SECOND DIVISION
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TITAN CONSTRUCTION |
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G.R. No. 169548 |
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CORPORATION, |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and |
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MARTHA S. DAVID, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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March 15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
The review of
factual matters is not the province of this Court.[1] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the
ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.[2]
This Petition
for Review assails the July 20, 2004 Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modification the March 7, 2000 Decision[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80. Also assailed is the
Factual
Antecedents
Manuel A. David,
Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on
Sometime in
March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to
Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for P1,500,000.00
through a Deed of Sale[8]
dated
Thus, on
In
its Answer with Counterclaim,[10]
Titan claimed that it
was a buyer
in
good faith and
for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) [11]
dated January 4, 1995 signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of
the property on behalf of the spouses. Titan
thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
In his unverified
Reply,[12]
Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to
be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the
property.
Subsequently,
Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint[13]
which was granted by the trial court.
Thus, on
Ruling of the
Regional Trial Court
On March 7,
2000, the RTC issued a Decision which (i) invalidated
both the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129; (ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and Manuel; (iii) directed
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the names of
Manuel and Martha; and (iv) ordered Titan to pay P200,000.00
plus P1,000.00 per appearance as attorney’s fees, and P50,000.00
as costs of suit.
The RTC found
that:
1) The property was conjugal in character since it was purchased by Manuel
and
Martha with conjugal funds during their marriage. The fact that TCT No. 156043
was registered in the name of “MARTHA S. DAVID x x x married to Manuel A. David” did not negate the property’s
conjugal nature.
2) The SPA professing to
authorize Martha to sell the property on behalf of the spouses was spurious,
and did not bear Manuel’s genuine signature. This was the subject of expert
testimony, which Titan failed to rebut. In addition, despite the fact that the
SPA was notarized, the genuineness and due execution of the SPA was placed in
doubt since it did not contain Manuel’s residence certificate, and was not
presented for registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds, in violation
of Section 64 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.[17]
3) The circumstances surrounding
the transaction with Martha should have put Titan on notice of the SPA’s dubious
veracity. The RTC noted that aside from Martha’s failure to register the SPA
with the Register of Deeds, it was doubtful that an SPA would have even been
necessary, since the SPA itself indicated that Martha and Manuel lived on the
same street in Navotas.
The dispositive
portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.)
Declaring the
Deed of Sale dated
2.)
Declaring
null and void TCT No. 130129 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in
the name of defendant Titan Construction Corporation.
3.)
Ordering
defendant Titan Construction Corporation to reconvey
the subject property to plaintiff and his spouse.
4.)
Ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to make and issue a new title in the name of
plaintiff Manuel David and his Spouse, Martha David.
5.)
Ordering
defendant to pay P200,000.00 plus P1,000.00
per appearance as attorney’s fees and P50,000.00 as costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision
dated P50,000.00 as
costs.
The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION by deleting the
award of attorney’s fees in favor of plaintiff-appellee
Manuel A. David, Sr. and the amount of P50,000.00
as costs, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with
costs against defendant-appellant Titan Construction Corporation.[19]
Titan moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied on
Hence,
this petition.
Issues
Titan raises the
following assignment of errors:
A.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SUBJECT DEED OF SALE NULL AND VOID AND
FAILED TO APPLY TO THIS CASE THE PERTINENT LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE TORRENS
SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION.
B.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT TITAN WAS NOT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH
CONTRARY TO THE STANDARDS APPLIED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN CASES INVOLVING
SIMILAR FACTS.
C.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY DISCARDING THE NATURE OF A NOTARIZED SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY CONTRARY TO JURISPRUDENCE AND BY GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED
EXPERT TESTIMONY VIS-À-VIS THE CONTESTED SIGNATURES AS THEY APPEAR TO THE NAKED
EYE CONTRARY TO JURISPRUDENCE.
D.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY FAILING TO DETECT BADGES OF CONNIVANCE BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS.
E.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY NOT RULING THAT ASSUMING THE SPA WAS NULL AND VOID,
THE SAME IS IMMATERIAL SINCE THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS SOLELY THAT OF RESPONDENT MARTHA S.
DAVID.
F.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED BY NOT RULING THAT ASSUMING THE
Petitioner’s
Arguments
Titan is
claiming that it was a buyer in good faith and for value, that the property was
Martha’s paraphernal property, that it properly relied on the SPA presented by
Martha, and that the RTC erred in giving weight to the alleged expert testimony
to the effect that Manuel’s signature on the SPA was spurious. Titan also argues, for the first time, that
the CA should have ordered Martha to reimburse the purchase price paid by
Titan.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The property is part of the
spouses’ conjugal partnership.
The Civil Code of the
Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 153 of the
Civil Code also provides:
Article
153. The following are conjugal
partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title
during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
x x x
x
These
provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In particular, Article 117 thereof provides:
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership
properties:
(1)
Those
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
x x x
x
Article 116 of
the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that “[a]ll
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.”
We are not
persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s exclusive
property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his
income in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute
to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was
Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. In consonance with our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat,[22] Manuel was not required to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.[23]
Here, we find that Titan failed
to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses’
marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.
In the absence of
Manuel’s consent, the Deed of
Since
the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to
Titan required the consent of both spouses.
Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership”.
Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that “(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law”.
Similarly, Article
124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property must have the written consent of the other spouse,
otherwise, such disposition is void.
Thus:
Art.
124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The Special Power of Attorney
purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void.
The RTC found
that the signature of Manuel appearing on the SPA was not his genuine
signature.
As to the issue of the validity or invalidity of the subject
Special Power of Attorney x x x
the Court rules that the same is invalid. As aptly demonstrated by
plaintiff’s evidence particularly the testimony of expert witness Atty. Desiderio Pagui, which the
defense failed to rebut and impeach, the subject Special Power of Attorney does
not bear the genuine signature of plaintiff Manuel David thus rendering the
same as without legal effect.
Moreover,
the genuineness and the due execution of the Special Power of Attorney was
placed in more serious doubt as the same does not contain the Residence
Certificate of the plaintiff and most importantly, was not presented for
registration with the Quezon City Register of Deeds which is a clear violation
of Sec. 64 of P.D. No. 1529.
As
regards defendant Titan Construction Corporation’s assertion that plaintiff’s
failure to verify his Reply (wherein the validity of the Special Power of
Attorney is put into question) is an implied admission of its genuineness and
due execution, [this] appears at first blush a logical conclusion. However, the
Court could not yield to such an argument considering that a rigid application
of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not be given premium
when it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interest of justice.[24]
Titan claims that the RTC gave undue
weight to the testimony of Manuel’s witness, and that expert testimony on
handwriting is not conclusive.
The contention
lacks merit. The RTC’s ruling was based
not only on the testimony of Manuel’s expert witness finding that there were
significant differences between the standard handwriting of Manuel and the
signature found on the SPA, but also on Manuel’s categorical denial that he ever
signed any document authorizing or ratifying the Deed of Sale to Titan.[25]
We also note
that on October 12, 2004, Titan filed before the CA a Manifestation with Motion
for Re-Examination of Another Document/ Handwriting Expert[26]
alleging that there is “an extreme necessity”[27]
for a conduct of another examination of the SPA by a handwriting expert “as it will materially affect and alter the
final outcome”[28]
of the case. Interestingly, however,
Titan filed on
In any event, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that
the factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.[31]
We are mandated to accord great weight
to the findings of the RTC, particularly as regards its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses[32]
since it is the trial court judge who is in a position to observe and examine
the witnesses first hand.[33]
Even after a careful and independent scrutiny of the records, we find no cogent
reason to depart from the rulings of the courts below.[34]
Furthermore, settled is the rule that only errors of law and
not of fact are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This applies with even greater force here,
since the factual findings by the CA are in full agreement with those of the
trial court.[35]
Indeed, we
cannot help but wonder why Martha was never subpoenaed by Titan as a witness to
testify on the character of the property, or the circumstances surrounding the
transaction with Titan. Petitioner’s
claim that she could not be found is belied by the RTC records, which show that
she personally received and signed for the summons at her address in Greenhills, San Juan.
Titan neither filed a cross claim nor made any adverse allegation
against Martha.
On the Failure to Deny the Genuineness and Due
Execution of the SPA
Titan claimed
that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due
execution of the SPA in his Reply, he is deemed to have admitted the veracity
of said document, in accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8,[36]
of the Rules of Court.
On this point, we fully concur with
the findings of the CA that:
It
is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of
attorney is a forgery was not made under oath. However, the complaint, which
was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the subject
property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing
on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent
thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin, it
was held that where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never
sold, transferred or disposed their share in the inheritance left by their
mother to others, the defendants were placed on adequate notice that they would
be called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due execution of the
disputed deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery
procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way
as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be
one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most
important, a just determination of the disputed issues.
Moreover, during the
pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation that the special power of attorney
was signed by Manuel authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but
Manuel refused to admit the genuineness of said special power of attorney and
stated that he is presenting an expert witness to prove that his signature in
the special power of attorney is a forgery. However, Titan did not register any
objection x x x. Furthermore, Titan did not object to the
presentation of Atty. Desiderio Pagui,
who testified as an expert witness, on his Report finding that the signature on
the special power of attorney was not affixed by Manuel based on his analysis
of the questioned and standard signatures of the latter, and even
cross-examined said witness. Neither did Titan object to the admission of said
Report when it was offered in evidence by Manuel on the ground that he is
barred from denying his signature on the special power of attorney. In fact,
Titan admitted the existence of said Report and objected only to the purpose
for which it was offered. In Central
Surety & Insurance Company v. C.N. Hodges, it was held that where a
party acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and
did not object to the introduction and admission of evidence questioning the
genuineness and due execution of a document, he must be deemed to have waived
the benefits of said Rule. Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the
mantle of protection given [it] by Section 8, Rule 8.[37]
It is true that
a notarial document is considered evidence of the
facts expressed therein.[38]
A notarized document enjoys a prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due execution[39]
and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal presumption.[40] However,
such clear and convincing evidence is present here. While
it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were
defects in the notarization which mitigate against a
finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details
of Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Martha’s
are complete. The absence of Manuel’s data supports his claim that he did not
execute the same and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have
Manuel’s positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in addition to the
expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not Manuel’s true
signature.
Moreover, there
were circumstances which mitigate against a finding
that Titan was a buyer in good faith.
First, TCT No.
156043 was registered in the name of “MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Manuel A. David” but the Deed of Sale failed to include Martha’s
civil status, and only described the vendor as “MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age,
Filipino citizen, with postal address at 247 Governor Pascual,
Navotas, Rizal.” And it is quite peculiar that an SPA
would have even been necessary, considering that the SPA itself indicated that
Martha and Manuel lived on the same street (379 and 247 Governor Pascual Street, respectively).
Second, Titan’s
witness Valeriano Hernandez, the real estate agent
who brokered the sale between Martha and Titan, testified that Jerry Yao (Yao),
Titan’s Vice President for Operations (and Titan’s signatory to the Deed of
Sale), specifically inquired why the name of Manuel did not appear on the Deed
of Sale.[41] This
indicates that Titan was aware that Manuel’s consent may be necessary. In addition, Titan purportedly sent their
representative to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to verify TCT No.
156043, so Titan would have been aware that the SPA was never registered before
the Register of Deeds.
Third, Valeriano Hernandez also testified that during the first
meeting between Martha and P500,000.00.
Without even seeing the property, the original title, or the SPA, and without
securing an acknowledgment receipt from Martha, Titan (through P500,000.00 so she could redeem the property from the casino.[42]
These are certainly not actions typical of a prudent buyer.
Titan cannot belatedly claim that the RTC should have
ordered Martha to reimburse the purchase price.
Titan argues that the CA erred in
not ruling that, even assuming the sale was void, on grounds of equity, Martha
should reimburse petitioner its payment with legal interest. We note that this
equity argument was raised for the first time before the CA, which disposed of
it in this manner:
Anent
defendant-appellant’s claim that the court a
quo and this Court never considered the substantial amount of money paid by
it to Martha David as consideration for the sale of the subject property,
suffice it to say that said matter is being raised for the first time in the
instant motion for reconsideration. If
well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first
time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court.
Nonetheless,
record shows that only defendant-appellant was initially sued by plaintiff-appellee in his complaint for annulment of contract and reconveyance upon the allegation that the sale executed by
his wife, Martha David, of their conjugal property in favor of
defendant-appellant was without his knowledge and consent and, therefore, null
and void. In its answer, defendant-appellant claimed that it bought the
property in good faith and for value from Martha David and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and the payment of his counterclaim for attorney’s
fees, moral and exemplary damages. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellee
filed a motion for leave to file amended complaint by impleading
Martha David as a defendant, attaching the amended complaint thereto, copies of
which were furnished defendant-appellant, through counsel. The amended
complaint was admitted by the court a quo
in an Order dated
While it is true that litigation is
not a game of technicalities,[44]
it is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that a
party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered. Thus, we cannot, in these proceedings, order
the return of the amounts paid by Titan to Martha. However, Titan is not precluded by this Decision
from instituting the appropriate action against Martha before the proper court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 20, 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67090 which affirmed with modifications the
March 7, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80,
and its August 31, 2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to the recovery by petitioner Titan Construction Corporation
of the amounts it paid to Martha S. David in the appropriate action before the
proper court.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] City
of
[2] Soriano III v. Yuzon,
G.R. No. L-79520,
[3] Rollo, pp. 67-78; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada.
[4] Records, pp. 316-321; penned by Judge Agustin S. Dizon.
[5] Rollo, pp. 20-23; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III, Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe. Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada wrote a Separate Opinion, id. at 24-28.
[6] Records, p. 7; TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] Records, pp. 12-14.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Amending
and Codifying The Laws Relative To Registration Of
Property And For Other Purposes (1978).
Section 64 provides:
Section 64. Power of attorney. Any person may, by power of attorney, convey or otherwise deal with registered land and the same shall be registered with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. Any instrument revoking such power of attorney shall be registered in like manner.
[18] Records,
p. 321.
[19] Rollo, p. 78.
[20]
[21] Republic Act No. 386, An Act to
Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of the
[22] 445 Phil. 282 (2003).
[23]
[24] Records, p. 319.
[25] TSN,
[26] CA rollo, pp. 151-154.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Abapo-Almario v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 933, 940 (2000).
[32] Ferrer v. People, G.R. No. 143487,
[33] People v. Umali, G.R. No.
84450,
[34] People v. Garchitorena,
G.R. No. 184172,
[35] Blanco v. Quasha, 376 Phil. 480,
491 (1999).
[36] Sec. 7. Action
or defense based on document.
Whenever
an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the
substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading,
and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an
exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may
with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
Sec. 8. How to
contest such documents.
When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding
pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an
order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
[37] Rollo, pp. 13-15.
[38] Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, 193
Phil. 326, 335 (1981). Rule 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section
30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented
in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being
prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved.
[39] Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, G.R. No.
185477,
[40] Domingo v. Robles, 493 Phil. 916, 921 (2005).
[41] TSN,
[42]
[43] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[44] In Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 603,
611-612 (2001), we held:
It is true that a litigation
is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be
strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice. However, it does not mean
that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice
of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be belittled
or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice
to a party’s substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons.