Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
|
ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC., Petitioner,
- versus - ROMY B. BASTOL, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 186289 Present: VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ,
JJ. Promulgated: June 29, 2010 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In a
Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Oriental Shipmanagement Co.,
Inc. (OSCI) assails the Decision[2] dated
August 12, 2008 and the Resolutions dated January 7, 2009[3]
and February 6, 2009[4] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100090, which annulled and set
aside the July 31, 2006 Decision[5]
and May 30, 2007 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
and reinstated the January 28, 1999 Decision[6] of
the Labor Arbiter.
The Facts
OSCI is
a domestic manning agency engaged in the recruitment and placement of Filipino
seafarers abroad. Paterco Shipping Ltd.
(PSL) is a foreign shipping company which owned and operated the vessel MV Felicita
and a client of OSCI. Protection &
Indemnity Club (PIC) was the insurer of PSL covering contingencies like illness
claims and benefits of seamen. Pandiman
Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is the local representative of PIC.
As
agent of PSL, OSCI hired Romy B. Bastol (Bastol) as bosun on
The
genesis of the instant case emerged when, on
Upon
arrival here in the
Thus, PPI
referred Bastol for medical treatment to the
Unsatisfied
with the treatment by Dr. Lim and seeking a second opinion, he went to Dr.
Efren R. Vicaldo, a Cardiologist and Congenital Heart Disease Specialist of the
Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed
him to be suffering from “Coronary Artery Disease and Extensive
Anteriorseptalmia” with the corresponding remarks: “For Disability, Impediment
Grade 1 (120%).”[12]
Feeling
abandoned and aggrieved with OSCI and PSL, Bastol, through counsel, sent a November
27, 1997 letter on December 2, 1997 to Capt. Rosendo C. Herrera, the President
of OSCI, for a possible settlement of his claim for disability benefits.[13] He attached the Medical Certificate issued by
Dr. Vicaldo. His letter did not merit a
response from OSCI.
Thus,
Bastol was compelled to file a Complaint[14]
before the Labor Arbiter on May 8, 1988 for: (a) medical disability benefit
(Grade 1) of USD 60,000; (b) illness allowance until he is deemed fit to work
again; (c) medical benefits for the treatment of his ailment; (d) moral damages
of PhP 100,000; and (e) attorney’s fee of 10% of the total monetary award.
OSCI countered
that Bastol is not entitled to his indemnity claims, among others, for
disability benefits on account of non-compliance with the requirements of the
1994 revised Standard Employment Contract (SEC) by failing to properly submit
himself for treatment and examination by the company-designated physician who
is the only one authorized to set the degree of disability, i.e., disability grade. Submitting documentary evidence, OSCI maintained
that Bastol submitted to the examination and treatment by the
company-designated physician only on April 25, 1997,[15]
May 23, 1997,[16]
September 16, 1997,[17]
and October 28, 1997,[18] but
he voluntarily discontinued said treatment and did not show up for the
follow-up examination on December 2, 1997.
Thus, the company-designated physician was not given ample opportunity
to properly treat Bastol’s ailment and did not have sufficient chance to assess
and determine his disability grade, if any.
On
January 28, 1999, Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. rendered a Decision based on the
parties’ respective position papers[19]
and the documentary evidence presented in NLRC NCR OFW Case No. 98-05-0801, the
decretal portion reading:
WHEREFORE, in
view of all the foregoing, respondents Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. and
Paterco Shipping Ltd. are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay
complainant the sum of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment plus the sum equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award or in the
amount of US$6,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fee.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The Labor
Arbiter saw no need to conduct formal hearings.
He found that Bastol was healthy when deployed in December 1995 but subsequently
contracted or suffered heart ailment during his period of employment with OSCI
and PSL. He also found that Bastol did
not show any appreciable improvement despite treatment by the
company-designated physician, thus ruling that the fact that Dr. Lim had not
issued a certification as to Bastol’s condition did not negate his claim for disability
indemnity, as the determination of the degree thereof by Dr. Vicaldo of the
Philippine Heart Center sufficed.
OSCI
immediately assailed the above Labor Arbiter decision before the NLRC.[21] Subsequently, on July 30, 1999, the NLRC
issued a Resolution[22]
in NLRC NCR CA No. 019238-99, vacating and setting aside the January 28, 1999
Decision of the Labor Arbiter and remanding the case back to the Labor Arbiter
for further proceedings, the dispositive portion ordering, thus:
WHEREFORE, for
the reasons [above discussed], the decision appealed from is hereby vacated and
set aside and the records of this case Remanded to the Labor Arbiter of origin
for conduct of further approximate proceedings and to terminate the same with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.[23]
In remanding
the case back to the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC ruled that Bastol should have presented
himself before the Labor Arbiter for the latter to properly assess his
condition, and that Dr. Lim and Dr. Vicaldo should be presented to determine
with certainty the status of Bastol’s heart ailment.
This
prompted both parties to file their respective motions for reconsideration
which were rejected by the NLRC through its Resolution[24]
of
Subsequently,
on
On
October 26, 2001, however, Bastol filed a Manifestation/ Compliance[25] submitting
the following documents: (1) Affidavit[26]
of Dr. Vicaldo executed on May 10, 2001; (2) Conforme[27]
for disability benefit settlement in the amount of USD 25,000; (3) Special
Power of Attorney (SPA)[28]
executed by Bastol in favor of Martin Jarmin, Jr. of OSCI; (4) Medical Disability
Grading[29] of
Bastol issued by Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician, on June 26, 1997;
and (5) Assessment and disability grading determined by Dr. H.R. Varwig,[30]
company-designated physician of PPI.
Bastol’s
manifestation and the documents he presented showed that prior to filing the
instant case on
Even
after Bastol already filed the instant case on May 8, 1998, Jarmin, Jr. of OSCI
instructed him to execute a SPA to authorize them to represent him (Bastol) in
the auction sale of SPL’s vessel M/V Felicita.
Forthwith, Bastol executed an SPA in favor of Jarmin, Jr. on
OSCI
vehemently objected[31]
to Bastol’s Manifestation/Compliance and the documentary evidence appended thereto.
The Ruling of Labor Arbiter
Lustria in
Case No. NLRC NRC OFW Case
No. 95-05-0501
On January
31, 2003, Labor Arbiter Lustria rendered a Decision[32] similar
to that of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in
view of all the foregoing, let a judgment be, as it is hereby rendered,
ordering respondents Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. and Paterco Shipping,
Ltd., to jointly and severally pay complainant Romy Bastol, the sum of US$60,000.00
or its peso equivalent prevailing at the time of payment plus the sum
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, or in the amount of US$6,000.00
or its peso equivalent prevailing at the time of payment, as and by way of
attorney’s fee.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Labor
Arbiter Lustria found that Bastol indeed suffered from a heart ailment for
which he is pursuing disability indemnity which was duly proved by the concurring
diagnosis of Dr. Peralta, Dr. Lim, Dr. Varwig and Dr. Vicaldo. He found that the settlement agreement with
PPI was pursuant to the medical findings and assessments of both
company-designated physicians, Dr. Lim and Dr. Varwig. Thus, the reiteration of the award of Labor
Arbiter Mayor, Jr.
Aggrieved,
OSCI promptly filed its Memorandum of Appeal[34]
before the NLRC.
The Ruling of the NLRC in
NLR NCR CA No. 019238-99
(NLRC NCR
OCW No. 98-05-0501)
On July 31, 2006, the NLRC First
Division rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside Labor
Arbiter Lustria’s January 31, 2003 Decision
and dismissed the instant case, the fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria
dated
SO ORDERED.[35]
In
dismissing the case, the NLRC held that the sworn affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo and the
manifestations of Bastol could not substitute for their presence and testimony,
and that of Dr. Lim. It ruled that since
not one clarificatory hearing was conducted, the sworn affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo
is reduced to mere hearsay sans a cross-examination by OSCI. Moreover, it noted that the reliance by the
LA on the certificates of Dr. Lim and Dr. Varwig is misplaced, for the
disability ratings indicated therein do not appear to be final for they were
merely suggested ones. Besides, it
pointed out that the records show that Bastol was still under treatment and being
re-evaluated by Dr. Lim when the purported certificate was issued by Dr. Lim on
Undaunted,
Bastol went to the CA questioning the reversal of Labor Arbiter Lustria’s Decision
via a Petition[36] for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
100090.
The Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
On August
12, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the July
31, 2006 Decision and May 30, 2007 Resolution of the NLRC, and reinstated the
January 28, 1999 Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the premises
considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Assailed Decision and Resolution of the NLRC, First Division dated July 31,
2006 and May 30, 2007, respectively are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and the January 28, 1999
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[37]
In
reinstating the Labor Arbiter’s January 28, 1999 Decision, the appellate court ruled,
first, that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in remanding the case
back to the Labor Arbiter on the mistaken notion that the determination of
Bastol’s health ailment and entitlement to disability benefits under the 1994
revised SEC cannot be ascertained without conducting a formal trial. It ratiocinated that Art. 221 of the Labor
Code as amended by Sec. 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6715 in relation to Sec. 4,
Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure then prevailing granted the Labor Arbiter
discretion
to determine the necessity for a formal hearing or investigation. In the instant case, the CA found that the Labor
Arbiter acted properly and ruled appropriately on the evidence on record
without need for formal hearings. Thus,
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the instant case.
Second,
relying on and applying the principles enunciated in Remigio v. National
Labor Relations Commission[38]
together with the application of Sec. 20 in relation to Secs. 30 and 30-A of
the SEC, the appellate court appreciated and found total and permanent disability
of Bastol, considering the undisputed fact that he could not pursue his usual
work as a seaman for a period of more than 120 days. Moreover, it noted that no less than four
doctors—Dr. Peralta, Dr. Lim, Dr. Varwig and Dr. Vicaldo—found Bastol to be
suffering from a heart ailment which prevented him from being employed at his
usual job as a seafarer or seaman.
Third, the
CA viewed no violation of Sec. 20, B, 3 of the SEC, for said proviso in its
third paragraph does not prohibit a second medical opinion, but, in fact,
provides for the seafarer the right to seek a second opinion and even a third
opinion in cases where the seafarer’s doctor disagrees with the assessment of
the company-designated doctor. Thus, the
CA ruled that the NLRC gravely erred in construing the proviso that it is only
the company-designated physician who could declare the fitness of the seafarer
to work or establish the degree of his disability. In fine, the CA pointed out that the SEC does
not serve to be a limitation but is a guarantee of protection to overseas
contract workers and must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in favor of and for the benefit of seamen and their
dependents.
OSCI moved
for reconsideration[39]
of the above assailed CA Decision but the appellate court denied the same
through the first assailed January 7, 2009 Resolution. While affirming its
Decision, the CA held in its Resolution:
Finding no
cogent or justifiable reason to set aside the Decision of this Court dated
August 12, 2008 dismissing the instant petition, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners is hereby not given due course.
WHEREFORE, the
aforementioned decision is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.
SO ORDERED.[40]
OSCI
then filed a Motion for Clarification[41]
considering that Bastol, the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 100090, did not file
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Decision which did not dismiss Bastol’s
petition, but instead annulled the NLRC dismissal of the instant case and
reinstated the January 28, 1999 Labor Arbiter Decision.
On
February 6, 2009, the CA issued the second assailed Resolution rectifying the first
assailed Resolution of January 7, 2009.
Thus,
the instant appeal before us.
The Issues
OSCI raises
the following issues for our consideration:
a. Whether or not it is contrary to the
principles of res judicata for the Court of Appeals to have ordered the
reinstatement of Labor Arbiter Mayor’s Decision dated 28 January 1999 which was
already vacated and set aside by the NLRC’s Resolution dated 30 July 1999 which
in turn has become final and executory without respondent questioning the same.
b. Whether or not it is contrary to the
legal principles of the “law of the case” for the Court of Appeals to have
disregarded the findings of the NLRC in the latter’s Resolution dated 30 July
1999 which by law is already final and executory.
c. Whether or not it was grave and reversible
error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have sanctioned Labor Arbiter
Lustria’s departure from accepted procedure in admitting into evidence the
gravely belated submissions of respondent without any justifiable reason being
advanced for said belated filing.
d. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in recognizing in favor of respondent a declaration of disability grade 1
by an alleged doctor who is not the company-designated physician and whose
competence was not established.
e. Whether or not the lack of a proper
verification of the Position Paper and/or Manifestation/Compliance filed by
respondent before Labor Arbiter Lustria rendered said pleadings without legal
effect as an unsigned pleading provided by Sec. 4 in relation to Sec. 3, both of
Rule 7.
f. Whether or not respondent’s complaint
for disability filed with the Labor Arbiter should have been dismissed for
failure to be supported by a certification of non-forum shopping as required
under Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 3, rule 1 of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure.[42]
The
foregoing issues can be summarized into three: first, on procedural
grounds, whether the Complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter ought to be
dismissed for lack of certification against forum shopping as required by the
Rules and whether the verification by counsel is sufficient for Bastol’s
Position Paper and Manifestation/Compliance; second, whether the July
30, 1999 NLRC Decision constitutes res judicata and serves as the “law
of the case”; and third, whether the belated submissions are allowed by
the Rules, and the Affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo sufficient.
In the
meantime, pending resolution of the instant case, Romy B. Bastol died on
The
Court’s Ruling
We deny
the appeal for lack of merit.
Procedural
Issues
In its
bid to overturn the assailed Decision and Resolutions, OSCI foisted several
procedural issues all based on the Rules of Court, the application of which it
anchors on Sec. 3, Rule I of the NLRC Rules of Procedure then prevailing, which
pertinently provided:
Section 3. Suppletory application of Rules of Court
and jurisprudence. — In the absence of any applicable provision in these
Rules, and in order to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code, the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines and
prevailing jurisprudence may, in the interest of
expeditious dispensation of labor justice and whenever practicable and
convenient, be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.[44]
OSCI
argues that the Complaint of Bastol ought to have been dismissed at the outset,
i.e., before the labor arbiter
level, since it is an initiatory pleading which lacked the mandatorily required
certification of non-forum shopping under Sec. 5,[45]
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In the
same vein, OSCI contends that Bastol’s Position Paper and
Manifestation/Compliance ought to have been considered as unsigned pleadings
which produce no legal effect under Sec. 3,[46]
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court for violation of Sec. 4,[47]
Rule 7, requiring verification to be made upon personal knowledge or based on
authentic records, because said pleadings were verified only by counsel, which verification
is clearly not based on personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Pro-forma
Complaint Forms Used in the RAB
The
foregoing arguments are untenable. For
the expeditious and inexpensive filing of complaints by employees, the Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the NLRC provides pro-forma complaint forms. This is to facilitate the exercise and protection
of employees’ rights by the convenient assertion of their claims against
employers untrammeled by procedural rules and complexities. To comply with the certification against
forum shopping requirement, a simple question embodied in the Complaint form answerable
by “yes” or “no” suffices. Employee-complainants
are not even required to have a counsel before they can file their
complaint. An officer of the RAB, duly
authorized to administer oaths, is readily available to facilitate the
execution of the required subscription or jurat of the complaint.
This
can be seen in the case at bar. Bastol,
assisted by counsel, filled out the Complaint form, line No. 11 of which is a
question on anti-forum shopping which he answered by underlining the word “No.”[48] It is thus clear that the strict application
of Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court does not apply to labor complaints
filed before the NLRC RAB.
Verification by Counsel
Sufficient
Anent
the issue of verification, we have scrutinized both the Position Paper and the
Manifestation/Compliance filed by Bastol and we fail to see any violation
thereof. First, there is no law
or rule requiring verification for the Manifestation/Compliance. Second, the counsel’s verification in
Bastol’s Position Paper substantially complies with the rule on
verification. The second paragraph of
Sec. 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
“A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.”
On the
other hand, the actual verification of counsel in Bastol’s Position Paper states: “That I am the counsel of record for the
complainant in the above-entitled case; that I caused the preparation of the
foregoing Position Paper; that I have read and understood the contents thereof;
and that I confirm that all the
allegations therein contained are true and correct based on recorded evidence.”[49] Appended to the position paper were Bastol’s
contract of employment, counsel’s letter to OSCI, and various medical
certifications issued by several doctors with similar findings and diagnosis of
Bastol’s heart ailment. Evidently, the
verification is proper as based on, and evidenced, by the appended documents,
which were not disputed save the contents of the medical certificate issued by
Dr. Vicaldo.
First Substantive
Issue: Res Judicata and “Law of
the Case”
OSCI
strongly argues that the July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision remanding the case has
become final and executory, thus the applicability of the doctrine of res
judicata and the principle of the “law of the case” thereto. There being res
judicata between the parties, the NLRC’s setting aside of the January 28,
1999 Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. has become final. Thus, OSCI maintains that the CA gravely
erred in reinstating the January 28, 1999 Decision of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr.
And relying
on the Court’s pronouncement in Cucueco v. Court of Appeals[50]
on the principle of the “law of the case,” OSCI asserts that the ruling of the
July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision, remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for
clarificatory hearings requiring the personal appearance of Bastol and the
testimonies of Dr. Lim and Dr. Vicaldo, may no longer be disturbed and must be
complied with. Thus, it argues that the
non-compliance thereof and the belated submission of an alleged affidavit by
Dr. Vicaldo are clear contraventions of the prevailing “law of the case” as
embodied in the final and executory July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision.
The foregoing
arguments of OSCI are tenuous at best.
Doctrine of res judicata
inapplicable
We
agree with OSCI that the CA committed double faux pas by (1) ruling on
the remand of the case by the NLRC to the Labor Arbiter which was not the subject
of Bastol’s appeal before it; and (2) reinstating the January 28, 1999 Decision
of Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. which had earlier been set aside and was not the
object of OSCI’s appeal to the NLRC. But these lapses do not adversely affect
the CA’s determination of the propriety of the disability indemnity awarded to
Bastol, as will be discussed here.
Suffice
it to say that the July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision cannot and does not constitute res
judicata to the instant case. In Estate
of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon,[51]
extensively quoting from the earlier case of Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr.,[52]
we explained the nature of res judicata, as now embodied in Sec. 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in its
two concepts of “bar by former judgment” and “conclusiveness of judgment.” These concepts of the doctrine of res
judicata are applicable to second actions involving substantially the same
parties, the same subject matter, and cause or causes of action.[53] In the instant case, there is no second
action to speak of, involving as it is the very same action albeit the NLRC
remanded it to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
Principle of “Law of the Case”
inapplicable
“Law of
the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal—it is a
term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a
question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the
question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.[54]
OSCI’s
application of the law of the case principle to the
instant case, as regards the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for
clarificatory hearings, is misplaced.
The only matter settled in the July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision, which can be
regarded as law of the case, was the undisputed fact that Bastol was suffering
from a heart ailment. As it is, the
issue on the degree of disability of Bastol’s heart ailment and his entitlement
to disability indemnity, as viewed by the NLRC through said decision, has yet
to be resolved. Precisely, the NLRC
remanded the case to Labor Arbiter Mayor, Jr. “for conduct of further
approximate proceedings and to terminate the same with dispatch.”[55]
Second
Substantive Issue: Sufficiency of Sworn
Affidavit
And the
primordial reason why the argument of OSCI for the mandatory conduct of
clarificatory hearings requiring the personal appearance of Bastol and the
testimonies of Dr. Lim and Dr. Vicaldo is erroneous is that the law and the
rules do not require such mandatory clarificatory hearings.
Labor Arbiter Has
Discretion on the Propriety of Conducting Clarificatory Hearings
While
it can be argued that the NLRC through its July 30, 1999 Decision skewed to have
clarificatory hearings for the presentation of evidence, it cannot be gainsaid
that with the remand of the case, the Labor Arbiter must proceed in accordance
to the Rules governing proceedings before him provided under the prevailing
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.[56]
We
fully agree with Bastol’s arguments that the NLRC, while having appellate
jurisdiction over decisions and resolutions of the Labor Arbiter, may not
dictate to the latter how to conduct the labor case before him. Sec. 9 of Rule V of the then prevailing NLRC
Rules of Procedure, issued on December 10, 1999, provided for the nature of
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, thus:
Section 9. Nature of Proceedings. — The proceedings
before a Labor Arbiter shall be non-litigious in nature. Subject to the requirements of due process,
the technicalities of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the
courts of law shall not strictly apply thereto. The Labor Arbiter may avail himself of all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of the controversy speedily, including
ocular inspection and examination of well-informed persons. (Emphasis supplied.)
And the
Labor Arbiter is given full discretion to determine, motu proprio, on
whether to conduct hearings or not.
Secs. 3 and 4 of Rule V of the then prevailing NLRC Rules of Procedure also
pertinently provided:
Section 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — x
x x
These verified
position papers shall cover those claims and causes of action raised in the
complaint excluding those that may have been amicably settled, and shall be
accompanied by all supporting documents including the affidavits of their
respective witnesses which shall take the place of the latter’s direct
testimony. x x x
Section 4. Determination of Necessity of Hearing. — Immediately
after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memorandum, the Labor
Arbiter shall motu proprio determine whether there is a need for a formal trial
or hearing. At this stage, he may,
at his discretion and for the purpose of making such determination, ask
clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or information, including but
not limited to the subpoena of relevant documentary evidence, if any from any
party or witness. (Emphasis supplied.)
The
foregoing provisos manifestly show the non-litigious and the summary nature of
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, who is given full discretion whether
to conduct a hearing or not and to decide the case before him through position
papers. In Iriga Telephone Co, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[57] the
Court discussed the reason why it is discretionary on the part of the Labor
Arbiter, who, motu proprio, determines whether to hold a hearing or
not. Consequently, a hearing cannot be
demanded by either party as a matter of right.
The parties are required to file their corresponding position papers and
all the documentary evidence and affidavits to prove their cause of action and
defenses. The rationale behind this is
to avoid delay and curtail the pernicious practice of withholding of evidence. In Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v.
Santos,[58] the
Court reiterated the Labor Arbiter’s discretion not to conduct formal or clarificatory
hearings which is not violative of due process, thus:
The holding of
a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the Labor Arbiter and is
something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. The requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein
they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in
case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary.[59]
In sum, it can be properly said
that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter are non-litigious in nature and
the technicalities of law and procedure, and the rules obtaining in the courts
of law are not applicable. Thus, the
rules allow the admission of affidavits by the Labor Arbiter as evidence
despite the fact that the affiants were not presented for cross-examination by
the counsel for the adverse party. To
require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary
nature of the administrative proceedings and to make mandatory the application
of the technical rules of evidence. What
the other party should do is to present counter-affidavits instead of merely
objecting on the ground that the affidavits are hearsay.
The
Court, however, has recognized specific instances of the impracticality for the
Labor Arbiter to follow the position paper method of disposing cases; thus, formal
or clarificatory hearings must be had in cases of termination of employment:
such as, when claims are not properly ventilated for lack of proper
determination whether complainant employee was a rank-and-file or a managerial
employee,[60] that the
Labor Arbiter cannot rely solely on the parties’ bare allegations when the
affidavits submitted presented conflicting factual issues,[61]
and considering the dearth of evidence presented by complainants the Labor
Arbiter should have set the case for hearing.[62]
In the
instant case, we find substantial evidence to support the decision of Labor
Arbiter Lustria. Substantial evidence is
such amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably
opine otherwise.[63]
Late submission of
documentary evidence admissible
OSCI
asserts that Labor Arbiter Lustria gravely abused his discretion in admitting
as evidence the belated submissions of Bastol through his
Manifestation/Compliance filed on October 26, 2001 or five months after the
instant case was deemed submitted for decision on May 10, 2001. It considers suspicious the submission of the
Affidavit of Dr. Vicaldo, as Bastol never provided any explanation for such
late submission and much less did the Labor Arbiter require Bastol for such
explanation. OSCI also rues said
admission when Labor Arbiter Lustria did not act on its Motion to Dismiss filed
on July 25, 2001 on the ground of Bastol’s failure to present additional
evidence. Neither did Labor Arbiter
Lustria give it an opportunity to submit contrary evidence by setting, at the
very least, another hearing. Thus, OSCI
concludes that Labor Arbiter Lustria acted wantonly, whimsically and capriciously
to its grave prejudice by admitting and using the late submission of Bastol as
basis for his decision, and the CA, in turn, gravely erred in sanctioning the Labor
Arbiter by granting Bastol’s petition for certiorari.
We
cannot agree.
The
nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter is not only non-litigious
and summary, but the Labor Arbiter is also given great leeway to resolve the
case; thus, he may “avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of the controversy.”[64] The belated submission of additional
documentary evidence by Bastol after the case was already submitted for
decision did not make the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter improper. The basic reason is that technical rules of
procedure are not binding in labor cases.
In Dacut
v. Court of Appeals, we held that the fact that the Labor Arbiter admitted
the company’s reply after the case had been submitted for decision did not make
the proceedings before him irregular.[65] In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we also held that the submission of additional evidence on
appeal before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure; after
all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases.[66] Indeed, technical rules of evidence do not
apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its
sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position
papers and other documents.[67]
And
neither can OSCI rely on lack of due process. The essence of due process lies simply in an
opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and
indispensably he held.[68] Considering that OSCI indeed contested the
late submission of Bastol by filing its most vehement objection thereto on
Documentary evidence
submitted substantially proves Bastol’s claim for disability indemnity
On the
related issue of the certification of a medical doctor other than the
company-designated physician, OSCI adamantly maintains that pursuant to Sec. 20
(B) of the 1996 SEC it is only the company-designated physician who is allowed
to fix or determine the degree of disability.
Thus, according to OSCI, the Labor Arbiter and the CA gravely erred in
sanctioning the Grade 1 disability impediment based on a certification issued
by a medical doctor who is not the company-designated physician.
We do
not agree.
The
Contract of Employment of Bastol and PSL, through its agent OSCI, stipulated
thus:
1. That the Employee shall be employed on board
under the following terms and conditions:
1.1 Duration of
Contract: 9+3 months upon mutual
consent of the crew & owners/agent
1.2 Position Bosun
1.3 Basic Monthly
Salary US$500.00
1.4 Hours of Work 48 hours a week
1.5 Overtime F.O.T. – 30% of basic
wage
1.6 Vacation Leave
with Pay One month basic wage per one year service or pro-rata
2. The terms and conditions of the revised
Employment Contract for seafarers governing the employment of all Filipino
seafarers approved by the POEA/Dole on July 14, 1989 under Memorandum Circular
No. 41 series of 1989 amending circulars relative thereto shall be strictly and
faithfully observed.[69] (Emphasis supplied.)
The
parties having mutually agreed to the application of the 1994 revised SEC under
Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989,[70]
approved by the DOLE and the POEA on July 14, 1989, it is the law between them.
The
pertinent provisos of the 1994 revised SEC provided:
PART
II
TERMS
OF SERVICE
SECTION A. HOURS OF WORK
x x x x
SECTION C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
x x x x
4. The liabilities of the employer when the
seaman suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as
follows:
a.
The employer shall continue to pay the seaman
his basic wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
b.
If the injury or illness requires medical and/or
dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full
cost of such medical, dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board
and lodging until the seaman is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if
after repatriation, the seaman still required medical attention arising from
said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until
such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established
by the company-designated physician.
c.
The employer shall pay the seaman his basic
wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman
is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by
the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty days. For the
purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post employment medical
examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon
his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seaman to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The
foregoing provisos were substantially retained in the 1996 SEC with slight
changes in Sec. C, 4, c. which was placed under Sec. 20, B, 3, expressed as
follows:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical
treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no
case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall
submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the
agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Applying
the foregoing provisos in the instant case, it is thus clear—in either the revised
1994 and the 1996 SEC—that Bastol, suffering from a heart ailment and
repatriated on March 7, 1997, must comply with two requirements: first, to submit himself to a
post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within
three working days from his repatriation; second, he must allow himself
to be treated until he is either declared fit to work or be assessed the degree
of permanent disability by the company-designated physician. Most importantly, the mandatory compliance of
the second requirement is qualified by the limitation or condition that in
no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. The 120-day limitation refers to the period
of medical attention or treatment by the company-designated physician, who must
either declare the seafarer fit to work or assess the degree of permanent disability.
The
undisputed facts clearly show Bastol complying with the two mandatory
requirements. In fact, OSCI did not
dispute that Bastol was referred to the Jose L. Gutierrez Clinic for follow-up
examination and treatment with attending company-designated physician Dr.
Peralta, who found him unfit for sea duty on March 8 and April 1, 1997. That Bastol submitted himself to the
treatment and medical evaluation of company-designated physicians Dr. Peralta
and Dr. Lim is undisputed. The facts
further show that after Dr. Peralta found Bastol unfit for sea duty, PPI—the local
representative of PIC, the insurer of PSL—referred him (Bastol) to further
medical treatment at the
Dr. Lim
found Bastol to be suffering from a heart ailment certifying that he had
“Coronary artery dse; S/P Ant. wall MP; Hypercholesterolemia;
Hyperglycemia.” Dr. Lim regularly updated
PPI on the medical status of Bastol as shown by his letters to PPI addressed to
Ms. Charry Domaycos, Claims Executive, Crew Claims Division, on April 23, May
24, September 16 and
That
Bastol suffered from a heart ailment is not disputed. In fact, as noted by the CA, no less that
four medical doctors had similar diagnosis of Bastol’s heart ailment, viz:
Dr. Peralta of the Jose L. Gutierrez Clinic, Dr. Lim of the
In all,
after his repatriation on
It has
been held that disability is intimately related to one’s earning capacity.[72] It should be understood less on its medical
significance but more on the loss of earning capacity.[73] Total disability does not mean absolute
helplessness.[74] In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one’s earning capacity.[75] Thus, permanent disability is the inability
of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.[76] This is the case of Bastol, aptly held by the
CA.
In Wallem
Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[77] we
cited the consistent application of the definition of permanent disability
under Sec. 2 (b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor
Code as amended by PD 626, which provides:
(b) A disability is total and permanent
if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any
gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as
otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.[78]
We
likewise noted in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.[79]
that:
The foregoing
concept of permanent disability has been consistently employed by the Court in
subsequent cases involving seafarers, such as in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v.
Natividad,[80] in
which it was reiterated that permanent disability means the inability of a
worker to perform his job for more than 120 days. Also in Philimare, Inc. v. Suganob,[81]
notwithstanding the opinion of the company-designated physician that the
seafarer therein was fit to work provided he regularly took his medication, the
Court held that the latter suffered permanent disability in view of evidence
that he had been unable to work as chief cook for more than 7 months. Similarly, in
Moreover,
we explained in Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. that the lapse of the
120-day threshold period is not the benchmark for considering a permanent
disability due to injury or illness, “rather, the true test of whether
respondent suffered form a permanent disability is whether there is evidence
that he was unable to perform his customary work as messman for more than 120
days.”[84]
Applying
the foregoing considerations, it is clear that Bastol was not only under the
treatment of company-designated physicians for over seven months, but it is
likewise undisputed that he had not been employed as bosun for said time. Note again upon his repatriation on
Thus,
the declaration by Dr. Vicaldo of Bastol’s disability as Disabiltiy Impediment
Grade 1 Degree (120%) constituting total permanent disability on
Thus, we
can say that Bastol had the right to seek medical treatment other than the
company-designated physician after the lapse of the 120-day considering that
said physician, within the maximum
120-day period stipulated in the SEC neither declared him fit to work or
gave the assessment of the degree of his permanent disability which he is
incumbent to do. Moreover, as the CA aptly
noted, Dr. Vicaldo’s diagnosis and assessment should be accorded greater weight
considering that he is a Cardiologist and Congenital Heart Disease Specialist
of the Philippine Heart Center. It is
undisputed that Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician, is not a cardiology
expert being a Diplomate in Rehabilitation Medicine and who seemed to be not
the attending physician of Bastol in the
OSCI
also erroneously contends that the illness of Bastol is not compensable under
the SEC. It has already been settled in Heirs
of the Late R/O Reynaldo Aniban v. National Labor Relations Commission[86]
that myocardial infarction as a disease or cause of death is
compensable, such being occupational. As
the CA aptly noted, Bastol’s work as bosun caused, if not greatly contributed, to
his heart ailment, thus:
A job of a
bosun, as the position of petitioner, is not exactly a walk in the park. A bosun manages actual deck work schedules
and assignments directed by the Chief Officer and emergency duties as indicated
in the Station Bill. He attends to
maintenance and upkeep of all deck equipment, cargo, riggings, safety equipment
and helps in maintaining discipline of the deck hands. He assists in ships emergency drills and in
any event of emergency and performs other duties and responsibilities as
instructed or as necessary. He reports
directly to the Chief Officer. What
makes the job more difficult, aside from exposure to fluctuating temperatures
caused by variant weather changes, the job obviously entails laborious manual
tasks conducted in a moving ship, which makes for increased work-related
stress. All these factors may have
exacerbated petitioner’s heart condition.
Prolonged and continued exposure to the same could probably risk
petitioner [Bastol] to another attack.[87]
We are not blind to the needs of our
seafarers who, when getting sick in the line of duty, are given the run around
by unscrupulous employers and manning agencies.
The instant case has spanned a dozen years with the disability indemnity
benefit not granted. Alas, the sad
reality is that Romy B. Bastol succumbed to his illness and died on
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we DENY the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-33, dated
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
G.R. No. 159887,
[39] Rollo,
pp. 284-287, Motion for Reconsideration dated
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
The New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, issued
on
[45] SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. x x x
[46] SEC. 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
[47] SEC. 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading
required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and
belief” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M.
No. 00-2-10,
[48] Rollo, p. 35.
[49]
[50]
G.R. No. 139278,
“Law of the case” has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.
[51]
G.R. No. 148777,
[52]
G.R. Nos. 75109-10,
[53] I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 472-473 (6th rev. ed.).
[54] Meralco Industrial Engineering Services Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 145402, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 315, 329-330.
[55] Supra note 22.
[56]
As amended by Resolution 3-99, Series of 1999, issued on
[57]
G.R. No. 119420,
[58]
G.R. No. 165968,
[59]
[60] Batongbacal
v. Associated Bank, No. L-72977,
[61] Greenhills Airconditioning and Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112850, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 384.
[62] Progress
Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 106212,
[63] Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 307, 316; citing Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 153166, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 210, 230.
[64] Sec.
9, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, issued on
[65] Dacut v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169434, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 260, 267.
[66]
G.R. No. 176240,
[67]
[68] Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Sallao, G.R. No. 166211, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 251, 259; citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Barrientos, G.R. No. 157028, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 311, 321-322.
[69] Supra note 7.
[70] Revised Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels.
[71] Supra note 8.
[72] Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, G.R. No. 168753, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 438, 448.
[73] Id.; citing Austria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146636, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 216, 221.
[74]
[75] Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, supra note 72, at 449; citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 47, 53; Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 74.
[76] Philimare, Inc./Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Suganob, supra note 72, at 448; citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cadiz, G.R. No. 154093, July 8, 2003, 405 SCRA 450, 454; Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 74.
[77] Supra note 74.
[78] Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 74.
[79]
[80]
G.R. No. 154798,
[81] Supra note 72.
[82] G.R.
No. 156573,
[83] G.R.
No. 165934,
[84] Supra note 74, at 350.
[85] Supra note 17.
[86] G.R.
No. 116354,
[87] Supra note 2, at 223.