THIRD
DIVISION
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, G.R. No. 189122
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO,
JR.,
-
v e r s u s
- NACHURA,
PERALTA
and
MENDOZA,
JJ.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE
OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 17, 2010
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D E
C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Bail,
the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his
release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,[1]
is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to
be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the “dubious
interval,” often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?[2]
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s
interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.[3]
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, the
accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving
time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.[4] An
accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms
that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed.[5] Even if
the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s
interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review,
opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential
hardships of prison.[6] On the
other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly
incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.[7] Other
recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the
prevention of the accused’s flight from court
custody, the protection of the community from
potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.[8] Under
what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a
delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.[9]
Our
rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are
to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity
but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial
court.[10]
The
Facts
Charged
with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[11]
He
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.[12]
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any
risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.[13]
It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the
discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with
grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Citing well-established
jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It
found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity
that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health
or put his life in danger. x x x
Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does
not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though
he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.[14]
For
purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioner’s conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case
and made a prima facie determination
that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s
guilt.
Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied.[15]
Petitioner
now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for
bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending
appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is
this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by
the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused
may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the
appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If
the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing
by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other
similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole,
or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on
motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court
after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner
claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an
appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six
years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioner’s
stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns
Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner
filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to
challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[16]
Other
than the sweeping averment that “[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal
despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof
under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution,”[17]
however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that
the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for
bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was
strong.
We
disagree.
It
cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without
or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary.
Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as
this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve
petitioner’s urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither
can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave
abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but it is
such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.[18] Ordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.[19] It must
be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act
at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there
must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of
discretion.[20]
Petitioner
never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and
whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion
was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of
its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal
was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of
petitioner’s claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the
merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined
whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial
question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless
manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At
best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application
and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However,
the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.[21] In this connection, Lee v. People[22] is apropos:
… Certiorari may not be
availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded
its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its
questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s
findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards
interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders
to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay
the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.[23]
(emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5,
Rule
114 Contradicts Petitioner’s
Interpretation
The
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding
six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the
said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail
without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation,
parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of
flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the
pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The
implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in
the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability
of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
x x x x x x x x x
e. After
conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court
imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20
years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said
court (Sec. 5); x x
x[24]
(emphasis supplied)
Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law,
is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail
shall be denied.[25]
(emphasis supplied)
In
the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the
bail-negating[26]
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In
other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of
the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of
discretion.
On
the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists.
If it so determines, it has no other option except to
deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court
grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given
these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will
exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application
for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;[27] on the
basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s
case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s stringent
discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the
allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those
circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a
finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically
result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to
use the less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner
disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different
situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114.
Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the
import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing
the grant of bail pending appeal.
In
particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court
on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a
situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited
discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the
five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this
position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be
denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s
theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body
whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly
constricts its “discretion” into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation
severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to
determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances is present.
However,
judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.”[28] Choice occurs where, between “two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more
than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker.”[29]
On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined
rule of action is the end of discretion.[30] Thus,
by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in
applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed
by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years,
petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”
The
judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve
the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of
the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.[31]
In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether
or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his
punishment if his conviction is affirmed.[32]
It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record
of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the
applicant,[33] among
other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or
disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an
initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial
question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.[34]
In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that
the appeal is not pro forma and
merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.[35]
This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous
and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient
attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with
the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower court’s exercise of
discretionary power was sound,[36] specially since the rules on criminal procedure require
that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except
for substantial error.[37]
Moreover,
to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the
bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies
the expressio
unius est
exclusio alterius[38]
rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of
the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to “the following or other similar circumstances.” Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant
situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.
Finally,
laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if
none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail
pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of
imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does
not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the
penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any
of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases
where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied
even without those conditions.
Is
it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending
appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to
those convicted of less serious crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory
Deviates from History
And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending
Appeal
Petitioner’s
interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of
the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The
relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule
110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction
by the Court of First Instance. — After judgment by a municipal judge and
before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be
admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the
Court of First Instance. — After conviction by the Court of First Instance,
defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable.
— No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be
admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The
aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the
1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right;
exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis
supplied)
The
significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No.
2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the
right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec.
3. Bail, a matter of right;
exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at
the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of
guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who
is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the
case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the
bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial
courts, this Court en banc lays down
the following policies concerning the effectivity of
the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the
law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be
allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his
appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2
(a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is
charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua
and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set
forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be
cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of
his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered
under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional
liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused
within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender,
after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused
shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not
surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be
forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken
by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments
were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule.
(3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may
allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond
during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If
the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist,
quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense
while on probation, parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or
his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the
adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital
offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis
supplied)
The
above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The
development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence
to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal
should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons.
The
earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a
non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional
Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail
pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final
conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable
by reclusion perpetua
was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any
stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not
punished by reclusion perpetua.[39]
The
amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending
appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus,
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter
of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal
under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it
reiterated the “tough on bail pending appeal” configuration of Administrative
Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right
before final conviction.[40]
Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the “tough on bail pending appeal” policy, the
presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail
pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now,
what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending
appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex
abundante cautelam view
of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence
of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114?
Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of
all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on
criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach
adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural
provisions on bail emanated.[41] While
this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our
treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic
societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a
strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the
principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending
bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons.[42]
In fact, it has even been pointed out that “grave caution that must attend the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule
114, Section 5.”[43]
Furthermore, this Court has been guided
by the following:
The importance
attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,
and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would,
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the
burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another
point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate
punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more
likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.[44] (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the
reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals[45]
(promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise
discretion.”
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x
x (emphasis supplied)
After conviction by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right
to bail ends.[46]
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk
of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and
only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by
the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This
judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting
the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect
of our criminal laws. This is especially germane
to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the
trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus
may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in
spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make
a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed
to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
[2] Verilli, Donald, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical Perspectives, 82 Columbia L.Rev. 328 (1982).
[3] Id.
[4] See Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
[5] Keller, Doug, Resolving A “Substantial Question”: Just Who Is Entitled to Bail Pending Appeal Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984?, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 825 (2008).
[6] Leibowitz, Debra, Release Pending Appeal: A Narrow Definition of ‘Substantial Question’ Under the Bail Reform Act, 54 FDMLR 1081 (1986).
[7] Keller, supra.
[8] Leibowitz, supra note 6.
[9] Keller, supra.
[10] Yap v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 190, 202 (2001).
[11] Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 07-179 penned by Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Rollo, pp. 198-235.
[12] Notice of Appeal dated January 14, 2009. Id., p. 238-241.
[13] Resolution dated April 8, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32159 penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro of the third Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 36-45.
[14] Id., p. 43.
[15] Id., p. 47.
[16] See Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
[17] See Petition, p. 14. Rollo, p. 16.
[18] Dueñas, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 185401, 21 July 2009, 593 SCRA 316, 344.
[19] Id.
[20] Id, p. 345.
[21] Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461 (1998).
[22] 441 Phil. 705 (2002).
[23] Id.
[24] Regalado, Florenz, II Remedial Law Compendium 417 (Tenth
Revised Edition [2004]).
Justice Regalado was
Vice-Chairman and, later, Co-Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules
of Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal procedure (Rules
110-127 of the Rules of Court).
It should be noted, however, that Justice Regalado speaks of application for bail pending appeal in cases “wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) A careful reading of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 does not impose the limit of “not more than 20 years.”
[25] Herrera,
Oscar, IV Remedial Law 455-456
(2007).
Justice Herrera was Consultant to the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which proposed the present (2000) rules on criminal procedure (Rules 110-127 of the Rules of Court).
[26] These circumstances are herein referred to as “bail-negating” because the presence of any of them will negate the allowance of bail.
[27] Discretion implies that, in the absence of a positive law or fixed rule, the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of equity and justice. (Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City , G.R. No. 179878, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 575 and Luna v. Arcenas, 34 Phil. 80 [1916] both citing Goodwin v. Prime [92 Me., 355]).
[28] Rosenberg, Maurice, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 659 (1971) cited in Painter, Mark and Welker, Paula, Abuse of Discretion: What Should It Mean in Ohio Law?, 29 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 209 (2002).
[29] Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 2 Standards of Review § 15.8, at 296 (1986) cited in Painter and Welker, supra.
[30] Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. v. Presiding Judge of RTC-Negros Occidental, Branch 52, Bacolod City, supra note 21.
[31] Morada v. Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 07 February 1994, 229 SCRA 723.
[32] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 83 Phil. 658 (1949).
[33] Id.
[34] United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926) (Butler, Circuit Justice).
[35] See
D'Aquino v. United States, 180
F.2d 271, 272 (1959) (Douglas, Circuit Justice).
Justice Douglas of the United States
Supreme Court, in his capacity as a Circuit Justice, was one of the first
judges to discuss the definition of “substantial question.” He equated the
phrase with an issue that is “fairly debatable.” Later, he provided additional
guidance to district courts trying to determine whether a defendant's appeal
would raise a fairly debatable issue:
[T]he first consideration is the soundness of the errors
alleged. Are they, or any of them, likely to command the respect of the appellate
judges? It is not enough that I am unimpressed. I must decide whether there is
a school of thought, a philosophical view, a technical argument, an analogy, an
appeal to precedent or to reason commanding respect that might possibly
prevail.(Herzog v. United States, 75
S. Ct. 349, 351 (1955) (Douglas, Circuit Justice)
See also United States v. Barbeau, 92 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. Alaska 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968 (1952); Warring v. United States, 16 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Md. 1954); United States v. Goo, 10 F.R.D. 337, 338 (D. Hawaii 1950).
[36] Luna
v. Arcenas, supra note 21 quoting 2
Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice 416, 418.
Thus, the general rule and one of the fundamental rules of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court which “lie in discretion” will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or criminal, at law or in equity (Cuan v. Chiang Kai Shek College, Inc, G.R. No. 175936, 03 September 2007, 532 SCRA 172, 187-188).
[37] Section 10, Rule 114, Rules of Court.
[38] The express mention of one implies the exclusion of all others not mentioned.
[39] Regalado, Florenz, II Remedial Law Compendium 273 (Fifth Revised Edition [1988]).
[40] See Herrera, supra note 19, p. 457.
[41] In particular, in the United States, the history of bail pending appeal has been divided by one scholar on the matter into four distinct periods: (1st period) 1879 to 1934, (2nd period) 1934 to 1956, (third period) 1956 to 1984 and (post-1984 period) 1984 to present. The first period, during which the rules on the matter were just being developed, showed liberality in the grant of bail pending appeal. The second period produced a more restrictive rule, one which limited bail to defendants who could prove that their appeal would raise “a substantial question which should be determined by the appellate court.” The third period saw the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 establishing a standard wherein bail may be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay. Under that standard, the court could deny bail if the defendant was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Hence, bail pending appeal was again favored. The post-1984 period is determined by the enactment and implementation of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The law was purposely designed to make restrictive the allowance of bail pending appeal. As the Act’s legislative history explains, prior law had “a presumption in favor of bail even after conviction” and Congress wanted to “eliminate” that presumption. (Keller, supra note 5.)
[42] Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 281.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. See also Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10.
[45] Id.
[46] See Obosa v. Court of Appeals and Yap v. Court of Appeals, supra. See also Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 492 (2009).