SECOND DIVISION
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HONORIO
BERNARDO, Petitioner, - versus - HEIRS
OF EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 183357 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, ABAD,
and PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: March
15, 2010 |
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D E C
I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to assail the validity of the
Decision[1]
dated
This
controversy stemmed from a Complaint dated
Respondents
alleged in the Complaint that their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
46891 with an area of 18,369 square meters and situated in Barangay Pag-asa,
Binangonan, Rizal; that petitioner, by stealth and in
the guise of merely grazing his cattle, surreptitiously entered into possession
of a portion of respondents’ land; that petitioner conspired and confederated
with Gaza and Francisco by illegally constructing their own houses on the
subject land; that the issue of possession was brought to the barangay for conciliation but no
settlement was reached by the parties; and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco
had forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and continue to possess the
subject property and had refused to vacate the same.
In
his Answer, petitioner denied taking possession of any portion of the property
of respondents. He argued that the cause
of action is barred by the judgment in the ejectment
case. He claimed that he had been in
possession of his land since the early 1950s.[3]
As he did before the MTC, petitioner
also alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
An
ocular inspection was conducted by the trial court judge. On 5 March 2007, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner, P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.[6]
The
trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its jurisdiction. It found that the houses of petitioner and
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
In
his appeal, petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject matter and argued that in their complaint, the respondents failed to state
the assessed value of the property in dispute.
The appellate court ruled that petitioner is estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction because he failed to file a motion to
dismiss on such ground and, instead, actively participated in the proceedings
before the trial court.
With
respect to the argument that being indispensable parties, all of the heirs of Eusebio Villegas should have been impleaded
as parties, the appellate court disagreed and invoked Article 487 of the Civil
Code, which provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The
appellate court construed said provision to cover all kinds of actions for
recovery of possession.[9]
The
appellate court sustained the trial court’s finding that the portions of the
land occupied by petitioner and
His
motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant
petition.
Petitioner
insists that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action for failure of respondents to allege the assessed value of the property
involved in their complaint. Petitioner
belies the ruling of the appellate court that he failed to raise objections
before the trial court. Petitioner reiterates
that he raised the defense of lack of jurisdiction as
early as in his Answer filed before the trial court. Moreover, he argues that even if he did not
raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction, the trial
court should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio.
Petitioner disputes the application to him of the doctrine of estoppel by laches in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[11] Petitioner avers that unlike in Tijam, he raised
the issue of jurisdiction, not only in his answer, but also in his appeal. [12]
Respondents
defend the ruling of the Court of Appeals and maintain that petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial
court.[13]
The
issue presented before this Court is simple:
Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana must be brought before the
regional trial courts. With the
modifications introduced by Republic Act No. 7691[14]
in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts was limited to real
actions where the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00,
and P50,000.00 where the action is filed in Metro Manila, thus:
SEC.
19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
Under
the law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the
property.
A
reading of the complaint shows that respondents failed to state the assessed
value of the disputed land. The
averments read:
x
x x x
3.
EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, deceased father of hte plaintiffs,
is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Pag-asa (formerly Barangay Tayuman), Binangonan, Rizal with a land area of 18,369 square meters. The same is covered by and embraced in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 46891 of the Registry of Deeds for the
4.
Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of EUSEBIO VILLEGAS and succeeded to the subject
parcel of land by virtue of their inheritance rights as compulsory heirs of
said deceased Eusebio Villegas and upon his death,
immediately took over and were enjoying the peaceful possession of the said
parcel of land and exercising said rights of possession and ownership thereof;
5. That sometime in 1996, defendant Honorio Bernardo, by stealth and in guise of merely grazing
his cattle, without the consent of the plaintiffs, surreptitiously entered into
the possession of a portion of the subject parcel of land. Employing threats and intimidations, he
claimed later that the area he illegally occupied is purportedly not part and
parcel of the land owned by the plaintiff’s predecessor, Eusebio
Villegas, and forcibly fenced and built his house on the portion of land he
illegally occupied;
6. Not being content with his own forcible and
unlawful invasion, usurpation and incursion into the plaintiffs’ parcel of
land, and in furtherance of his desire to forcibly exclude the plaintiffs of
their lawful and for possession of the subject portion of plaintiffs’ parcel of
land, defendant Bernardo, conspired and confederated with defendants Romeo Gaza
and Monina Francisco by surreptitiously and illegally
constructing their own houses on the subject parcel of land through stealth and
intimidation;
7. That the issue of the possession of the
subject parcel of land was brought under the Barangay
Justice System in 1996 for conciliation but, no settlement was reached by the
parties. Copies of the Certifications
issued by the Barangay for that matter is hereto
attached and marked as Annex “B”;
8.
That the defendants have forcibly, unlawfully, and unjustly dispossessed and
still continues to forcibly, unlawfully, and unjustly dispossesses the
plaintiffs of their lawful rights of possession and ownership on a portion of
the subject property since 1966 up to the present;
9. Because of the unjust refusal of the
defendants to vacate the premises, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of counsel to protect their interest on the property for an agreed
attorney’s fee of P50,000.00, and have incurred litigation expenses[;]
10.
By reason of the unlawful and forcible invasion by the defendants of the
property of the plaintiffs which was accompanied by threats and intimidation,
the plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer anxiety and sleepless
nights for which the defendants should be made to indemnify by way of moral
damages in the amount of at least P100,000.00;
11. To
serve as an example to others who might be minded to commit similar wanton and
unlawful acts, defendants should be held answerable for exemplary damages of
not less than P50,000.00.[15]
This fact was noted
by the Court of Appeals in its Decision but it proceeded to rule in this wise:
Records
show that at the time plaintiffs-appellees filed
their complaint below, R.A. No. 7691 which amended Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 was already in effect. However, the complaint failed to allege the
assessed value of the real property involved. Although appellant indeed raised
the issue of jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss
on this ground nor reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated
in the proceedings after the denial of his demurrer to evidence anchored on the
failure of the plaintiffs to identify in their complaint all the heirs of the
registered owner and supposed lack of technical description of the property in
the certificate of title. Indeed,
appellant is now estopped to question the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the case having
actively pursued throughout the trial, by filing various pleadings and
presenting all relevant documentary and testimonial evidence, his theory that
the portion occupied by him is not covered by the torrens title of Eusebio
Villegas.[16]
We
agree.
As already
shown, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of the subject property
ever mentioned. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the
The
general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage
of the proceedings.[18] Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted
grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds
exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. [19]
The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the
very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.[20]
However,
estoppel sets in when a party participates in all
stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One
cannot belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting
to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative relief against one's opponent
or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again, frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.[21]
In Tijam, the Court held that it is
iniquitous and unfair to void the trial court’s decision for lack of
jurisdiction considering that it was raised only after fifteen (15) years of
tedious litigation, thus:
The
facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on
July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo
as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on
the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we
to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.[22]
The principle of
justice and equity as espoused in Tijam should be applied in this case. The MTC dismissed the ejectment case upon its ruling that the case is for accion publiciana.
It did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have done so
based on the assessed value of the property subject of the accion
publiciana.
And there was no showing, indeed, not even an allegation, that the MTC
was not aware of its jurisdictional authority over an accion
publiciana involving property in the amount
stated in the law. Moreover, petitioner
did not bring up the issue of jurisdictional amount that would have led the MTC
to proceed with the trial of the case. Petitioner obviously considered the dismissal
to be in his favor.
When, as a result of such dismissal, respondents brought the case as accion publiciana
before the RTC, petitioner never brought up the issue of jurisdictional
amount. What petitioner mentioned in his
Answer before the RTC was the generally phrased allegation that “the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the nature of the action in the above-entitled case.”[23]
This
general assertion, which lacks any basis, is not sufficient. Clearly, petitioner
failed to point out the omission of the assessed value in the complaint. Petitioner actively participated during the
trial by adducing evidence and filing numerous pleadings, none of which
mentioned any defect in the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on appeal before the Court of
Appeals, after he obtained an adverse judgment in the trial court, that
petitioner, for the first time, came up with the argument that the decision is
void because there was no allegation in the complaint about the value of the
property.
Clearly,
petitioner is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the
We
note that the decisions of the
Significantly,
the Technical Report on Verification Survey[25]
by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached
to and formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration[26]
indicating that the subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00.
It is basic that the tax declaration
indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.[27] Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
Taking
into consideration the decision of the MTC proclaiming that the case is one for
accion publiciana
and the assessed value of the property as evidenced by the case records, jurisdiction
pertains, rightfully so, with the
WHEREFORE,
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
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JOSE
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WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D.
BRION MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Former
Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a
member of this Court) with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam
and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal concurring. Rollo,
pp. 21-46.
[2] Records, p. 276.
[3]
[4]
[5] TSN,
28 July 2006, p. 327.
[6] Rollo, p. 107.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] 131 Phil. 556
(1968).
[12] Rollo,
pp. 14-18.
[13]
[14] Entitled, AN
ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980.”