Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
JULIE ANN C. DELA CUEVA,
Complainant, - versus - SELIMA B. OMAGA, Court Stenographer I, MTC-Calauan, Laguna, Respondent. |
|
A.M. NO. P-08-2590* Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This
administrative case stemmed from a sworn Affidavit-Complaint[1]
dated June 15, 2007 filed by Julie Ann dela Cueva charging respondent Selima B.
Omaga, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court, Calauan, Laguna, with Immorality.
Complainant Julie Ann C. dela
Cueva is the legal wife of P/Supt. Nestor dela Cueva.[2] They were married on
On
Complainant
dela Cueva also filed an administrative complaint against both her husband and
the respondent.[8] In her defense, respondent averred that she
first met P/Supt. dela Cueva in 1995 when he was assigned by the Philippine
National Police as Chief of Police in Calauan, Laguna. Their relationship started on March 8, 1995
and continued until she received notice of the bigamy and concubinage case
filed against him.[9] It was only then that she discovered that he
was married.[10] She bore P/Supt. dela Cueva three children:
John Emmanuel, born on December 27, 1996; Patrick Josef, born on May 1, 1998;
and Patricia May, born on May 18, 2000.[11] Respondent further asserted that despite
having had three children with P/Supt. dela Cueva, they did not live together
in one house but rather, he would just visit her in her house from time to
time.[12]
On October 23,
2008, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that “the complaint be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be in the
meantime suspended for a period six (6) months and one (1) day, without pay
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more
severely.”[13]
As
recommended, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative
matter in a Resolution dated
During the hearing
of the case before the investigating judge on October 8, 2009, the complainant
manifested that she was withdrawing her complaint after learning that respondent
and her husband never lived together as husband and wife.[16] Complainant confessed that she was prompted
to file the complaint simply because her husband had filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.[17]
In his Report
and Recommendation dated December 10, 2009, Judge Morga recommended that the respondent
be absolved from any administrative liability taking into consideration the
following circumstances: (1) respondent and P/Supt. dela Cueva began their
relationship after he was already separated in fact from complainant; (2) complainant
is no longer interested in pursuing the case as she realized that filing it was
a mistake since respondent and her husband never lived together as husband and
wife; (3) there is no evidence to contradict respondent’s claim that during
their relationship she did not know dela Cueva was married and that they did
not cohabit in one house; (4) respondent’s performance as court stenographer
was not adversely affected by her situation; and (5) respondent has properly
reared her children and conducted herself in public appropriately.[18] He further stated that:
All
told, the totality of the above circumstances necessitates a review on the
findings of the Honorable Court and the Court Administrator to impose a
six-month suspension. While it cannot be
disputed that respondent entered into an illicit relationship, the same to the
mind of this Investigator was not so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[19]
The sole
issue before this Court is whether or not respondent is guilty of immoral
conduct.
At
the outset, it should be stressed that complainant’s change of heart in
deciding not to pursue the case against respondent is of no moment as it has no
controlling significance in this administrative case. The long standing policy is:
Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may
be detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant
in a matter relating to its disciplinary power x x x Desistance cannot divest
the Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the complaint against
the respondent. To be sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and
actuations of officials and employees of the judiciary. And the program and
efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people should
not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between the
parties.[20]
This is so
because the issue in administrative cases is not whether the complainant
has a cause of action against the respondent but, rather, whether the employee
against whom the complaint is filed has breached the norms and standards of
service in the judiciary.[21]
As such, this Court, having disciplinary authority over employees of the lower
courts, has the power and duty to pursue this administrative matter regardless
of complainant’s desistance.
The Court now determines whether or not respondent is indeed guilty of
immoral conduct.
Well-established
is the principle that public office is a public trust.[22] No less than the Constitution requires that:
“Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”[23] In relation thereto, this Court has held
that:
x x x. This
constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public servants to
guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government
service. The good of the service and the degree of morality which every
official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and
confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law,
demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and
efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and commensurate
sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account.[24]
Employees of
the judiciary, however, are subject to a higher standard than most other civil
servants. It has been written that “a place in
the judiciary demands upright men and women who must carry on with dignity and
be ever conscious of the impression that they could create by the way they
conduct themselves.”[25] In the case of Acebedo
v. Arquero,[26] this Court ruled that:
Although
every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than
in the judiciary. That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting
standards of morality and decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention their behavior, is circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the public’s respect and
confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but
also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no
dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their private morals.[27]
These
exacting standards of morality and decency are required of employees of the
judiciary in order to preserve the faith of the people in the courts as
dispensers of justice.[28] Our reminder, through the words of Justice
Muñoz-Palma, must be taken to heart:
x x x. The
image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowest of its personnel - hence, it becomes the imperative sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing
as a true temple of justice.[29]
This was further emphasized by the Court in Ratti v. Mendoza-de Castro:[30]
It must
be stressed that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings with other
people. In order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of
justice, court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct.
Under the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six months and one day to
one year for the first offense.[31]
Immorality has
been defined to include not only sexual matters but also “conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity,
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.”[32]
There is no
doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a
violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary but is
also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this
Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.
Respondent
claims, however, that she had no knowledge that P/Supt. dela Cueva was married
and that she ended their relationship as soon as she was made aware of his true
civil status. If her contention were
true, this would serve to exculpate her from the accusation of immorality.
The Court
finds respondent’s assertion to be plausible.
It should be noted that the complainant did not refute her defense that
she did not learn of P/Supt. dela Cueva’s marital status until complainant
filed a complaint against them. Indeed,
there is no concrete evidence on record to show that respondent knew of his
married state at the time their relationship started.
The idea,
however, that the respondent never had the slightest notion that P/Supt. dela
Cueva was married and that she did not cohabit with him despite having three
children may be quite a stretch of the imagination. It is fairly inconceivable for a woman to
have had a relationship with a married man for more than a decade without even
a tinge of suspicion that he might have been lying about his true civil
status. But then again, there is nothing
on record which can refute respondent’s allegation. In view of the lack of proof showing that
respondent willingly entered into an immoral sexual liaison with a married man,
she cannot be held liable for immoral and disgraceful conduct.
It
is a well-settled rule that administrative penalties must be supported by
substantial evidence for the imposition thereof.[33] This is in keeping with the constitutional
imperative that a person is entitled to due process of law. The Court will exercise its disciplinary
authority over respondent only if the case against her is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34] In this case, the Court finds the evidence
against respondent insufficient to warrant the imposition of an administrative
penalty.
We are, thus,
guided by the disquisition of the Court in the case of Concerned Employee v. Mayor.[35]
In said case, a court stenographer had sexual relations with a married man. She
alleged that she did not know that her lover was married when they commenced
their relationship. The Court acknowledged the validity of such a defense:
The legal effect of such ignorance
deserves due consideration, if only for intellectual clarity. The act of having
sexual relations with a married person, or of married persons having sexual
relations outside their marriage is considered “disgraceful and immoral”
conduct because such manifests deliberate disregard by the actor of the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and our laws. The perversion is especially
egregious if committed by judicial personnel, those persons specifically tasked
with the administration of justice and the laws of the land. However, the malevolent
intent that normally characterizes the act is not present when the employee is
unaware that his/her sexual partner is actually married. This lack of awareness
may extenuate the cause for the penalty, as it did in the aforementioned Ui case.[36] (emphasis supplied)
In the cited case
of Ui v. Bonifacio,[37] the
respondent was a female lawyer who had a relationship with, and actually
married, a man whose earlier marriage was still subsisting. She asserted, however, that as soon as she
learned that he was married, she left him and ended their association. The Court found that she did not deserve administrative
punishment:
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
We have
held that “a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships
. . . but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.” Respondent's
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal
profession. Complainant's bare assertions
to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This,
herein complainant miserably failed to do.[38]
(emphases supplied)
On a final
note, the Court would like to point out that, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence, it would be insensitive to condemn the respondent for simply
being an unmarried mother of three. There
has been no showing that she has lived her life in a scandalous and disgraceful
manner which, by any means, has affected her standing in the community.[39]
To speculate that she did so would be tantamount to committing a discrimination
against a solo parent,[40]
which is prohibited under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8972, the Solo Parents’
Welfare Act of 2000, to wit:
Section 7. Work Discrimination – No employer shall
discriminate against any solo parent employee with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account of his/her status.
WHEREFORE, the
complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against respondent Selima B.
Omaga is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A.
ABAD
Associate Justice
* Formerly OCA-IPI No. 08-2986-P.
[1] Rollo, p. 5.
[2]
[3]
[4] Id at 124-127.
[5]
[6] Id at 9.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Gamboa v. Gamboa, A.M. No. P-04-1836, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 436, 440 citing Rizon v. Zerna, 365 SCRA 315, 319 (2001).
[21]
[22] Const. (1987), Art. XI, Sec. 1.
[23]
[24] Lim-Arce v.
Arce, A.M. No. 89-312, January 9, 1992, 205 SCRA 21, 31.
[25] Supra note 20.
[26] A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 10.
[27] Acebedo v. Arquero, A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 10, 16.
[28] Navarro v. Navarro A.M. No. O.C.A.-00-01, September 6, 2000, 339 SCRA 709, 717.
[29] Recto v. Racelis, A.M. No. P-182, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 438, 443.
[30] A.M. No. P-04-1844, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA 11.
[31] CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, Rule IV, Sec. 52(A)(15).
[32] Regir v. Regir, A.M. No. P-06-2282, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 455, 462.
[33] Concerned Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA SCRA 448, 456.
[34] Ui v. Bonifacio, Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38, 52.
[35] Supra note 33.
[36] Supra note 33 at 462.
[37] Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38.
[38]
[39] Separate Opinion of Justice Bellosillo in Estrada v. Escritor, A. M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1, 200.
[40] Included in the definition of a “solo parent” under Section 3(a)(8) of Republic Act No. 8972 is an unmarried mother who has preferred to keep and rear her children instead of having others case for them or give them up to a welfare institution.