Republic of the
Supreme Court
EN BANC
|
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, - versus - JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, - versus - JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, - versus - JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x IN RE APPLICABILITY OF
SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner, x - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - x JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, - versus - JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC). Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -x PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR
CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P.
TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE
BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA
P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE)
CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY
GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA
SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA
CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK
TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP)
CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN
VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP)
CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING- JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA
GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA
DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE Intervenors. x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -x ATTY.
AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor–Southern
(IBP Governor–Eastern
Visayas), Petitioners, - versus - JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x PHILIPPINE
BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, - versus - JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents. |
G. R. No. 191002 G.R. No. 191032 G.R. No. 191057 A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC G.R. No. 191149 G.R. No. 191342 G.R.
No. 191420 Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: March 17, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
The
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
Precís of the Consolidated Cases
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and
John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002[1]
and G.R. No. 191149[2] as
special civil actions for certiorari
and mandamus, praying that the JBC be
compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three
nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191032,[3]
Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition
for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search,
selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil
action for mandamus,[4] the Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May
17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition
that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department.
In
Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,[5]
petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from
the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII
applies to appointments to the Judiciary.
In
G.R. No. 191342,[6] which
the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners
Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas,
respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment
during the period provided for in Section 15, Article VII.
All the petitions now before
the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That
question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation,
because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most important
appointment.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively
(Valenzuela),[7] by which the Court held that Section
15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting
opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries –
one side holds that the
incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months
immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her
term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the
prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may
influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the
appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban –
has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list of at least
three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.[8] He
opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself “the judicial function
that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution,” which has limited it to the
task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to
“finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in
the Supreme Court under the Constitution.” As such, he contends that the JBC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of
nominees to the President; and that a “final and definitive resolution of the
constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go a long way to
keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system.”[9]
In G.R. No. 191032,
Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on
January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selection process for the
position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing
authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the
President’s authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the
Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless a
nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.[10]
For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No.
191057 that “unorthodox and exceptional circumstances spawned by the discordant
interpretations, due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art.
VII in relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution” have
bred “a frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional provisions
mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar and the general public as
well, because of its dimensional impact to the nation and the people,” thereby
fashioning “transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBC’s proper
exercise of its “principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary” by submitting only to the President (not to the next President) “a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy” from which the members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower
courts may be appointed.”[11]
PHILCONSA further believes and submits that now is the time to revisit and
review Valenzuela, the “strange and
exotic Decision of the Court en banc.”[12]
Peralta states in his
petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus
can compel the JBC “to immediately transmit to the President, within a
reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the
mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its
mandated duty under the Constitution” in the event that the Court resolves that
the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.[13]
The petitioners in
G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that
the “JBC has initiated the process of receiving applications for the position
of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the
applications to the position,” and “is perilously near completing the
nomination process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the
President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on
March 10, 2010,” which “only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a
writ of prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting
the list, especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban on
midnight appointments.”[14]
Antecedents
These cases trace their genesis to
the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief
Justice Puno on
On
In its
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of
It will publish the opening of the position
for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of candidates;
publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the
applications; conduct public interviews of candidates; and prepare the
shortlist of candidates.
As to the time to submit this shortlist to
the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution, existing
laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the
matter.
(sgd.)
MA.
LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk
of Court &
Ex-Officio
Secretary
Judicial
and Bar Council
As
a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement dated
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces
the opening for application or recommendation, of the position of CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated on
Applications or recommendations for this
position must be submitted not later than
The announcement was published on
Conformably
with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position
of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C.
Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the
last two declined their nomination through letters dated
Others
either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman
for
The
JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure
to meet the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis
Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office
of the Ombudsman).[21]
In
its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step
of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to
file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later
than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice
Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of
Issues
Although it has
already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to
the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy now
before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick
step towards
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not
only among legal luminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and brought out
highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint the
next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the
appointments of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed
this issue now before us as an administrative matter “to avoid any possible
polemics concerning the matter,” but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela “would be miniscule [sic] compared to the “polemics” that
have now erupted in regard to the current controversy,” and that unless “put to
a halt, and this may only be achieved by a ruling from the Court, the integrity
of the process and the credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of
Chief Justice, may irreparably be impaired.”[23]
Accordingly, we reframe the issues as
submitted by each petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of their
petitions.
G.R. No. 191002
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to
resolve the constitutional question of whether the incumbent President can
appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power
and authority to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice
Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on
G.R. No. 191032
a. Is the power
to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en banc?
G.R. No. 191057
a. Is the constitutional prohibition against
appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only
to positions in the Executive Department?
b. Assuming
that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution also
applies to members of the Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted because
they are impressed with public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of
public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the period of
prohibition?
c. Does the JBC
have the authority to decide whether or not to include and submit the names of
nominees who manifested interest to be nominated for the position of Chief
Justice on the understanding that his/her nomination will be submitted to the next President in view of the prohibition
against presidential appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
a. Does Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary
under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution?
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments
to the Judiciary after
G.R. No. 191149
a. Does the JBC
have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?
G.R. No. 191342
a.
Does the JBC have
the authority to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President without
committing a grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting
the incumbent President from making
b.
Is any act
performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the candidates for the position
of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBC’s illegal
composition allowing each member from the Senate and the House of
Representatives to have one vote each?
On
On
Likewise,
the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the
proper appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled
within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments “two (2)
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term” and Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines.
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the
final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by its decision
in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter.
On
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to
prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution
to recommend appointees in the Judiciary; (b)
the JBC’s function to recommend is a “continuing process,” which does not begin
with each vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is “to submit the
list of nominees to Malacañang on the very day the vacancy arises”;[26]
the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it commenced and set in
motion the process of selecting the nominees to be submitted to the President
for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno;[27]
(c) petitioner Soriano’s theory that
it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the power to appoint the
Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation of the
phrase “members of the Supreme Court” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the exclusion of
the Chief Justice; [28] (d) a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees
to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least
three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial
act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the
JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not vested with
the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice
and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the President; [29]
and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the JBC
to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees, considering that there
is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude from the list
particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBC’s determination of who it
nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.[30]
The OSG contends that the incumbent
President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be
filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution; [31] that
in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against
midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa;[32]
that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department)
was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political
pressures,”[33] such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC,
the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of
RTC Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief
Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there might be “the imperative need for an
appointment during the period of the ban,” like when the membership of the
Supreme Court should be “so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the
voting on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be
divided”;[34] and
that Valenzuela also recognized that
the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the prohibition.[35]
Lastly, the OSG urges that there are
now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the
next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a
deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is “quite expected”;[36]
(b) the Court acts as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and,
as such, has “the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes
(SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC)”;[37]
(c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was
appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the
effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the
next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno;[38]
and (d) should the next Chief Justice
come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby
causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the
selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.[39]
On
(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated
(b) The opposition-in-intervention dated
(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated
(d)
The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated
(e) The opposition-in-intervention dated
(f)
The opposition-in-intervention dated
(g)
The opposition-in-intervention dated
(h)The
consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of
BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN Secretary General Renato M.
Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government
Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan
ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang
Pag-asa Convenor Alvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman James
Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP)
Chairman Einstein Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP)
Chairman Vijae Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the Philippines
(SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et al.);
(i)
The
opposition-in-intervention dated
(j)
The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 4, 2010 of the
Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty.
Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana; Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. Teresita
Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta.
Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty. Guinevere de Leon (WTLOP).
Intervenors
Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and
NUPL take the position that De
Castro’s petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article
VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making any
appointments from
Intervenors
Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et
al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela
recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief
Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that
recognition is obiter dictum; and
aver that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause
epic damage or absolute disruption or paralysis in the operations of the
Judiciary. They insist that even without the successor of Chief Justice Puno
being appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to sit and
adjudge en banc or in divisions of
three, five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the
Court is not necessary; that petitioner De Castro’s fears are unfounded and
baseless, being based on a mere possibility, the occurrence of which is
entirely unsure; that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief
Justice whose appointment is unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such
a situation will create a crisis in the judicial system and will worsen an
already vulnerable political situation.
Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as an
election offense the act of any government official who appoints, promotes, or
gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to any government
official or employee during the period of 45 days before a regular election;
that the provision covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a
government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President; that for
the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement
of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an
election offense; that even an appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to
the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because there can
be no appointment until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position
can occur only by May 17, 2010.
Intervenor
Boiser adds that De
Castro’s prayer to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the
incumbent President is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is
still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission of such list,
before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed advance
appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional;
and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no
vacancy.
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article
VII makes no distinction between the kinds of appointments made by the
President; and that the Court, in Valenzuela,
ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judges during the prohibition
period were void.
Intervenor
WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department, but also to
judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15
does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela
already interpreted the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that
petitioner Soriano’s contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is
vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless,
because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated
under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term “members” was
interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R.
No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court; that PHILCONSA’s prayer that the Court pass a
resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but
with conditions, shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically
opposed to the arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring
inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief prayed for
highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA’s petition; that the role of the JBC
cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition on the President; and
that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees
only to the next duly elected President after the period of the constitutional
ban against midnight appointments has expired.
Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines
that the JBC – because it is neither a judicial nor a
quasi-judicial body – has no duty
under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the incumbent
President can appoint a Chief Justice during the period of prohibition; that even
if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to bow to the
strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer
submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function,
but simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the application of the general rule in Section
15, Article VII to the Judiciary does
not violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an
exception.
Oppositors
NUPL, Corvera, Lim and
BAYAN et al. state that the JBC’s act of
nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not
involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of
the JBC in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that
the call for applications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the
Supreme Court; and that the commencement of the process of screening of
applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins
from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no
definite legal basis for any party to claim that the submission or
non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by the JBC is a matter
of right under law.
The main question
presented in all the filings herein – because it involves two seemingly conflicting provisions of the
Constitution – imperatively demands the
attention and resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve the
question definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the
ever-present need, first, to
safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary,
particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged
into the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle once and for all the doubt about an outgoing
President’s power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period starting
two months before the presidential elections until the end of the presidential
term; and third, to set a definite
guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its primary office of
screening and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the Judiciary.
Thus, we
resolve.
Ruling of the Court
Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners
have locus standi.
Black defines locus standi as “a right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.”[41] In
public or constitutional litigations,
the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need
to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any
official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient
functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is
required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:[42]
The question on legal standing is
whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.”[43]
Accordingly, it has been held that the
interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which
he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.[44]
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,[45] the
Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a
public action had locus standi. There,
the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.” Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of
the Senate,[46] Manila
Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente,[47] Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix,[48]
and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.[49]
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi,
being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,[50] the
Court liberalized the approach when the cases had “transcendental importance.” Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct
injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta
v. Dinglasan.[51]
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,[52]
this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their “far-reaching implications,” even if the
petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino
v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable
cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.[53]
However, the
assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal
or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that
the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may
not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it
is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled
to protection or relief from the Court in
the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi.
That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the
public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with
adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[54]
the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and “taxpayer”
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp
v. Silk,[55] where
it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:[56] “In
matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied.” With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan[57]
held that “the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action
in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be
denied.”[58]
Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No.
191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert
their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly
affected by the issue of the appointment of the next Chief Justice. De Castro
and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he
is affected by the continuing proceedings in the JBC, which involve
“unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds.”[59]
PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a
non-stock, non-profit organization existing under the law for the purpose of
defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution and promoting its growth
and flowering. It also alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing
to file cases on constitutional issues in several cases.[60]
In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states
that he is a citizen of the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar engaged
in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former Minister
of Justice, former Member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa, and former member of the Faculty of the College of Law of
the University of the Philippines.
The
petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for
The Court rules that the petitioners
have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as
to vest them with the requisite locus
standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people
as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone
(including the petitioners), regardless of one’s personal interest in life,
because they concern that great doubt
about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the
successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve
in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of
vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the
broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any
petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise
requires a liberalization of the requirement.[62]
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about
the locus standi of any petitioner,
we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the
resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to
shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more
technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[63]
we pointed out: “Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because
in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.” But
even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the definition,
it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement
and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.”[64]
Justiciability
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there
is no actual case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication,
considering that although the selection process commenced by the JBC is going
on, there is yet no final list of nominees; hence, there is no imminent
controversy as to whether such list must be submitted to the incumbent
President, or reserved for submission to the incoming President.
Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any
actual justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination,
pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has
already completed its selection process and is now ready to submit the list to
the incumbent President; and that petitioner De Castro is merely presenting a
hypothetical scenario that is clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise
its power of judicial review.
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately
opine that De Castro’s petition rests on an overbroad and vague allegation of
political tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its
power of judicial review.
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere advisory
opinion on what the JBC and the President should do, and are not invoking any
issues that are justiciable in nature.
Intervenors
Bello et al. submit that there exist
no conflict of legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal claims in any of
the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action taken by the JBC, but
simply avers that the conditional manifestations of two Members of the Court,
accented by the divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or
associations of lawyers and law students on the issues published in the daily
newspapers are “matters of paramount and transcendental importance to the
bench, bar and general public”; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal
duty or allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what
specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does not even attempt
to portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of rights, but, instead,
prays that the Court should “rule for the guidance of” the JBC; that the fact
that the Court supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court
can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, because supervision
involves oversight, which means that the subordinate officer or body must first
act, and if such action is not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and
only then, may the person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to
conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does not allege that
the JBC has performed a specific act susceptible to correction for being
illegal or unconstitutional; and that the Mendoza petition asks the Court to
issue an advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a
wrong act by the JBC, but to declare the state of the law in the absence of an
actual case or controversy.
We hold
that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings
for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be
submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed
Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant,
the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees
to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the
situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the
public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of
candidates, and the “interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.”
A part
of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated
the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors
that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another
part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list
is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness
of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The
challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to
continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the
insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the
incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the
JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground
that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position
that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article
VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on
May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent
President is not so prohibited are only some of the real issues for
determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,
considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by
We need not await the occurrence of
the vacancy by
Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
or
to other appointments to the Judiciary
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial
Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In
the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano,
Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on
The
Court agrees with the submission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting,
styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the
organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles,
three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among
the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article
VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition
of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure,
as Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the Court)
explained in his sponsorship speech:
We have in the political part of this
Constitution opted for the separation of powers in government because we
believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and
divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of
powers doctrine and the legislative, executive and judicial departments.[66]
As can be seen, Article VII is
devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the
provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices.
In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices
can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least
three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President
to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela[67]
came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot
be disputed that the Valenzuela
dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate
Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to
the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Relevantly,
Valenzuela adverted to the intent of
the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
V . Intent of the Constitutional
Commission
The
journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that
the original proposal was to have an eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner
Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also
wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any appreciable
length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that any
vacancy “must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy
occurs.” His proposal to have a
15-member Court was not initially adopted.
Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any
substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in
the provision (anent the Court’s membership) of the same mandate that “IN CASE
OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE
THEREOF.” He later agreed to suggestions
to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it turned out, however, the
Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme
Court came to include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days
from its occurrence.
In
this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any “vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days” (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of
Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which
is couched in stronger negative language - that “a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments…”
The
commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
(now a Member of this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII,
the following paragraph: “WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL
ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST” (of
nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated that his purpose was to
provide a “uniform rule” for lower courts.
According to him, the 90-day period should be counted from submission of
the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that the President
might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need more time to
submit a new one.
On
the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the
President of his appointing power “two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end
of his term” - was approved without
discussion.[68]
However,
the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or
support the result in Valenzuela. Far
to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers
to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, “a command
[to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its
occurrence,” which even Valenzuela conceded.[69]
The exchanges during deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission on
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices
now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: “Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.”
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years,
seldom has the Court had a complete complement.[70]
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the word shall – an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced[71]
– should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within
90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do
so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The
90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to
establish a definite mandate for the
President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the
effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such
interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of
the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
How
Valenzuela justified its
pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on
statutory construction:[72]
xxx the court should seek to avoid any
conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and
reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a
statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner
contain conflicting provisions. But what appears to the reader to be a conflict
may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted
for a definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what
appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions
reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will
leave every word operative will be favored over one which leaves some word or
provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given
effect, if to do so gives the statute a meaning contrary to the intent of the
legislature. On the other hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of
a statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the
provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of
the legislative intention. It may be that two provisions are irreconcilable; if
so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers should control. And
the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute, the
provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest
expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved
criticism. It is seldom applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable
conflict exists between different sections of the same act, and after all other
means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted. Where
the conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rule’s
application, largely because of the principle of implied repeal.
In this connection, PHILCONSA’s
urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela
is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela
arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have
Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently
of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further
ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of
Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to
unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the
intent of the framers.[73]
Consequently,
prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the
premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot
be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela
should not be allowed to last
after its false premises have been exposed.[74] It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the
result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela
decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and
forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all
other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the
reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to
eliminate
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is
directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and
(2) those made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
xxx
The
second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of
the so-called “
“The filling up of vacancies in
important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance
of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and the planned induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the
inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of
fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of
an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.”
As
indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to
important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the
new President. Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so spaced as to afford
some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can be made by the outgoing President.
Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were
shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader
scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only “midnight” appointments – those made obviously for
partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making – but
also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of
the Presidential election.
On
the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII – allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided – is much
narrower than that recognized in Aytona.
The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts
the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering
the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court’s
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding
delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of
the ban which, incidentally and as earlier
pointed out, comes to exist only
once in every six years. Moreover, those
occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting
and permanent in their effects. They
may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and,
for that reason, their making is considered an election offense.[76]
Given the background and rationale for
the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments
in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting
the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried
and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be
Also, the intervention of the JBC
eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the
purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying
partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of
the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed
by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being
recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to
undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating
process was absent from the Aytona
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section
15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior
Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to
the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela
was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the
framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much
of the unfounded doubt about the President’s power to appoint during the period
of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been dispelled since its
promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela
properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a distinguished member
of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section
16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the
succeeding President to revoke appointments
made by an Acting President,[81]
and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has
no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting
appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their
being revocable at will.[82]
The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there
is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation
of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation,
judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level
courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may
be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential
appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby,
the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from the 1973
Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored
requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.[83]
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16
are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.[84] It
is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all
kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have
easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely
within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary
further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence
of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such
a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or
misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential
election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current
incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and
cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden
to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent
President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence,
precisely because her term will end by
Sixth. The
argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent
President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there
will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article
VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is
focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno’s
retirement by
The argument also rests on the
fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day
period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as
the OSG has shown in its comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires
the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the
elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the
regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition
is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the
full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The
result is that there are at least 19
occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for
appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply
with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is
safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended
such an absurdity. In fact, in their
deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned,
nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article
VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section
15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the
lower courts.
Seventh.
As a matter of fact, in an extreme case,
we can even raise a doubt on whether a
JBC list is necessary at all for the President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to
come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The
Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The
provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the
outside, that is, a non-member of the
Court aspiring to become one. It speaks
of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or
sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the
JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint
any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before
us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when
circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional
Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile’s
statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the
sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
II
The
Judiciary Act of 1948
The
posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can
still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. — In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.
The
provision calls for an Acting
Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or in
the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and powers. In
either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the office of the
Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is
removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no
pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby
resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront the
matter now.
We cannot agree with the posture.
A
review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is
composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed
by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The
express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated
an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership
of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the
Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in
order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest
is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
For
sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to
be occupied in an acting or temporary
capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section
12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the
new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice
is unable to perform the
duties and powers of the office. It ought to be
remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed
under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected.
The
appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable
to having the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads
of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever
are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective
Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief
Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is
the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions
absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court
being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of
the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief
Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make
within the 90-day period from
Historically, under the present
Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and the resignation
of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and
assumption of office of his successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the
comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession is as follows:
1.
When Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on
2.
When Chief
Justice Yap retired on
3.
When Chief
Justice Fernan resigned on
4.
When Chief
Justice Narvasa retired on
5.
When Chief
Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
was appointed the next day, December 20, 2005; and
6.
When Chief
Justice Panganiban retired on
III
Writ of mandamus
does not lie against the JBC
May
the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
Mandamus
shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station.[86]
It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to
direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.[87]
For
mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is
mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance
of the duty enjoined by law; (d)
the act to be performed is ministerial,
not discretionary; and (e)
there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article
VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the
President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal
function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall
issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9,
Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the
submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is
directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is
mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of
them within the 90-day period from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the
President after the vacancy occurs,
because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its
part, considering that it will thereby effectively
and illegally deprive the President of
the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications
of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list
of nominees before the start of the President’s
mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the
candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies
within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the
duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the
Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must
be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.[88]
For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that
is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial
act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and
discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is
one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such
duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.[89]
Accordingly,
we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus
against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is
clear that the JBC still has until
IV
Writ of prohibition
does not lie against the JBC
In light of the foregoing disquisitions,
the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief
Justice. Hence, Soriano’s petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which
proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the
successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.
On the other hand, the petition for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is
similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the
JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and
the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some
candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in
accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners’ actual
interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were
nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the
petitioners lack locus standi on that
issue.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition
for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for
prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3.
Grants
the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and,
accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings
for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
(b) To prepare the short list
of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent
President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other
vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Filed on
[2] Begun on
[3] Initiated on
[4] Commenced on
[5] Dated
[6] Filed on
[7] A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
[8] Petition in G.R. No. 191002, pp. 3-4.
[9]
[10] Petition in G.R. No. 191032, pp. 4-8.
[11] Petition in G.R. No. 191057, pp. 1-2.
[12]
[13]
Petition in G.R. No. 191149.
[14]
Petition in G.R. No. 191342.
[15] http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/JBCreCJ.pdf
[16] http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/jbc_announce_2009/jan22%20%2710.pdf
[17] Comment of the JBC, p. 3.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, pp. 5-6.
[24] Comment of the JBC, p. 6.
[25]
[26] Comment of the OSG, pp. 13-14.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
National interest compels the President to make such
appointment for it is particularly during this crucial period when national
leaders are seeking fresh mandates from the people that the Supreme Court, more
than at any other time, represents stability. Hence, a full court is ideal to
ensure not only due deliberation on and careful consideration of issues but
also expeditious disposition of cases.
Indeed, such function becomes especially significant in view
of the fact that this is the first time that the whole country will experience
automated elections.
[37]
The possible fallouts or serious aftermath of allowing a
vacuum in the position of the Chief Justice may be greater and riskier than the
consequences or repercussions of inaction. Needless to state, the appointment
of the Chief Justice of this Honorable Court (sic) is the most important appointment vested
by the 1987 Constitution to (sic) the President.
[38]
[39]
[40] Filed by Atty. Pitero M. Reig.
[41] Black’s Law Dictionary, 941 (6th Ed. 1991).
[42] G.R. No. 155001,
[43] Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562-563, citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed.
633 (1962).
[44] Citing Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Morato, supra; Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000; 342 SCRA 449, 478.
[45] 65 Phil. 56.
[46] G.R. No. 117,
[47] G.R. No. 2947,
[48] 77 Phil. 1012 (1947).
[49] 110 Phil. 331 (1960).
[50] 84 Phil. 368 (1949)
[51] E.g., Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002,
384 SCRA 152 (in which the Court
ruled that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural
resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner
with locus standi); Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572,
138587, 138680, 138698, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449 (in which the Court held that “given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court
may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the
lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review” of the
Visiting Forces Agreement); Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002,
380 SCRA 739 (in which the Court,
albeit conceding that the petitioners might not file suit in their capacity as
taxpayers without a showing that Balikatan
02-01 involved the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending powers, reiterated Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, declaring
that cases of transcendental
importance must be settled promptly and definitely and the standing
requirements may be relaxed); and Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 100318, 100308, 100417,100420, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750 (in which
the Court held that where serious constitutional questions were involved, the transcendental importance to the public of the cases
demanded that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside
technicalities of procedure).
[52] L-No. 40004,
[53] E.g.,
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27 (in
which the Court held that it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen
interested in the execution of the law, because the question is one of public
duty and the enforcement of a public right, and the people are the real
party-in-interest); Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530 (in
which the Court declared that where an assertion of a public right is involved,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen and is part of the general public which possesses the
right); Kapatiran ng mga
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311,
June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 (in which the Court disregarded objections to
taxpayers’ lack of personality to sue in determining the validity of the VAT
Law); Albano v. Reyes, G.R.
No. 83551, July 11, 1989, 175 SCRA 264 (in which the Court pronounced that
although no expenditure of public funds was involved in the questioned
contract, the petitioner was nonetheless clothed with the legal personality
under the disclosure provision of the Constitution to question it, considering
its important role in the economic development of the country and the magnitude
of the financial consideration involved, indicating that public interest was
definitely involved); and Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343 (in which the Court ruled that
it had the discretion to waive the requirement of locus standi in determining the validity of the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, although the petitioners were not,
strictly speaking, covered by the definition of
proper party).
[54] David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
[55] 275 Ky 91, 120 SW2d 765 (1938).
[56] 19 Wend. 56 (1837).
[57] 232 NC 48, 59 SE2d 359
(1950).
[58] Bold emphasis is in the original text.
[59] Petition
in G.R. No. 191032, p. 2.
[60]
Petition in G.R. No. 191057, pp.
3-4; citing the cases of PHILCONSA v.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; PHILCONSA v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300; PHILCONSA
v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506; and Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160.
[61] Petition in G.R. No. 191342, pp. 2-3.
[62] See, for instance, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338
SCRA 81 (where the petitioner questioned the validity of the deployment and
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement, asserting that IBP was the official
organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, but the Court held that the IBP had not shown
that it was so tasked: “In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the
IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant
threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated
by the
[63] Supra,
note 42, p. 645.
[64]
[65] See Buckley v. Valeo,
424
[66] Record
of Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., p.
912, October 12, 1998.
[67] Supra, note 6, p. 426-427, stating:
Considering the
respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and
the restriction on the President’s power of appointment, it is this Court’s
view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding
delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases.
Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as
earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six
years. Moreover, those occurring in the
lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting
and permanent in their effects. They
may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and,
for that reason, their making is considered an election offense.
To the contention
that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII should
prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted
the Constitution, it suffices to point out that the Constitution must be
construed in its entirety as one, single, instrument.
To
be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment,
during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme
Court. This may be the case should the membership of the court be so reduced
that it will have no quorum or should the voting on a particularly important
question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither
Section 15 of Article VII nor Section 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
[68]
[69]
[70] Record of Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. V.,
pp. 632-633.
[71] Dizon v. Encarnacion, G.R. No. L-18615,
[72] Crawford, Earl. T., The
Construction of Statutes, Thomas Law Book Company,
[73] Garcia v. Social Security
Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735,
[74]
According to
[75] No. L-19313,
[76] Supra, note 6, pp. 424-426; bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis.
[77] Aytona v. Castillo, supra, note 74, pp. 8-10 (N.B. - In the
time material to Aytona, there were
judges of the Court of First Instance who were appointed to districts that had
no vacancies, because the incumbents had not qualified for other districts to
which they had been supposedly transferred or promoted; at any rate, the
appointments still required confirmation by the Commission on Appointments).
[78] Crawford, op. cit., supra, note 72, pp. 248-249.
[79] Supra, note 6, p. 413.
[80]
[81] Section 14. Appointments extended by an
Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President
within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
[82]
Cruz,
[83]
Record of Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., p. 908, which indicates that in his
sponsorship speech delivered on
[84] Rodriguez, Statutory Construction, 171 (1999).
[85] Comment of the OSG, p. 37.
[86]
Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
[87]
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293,
[88] Nery v. Gamolo, A.M. No. P-01-1508,
[89] Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
146933,