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FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner, - versus
- the SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents. |
G.
R. No. 142549
Present:
PUNO,
C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN,
and VILLARAMA,
JR., JJ.
Promulgated: March 9, 2010 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
The property
involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of
the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a “vast tract of land [that] stretches over three
cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the
Vatican.”[1] What we have before us now is touted as “one
of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history.”[2]
The existence of
several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate
has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on one hand, as
there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but
complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with
thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair
conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45)
years.
Submitted for
Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents
Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order[3]
dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC
Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner,
together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a
certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to
inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City
and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced
a special civil action for partition and
accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT
No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in
the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were
able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the
Maysilo Estate. They also had led this
Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems
(MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,[4]
reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v.
Court Of Appeals,[5]
the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3,
1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented,
Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for
by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of
Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the
names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of
land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred
Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said
parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the
proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective
interests in the property.
The dispositive
portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint
Commissioners’ Report dated October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners’
Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer
certificates of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in
the names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among
themselves in proportion to their respective interest in the property, is
approved.
The
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to
issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners for the
following lots, namely:
x x x x
Any sale
of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant
to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[6]
Petitioner
alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City
refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from
the LRA Administrator before proceeding.
Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct
said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA
Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply[7]
dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement[8]
dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent
Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11[9]
issued to all Registers of Deeds. The
letter-reply reads in part:
We regret
to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of
the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 September
1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite
Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding
that there is only one OCT No. 994 which
was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April
1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this
Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy
attached, stating the following:
x
x x x
In
compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st
Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the
Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said
Order dated 8 January 1998.
The
findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate
Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.[10]
(Emphasis ours.)
The LRA
Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May
25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning
came up with the following findings:
i.
There is only one Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3,
1917[.]
ii. The
[OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr.
Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The
alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the
late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical
and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr.
Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing “certifications” and/or
written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on
April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3,
1917.
v. Atty.
Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in
the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT
No. 994. Malice was evident because she
had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals
which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact
questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the
registration of OCT No. 994.[11] (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply
further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA “to
prevent its alteration and tampering.”
We quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
As found
by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and
Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19
April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT No.
994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates
of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the
parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the
integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real
properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the
Torrens system of land registration.
With due
respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer
certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain
deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had
long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in
the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands
were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government
agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will
result to duplication of certificates of title covering land previously
registered in the names of other persons.
Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity
of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May
1917. It merely invalidates the title of
MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the
various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate
action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title
pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed
by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), “there are too many fake titles being peddled
around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern
the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a
mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty,
devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at
large.”[12]
Petitioner avers
that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,[13]
made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that “[n]ot even the
Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an
established ruling made by the highest Court of the land.” According to petitioner, respondent Guingona
claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which
was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April
19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on
“what is the valid OCT No. 994.”
Petitioner contends that “[t]he rule is well settled that once a
decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set
aside the same” and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did
a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect.[14]
Petitioner
claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA
Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same
legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the
parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls
for “condemnation and reproof of the highest degree.”[15]
Petitioner
alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty,
that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the
benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no “plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action.”
In his Comment,[16]
respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action
against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of
Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st
Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August
27, 1997 made by the committee created by Department Order No. 137 dated April
23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any
judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due
process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not
yet in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to
enforce claims of damages.[17]
Respondent
Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he
did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in
this case by way of a writ of mandamus;
he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an
act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not
have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a
real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent
Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated
April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received by the
Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the
investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in
connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was tasked
for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
“(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon,
Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of
Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a
finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the
involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s)
and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may
appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative
and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this
Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration
Authority, and other units and attached agencies of this Department, with
respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into
account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate.”[18]
Respondent
Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of
the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend
policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office
of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to
the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that
relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges
that based on this committee’s report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the
subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures,
and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not
only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo
Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as
well. He contends that the 1st
Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could
not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent
Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22,
1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not
be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were
non-existent at that time. Furthermore,
respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the
LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner’s counsel to present
petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff.
Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies
the requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard. [19]
With regard to the claim for
damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the
petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where petitioner’s claim for
damages can be fully litigated. This
Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for
petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus
a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this
Honorable Court. There is also no
showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for
damages. On this score alone, such a
claim should be outrightly dismissed.[20]
In her Reply,[21]
petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as
private respondent because he was the cause of public respondents’ failure to
comply with their ministerial duty. A
private respondent is “the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected
by the proceedings x x x.” He is not
charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of
relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondent’s active participation. [22]
Anent private
respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way
alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner counters that
the 1st Indorsement and “pertinent acts of private respondent x x x
resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court.” The complaints praying that an investigation
be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were
made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994
on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court
had rendered its decision in MWSS v.
Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner
argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is entitled to file a
petition for mandamus as she and her
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and
losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the
respondents. Petitioner cites the
following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
x x x x
SECTION
9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy of
the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be
served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and
disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for
any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon
final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has
been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or
final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The
appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice
so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers
that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the
Executive Department, because he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular
that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and
executory. Petitioner likewise avers
that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government
to be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw
fit.[23]
Public
respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their Comment[24]
on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of
said complaint for partition. Their
allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest
of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land
described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate
share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs
XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to
deceive. This is because the findings
embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which
are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of
the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and
her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates
of title in their names.[25]
Public respondents claim the
following as facts:
The DOJ
Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the
Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early
as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and
divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y
Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Bańos, Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason
Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y
de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la
Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz,
Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la
Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patińo, Maria Rocha de Despujols,
Sofia O’Farrell y Patińo, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y
Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer
y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion
to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE
PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO)
consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex “D”, and its
faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached
as Annex “E”, and both made integral parts hereof.
As a
result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same
subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-enumerated
true owners.
The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned
counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned
Order of the lower court.
The
resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before
the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by higher
courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.[26]
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue
the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her
co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from
the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the
issuance of a writ of mandamus
against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background
and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed
below, we find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance
with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their
ministerial duty; hence, mandamus
does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.[27] It is nonetheless
likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either.[28]
Therefore,
we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with
the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus;
or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public
respondents’ refusal to comply with said Order.
Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant
petitioner’s request?
In this regard, we find our
discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration
Authority[29]
instructive, to wit:
That the
LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather
than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the
LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of
land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
x x x x
x x x
Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners'
legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.
But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute,
as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.[30]
(Emphasis ours.)
As can be
gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a
decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they
find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case,
which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of
Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to
comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of
title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the
rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be
mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order,
for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his
letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent
Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as
reasons for his refusal to grant petitioner’s request.[31] There was, therefore, sufficient basis for
public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding,
contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on
which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their
rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at
this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation[32]
(the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution[33]
in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo
Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been
finally laid to rest. All other cases
involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by
the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner
anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court[34]
which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and
the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived
their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has
a leg to stand on. As we held in the
2007 Manotok case:
The
determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should
be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the
respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No.
994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be
recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT
No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the
case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.[35]
Specifically, petitioner cannot
anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and
actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007
Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May
1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994
resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917,
although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and
CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917
casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent
OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court
of Appeals
cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of
an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as
inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case
operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.[36] (Emphases supplied.)
To be sure, this Court
did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the
Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of
fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the
Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the
parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial
decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the
same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact
that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself,
persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments
presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and
certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions
looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to
the Court of Appeals. x x x.
x x x x
The Special Division is tasked to
hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from
finality of this Resolution.[37]
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok
case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special
Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions as to the status of the original
title and its subsequent conveyances.
This case affirmed the earlier finding that “there
is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been
decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917” and categorically
concluded that “OCT No. 994 which reflects
the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void.”
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last
surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3,
1965. The records bear several attempts
of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money,
should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and
accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs
prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted
above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered,
OCT No. 994, does not exist.
The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance
of the writ of mandamus not having
been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
|
|
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|
|
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MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007, 540 SCRA 304, 319.
[2] Rollo, p. 500.
[3] Id. at 15-33.
[4] G.R. No. 103558, 17 November 1992, 215 SCRA 783.
[5] 330 Phil. 8
(1996).
[6] Rollo, pp. 22-33.
[7] Id. at 9-11.
[8] Id. at 12-13.
[9] Id. at 14.
[10] Id. at 9-10.
[11] Id. at 10.
[12] Id. at 10-11.
[13] The 1st Indorsement
reads:
Respectfully transmitted x x x the attached report of the fact-finding committee constituted pursuant to Department Order No. 137, to conduct inquiry relative to the irregularly issued transfer certificates of title affecting the Maysilo Estate, calling attention to the committee’s recommendations insofar as our office is concerned. In pursuance thereof, you are hereby directed:
1.
Consistent
with the rationale of Opinion No. 239, s. 1982 to immediately issue a directive
instructing the Registry officials concerned, to annotate on the originals of
the questioned titles a memorandum to the effect that the Report dated August
28, 1997 of the Composite Fact-Finding Committee created under Department of
Justice DO 137, questioning the regularity of the titles has been forwarded to
the Office of the Solicitor General for evaluation,
x
x x x
3.
To promulgate the following issuances:
x x x x
e.
An Administrative Order requiring the Registrars of Deeds to elevate en consulta to the Administrator, for
possible referral to the Office of the Solicitor General for judicial action,
court orders directing the issuance of titles even after the court’s attention
has been called by the Registrar to an overlapping with an existing one or to
any other irregularity in the title ordered to be issued. (Rollo, pp. 12-13.)
[14] Rollo, pp. 4-5.
[15] Id. at 5.
[16] Id. at 39-49.
[17] Id. at 41-42.
[18] Id. at 54.
[19] Id. at 45-46, citing Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 560, 566 (1997); Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 691, 704 (1997).
[20] Rollo, p. 47.
[21] Id. at 122-132.
[22] Id. at 123-124.
[23] Id. at 128-129.
[24] Id. at 144-165.
[25] Id. at 148.
[26] Id. at 149-150.
[27] Go v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 613, 616 (1996).
[28] Angchangco,
Jr. v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766, 771-772 (1997); citing Martin, Rules of
Court in the Philippines, Volume III (4th Ed.), p. 233.
[29] 350 Phil. 779, 789-793 (1998).
[30] Id. at 792-794.
[31] Rollo, pp. 9-11.
[32] Supra note 1.
[33] 582 SCRA 583.
[34] Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4; Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5.
[35] Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, supra note 1 at 341.
[36] Id. at 348-349.
[37] Id. at 353-355.