FIRST DIVISION
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,
-
versus - JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT,
Respondents.
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G.R. No. 182497 Present: Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: June
29, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65[1] of
the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court (
Petitioner alleged in her petition that
her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police
Station. On
Petitioner continues that on 21 April
2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further
investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.[4] The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief
Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Private respondents had another
version of the antecedent facts. They
narrated that at around 7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a
sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of
the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita,
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior
Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with
Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected
to summary hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for
Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 8551[6] in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:
That
on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active
member of the
Acts
contrary to the existing
Also, through a Memorandum dated
1.
Reference: Memo from that Office dated
2.
This pertains to the power of the Chief,
3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.
4. For strict compliance.[8]
On
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No.
921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan under
restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April
2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:
Restrictive Custody
PO1
Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO effective
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:[10]
Meanwhile, on
Armed with the 21 April 2008
recommendation of the
On 24 April 2008, finding the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V.
Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and
directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or
restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.[12]
On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved
the Petition in its Order which reads:
Essentially,
counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally
detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008.
They further claim that as of
Respondents,
while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan,
assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an
administrative case for grave misconduct.
They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge
Sheet. Further, in support of their
position, respondents cited the case of
Petitioner
countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was
ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral.
Granting
arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply
ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the
The
filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the
Lastly,
anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1
Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could
not be accepted by this Court. It must
be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate
police officials of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.[13]
Distressed, petitioner is now before
this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
I.
THE
II.
THE
III.
THE
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.[15]
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed
in the issuance of the writ. The Rule
provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION
1. To
what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SEC
2. Who
may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof,
or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any
time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.
x x x x
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the
The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for
the writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[16]
Plainly stated, the writ obtains
immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the
custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.[17]
The most basic criterion for the
issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of
illegal restraint. If an individual’s
liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.[18] Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant
of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action.[19]
In general, the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as
a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.[20]
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must
first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the
writ will be refused.[21]
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a
person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed,
the petition should be dismissed.[22]
Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of
respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed
against him. When the release order of
Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April
2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on
On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment[23]
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court
correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents
maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended
that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only
insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution
office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which
he may be held under custody. In the
instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo
v. Calderon,[24]
where this Court held that a petition for habeas corpus will be
given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or
restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[25]
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been
placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the
Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may
be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as
a matter of internal discipline. The
pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
x x x x
4. The Chief of the
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes
a valid argument for his continued detention.
This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.[26]
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the
ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint
that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.[27]
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since
SEC. 55. Section 47 of
Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from
office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided,
however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing
the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension
of the accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower
than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided,
further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90)
days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided,
finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court
in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous
trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on
its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and
enshrined in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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JOSE
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WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
[2] Also spelled as Busser B. Ampatuan in some parts of the records.
[3] Rollo, p. 3.
[4] Records, p. 9.
[5]
[6] Philippine National Police Act of 1990.
[7] Records, p. 9.
[8] Rollo, p. 75.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Records, p. 24.
[13] Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[14]
[15] Moncupa v. Enrile, 225 Phil. 191, 197 (1986).
[16] Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 266, 301.
[17]
[18] In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, G.R. No. 158802, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 706, 719.
[19] Veluz v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169482, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 63, 67-68.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 45-70.
[24] G.R. No. 178920, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 290.
[25]
[26] Manalo v. Calderon, supra note 24 at 294.
[27]