SECOND DIVISION
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RENO FOODS, INC., and/or |
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G.R. No. 164016 |
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VICENTE KHU, |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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CARPIO, J., Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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BRION, |
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ABAD, and |
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Nagkakaisang Lakas
ng Manggagawa |
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PEREZ, JJ. |
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(NLM) - KATIPUNAN on behalf of |
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its member, NENITA CAPOR, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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March 15, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
There is no legal or equitable justification
for awarding financial assistance to an employee who was dismissed for stealing
company property. Social justice and
equity are not magical formulas to erase the unjust acts committed by the
employee against his employer. While
compassion for the poor is desirable, it is not meant to coddle those who are
unworthy of such consideration.
This Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1] assails
the June 3, 2004 Decision[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76789 which denied the petition
for certiorari filed by the petitioners
and affirmed the award of financial assistance to respondent Nenita Capor.
Factual
Antecedents
Petitioner Reno Foods,
Inc. (Reno Foods) is a manufacturer of canned meat products of which Vicente Khu is the president and is being sued in that capacity. Respondent Nenita Capor (Capor) was an employee of
Reno Foods until her dismissal on
It is a standard operating
procedure of petitioner-company to subject all its employees to reasonable
search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises. On
Petitioners accorded Capor several opportunities to explain her side, often with
the assistance of the union officers of Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
(NLM) – Katipunan. In fact, after petitioners sent a Notice
of Termination to Capor, she was given yet another
opportunity for reconsideration through a labor-management grievance conference
held on
On
Meanwhile, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM) – Katipunan filed
on behalf of Capor a complaint[4]
for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners with the Head
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the
National Capital Region. The complaint
prayed that Capor be paid her full backwages as well as moral and exemplary damages. The complaint was docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-01-00183-99.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter, Capor alleged that she was
unaware that her clutch bag contained the pilfered canned products. She claimed that petitioners might have planted
the evidence against her so it could avoid payment of her retirement benefits,
as she was set to retire in about a year’s time.
After the submission of
the parties’ respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter rendered his
Decision[5]
dated
The Labor Arbiter noted
that Capor was caught trying to sneak out six cans of
Moreover, the Labor
Arbiter ruled that consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, an employee who
commits theft of company property may be validly terminated and consequently,
the said employee is not entitled to separation pay.[6]
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings and monetary awards of
the Labor Arbiter but added an award of financial assistance. The decretal
portion of the
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision under review is hereby MODIFIED by granting an award
of financial assistance in the form of separation pay equivalent to one-half
month pay for every year of service. In
all other respects the decision stands affirmed. All other claims of the complainant are
dismissed for lack of merit.[8]
Both parties moved for a
reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. Petitioners
asked that the award of financial assistance be deleted, while Capor asked for a finding of illegal dismissal and for
reinstatement with full backwages.[9]
On
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners
filed a Petition for Certiorari[11]
before the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for awarding financial assistance to Capor.
Citing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission,[12]
petitioners argued that theft of company property is a form of serious
misconduct under Article 282(a) of the Labor Code for which no financial
assistance in the form of separation pay should be allowed.
Unimpressed, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s award of financial
assistance to Capor.
It stressed that the laborer’s welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration when carrying out and interpreting provisions of the Labor
Code. It explained that the mandate laid
down in Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission[13]
was not absolute, but merely directory.
Hence,
this petition.
Issue
The issue before us is whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting financial
assistance to an employee who was validly dismissed for theft of company
property.
Our Ruling
We grant the
petition.
Conviction in a criminal case is
not necessary to find just cause for termination of employment.
On the date that the
appellate court issued its Decision, Capor filed a
Manifestation[14] informing
the CA of her acquittal in the charge of qualified theft. The dispositive
portion of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered acquitting Nenita Capor
of the crime charged against her in this case on the ground of reasonable doubt
with costs de oficio.
Capor thus claims that her acquittal in the criminal case proves
that petitioners failed to present substantial
evidence to justify her termination from the company. She therefore asks for a finding of illegal
dismissal and an award of separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every
year of service.
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the dismissal of a criminal action
should not carry a corresponding dismissal of the labor action since a criminal
conviction is unnecessary in warranting a valid dismissal for employment.
Petitioners further
maintain that the ruling in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission[15] regarding the disallowance of
separation pay for those dismissed due to serious misconduct or moral turpitude
is mandatory. Petitioners likewise argue
that in Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[16]
the Supreme Court found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when
it ignored the principles laid down in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v.
National Labor Relations Commission. Thus, petitioners pray for
the reversal of the CA Decision and reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision dated
Capor was acquitted in Criminal Case No.
207-58-MN based on reasonable doubt. In
his Decision, the trial judge entertained doubts regarding the guilt of Capor because of two circumstances: (1) an ensuing labor
dispute (though it omitted to state the parties involved), and (2) the upcoming
retirement of Capor.
The trial judge made room for the possibility
that these circumstances could have
motivated petitioners to plant evidence against Capor
so as to avoid paying her retirement benefits.
The trial court did not categorically rule that the acts imputed to Capor did not occur.
It did not find petitioners’ version of the event as fabricated, baseless,
or unreliable. It merely acknowledged
that seeds of doubt have been planted in the
juror’s mind which, in a criminal
case, is enough
to acquit an accused based on reasonable
doubt. The pertinent portion of the trial
court’s Decision reads:
During the cross examination of the accused, she
was confronted with a document that must be related to a labor dispute. x x x The Court noted very clearly from the
transcript of stenographic notes that it must have been submitted to the
NLRC. This is indicative of a labor
dispute which, although not claimed directly by the accused, could be one of the reasons why she insinuated that evidence was planted
against her in order to deprive her of the substantial benefits she will be
receiving when she retires from the company.
Incidentally, this document was never included in the written offer of
evidence of the prosecution.
Doubt has, therefore, crept into the mind of the
Court concerning the guilt of accused Nenita Capor which in this jurisdiction is mandated to be resolved
in favor of her innocence.
Pertinent to the foregoing doubt being entertained
by this Court, the Court of Appeals citing People
v. Bacus, G.R. No. 60388, November 21, 1991: “the
phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ means not a single iota of doubt remains
present in the mind of a reasonable and unprejudiced man that a person is
guilty of a crime. Where
doubt exists, even if only a shred, the Court must and should set the accused
free.” (People v. Felix, CA-G.R.
No. 10871, November 24, 1992)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered acquitting accused Nenita Capor of the crime charged against her in this case on the
ground of reasonable doubt, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In Nicolas v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[18] we held that a criminal conviction is
not necessary to find just cause for employment termination. Otherwise stated, an employee’s acquittal in
a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on the existence of reasonable
doubt, will not preclude a determination in a labor case that he is guilty of
acts inimical to the employer’s interests.[19]
Criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while labor
disputes require only
substantial evidence, which means such
relevant
evidence as a
reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[20] The evidence in this case was reviewed by the
appellate court and two labor tribunals endowed with expertise on the matter –
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. They all
found substantial evidence to conclude that Capor had
been validly dismissed for dishonesty or serious misconduct. It is settled that factual findings of
quasi-judicial agencies are generally accorded respect and finality so long as
these are supported by substantial evidence.
In the instant case, we find no compelling reason to doubt the common findings
of the three reviewing bodies.
The award of separation pay is not warranted under the law and
jurisprudence.
We find no justification for the
award of separation pay to Capor. This award is a deviation from established
law and jurisprudence. [21]
The law is clear. Separation pay is only warranted when the
cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, such as
those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases
of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.[22] It is not
allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause,[23] such as
serious misconduct.
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a serious
misconduct and denied the award of separation pay to the erring employee.[24] We see no reason why the same should not be
similarly applied in the case of Capor. She attempted to steal the property of her
long-time employer. For committing such
misconduct, she is definitely not entitled to an award of separation pay.
It is true that there have been instances
when the Court awarded financial assistance to employees who were terminated
for just causes, on grounds of equity and social justice. The same, however, has been curbed and
rationalized in Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission.[25] In that case, we recognized the harsh
realities faced by employees that forced them, despite their good intentions,
to violate company policies, for which the employer can rightfully terminate
their employment. For these instances,
the award of financial assistance was allowed.
But, in clear and unmistakable language, we also held that the award of
financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose
offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral
character. When the employee commits an
act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is
misplaced compassion. It is tantamount not
only to condoning a patently illegal or dishonest act, but an endorsement
thereof. It will be an insult to all the
laborers who, despite their economic difficulties, strive to maintain good
values and moral conduct.
In fact, in the recent case of
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and
the CA must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an
employee’s dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience;
gross and habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of trust; or
commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate
family – grounds under Art. 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of
employees. They must be most judicious
and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the
constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an
instrument to oppress the employers. The
commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from
sustaining the employers when they are right, as here. In fine, we should be
more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who
are unworthy of the liberality of the law.
We are not persuaded by Capor’s argument that despite the finding of theft, she
should still be granted separation pay in light of her long years of service
with petitioners. We held in Central Pangasinan
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission[28] that:
Although long years of service
might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form
of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is
not the appropriate instance for generosity x x x. The fact that
private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no
negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call
for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of
loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company.
If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as justification
for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a
prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining
the efforts of labor to clean its ranks of undesirables.
Indeed, length
of service and a previously clean employment record cannot simply erase the
gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee.[29] Length of service is not a bargaining chip
that can simply be stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee relationship
is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual loyalty and dedicated
service. If an employer had treated his
employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate compensation as
determined by law, it is only fair to expect a long-time employee to return
such fairness with at least some respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a long-time
employee is more insulting and odious for a fair employer. As stated in another case:
x x
x The fact that [the
employer] did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate respondent’s
betrayal of trust and confidence reposed by petitioner. Neither would his length of service justify
his dishonesty or mitigate his liability.
His length of service even aggravates his offense. He should have been more loyal to petitioner company from which he derived his family bread
and butter for seventeen years.[30]
While we sympathize with Capor’s plight, being of retirement age and having served
petitioners for 39 years, we cannot award any financial assistance in her favor
because it is not only against the law but also a retrogressive public
policy. We have already explained the
folly of granting financial assistance in the guise of compassion in the
following pronouncements:
x x x Certainly, a dishonest employee cannot be rewarded with
separation pay or any financial benefit after his culpability is established in
two decisions by competent labor tribunals, which decisions appear to be
well-supported by evidence. To hold
otherwise, even in the name of compassion, would be to send a wrong signal not
only that “crime pays” but also that one can enrich himself at the expense of
another in the name of social justice.
And courts as well as quasi-judicial entities will be overrun by
petitioners mouthing dubious pleas for misplaced social justice. Indeed, before there can be an occasion for
compassion and mercy, there must first be justice for all. Otherwise, employees will be encouraged to
steal and misappropriate in the expectation that eventually, in the name of
social justice and compassion, they will not be penalized but instead
financially rewarded. Verily, a contrary
holding will merely encourage lawlessness, dishonesty, and duplicity. These are not the values that society
cherishes; these are the habits that it abhors.[31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
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ARTURO
D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-20.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 60.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 21-37.
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 38-44.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 62-63.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 2-25.
[12] G.R. No. L-80609,
[13]
[14] CA rollo, pp. 225-228.
[15] Supra note 12.
[16] G.R. No. 111110,
[17] Rollo, pp. 129-130.
[18] 327 Phil. 883, 886-887
(1996).
[19] Vergara v. National Labor Relations Commission, 347 Phil. 161, 173-174 (1997); Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 105775, February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 545, 548; See MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 328 Phil. 1047, 1068 (1996).
[20] See Patna-an v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 92878, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 106; Iriga Telephone Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 350 Phil. 245, 253 (1998).
[21] See Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 12; Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 16; Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 Phil. 211 (1989).
[22] Section
4(b), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code.
[23] Article 282 of the Labor Code and Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code.
[24] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 12; Zenco Sales, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 16.
[25] Supra note 12.
[26] G.R. Nos. 158798-99,
[27] G.R. No. 163607,
[28] G.R. No. 163561,
[29] See Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. The Late Romeo F. Bolso, G.R. No. 159701, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 550, 563-564; Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra; Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 12; United South Dockhandlers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 335 Phil. 76, 81-82 (1997).
[30] United South Dockhandlers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 29.
[31] San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 325 Phil. 940, 952 (1996).