Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
|
ROLANDO E.
MARCOS, Complainant,
- versus - JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 60, Respondent. |
A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2180 [Formerly
OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2817-RTJ] Present: CARPIO,
J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 26, 2010 |
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PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint[1]
dated February 1, 2008, filed by Rolando E. Marcos (complainant) against
respondent Ofelia T. Pinto (respondent judge), Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 60, Angeles City, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Knowingly
Rendering an Unjust Judgment/Order and Partiality relative to Criminal Case No.
04-775 entitled People of the
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On
On
On December 22, 2006,[5]
while the resolution of private complainant’s motion for reconsideration was
still pending, respondent Judge Pinto granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information and dismissed the subject case. The pertinent portion of the Order
reads:
On
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion to Withdraw Information and considers this case as dismissed.
The cash bail posted by the accused is hereby ordered released to him upon presentation of the original receipt.
SO ORDERED.
(Signed)
Ofelia Tuazon Pinto
On
On
Thus, feeling aggrieved, Marcos, one of the witnesses in the subject
criminal case, filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent
Judge Pinto.
Marcos alleged that respondent judge did not even exert any effort to
assess whether there was a valid ground to dismiss the case. He claimed that
respondent judge cannot validly dismiss the case based on the failure of the
private prosecutor to file any comment or opposition to the motion to withdraw
information. More so since as of
Moreover, complainant alleged that respondent judge manifested bias and
partiality in favor of accused Leyco which he attributed to a special
relationship between respondent judge and the Spouses Leyco. Complainant
claimed that respondent judge even acted as the solemnizing officer at the
marriage of Paul F. Leyco, son of accused Leyco. He, thus, questioned the
integrity of respondent judge, considering that the marriage ceremony was held
on
On
In her Comment[8]
dated
Judge Pinto likewise argued that complainant’s allegation that she had
been biased and partial to the accused was unsupported by evidence. She,
however, admitted that she was indeed the solemnizing officer in the marriage
of the accused’ son, Paul Leyco, but stressed that it was her duty after all to
solemnize marriages under the Family Code. She likewise pointed out that she
did not know that the parties were related to the accused. She claimed that she
came to know of such fact only when she was already in the residence of the
marrying parties. Judge Pinto insisted
that said act cannot be equated as giving favor to a party in a criminal case
contrary to what the complainant claims.
Finally, Judge Pinto argued that the instant complaint should be
dismissed outright, because complainant Marcos was not the true
party-in-interest in the criminal case; thus, he has no locus standi to
file the complaint. Marcos was a mere
witness for the prosecution.
In a Memorandum[9] dated
The OCA maintained that while Marcos is not the real party-in-interest in
the subject case, he can still file the instant administrative case against
respondent judge. It explained that in
administrative proceedings, the issue is not whether the complainant has a
cause of action against the respondent, but whether the employees have breached
the norms and standards of the Judiciary.
Thus, the Court, in a Resolution[10]
dated
In compliance, Justice Arturo G.
Tayag,[11]
in his Report and Recommendation, found the charges of gross ignorance of the
law and knowingly rendering an erroneous or unjust order against Judge Pinto to
be true and with basis. He, however, found the charge of violation of Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be baseless.
In his Report, Justice Tayag, observed
that Judge Pinto did not perform her duty of making an independent evaluation
or assessment of the merits of the case when she dismissed Criminal Case No.
04-775. He, however, found no basis for violation of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, since he noted that in cases where both the parties requested
the solemnizing officer, in writing, to have the marriage solemnized at a house
or place designated by them, such can be done.
Accordingly, Justice Tayag, after
considering that this is the respondent’s first offense and that respondent has
a good record as a Family Court Judge, recommended that Judge Pinto be meted a
penalty of two (2) months suspension from service without pay.
RULING
While we agree that respondent judge
should be administratively held liable for her acts, we, however, disagree with
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law,
the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was “gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious.” Also
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who – shown
to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption – ignored,
contradicted or failed to apply settled law and jurisprudence.[12]
Such is not the case presently before this Court.
In the
instant case, it was apparent that the assailed Order of dismissal was solely
anchored on the private prosecutor’s failure to file his comment and/or
objection to the Motion to Withdraw the Information. Indeed, respondent judge
did not perform her duty of making an independent evaluation or assessment of
the merits of the case when she dismissed Criminal Case No. 04-775. The disputed Order does not contain the facts
of the case and the law upon which the dismissal was based. However, there was also no evidence showing
that in issuing said Order, respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption.
In administrative proceedings like
the one at bench, it goes without saying that it is the complainant who has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaint.[13]
We do not find any evidence to support complainant’s accusations.
As
a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations
are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge. It does not mean, however, that a judge, given the leeway he is
accorded in such cases, should not evince due care in the performance of his
adjudicatory prerogatives.[14]
With regard to the accusation of
impropriety, we find it to be with basis. Section 1, Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary[15]
enunciates the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities."
Upon
assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and
of justice. Membership in the Judiciary circumscribes one’s personal
conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance
is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that
his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public
scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system.
This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of
conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar’s
wife in all their activities.[16] Hence, we require them to abide
strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Here, it
appears that respondent judge has failed to live up to those rigorous
standards. Her act of solemnizing the marriage of accused’s son in the
residence of the accused speaks for itself. It is improper and highly unethical
for a judge to actively participate in such social affairs, considering that
the accused is a party in a case pending before her own sala. What she should have done was courteously
deny the parties’ request. Her claim
that she was unaware that the parties were related to the accused fails to
convince.
In pending or prospective litigations before them,
judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken
the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence
their objectivity. Not only must judges possess proficiency in law, they must
also act and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and their
counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence.[17]
Considering the above findings, it is
apparent that respondent
judge’s actuations constitute simple misconduct.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, simple
misconduct is considered a less serious offense, sanctioned with suspension
without pay for not less than one month, but not more than three months, or a
fine of not less than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not exceeding Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds Judge Ofelia T. Pinto of the P10,000.00. She
is, likewise, STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice Chairperson |
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
|
JOSE CATRAL Associate
Justice |
|
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Raffle dated July 19, 2010.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-20.
[2] An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, And For Other Purposes. Approved June 17, 1992.
[3] Rollo, pp. 229-230.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[10]
[11] Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals to whom the instant administrative case was raffled for investigation and recommendation.
[12] Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1323, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 532, 541.
[13] Araos v. Luna-Pison, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677,
[14] Diego v. Judge Castillo, 479 Phil. 705, 713 (2004).
[15] A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, effective June 1, 2004.
[16] OCA v. Judge Sayo, 431 Phil. 408 (2002).
[17] Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz, 462 Phil. 620, 630 (2003).