Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
EUMELIA R. MITRA, Petitioner, -
versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondents. |
|
G.R. NO. 191404 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated: July 5, 2010 |
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D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July 31, 2009 Decision[1]
and the February 11, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31740. The subject decision and
resolution affirmed the August 22, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City (RTC) which,
in turn, affirmed the May 21, 2007 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 2, Batangas City (MTCC).
THE FACTS:
Petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the Treasurer, and Florencio L.
Cabrera, Jr. (now deceased) was the President, of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation
(LNCC), a corporation engaged in money
lending activities.
Between 1996 and 1999, private
respondent Felicisimo S. Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement
transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he invested plus
the interest on his investments. The following checks, signed by Mitra and Cabrera,
were issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.[2]
|
Bank |
Date Issued |
Date of Check |
Amount |
Check No. |
|
Security Bank |
|
|
|
0000045804 |
|
-do- |
|
|
125,000.00 |
0000045805 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000045809 |
|
-do- |
|
|
100,000.00 |
0000045810 |
|
-do- |
|
|
5,000.00 |
0000045814 |
|
-do- |
|
|
200,000.00 |
0000045815 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000045875 |
|
-do- |
|
|
100,000.00 |
0000045876 |
|
-do- |
|
February17, 1999 |
5,000.00 |
0000046061 |
|
-do- |
|
|
5,000.00 |
0000046062 |
|
-do- |
|
|
200,000.00 |
0000046063 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000046065 |
|
-do- |
|
February19, 1999 |
2,500.00 |
0000046066 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000046067 |
|
-do- |
|
|
100,000.00 |
0000046068 |
|
-do- |
|
|
10,000.00 |
0000046070 |
|
-do- |
|
February
20, 1999 |
10,000.00 |
0000046071 |
|
-do- |
|
|
10,000.00 |
0000046072 |
|
-do- |
|
|
10,000.00 |
0000046073 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000046075 |
|
-do- |
|
February
28, 1999 |
2,500.00 |
0000046076 |
|
-do- |
|
|
2,500.00 |
0000046077 |
|
-do- |
|
|
100,000.00 |
0000046078 |
When Tarcelo presented these checks
for payment, they were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the
payment of these checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he caused
the filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22)
in the total amount of P925,000.00 with the MTCC in
After trial on the merits, the MTCC
found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the charges. The fallo of the May
21, 2007 MTCC Decision[4]
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
the accused FLORENCIO I. CABRERA,
JR., and EUMELIA R. MITRA are
hereby found guilty of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and
are hereby ORDERED to respectively pay the following fines for each
violation and with subsidiary
imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency:
1. Criminal
Case No. 43637 - P200,000.00
2. Criminal
Case No. 43640 - P100,000.00
3. Criminal
Case No. 43648 - P100,000.00
4. Criminal
Case No. 43700 - P125,000.00
5. Criminal
Case No. 43702 - P200,000.00
6. Criminal
Case No. 43704 - P100,000.00
7. Criminal
Case No. 43706 - P100,000.00
Said accused, nevertheless, are adjudged civilly
liable and are ordered to pay, in solidum,
private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
SO ORDERED.
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the
Batangas RTC contending that: they signed the seven checks in blank with no
name of the payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; they did not know
when and to whom those checks would be issued; the seven checks were only among
those in one or two booklets of checks they were made to sign at that time; and
that they signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because
they did not regularly hold office there.[5]
The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision and later
denied their motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone
filed this petition for review[6]
claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of the notice of
dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals
dismissed her petition for lack of merit.
Mitra is now before this Court on a
petition for review and submits these issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS
WERE DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE SIGNATORIES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER SERVICE
OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO THE PETITIONER AND THE LATE
FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The
Court denies the petition.
A check is a negotiable instrument
that serves as a substitute for money and as a convenient form of payment in financial
transactions and obligations. The use of
checks as payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed without
the actual handling of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically
count bills and coins whenever payment is made.
It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly
and efficiently. But the convenience
afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect
confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure
public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted
for the specific purpose of addressing the problem of the continued issuance
and circulation of unfunded checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm
caused by these bouncing checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act
of issuing an unfunded check as an offense not only against property but also against
public order.[7] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere
issuance of a bouncing check as malum
prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and
rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.[8] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the
amount of the check or both imprisonment and fine.
Specifically,
BP
22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks
Without Sufficient Funds. — Any person
who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person
who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or
draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company
or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of
such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence
of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Mitra posits in this petition that
before the signatory to a bouncing corporate check can be held liable, all the
elements of the crime of violation of BP 22 must first be proven against the
corporation. The corporation must first be declared to have committed the violation
before the liability attaches to the signatories of the checks.[9]
The Court finds Itself unable to agree
with Mitra’s posture. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads:
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be
liable under this Act." This provision
recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers.
Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory – that the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held
liable for a violation of BP 22. This
provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.
In the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court ruled that the accused was
liable on the unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer of the
corporation. He could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation for
the transaction as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which the check was issued or in
consideration of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this
case, Mitra signed the LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held liable for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a
violation of BP 22 is the drawer’s knowledge that he has insufficient funds or
credit with the drawee bank to cover his check. Because this involves a state
of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22 creates the prima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the
drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the holder
of the check or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check. The service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer the opportunity
to make good the check within those five days to avert his prosecution for
violating BP 22.
Mitra alleges that there was no
proper service on her of the notice of dishonor and, so, an essential element
of the offense is missing. This contention raises a factual issue that is not
proper for review. It is not the function of the Court to re-examine the
finding of facts of the Court of Appeals.
Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of facts
unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or
circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the case[11]
or that the findings of fact have no basis on record. Hence, with respect to
the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of the notice of dishonor, the
Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent findings of the MTCC, the
RTC and the CA.
The defense postulated that there was no demand
served upon the accused, said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive
allegation of the prosecution that a demand letter was served upon the accused
prevails over the denial made by the accused.
Though, having denied that there was no demand letter served on
With the notice of dishonor duly
served and disregarded, there arose the presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew
that there were insufficient funds to cover the checks upon their presentment
for payment. In fact, the account was
already closed.
To reiterate the elements of a
violation of BP 22 as contained in the above-quoted provision, a violation
exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or
for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the full payment of the check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment. [13]
There is no dispute that Mitra signed
the checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been
closed. Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the
checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With
all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal
liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.[14]
WHEREFORE, the
July 31, 2009 Decision and the February 11, 2010 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31740 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring.
[2] Complaint-Affidavits, Rollo, pp. 109-115.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Lozano v.
[8]
[9] Rollo, p. 47.
[10] 337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).
[11] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, 368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
[12] Rollo, p. 133.
[13] Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
[14]
In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807,