Republic of the
Supreme Court
Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra,
Petitioner, -
versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V.
GONZALES, and Respondents. |
G.R. No. 191938
Present: CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 2, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION,
J.:
The minimum requirement under our Constitution[1]
and election laws[2]
for the candidates’ residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never
been intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very
specific purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with
the conditions and needs of a community” from seeking elective offices in that community.[3]
The requirement is rooted in the recognition that
officials of districts or localities should not only be acquainted with the
metes and bounds of their constituencies; more importantly, they should know
their constituencies and the unique circumstances of their constituents – their
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and
all matters vital to their common welfare.
Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these circumstances
can only come with residency in the constituency to be represented.
The purpose of the residency requirement is “best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.”[4] At the
same time, the constituents themselves can best know and evaluate the
candidates’ qualifications and fitness for office if these candidates have
lived among them.[5]
Read and understood in this manner, residency can readily be
appreciated as a requirement that goes into the heart of our democratic system;
it directly supports the purpose of representation – electing those who can
best serve the community because of their knowledge and sensitivity to its
needs. It likewise adds meaning and
substance to the voters’ freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that
characterizes every democracy.
In the
present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B.
Mitra for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the
The Antecedents
When his COC for the position of
Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other
territories, the
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end
of Mitra’s second term as Representative),
On March 20, 2009, with the intention
of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta.
Monica,
Soon
thereafter, respondents Antonio V.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.[10] They essentially argued that Mitra remains a
resident of
The
Parties’ Claims and Evidence
The respondents’ petition before the
COMELEC claimed that Mitra’s COC should be cancelled under the following
factual premises: (a) Mitra bought, in June 2009, a parcel of land in Aborlan
where he began to construct a house, but up to the time of the filing of the
petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC, the house had yet to be
completed; (b) in the document of sale, Puerto Princesa City was stated as
Mitra’s residence (attached as Annex “J” of the Respondents’ Petition before
the COMELEC);[12] (c)
Mitra’s Puerto Princesa City residence was similarly stated in his application
for a building permit (attached as Annex “K” of the Respondents’ Petition
before the COMELEC);[13]
and (d) Mitra’s community tax certificate states that his residence was Puerto
Princesa City (attached as Annex “M” of the Respondents’ Petition before the
COMELEC).[14] The respondents presented several affidavits
attesting to the non-completion of the construction of the house,[15]
and asserted that without a fully constructed house, Mitra could not claim
residence in Aborlan.
Mitra
denied the respondents’ allegations in his Answer. He claimed that the respondents misled the
COMELEC by presenting photographs of his unfinished house on the land he
purchased from a certain
He
submitted the following: (a) the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ricardo Temple;
Florame T. Gabrillo, the Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; Marissa U. Zumarraga,
Councilor of Aborlan; Virginia J. Agpao and Elsa M. Dalisay, both Sangguniang
Barangay members of Isaub, Aborlan, attesting that Mitra resides in their
locality;[17] (b)
photographs of the residential portion of the Maligaya Feedmill[18]
where he claims to reside, and of his Aborlan experimental pineapple
plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm;[19]
(c) the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill;[20]
(d) the community tax certificate he claims he himself secured, stating that
Aborlan is his residence;[21]
and (e) an updated identification card issued by the House of Representatives
stating that Aborlan is his residence.[22]
To
refute Mitra’s claimed residence in Aborlan – specifically, that he resides at
the Maligaya Feedmill property – the respondents additionally submitted: (a) the
affidavits of the 14 Punong Barangays
of Aborlan and of six residents of Aborlan, all stating that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan and has never been seen in that municipality; (b) a
Certification from the Barangay Captain of Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa
City stating that Mitra was a resident of that barangay as of November 16,
2009; (c) the affidavit of Commodore Nicanor Hernandez attesting that Mitra
continues to reside in Puerto Princesa City; and (d) 24 affidavits of former
employees, workers, Aborlan residents and a customer of the Maligaya Feedmill
attesting that they have never seen Mitra during the time he claimed to have lived
there and that the area where Mitra supposedly lives is, in fact, the office of
the feedmill and is unlivable due to noise and pollution.[23]
The Ruling of the COMELEC’s
First Division[24]
The
Law. The First Division defined the
governing law with the statement that residence means domicile under the
Court’s consistent rulings since 1928 in Nuval
v. Guray.[25] Domicile imports not only the intent to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of this intention.[26]
To acquire a new domicile – a domicile
by choice – the following must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in a
new locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words, there must
be an animus non revertendi with
respect to the old domicile, and an animus
manendi at the domicile of choice.
The intent to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time and the acts of the person must be consistent with this
intent.[27]
The
First Division’s Evaluation of the Parties’ Evidence. Based on its consideration of the submitted evidence
(including various affidavits submitted by both parties and the photographs of
the room that Mitra claims to be his residence) and citing jurisprudence, the
First Division granted the respondents’ petition to cancel Mitra’s COC.
To the First Division, Mitra’s
submitted pictures are telling; they show a small, sparsely furnished room that
is evidently unlived in, located at the second floor of a structure that
appears to be a factory or a warehouse; the residence appears hastily set-up,
cold, and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s personality such as old
family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. What the
supposed residence lacks, in the First Division’s perception, are the loving attention and
details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence; perhaps, at most,
this small room could have served as Mitra’s resting area whenever he visited
the locality, but nothing more than this.[28]
These observations – coupled with the
statements from former employees and customers of the Maligaya Feedmill that
the claimed residence is located in an unsavory location (for its noise and
pollution), and that it had been in fact Maligaya Feedmill’s office just a few
months back – militated against Mitra’s claim. These pieces of information made it clear, to
the First Division, that this room is not the home that a residence is supposed
to be.[29]
A person’s domicile of origin is not
easily lost, the First Division further said.
The fact that Mitra registered as a voter in Aborlan, has a cock farm, a
farm, a rest house and an experimental pineapple plantation in Maligaya Feedmill,
was occasionally seen staying in Aborlan, and held meetings with Aborlan
constituents does not necessarily establish Mitra’s status as an Aborlan
resident, or prove his abandonment of his domicile of origin in Puerto Princesa
City. Mere absence from one’s residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, engage in business, or practice one’s vocation is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of domicile.
Registration or voting in a place other than one’s domicile does not
eliminate an individual’s animus
revertendi to his domicile of origin; the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to the place of birth and his strong feeling of
attachment to this place can only be shown to have been overcome by a positive
proof of abandonment of this place for another.[30]
Also, the First Division said that
Mitra’s witnesses’ sworn statements appear to have been prepared by the same
person, as they use similar wordings, allegations, and contents; thus, putting
into question the credibility of the statements. Furthermore, the lease contract over the
Maligaya Feedmill between Mitra and Carme Caspe is effective only up to February
28, 2010, thus casting doubt on Mitra’s claim of residency in Aborlan.[31]
The COMELEC
En Banc Ruling
The
COMELEC en banc – in a divided
decision[32] – subsequently
denied Mitra’s motion to reconsider the First Division ruling under the
following outlined reasons.
First, registration as a
voter of Aborlan is not sufficient evidence that Mitra has successfully
abandoned his domicile of origin.[33]
Second, mere intent cannot
supplant the express requirement of the law; the “physical presence” required
to establish domicile connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in a given locality. The COMELEC en banc agreed with the First Division’s evidentiary findings on
this point.[34]
Third, the First Division’s
Resolution was based on a careful and judicious examination and consideration
of all evidence submitted by the parties. The summary nature of the proceedings
is not necessarily offensive to a party’s right to due process.[35]
Fourth, Fernandez v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal[36] is
not on all fours with the present case – Fernandez
stemmed from a quo warranto case
while the present case involves a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC. Likewise, Fernandez successfully proved that
his transfer to
In his Dissent,[38]
Commissioner Sarmiento points out that the following acts of Mitra, taken
collectively, indubitably prove a change of domicile from Puerto Princesa to
Aborlan:
(a)
in
January 2008, [Mitra] started a pineapple growing project in a rented farmland
near Maligaya Feedmill and Farm located in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan;
(b)
in
February 2008, [Mitra] leased the residential portion of the said Maligaya
Feedmill;
(c)
in
March 2008, after the said residential portion has been refurbished and
renovated, [Mitra] started to occupy and reside in the said premises;
(d)
in
2009, [Mitra] purchased his own farmland in the same barangay but
continued the lease involving the Maligaya Feedmill, the contract of which was
even renewed until February 2010; and
(e)
[Mitra]
caused the construction of a house in the purchased lot which has been recently
completed.[39]
The Petition
Mitra
supports his petition with the following ARGUMENTS:
6.1
x x
x COMELEC’s GRAVE ABUSE is most
patent as IT forgets, wittingly or unwittingly that the solitary GROUND to deny
due course to a COC is the DELIBERATE false material
representation to DECEIVE, and not the issue of
the candidate’s eligibility which should be resolved in an appropriate QUO WARRANTO proceedings post election.[40]
6.2
Deny Due Course Petitions under Section 78 of the OEC, being SUMMARILY decided
and resolved, the same must be exercised most sparingly, with utmost care and
extreme caution; and construed most strictly against the proponent/s, and
liberally in favor of the candidate sought to be eliminated. When exercised otherwise and with apparent
biased in favor of the proponents, as in this instance, GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION necessarily sets in.[41]
6.3
The mandate to be extremely cautious and careful in the SUMMARY exercise of the
awesome power to simplistically cancel [one’s] candidacy x
x x is further made manifest by the availability
of a QUO WARRANTO proceeding appropriately prosecuted post election.[42]
6.4
Absent any formal HEARINGS and Presentation
of Evidence; Lacking the actual inspection and verification; and without actual
confrontation of affiants/alleged witnesses – ALL the “conclusions” of COMELEC
on the RESIDENCE issue, were indeed predicted (sic) on sheer SPECULATION[.][43]
6.5
A grievous procedural flaw, FATAL in character.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF MUST ALWAYS BE PLACED ON THE SHOULDERS OF THE
PROPONENT/s. Not so in the present
controversy, where COMELEC’s assailed decision/s were devoted exclusively to
the alleged weakness of MITRA’s submissions and COMELEC’s speculative
conclusions, rather than on the strength of proponents’ unverified and
unconfirmed submissions and unconfronted sworn statements of supposed affiants[.][44]
The petition also asks for ancillary
injunctive relief. We granted the
application for injunctive relief by issuing a status quo ante order, allowing Mitra to be voted upon in the May
10, 2010 elections.[45]
The
respondents’ Comment[46]
states the following counter-arguments:
a.
Procedural Arguments:
II. THE INSTANT PETITION FAILED TO ATTACH
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE MATERIAL PORTIONS OF THE RECORDS REFERRED TO
THEREIN IN GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 5 OF RULE 64 OF THE RULES OF COURT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT MUST BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.
III. THE INSTANT PETITION RAISES MERE
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT, WHICH ARE OUTSIDE THIS HONORABLE COURT’S CERTIORARI
JURISDICTION.
b. Arguments on the Merits
I.
XXX
B. THE LAW, IN IMPOSING A RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT, MANDATES NOT ONLY FAMILIARITY WITH THE NEEDS AND CONDITIONS OF THE
LOCALITY, BUT ALSO ACTUAL PHYSICAL, PERSONAL AND PERMANENT RESIDENCE
THEREIN. PETITIONER’S SUPPOSED
FAMILIARITY WITH THE “NEEDS, DIFFICULTIES, ASPIRATIONS, POTENTIALS (SIC) FOR GROWTH AND ALL MATTERS VITAL TO
THE WELFARE OF HIS CONSTITUENCY WHICH CONSTITUTES ONE/THIRD OF THE WHOLE
PROVINCE OF PALAWAN” AS A THREE-TERM CONGRESSMAN ABSENT SUCH RESIDENCE
DOES NOT SUFFICE TO MEET THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES SUCH AS THE COMELEC, ARE ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT, IF NOT FINALITY BY THE
COURTS, ESPECIALLY IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. BECAUSE THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COMELEC
IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THIS
HONORABLE COURT MAY NOT REVERSE SUCH FINDINGS.
V. THE COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT ANY GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED 04 MAY 2010.
A.
THE
COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER’S REGISTRATION AS A VOTER IN ABORLAN,
PALAWAN IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY ABANDONED HIS
DOMICILE OF ORIGIN AT PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, PALAWAN.
B.
THE
COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER’S MERE INTENT TO TRANSFER RESIDENCE TO
ABORLAN, PALAWAN, ABSENT ACTUAL, FACTUAL, AND BONA FIDE RESIDENCE THEREIN DOES NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE HIS TRANSFER
OF RESIDENCE FROM PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN TO ABORLAN,
C.
THE
COMELEC THOROUGHLY EVALUATED THE EVIDENCE, AND CORRECTLY ARRIVED AT THE
ASSAILED DECISION ONLY AFTER MUCH DELIBERATION AND CAREFUL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE,
ALBEIT THROUGH SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVELY BY PETITIONER. THE COMELEC CORRECTLY DID NOT GIVE CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PETITIONER’S WITNESSES FOR BEING INCREDIBLE AND CONTRARY
TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, ESPECIALLY PERTAINING TO HIS ALLEGED RESIDENCE AT THE
FEEDMILL PROPERTY.
D.
THE
COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT TRANSFERRED HIS RESIDENCE FROM
PUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN TO ABORLAN,
E.
THE
ALLEGED LEASE OF THE RESIDENTIAL PORTION OF THE FEEDMILL PROPERTY IS A SHAM.
VI.
GIVEN
HIS STATURE AS A MEMBER OF THE PROMINENT MITRA CLAN OF
VII.
THE
COMELEC CORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONER MAY NOT INVOKE THE CASE OF FERNANDEZ V.
HRET AS PETITIONER IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED AS DAN FERNANDEZ.
VIII. THE MATERIAL STATEMENT IN
PETITIONER’S COC RESPECTING HIS RESIDENCE HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE FALSE. BY MAKING SUCH FALSE STATEMENT, PETITIONER
DELIBERATELY TRIED TO MISLEAD AND TO MISINFORM THE ELECTORATE AS TO HIS ACTUAL
RESIDENCE. HENCE, HIS COC WAS CORRECTLY
DENIED DUE COURSE AND CANCELED.
In the
recently concluded elections of May 10, 2010, Mitra obtained the most number of
votes for Governor and was accordingly proclaimed winner of the
We
required the respondents and the COMELEC to comment on the petition.[48] They complied on May 6, 2010[49]
and June 2, 2010, respectively.[50] On May 17, 2010, the petitioner filed a
“Supplemental Petition.”[51]
On May
26, 2010, the respondents filed a “Supplemental Comment (with Omnibus Motion to
Annul Proclamation and for Early Resolution)” to the petitioner’s “Supplemental
Petition.”[52] We
deemed the case ready for resolution on the basis of these submissions.
The
Court’s Ruling
We find the petition
meritorious.
The Limited Review in Certiorari Petitions under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
A preliminary matter before us is the respondents’ jurisdictional
objection based on the issues raised in the present petition. The respondents assert that the questions
Mitra brought to us are beyond our certiorari
jurisdiction. Specifically, the
respondents contend that Mitra’s petition merely seeks to correct errors of the
COMELEC in appreciating the parties’ evidence – a question we cannot entertain
under our limited certiorari jurisdiction.
Mitra brought his case before us pursuant to Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[53] Our review, therefore, is based on a very
limited ground – the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether the COMELEC, by law,
has jurisdiction over a case or matter brought to it is resolved by considering
the black-letter provisions of the Constitution and pertinent election laws,
and we see no disputed issue on this point.
Other than the respondents’ procedural objections which we will fully
discuss below, the present case rests on the allegation of grave abuse of
discretion – an issue that generally is not as simple to resolve.
As a concept, “grave abuse of
discretion” defies exact definition; generally, it refers to “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction”; the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[54] Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave.[55] We have
held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a
decision-maker’s action with grave abuse of discretion.[56]
Closely
related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under
Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and non-reviewable.
Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.[57]
In light of our limited
authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari
case the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard
generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however,
when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps
the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the
Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.[58] When grave abuse of discretion is present,
resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.[59]
Our reading of the petition shows that it is
sufficient in form with respect to the requisite allegation of jurisdictional
error. Mitra clearly alleged the COMELEC acts that were
supposedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, we do not agree with the respondents’
contention that the petition on its face raises mere errors of
judgment that are outside our certiorari
jurisdiction. Whether the allegations of
“grave abuse” are duly supported and substantiated is another matter and is the
subject of the discussions below.
Nature of the Case under Review:
COC
Denial/Cancellation Proceedings
The present petition arose from a petition
to deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC. This is the context of and take-off point for our
review. From this perspective, the nature
and requisites of the COC cancellation proceedings are primary considerations
in resolving the present petition.[60]
Section 74, in
relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) governs the
cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections
requires that the candidate’s stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of
the COC’s denial or cancellation if any false representation of a material fact
is made. To quote these provisions:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. —
The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x
SEC. 78.
Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
– A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days
before the election.
The
false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to
a material fact. The critical material
facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office,
such as his or her citizenship and residence.
The candidate’s status as a registered voter in the political unit where
he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a
requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the
COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will
work for and represent the political unit where he or she ran as a candidate.[61]
The
false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a “deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.” Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office.[62] Thus,
the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive
is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who
falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot
serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
Based on these standards, we find that
Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan,
Under the evidentiary
situation of the case, there is clearly no basis for the conclusion that Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead the
From
the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from
Mitra’s
domicile of origin is undisputedly
(1)
residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) an
intention to remain there; and
(3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile.[63]
The
contentious issues in Mitra’s case relate to his bodily presence, or the lack
of it, in Aborlan, and the declaration he made on this point. The respondents anchor their cause of action
on the alleged falsity of Mitra’s statement that he is a resident of
Aborlan. To support this contention, the
respondents claim that the construction of the supposed Mitra residence or
house, other than the leased premises in Maligaya Feedmill, has yet to be
completed, leaving Mitra with no habitable place in Aborlan. When Mitra successfully refuted this original
claim, the respondents presented sworn statements of Aborlan residents contradicting
Mitra’s claimed physical residence at the Maligaya Feedmill building in
Aborlan. They likewise point out, by
sworn statements, that this alleged residence could not be considered a house
that Mitra could properly consider his residence, on the view that the feedmill
place is beneath what Mitra – a three-term congressman and a member of the
Mitra political clan of Palawan – would occupy.
Mitra,
on the other hand, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the
seller of the land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site of his
residence) attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the
residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his
experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock farm; the lease contract
over the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started
constructing his house. He clarified,
too, that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actual residence is the
mezzanine portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building.
Faced
with the seemingly directly contradictory evidence, the COMELEC apparently
grossly misread its import and, because it used wrong considerations, was led
into its faulty conclusion.
The
seeming contradictions arose from the sworn statements of some Aborlan
residents attesting that they never saw Mitra in Aborlan; these are
controverted by similar sworn statements by other Aborlan residents that Mitra
physically resides in Aborlan. The
number of witnesses and their conflicting claims for and against Mitra’s
residency appear to have sidetracked the COMELEC. Substantial evidence, however, is not a
simple question of number; reason demands that the focus be on what these differing
statements say.
For
example, the sworn statements that Mitra has never been seen in Aborlan border
on the unbelievable and loudly speak of their inherent weakness as evidence.
Mitra has
established business interests in Aborlan, a fact which the respondents have
never disputed. He was then the incumbent three-term Representative who, as
early as 2008, already entertained thoughts of running for Governor in 2010. It is not disputed, too, that Mitra has
started the construction of a house on a lot he bought from
While
Mitra might not have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009
because his office and activities as a Representative were in
The parties’
submitted documentary evidence likewise requires careful consideration for the
correct appraisal of its evidentiary value.
On the one hand, the document of sale of the
We
cannot give full evidentiary weight to the contract of sale as evidence
relating to Mitra’s residence for two reasons.
First, it is a unilateral contract executed by the
seller (
The
building permit, on the other hand, was filed by Mitra’s representative, an
architect named John Quillope, who apparently likewise filled the form. That Mitra only signed the building permit
form is readily discernible from an examination of the face of the form; even
the statement on his community tax certificate bearing a
The
respondents expectedly attacked the validity of the lease contract; they
contended in their Memorandum that the feedmill was situated in a forest land
that cannot be leased, and that the contract, while notarized, was not
registered with the required notarial office of the court.[71]
The
validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what
concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement
for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his
residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and
whether he indeed resided there. The
notary’s compliance with the notarial law likewise assumes no materiality as it
is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the parties’
affirmation before a notary public of the contract’s genuineness and due
execution.
A sworn
statement that has no counterpart in the respondents’ evidence in so far as it
provides details (particularly when read with the statement of
In
considering the residency issue, the COMELEC practically focused solely on its
consideration of Mitra’s residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere photographs
of the premises. In the COMELEC’s view (expressly voiced out by the Division
and fully concurred in by the En Banc),
the Maligaya Feedmill building could not have been Mitra’s residence because it
is cold and utterly devoid of any
indication of Mitra’s personality and that
it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s
residence.[75] This was the main reason that the COMELEC
relied upon for its conclusion.
Such
assessment, in our view, based on the interior design and furnishings of a
dwelling as shown by and examined only through photographs, is far from
reasonable; the COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as a
person’s residence based solely on very
personal and subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used. Where a dwelling
qualifies as a residence – i.e., the
dwelling where a person permanently intends to return to and to remain[76] –
his or her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack of it, is
immaterial.
Examined
further, the COMELEC’s reasoning is not only intensely subjective but also
flimsy, to the point of grave abuse of discretion when compared with the surrounding
indicators showing the Mitra has indeed been physically present in Aborlan for
the required period with every intent to settle there. Specifically, it was lost on the COMELEC
majority (but not on the Dissent) that Mitra made definite, although
incremental transfer moves, as shown by the undisputed business interests he has
established in Aborlan in 2008; by the lease of a dwelling where he established
his base; by the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; by his transfer of
registration as a voter in March 2009; and by the construction of a house all
viewed against the backdrop of a bachelor Representative who spent most of his
working hours in Manila, who had a whole congressional district to take care of,
and who was establishing at the same time his significant presence in the whole
Province of Palawan.
From
these perspectives, we cannot but conclude that the COMELEC’s approach – i.e., the application of subjective
non-legal standards and the gross misappreciation of the evidence – is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, as the COMELEC used wrong considerations and
grossly misread the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. In using subjective standards, the COMELEC
committed an act not otherwise within the contemplation of law on an
evidentiary point that served as a major basis for its conclusion in the
case.
With
this analysis and conclusion in mind, we come to the critical question of
whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented that his residence is in Aborlan to
deceive and mislead the people of the
We do
not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he
knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold
that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitra’s
favor; even assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go
below the level of an equipoise, i.e., when
weighed, Mitra’s evidence of transfer
and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by the respondents’ evidence that
he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed
any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.
The
character of Mitra’s representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case
that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the
character of Mitra’s feedmill residence.
For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error – one that goes beyond
an ordinary error of judgment. By
failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate misrepresentation
in Mitra’s COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming that
an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material
representation. In this case, it doubly
erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows,
Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section
74 of the OEC.
The
respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach
of using subjective norms, as they now argue that given his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra clan of Palawan, and
as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a
feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.[77]
We
reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the
COMELEC’s use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitra’s feed mill dwelling
cannot be considered in isolation and separately from the circumstances of his
transfer of residence, specifically, his expressed
intent to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make
him eligible to run for a provincial position; his preparatory moves starting
in early 2008; his initial transfer through a leased dwelling; the purchase of
a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in this lot that,
parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion
of his house. These incremental moves do
not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELEC’s highly subjective
non-legal standards do.
Thus, we
can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us,
that the respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to
overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and
the validity of his representation on this point in his COC, while the COMELEC could
not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s
statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
Mitra has significant
relationship with, and intimate knowledge of, the constituency he wishes to
serve.
Citing jurisprudence, we began this ponencia with a discussion of the
purpose of the residency requirement under the law. By law, this residency can be anywhere within
the
We also
consider that even before his transfer of residence, he already had intimate
knowledge of the
We can
reasonably conclude from all these that Mitra is not oblivious to the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potential for growth and development, and all
matters vital to the common welfare of the constituency he intends to serve. Mitra
who is no stranger to Palawan has merely been compelled – after serving three
terms as representative of the congressional district that includes
This
case, incidentally, is not the first that we have encountered where a former
elective official had to transfer residence in order to continue his public
service in another political unit that he could not legally access, as a
candidate, without a change of residence.
In Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC,[79] former
Governor Vicente Y. Emano re-occupied a house he owned and had leased out in
Cagayan de Oro City to qualify as a candidate for the post of Mayor of that
city (like Puerto Princesa City, a highly urbanized city whose residents cannot
vote for and be voted upon as elective provincial officials). We said in that case that –
In other
words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent
in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill
the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the
mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic,
academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy
this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement.
In Asistio v. Hon. Trinidad Pe-Aguirre,[80] we
also had occasion to rule on the residency and right to vote of former
Congressman Luis A. Asistio who had been a congressman for
These
cases are to be distinguished from the case of Velasco v. COMELEC[82] where
the COMELEC cancelled the COC of Velasco, a mayoralty candidate, on the basis
of his undisputed knowledge, at the time he filed his COC, that his inclusion
and registration as a voter had been denied. His failure to register as a voter was a
material fact that he had clearly withheld from the COMELEC; he knew of the
denial of his application to register and yet concealed his non-voter status when
he filed his COC. Thus, we affirmed the
COMELEC’s action in cancelling his COC.
If
there is any similarity at all in Velasco
and the present case, that similarity is in the recognition in both cases of
the rule of law. In Velasco, we recognized – based on the law – that a basic defect
existed prior to his candidacy, leading to his disqualification and the vice-mayor-elect’s
assumption to the office. In the present
case, we recognize the validity of Mitra’s COC, again on the basis of
substantive and procedural law, and no
occasion arises for the vice-governor-elect to assume the gubernatorial post.
Mitra has been proclaimed winner
in the electoral contest and has therefore the
mandate of the electorate to serve
We have
applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate.[83] Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are in mandatory
terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be
construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the
people.[84]
Quite
recently, however, we warned against a blanket
and unqualified reading and application of this ruling, as it may carry
dangerous significance to the rule of law and the integrity of our
elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information for an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness
for office.[85] Short of adopting a clear cut standard, we
thus made the following clarification:
We distinguish our ruling in this case
from others that we have made in the past by the clarification that COC defects
beyond matters of form and that
involve material misrepresentations
cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements
before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have
spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than
the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby
violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an
assault on the will of the people of the
Earlier, Frivaldo
v. COMELEC[87]
provided the following test:
[T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the
survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy
to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote.
[Emphasis supplied.]
With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any
material misrepresentation in his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal
to the primacy of the electorate’s will. We cannot deny, however, that the people of
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we GRANT the petition
and ANNUL the assailed COMELEC Resolutions in Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon,
Jr. v. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (SPA No. 09-038 [C]). We DENY the respondents’ petition to
cancel Abraham Kahlil Mitra’s Certificate of Candidacy. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO
C. Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR. Associate Justice JOSE
CATRAL Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
RENATO
C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Section
3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
[2] Section
39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
SEC. 39.
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
[3] Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337
SCRA 574, 584, citing Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300,
313 (1995), per Kapunan, J.; citing Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453,
459 (1941).
[4] Ibid.
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 3-259.
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra
note 11.
[17] Rollo,
pp. 172-193.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] See Attachments in the Respondents’ Memorandum
filed before the COMELEC; and the Decision of the First Division of the
COMELEC, id. at 58-68.
[24] Ibid.
[25] 52 Phil. 645, 651 (1928).
[26] Rollo, p. 62.
[27]
[28]
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31]
[32] Dated May 4, 2010. Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, no part;
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, concurring; Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and
Lucenito N. Tagle, dissenting.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
[37] Rollo,
pp. 79-81.
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] Resolution dated May 7, 2010; id. at 971-973.
[46]
[47] See the Petitioner’s Manifestation dated
May 24, 2010. The petitioner garnered
146, 847 votes while candidate Jose C. Alvarez garnered the second highest with
131, 872 votes.
[48] Supra
note 45.
[49] Supra
note 46.
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53] Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC.
2. Mode of
review. – A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to
the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
[54] Quintos v. COMELEC, 440 Phil. 1045
(2002).
[55] Suliguin v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
166046, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 219.
[56] Varias v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
189078, February 11, 2010.
[57]
[58] Section 1, par. 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
[59] Supra note 56, citing De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159713,
March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 698.
[60] See Velasco v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 602-603.
[61]
[62]
[63] See Fernandez
v. HRET, supra note 36.
[64] Rollo,
p. 132.
[65] Ibid.
[66] See Annex “M” of the Respondents Petition
before the COMELEC dated December 5, 2009.
[67] In her Affidavit
dated December 9, 2009, Lilia Camora alleged that:
2. Part of my duties as District Staff is to keep the records
of Congressman Mitra including the renewal of various documents, permits and
license.
3. In February 2009, considering that there are documents
requiring an updated Community Tax Certificate of Congressman Mitra, I took it
upon myself to secure a Community Tax Certificate in Barangay Sta. Monica,
4. Although I am aware
that he already changed his residence, considering that I do not know the exact
address of his new residence, I decided
to place his old residence in Puerto Princesa City in the Community Tax
Certificate issued without any intention of malice or to do harm to anyone
but simply to comply with my record keeping duties.
5. In fact, the issued Community Tax
Certificate does not bear any signature or thumbprint of Congressman Mitra. [Emphasis
supplied]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71] See the Respondents’ Memorandum before
the COMELEC en banc dated February
23, 2010.
[72] In his December 7, 2009 Sworn Statement,
Ricardo Temple alleged that: (1) he is a “Kagawad” of Barangay Isaub, Aborlan,
Palawan; (2) he knew Congressman Abraham
Kahlil B. Mitra (Cong. Mitra) since
the year 2001; (3) on January 2008, Cong. Mitra frequently visited Brgy. Isaub
to establish his Pineapple Farm Project in a plot of leased land near the
Maligaya Feedmill; (4) in March 2008, Cong. Mitra told him that he intended to
permanently reside at Maligaya Feedmill and that he was interested in
purchasing a lot where he could build his new house; (5) after a few months, he
sold a lot, belonging to his son located in Sitio Maligaya, Isaub, Aborlan,
Palawan which was situated near the Maligaya Feedmill and Farm to Cong. Mitra
to which the latter paid in full in April 2009; (6) on June 5, 2009, Rexter
Temple and Cong. Mitra executed a Deed of Sale over the lot; (7) starting April
2009, Cong. Mitra commenced the construction of a fence surrounding the lot, a
farmhouse and a water system; (8) in June 2009, Cong. Mitra initiated the construction
of a concrete house on the lot; (9) in June 2009, Cong. Mitra’s fighting cocks
arrived in Sitio Maligaya; and (10) at present, Cong. Mitra continues to reside
at Maligaya Feedmill pending the completion of his house in Sitio Maligaya.
[73]
[74] See also, in this regard, the Dissent of
Commissioner Rene Sarmiento; id. at
83-85.
[75] Supra
note 23, at 65-66.
[76] The term “residence” is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but
rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is “the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). Coquilla v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607, 616, citing Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA
400, 420 (1995).
[77] See the Respondents’ Comment, supra note 46.
[78] Supra
note 45, at 333-336.
[79] Supra
note 3, at 587.
[80] G.R. No. 191124,
April 27, 2010.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Supra note 60.
[83] Supra
note 3, at 587-588.
[84] Supra
note 60.
[85] Ibid.
[86]
[87] G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755, June 28,
1996, 257 SCRA 727, 771-772.