]
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;[43]
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;[44]
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over the offense;[45]
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;[46]
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;[47] and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.[48]
The substantive aspect:
Petitioners were charged with violation
of par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Introduction of Falsified
Document in a judicial proceeding. The
elements of the offense are as follows:
1.
That the offender knew
that a document was falsified by another person.
2.
That the false
document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of
Article 172.
3.
That he introduced
said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding.[49]
The falsity of the document and the defendants’ knowledge of its falsity
are essential elements of the offense. The
Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on
the basis of the Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Peña, attached to
which were the documents contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also
included as attachments to the complaint were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the
alleged falsified documents, copy of the regular meetings of ISCI during the
election of the Board of Directors and the list of ISCI Stockholders.[50] Based on these documents and the
complaint-affidavit of Atty. Peña, the City Prosecutor concluded that probable cause
for the prosecution of the charges existed. On the strength of the same
documents, the trial court issued the warrants of arrest.
This Court, however, cannot find these
documents sufficient to support the existence of probable cause.
Probable
cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information
or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause,
the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without restoring to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction.[51]
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52]
the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the
court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the
judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.[53]
We do not see how it can be concluded that the documents mentioned by
respondent in his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his complaint, Atty. Peña stated that
Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the
questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures therein; and that
they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.[54] He further claimed that Enrique Montilla’s
signature appearing in another memorandum addressed to respondent was forged.[55] These averments are mere assertions which are
insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or worse the issuance of
warrants of arrest. These averments
cannot be considered as proceeding from the personal knowledge of herein
respondent who failed to, basically, allege that he was present at the time of
the execution of the documents. Neither
was there any mention in the complaint-affidavit that herein respondent was
familiar with the signatures of the mentioned signatories to be able to
conclude that they were forged. What
Atty. Peña actually stated were but sweeping assertions that the signatories
are mere dummies of ISCI and that they are not in fact officers, stockholders
or representatives of the corporation.
Again, there is no indication that the assertion was based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on personal
knowledge is to guard against hearsay evidence.
A witness, therefore, may not testify as what he
merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the
same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.[56]
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony
or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as evidence applies to
written, as well as oral statements.[57]
The requirement of personal knowledge should have been strictly applied
considering that herein petitioners were not given the opportunity to rebut the
complainant’s allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite
noticeable is the fact that in the letter dated 19 December 1994 of Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the representation that they were
the president or secretary of ISCI. It
was only Atty. Peña who asserted that the two made such representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong was never a
stockholder of ISCI but he did not present the stock and transfer book of
ISCI. And, there was neither allegation
nor proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if Marilyn Ong was not a
stockholder of ISCI, such would not prove that the documents she signed were
falsified.
The Court may not be
compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public
prosecutor’s function without any showing of grave abuse of discretion or
manifest error in his findings.[58]
Considering, however, that the
prosecution and the court a quo
committed manifest errors in their findings of probable cause, this Court
therefore annuls their findings.
Our pronouncement in Jimenez v. Jimenez[59] as reiterated in Baltazar v.
People is apropos:
It
is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve
the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts
are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by visualizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has
been before. It should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the prosecutor as well
as the court a quo as to the
existence of probable cause. The
criminal complaint against the petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August
2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly,
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Negros Occidental,
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
JOSE
|
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
CATRAL
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per Raffle dated 27 April 2010, Associate Justice
Martin S. Villarama, Jr., is designated an additional member in place of
Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad who inhibited himself due to close
association with one of the parties.
** Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno was
originally designated as an additional member per raffle dated 15 February 2010
in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio who inhibited himself due to a
related case. However, per Special Order
No. 836 dated 12 April 2010, Associate Justice Jose Catral
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with
Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
concurring; rollo, pp. 50-60.
[2]
[3] The contract was allegedly confirmed in
a letter addressed to the respondent, the pertinent portion of which reads:
x x x x
This is to confirm the
engagement of your services as the authorized representative of Urban Bank,
specifically to hold and maintain possession of our above [-]captioned property
and to protect the same from former tenants, occupants or any other person who
are threatening to return to the said property and/or interfere with your
possession of the said property for and in our behalf.
You are likewise authorized to
represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may institute to carry out
your aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter or any other
person not otherwise authorized in writing by Urban Bank from entering or
staying in the premises.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] The case was docketed as I.S. Case No. 9248.
[11] Rollo, p. 108.
[12] The dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, In
view of all the foregoing, undersigned finds probable cause that the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents in evidence under par. 2, Article 172, Revised
Penal Code (4 counts) had been committed and that respondents Teodoro
Borlongan, Jr., Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric
Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon Bejasa, and Arturo Manuel are probably guilty.
Let Information
be filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
SO RESOLVED. (
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For reinvestigation is hereby denied.
Set arraignment of
the accused on December 1, 1998 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. (
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] People v. Vallejo, 461
Phil. 672, 686 (2003); People v. Palijon,
397 Phil. 545, 556 (2000).
[23] 473 Phil. 758, 776-777 (2004).
[24] CA rollo, pp.
902-903.
[25] 55 Phil. 706, 711 (1931).
[26] Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law,
Fourteenth Edition, Revised 1998, Appendix “A,” Table No. 15, p. 1010.
[27]
[28] (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and
regulations;
(2) Violations of
the rental law;
(3) Violations of
municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other
criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall
govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of
action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to
the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is
necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.
[29] Sales
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, 16 November 2001, 369 SCRA 293, 305
citing Bernardo v. Mendoza, G.R. No.
L-37876, 25 May 1979, 90 SCRA 214, 220; Vda.
De Jacob v. Puno, G.R. Nos. L-61554-55, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 144, 149.
[30] Rollo, pp.
368-372.
[31]
[32] Article III, Section 2, Philippine Constitution.
[33] G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406.
[34] Lim, Sr. v. Felix, G.R.
Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 305.
[35]
[36] Yee Sue Koy v.
Almeda, 70 Phil. 141, 146-147 (1940).
[37] Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[38] G.R. Nos. 69863-65, 10 December 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188.
[39] Hernandez v.
[40] Dimayuga v.
Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304, 306-307 (1922); Hernandez v.
[41] De
[42] Planas v. Gil, 67
Phil. 62, 75 (1939).
[43] Young v. Rafferty, 33
Phil. 556, 562 (1916); Yu Cong Eng v.
[44] Sangalang v.
People, 109 Phil. 1140, 1142 (1960).
[45] Lopez v. City
Judge, G.R. No. L-25795, 29 October 1966, 18 SCRA 616, 620-621.
[46] Rustia v.
[47] Recto v. Castelo, 18
L.J. [1953], cited in Rano v. Alvenia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, 8 October 1962; Guingona,
Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 213
Phil. 516, 524-525 (1984).
[48] Salonga v. Cruz
Paño, G.R. No. L-59524, 18 February 1985, 134 SCRA 438, 448-450.
[49] JBL Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Criminal Book Two,
Fourteenth Edition, Revised, 1998 ed., p. 246.
[50] Rollo, pp.
110-114.
[51] People v. Aruta,
351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
[52] G.R. No. 174016, 28 July 2008, 560 SCRA 278, 293-294.
[53] Baltazar v. People,
supra note 52 at 294 citing Okabe v.
Gutierrez, supra note 23 at 781.
[54] Rollo, pp.
108-109.
[55]
[56] Sec. 36, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence. See
also D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 409 Phil. 275, 285 (2001).
[57] 31A C.J.S. Evidence
§ 194. See also Philippine Home
Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268 (1996) cited in
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id.
at 285.
[58] Ang v. Lucero, G.R.
No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157, 168.
[59] G.R. No. 158148, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 516, 528-529.